







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JAMES

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THE
WORKS
OF
JAMES HARRIS, ESQ.

WITH
AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER,
BY HIS SON
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY LUKE HANSARD,
FOR F. WINGRAVE, SUCCESSOR TO
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
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PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

PHILOSOPHICAL
ARRANGEMENTS.

First published in the Year 1775.

VOL. II.

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PHILOSOPHICAL

ARRANGEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT.

MOST of the Speculations, contained in the following Work, are not the Author's own, but the Speculations of ancient and respectable Philosophers. His employ has been no more, than to exhibit what they taught, which he has endeavoured to do after the best manner he was able. The perusal of old Doctrines may afford perhaps amusement, if it be true (as he has observed in another place), that, what from it's Antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of Novelty.*

If he might ask a favour from his Readers, the favour should be this——that, they would not reject his Work upon a cursory inspection, should it appear in some parts too abstruse, and perhaps in others too obvious. He could not well avoid either the one or the other, without impairing an Arrangement, which had been established for Ages.

* See the Preface to *Hermes*.

ADVERTISEMENT

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If he might use a favour from his Readers, he should be that they would not reject his Work upon a cursory inspection. He is sensible that some parts are not perfect, and perhaps in others too obvious. He could not but be sensible that the work was not perfect. He could not but be sensible that the work was not perfect. He could not but be sensible that the work was not perfect.

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PHILOSOPHICAL

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ARRANGEMENTS,

ADDREST TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THOMAS LORD HYDE CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUTCHY OF LANCASTER, &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

*Introduction—Scope, or end of the Inquiry—Begins from the AR-
RANGEMENT of simple, or single Terms—Character of these Terms
—Nature and Multitude of the Objects, which they represent.*

PHILOSOPHY, taking its name from the *Love of Wisdom*,
and having for its *End* the Investigation of Truth, has an equal
regard both to Practice and Speculation, in as much as *Truth of
every kind is similar and congenial*. Hence we find that some of the
most illustrious *Actors* upon the great Theatre of the World have
been engaged at times in Philosophical Speculation. *Pericles*, who
governed *Athens*, was the Disciple of *Anaxagoras*; *Epaminondas*
spent his youth in the *Pythagorean School*; *Alexander the Great* had
Aristotle for his Preceptor; and *Scipio* made *Polybius* his Companion
and Friend. Why need I mention *Cicero*, or *Cato*, or *Brutus*? The
Orations,

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Orations, the Epistles, and the Philosophical Works of the first, shew him sufficiently conversant both in Action and Contemplation. So eager was *Cato* for Knowledge, even when surrounded with Business, that he used to read Philosophy in the Senate house, while the Senate was assembling: and as for the Patriot *Brutus*, though his life was a continual Scene of the most important Action, he found time not only to study, but to compose a *Treatise upon Virtue*.

WHEN these were gone, and the worst of times succeeded, *Thrasea Pætus*, and *Helvidius Priscus* were at the same period both Senators, and Philosophers; and appear to have supported the severest trials of *Tyrannic Oppression* by the manly system of the *Stoic Moral* *. The best Emperor, whom the *Romans*, or perhaps any Nation, ever knew, *Marcus Antoninus*, was involved during his whole life in business of the last consequence; sometimes Conspiracies forming, which he was obliged to dissipate; formidable Wars arising at other times, when he was obliged to take the field. Yet during none of these periods did he forsake *Philosophy*, but still persisted in *Meditation* †, and in committing his thoughts to writing, during moments gained by stealth from the hurry of courts and campaigns.

If we descend to later ages, and search our own Country, we shall find *Sir Thomas More*, *Sir Philip Sidney*, *Sir Walter Raleigh*,
Lord

* See *Arr. Epictet. lib. i. c. 1. and 2.* and the Notes of my late worthy Friend, the learned Editor, *Upton*. See also *Mrs. Carter's* excellent Translation.

† See the Original, particularly in *Gataker's* Edition. See also the learned and accurate Translation of *Meric Casaubon*.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Milton, Algernon Sidney, Sir William Temple, and many others, to have been all of them eminent in *public Life*, and yet at the same time conspicuous for their *Speculations* and *Literature*. If we look *abroad*, examples of like character will occur in other Countries. *Grotius*, the Poet, the Critic, the Philosopher, and the Divine, was employed by the court of *Sweden* as *Ambassador to France*: and *De Witt*, that acute but unfortunate Statesman, that Pattern of parcimony and political accomplishments, was an able mathematician, wrote upon the *Elements of Curves*, and applied his Algebra with accuracy to the Trade and Commerce of his Country.

AND so much in DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHY against those, who may possibly *undervalue* her, because they have *succeeded without* her; those I mean (and it must be confessed they are many) who, having spent their whole lives in what *Milton* calls the *busy hum of Men*, have acquired to themselves Habits of amazing efficacy, *unassisted* by the helps of *Science* and *Erudition*. To such the *retired Student* may appear an awkward Being, because they want a just standard to measure his merit. But let them recur to the bright examples before alledged; let them remember that these were eminent in their own way; were men of action and business; men of the world; and yet did they not disdain to cultivate *Philosophy*, nay, were many of them perhaps indebted to her for the splendor of their *active Character*.

THIS reasoning has a farther end. It justifies me in the address of these *Philosophical Arrangements*, as your Lordship has been distinguished

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tinguished in *either* character, I mean in your *public* one, as well as in your *private*. Those, who know the History of our *foreign* transactions, know the reputation that you acquired both in *Poland* and in *Germany**: and those, who are honoured with your *nearer* friendship, know that you can *speculate* as well as *act*, and can employ your pen both with Elegance and Instruction.

It may not perhaps be unentertaining to your Lordship to see, in what manner the *Preceptor of Alexander the Great* arranged his *Pupil's* Ideas, so that they might not cause confusion for want of accurate disposition. It may be thought also a fact worthy of your notice, that he became acquainted with this method from the venerable *Pythagoras*, who, unless he drew it from *remoter* sources, to us unknown, was, perhaps, himself its inventor and original teacher (a).

POETS relate that VENUS was wedded to VULCAN, the Goddess of Beauty to the God of Deformity. The Tale, as some explain it, gives

* The Treaty of *Warsaw*, negotiated and signed by Lord *Hyde*, was made in *January*, 1745; that of *Dresden*, made under Lord *Hyde's* Mediation, was signed the *December* following. By this last Treaty, not only the Peace of *Germany* was restored, but the *Austrian Netherlands*, and the King of *Sardinia's* Territories were in consequence of it preserved.

(a) From *Pythagoras* it past to his Disciples, and among others to *Archytas*, who wrote upon the Subject in the *Doric* Dialect, the Dialect generally used by *Pythagoras*, and his Followers. This Treatise of *Archytas*, is in part still extant, tho' but little known, large Quotations out of it being inserted by *Simplicius* into that valuable, but rare Book, his *Commentaries on the Predicaments*, from which many of them are transferred into the Notes upon the different Chapters of this Work.

Fabricius, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, T. i. p. 394, mentions a Tract upon this Subject, published at *Venice* an. 1571, under the name of *Archytas*, but he informs us withal, that its Authenticity is doubted, because the above-mentioned Quotations from *Archytas*, made by *Simplicius*, are not to be found there. This Tract I have never seen.

gives a *double* representation of *Art*; *Vulcan* shewing us the *Progressions* of Art, and *Venus* the *Completions*. The *Progressions*, such as the hewing of Stone, the grinding of Colours, the fusion of Metals, these all of them are laborious, and many times disgusting: the *Completions*, such as the Temple, the Palace, the Picture, the Statue, these all of them are Beauties, and justly call for admiration.

Now if Logic be one of those Arts, which help to improve Human Reason, it must necessarily be an Art of the *progressive* Character; an Art which, not ending with itself, has a view to something farther. If then in the following Speculations it should appear dry rather than elegant, severe rather than pleasing, let it plead by way of defence that, tho' its importance may be great, it partakes from its very nature (which cannot be changed) more of the *deformed God*, than of the *beautiful Goddesses*.

THE subject commences in the manner following.

THE VULGAR can give reasons to a certain degree (*d*), and can examine after a manner, the reasons given them by others.— And what is this, but NATURAL LOGIC? If therefore these Efforts of theirs have an Effect, and nothing happen without a Cause, this Effect must of necessity be derived from certain Principles.

THE

(*d*) Πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. Τῶν μὲν ἔν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ, κ. τ. λ. Omnes enim quadam tenus et exquirere et sustinere rationem, et defendere, et accusare aggrediuntur. At ex imperitâ quidem multitudine alii temerè, &c. Arist. Rhetor. lib. i. cap. 1. See also Vol. the first of these Works, Treatise the third, Note IV.

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THE Question then is, *What these Principles are*; for if these can be once investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by *Rule*, what others do by *Hazard*; and in what we do, as much to excell the uninstructed Reasoner, as a disciplined Boxer surpasses an untaught Rustic.

Now in the investigation of these Principles we are first taught to observe, that every *Science* (as Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy) may be resolved into it's *Theorems*; every *Theorem* into it's *Syllogisms*; every *Syllogism* into it's *Propositions*; and every *Proposition* into certain *simple*, or *single Terms*.

IF this be admitted, it is not difficult to see, that, in order to know Science, a man must know first what makes a Theorem; in order to know Theorems, he must know first what makes a Syllogism; in order to know Syllogisms, he must know first what makes Propositions; and to acquire a general Knowledge of these, he must first know simple or single Terms, since it is out of these that Propositions are all of them compounded.

AND thus we may perceive, that where these several Resolutions end, 'tis hence precisely the disquisition is to *begin* (e). It must
begin,

(e) There is an elegant Simile, taken from Architecture, to illustrate this Speculation. The Quotation from the original Author (*Ammonius*) may be found in the first Volume of these Treatises, Note VIII. to which a Translation is there subjoined.

Ammonius, after he has produced his Similitude, applies it as follows.

begin, where they end, that is to say, from simple Terms; because, if it were to begin sooner, it would begin in the middle; and because if the Resolutions did not stop somewhere, there could be no beginning at all.

Ch. I.

Now

Οὕτως ἔν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ποιεῖ βεβλόμενος γὰρ ποιῆσαι ἀποδείξιν, φησὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, βέλομαι περὶ Ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιστημονικὸς, ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς τὸν μὴ πρότερον εἰπόντα, τί ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς· τὸν δὲ ἀπλῶς συλλογισμὸν ἔκ ἂν μαθοῖμεν, ἢ μαθόντες, τί ἐστὶ πρότασις· λόγοι μὲν γὰρ τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις· τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογὴ ἐστὶν ὁ συλλογισμὸς· ὥστε ἄνευ τῆ γνώσεως τὰς προτάσεις, ἀδύνατον μαθεῖν τὸν συλλογισμὸν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων σύγκειται· ἀλλ' ἐδὲ τὴν πρότασιν, ἄνευ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε πᾶς λόγος. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, καὶ ῥήματα ἄνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων φωνὴ ἐστὶ σημαντικὴ. Δεῖ ἔν πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν εἰπεῖν. Ἐνταῦθα ἔν ἡ θεωρία κατέληξε, καὶ γίνεσθαι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς. Πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις. Εἰθ' ἔτω περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ῥημάτων, καὶ προτάσεως, ἐν τῇ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας· εἴτα περὶ τῆ ἀπλῶς συλλογισμῶν, ἐν τοῖς πρότεροις Ἀναλυτικοῖς· εἰθ' ἔτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως, ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις Ἀναλυτικοῖς. Ἐνταῦθα ἔν τὸ τέλος τῆς πρώτης, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. — *And thus also the Philosopher does: being willing to form a Demonstration, he says to himself, I am willing to speak concerning Demonstration. But, in as much as Demonstration is a Scientific Syllogism, it is impossible to say any thing concerning it, without first saying what is a Syllogism; nor can we learn what is simply a Syllogism, without having first learnt what is a Proposition; for Propositions are certain Sentences; and it is a Collection of such Sentences that forms a Syllogism: so that without knowing Propositions, it is impossible to learn what is a Syllogism, because it is out of these that a Syllogism is compounded. Farther than this, it is impossible to know a Proposition, without knowing Nouns and Verbs, out of which is composed every Species of Sentence; or to know Nouns and Verbs without knowing Sounds articulate, or simple Words, in as much as each of these is a Sound articulate, having a Meaning. It is necessary therefore in the first place to say something concerning simple Words.*

Here then ends the Theory, and it is this, which becomes the Beginning of the Practice, that is, from this last part the Theory is to be carried into execution.)

First therefore (with a view to the practical Part) he dissects concerning simple articulate Sounds in his PREDICAMENTS: after that, concerning Nouns and Verbs, and Propositions, in his Treatise concerning INTERPRETATION: then, concerning Syllogism, simply so called, in his FIRST ANALYTICS: and finally, concerning Demonstration, in his LATTER ANALYTICS. And here is the End of the Practice, which End (as we have shewn above) was the Beginning of the Theory. *Ammon. in Predic. p. 16. ed. 8vo.*

We have made this large Extract from *Ammonius*, not only as it fully explains the Subject of this Treatise, but as it gives a concise, and yet an elegant View of that celebrated Work of *Aristotle*, his ORGANON, and of that just and accurate Order in which its several Parts stand arranged.

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Now as to the Subject, whence the Disquisition is to begin (I mean *the Contemplation of Simple Terms*) 'tis obvious it must be widely different from the several Subjects that precede it. The preceding Subjects, such as Theorems, Syllogisms, Propositions, may all of them be *resolved*, because they are all of them *compound*: But *Terms cannot be resolved*, because they are *simple* or *single*. The most we can do, as their Multitude is large, is to seek after some Method, by which they may be classed or arranged; and if *different* Methods of *Arrangement* occur, then to adopt out of the several that, which appears to be *the best*.

It being therefore adjusted, *from what Subject* we are to begin (namely, from *simple* or *single Terms*) and *after what Manner* we are to begin (namely, by *classing* or *arranging* them) a farther Question occurs before we proceed, and that is, *What is it, that these Terms represent?*

THERE seem but *three* Classes possible, and these three are either WORDS—OR IDEAS—OR THINGS; that is to say, *Individuals*.

Now they cannot represent merely *Words*, for then the Treatise would be *Grammatical*—nor yet merely *Ideas*, for then the Treatise would be *Metaphysical*—nor yet merely *Things* or *Individuals*, for then the Treatise would be *Physical*.

How then shall we decide?—Shall we deny that *simple Terms* represent any one of these? Or shall we rather assume the contrary, and say they represent them *all*?—If so, and this be, as it will appear,

appear, the more plausible Hypothesis, we may affirm of *simple Terms* (the Subject of this Inquiry) that they are *WORDS representing THINGS, through the Medium of our IDEAS* (f).

THAT *this* in fact is their Character, may appear from the many *Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Theorems*, and to these (as *Man* is a Part of Nature) we may add also *Ethical Speculations*, which are occasionally interspersed in the course of this Inquiry (g).

BUT

(f) *Ammonius*, in his excellent Commentary upon these Predicaments of *Aristotle*, informs us there were different Sentiments of different Philosophers as to the Subject, concerning which these *Predicaments* were conversant. Some, as *Alexander of Aphrodisæum*, confined them wholly to *Words*: others, as *Eustathius*, wholly to *Things*: a third set, of which was *Porphyry*, wholly to our *Thoughts or Ideas*. *Ammonius* appears to have supposed that they all erred, and that, not so much in the respective Subjects they adopted, as in the restriction or limitation to one Subject only. For this reason he immediately subjoins—

Οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶ καὶ Ἰαμβλῖχ^{ος}, φασὶν ὡς ἔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ὁ λόγ^{ος}, ἔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, ἔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα, διὰ μέσων νοημάτων—But those, who speak more accurately, of which number *Iamblichus* is one, say that *Aristotle* discourses not upon *Ideas* alone, nor upon *Words* alone, nor upon *Things* alone; but that the SCOPE or END of his *Categoricals*, is, CONCERNING WORDS, SIGNIFYING THINGS, THRO' THE MEDIUM OF OUR THOUGHTS OR IDEAS. *Ammon. in Prædicam.* p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo.

(g) Thus *Boethius*—*Hæc quoque nobis de decem Prædicamentis inspectio, et in Physicâ Aristotelis Doctrinâ, et in Moralis Philosophiæ Cognitione perutilis est; quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit.* *Boeth. in Cat.* p. 113. Edit. fol. Basil.

Ammonius speaks to the same purpose in fuller and more general terms—"Ὅτι δὲ χρησίμῳ ἐστὶ τὸ βιβλίον εἰς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν φιλοσοφίας μέρος, καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν ἐδείξαμεν, ἀνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν ἔκ ἐστι γινώσκειν, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν κοινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα διαίρεται—*that the Book is useful both to the speculative Part of Philosophy, and the Practical, is evident from what has been said, if it be true both that Demonstration, as we have shewn, cannot be known without simple Words, and that THE BOOK ALSO TREATS CONCERNING THOSE COMMON CHARACTERS OR ATTRIBUTES, INTO WHICH ALL BEINGS ARE DIVIDED.* *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 16. Edit. Venet. 8vo.

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BUT to return to our subject, the *Contemplation of Simple Terms*.

As they appear to be *Words*, and not only *Words*, but *Words* which represent *Things* through the medium of our *Ideas*, it may not be improper to observe something upon the several *Objects* thus represented, and that with respect both to their *Nature*, and to their *Multitude*.

As to their *Nature* (without being too philosophically minute), 'tis enough to observe, that some of them are *sensible* *Objects*, and some of them are *intelligible*—that the *sensible* are perceived by our several *Senses*, and make up the *Tribe of external Individuals*—that the *intelligible* are more immediately *our own*, and arise within us, when the *Mind*, by marking what is *common to many Individuals*, forms to itself a *Species*; or, when by marking *what is common to many Species*, it forms to itself a *Genus*.

NOR are these mental Productions the mere efforts of Art, the ingenious inventions of Human Sagacity, but, under the *original* guidance of pure Nature, even Children in their early days *spontaneously* fashion them, and *spontaneously* refer them to *Individuals*, as they occur, saying of this *Individual*, 'tis a Horse; of another, 'tis a Dog; of a third, 'tis a Sparrow (*h*)

IF

(*h*) See *Hermes*, B. III. c. iv. where the Doctrine of *general* or *universal Ideas* is discussed more largely.

See also the *Εισαγωγή*, or Introduction of *Porphyry*, where the Subject of *Genus* and *Species* is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This Tract is usually prefixt to *Aristotle's Logic*.

IF from the *Nature* of these Objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their *Multitude*, we shall find the Genera to be fewer than the Species, and that from this plain reason, because *many* Species are included within *one* Genus. We shall find also the Species to be fewer than the Individuals, and that by parity of reason, because *many* Individuals are included within *one* Species. But as for Individuals themselves, these we shall find to be truly *infinite*; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are incessantly perishing, the new incessantly arising.

YET 'tis *these* that compose that *Universe*, in which we exist; and without knowing something of *these*, we may be considered as living, like the *Cimmerians*, in *Homer*,

Ἡέρι καὶ νέφελῃ κεκαλυμμένοι—*
Cover'd with mist and cloud.

IF, therefore, *all Science* be something *definite* and *steady* (for without this character it would not merit the name), how can it possibly bear relation to *such a Multitude* as this, a multitude in character so truly contrary to it's own, a multitude every where *fleeing*, every where *infinite* and *vague*? How indeed should the *fleeing* be known *steadily*; or how should the *vague* and *infinite* (*i*) be known *definitely*?

As

* Οδυσσ. Α. 15.

(i) INFINITORUM NULLA COGNITIO EST; *infinita namque animo comprehendere nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius Scientiæ fine concluditur: quare INFINITORUM SCIENTIA NULLA EST.* Boeth. in *Præd.* p. 113. Edit. Bas.

Such

Ch. I.

As this can hardly be supposed, 'tis for this reason that **LOGIC**, which is justly called **THE ORGAN (k)**, or **INSTRUMENT of the Sciences**, has for it's *first* Employment to reduce *Infinity*; and this it does by establishing certain definitive **ARRANGEMENTS**, or **CLASSES**, to some of which *all Particulars may be referred*, however numerous, however diversified, the past, the present, the future, all alike.

AND thus we return to *Classing and Arranging*, the Process already suggested to be the proper one.

IT

Such was the doctrine of *Boethius*, who, according to the practice of the age, in which he lived, united the *Platonic* and the *Peripatetic* Philosophies. But *Aristotle* himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ἢ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποσόν τι· τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποιόν τι τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων ἔσων καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἶδέναι τὰ ἐκ τῶν. ἔτω γὰρ εἶδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν. *Arist. Phys. l. i. p.* . Edit. Sylb. If therefore INFINITE, considered as infinite, be UNKNOWABLE, then that which is infinite in Multitude or Magnitude is unknowable as to QUANTITY, and that which is infinite in Form is unknowable as to QUALITY. But the Principles being infinite both in Multitude and in Quality, 'tis impossible to know the Beings derived out of them. For then 'tis we conceive that WE KNOW ANY BEING COMPOSITE, when we know out of WHAT Things, and HOW MANY Things it is compounded.

(k) The *Stoics* held **Logic** to be a *Part* of Philosophy; the *Peripatetics* held it no more than an **ORGAN**, or **INSTRUMENT**; *Plato* held it to be both, as well a *Part* as an *Organ*. His Reasoning, according to *Ammonius* was, as follows. Καθάπερ γὰρ φησιν ὁ ξένης διπλῶς, ὁ μὲν μετρῶν, ὁ δὲ μετράμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν μετρῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, ὁ δὲ μετράμενος μέρος τῆς ὅλης ὑγρᾶς ὡσανύτως καὶ ἡ Λογικὴ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔσα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας, συμβιβασζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας. As the *Quart*, says he, is twofold, one that which measures, the other that which is measured; and as that, which measures, is the *Organ of Mensuration*; that, which is measured, the *Part* of some whole or intire fluid: in like Manner also **Logic**, when taken apart from things, is an *Organ of Philosophy*; when connected with them, is a *Part of Philosophy*.

Thus *Ammonius* on the *Categorics*, p. 8. where we may find also the reasonings both of the *Stoics* and the *Peripatetics*.

It remains to inquire, whether there are more Methods of Arrangement than one; and, if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

Ch. I.

But this will be the Subject of the following Chapter.

THE Method of Arrangement is as follows.

The Methods of Ideas treated up in the human mind, and which, bearing reference to Things, are expressed by Words, may be arranged and distinguished under the following characters. They all denote either SUBSTANCE or ATTRIBUTES, and subdivided into three may be each of them modified under the different characters of UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR, as well before the Principles of Reasoning and Science. Thus Man is an universal substance; a particular One; a particular Attribute; the following, a particular One.

And hence there arises a systematic ARRANGEMENT OF THINGS; an Arrangement of them into SUBSTANCE UNIVERSAL, and SUBSTANCE PARTICULAR; into ATTRIBUTES UNIVERSAL, and ATTRIBUTES PARTICULAR, so being one of which even not only one Word and one Idea, but the innumerable Tribe of Individuals may all of them be reduced (a).

A LARGE

(a) This method may be found in the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where he comes to the actual composition of the *Metaphysics* itself.

CHAP. II.

A Method of Arrangement proposed—rejected, and why—another Method proposed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole.

Ch. II. **O**NE Method of Arrangement is as follows.

THE Multitude of *Ideas* treasured up in the human Mind, and which, bearing reference to *Things*, are expressed by *Words*, may be arranged and circumscribed under the following characters. They all denote either SUBSTANCE or ATTRIBUTE—and *Substance* and *Attribute* may be each of them modified under the different characters of UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR, as best befits the Purposes of Reasoning and Science. Thus *Man is an universal Substance; Alexander, a particular One: Valour, an universal Attribute; the Valour of Alexander, a particular One.*

AND hence there arises a QUADRUPLE ARRANGEMENT OF TERMS; an Arrangement of them into SUBSTANCE UNIVERSAL, and SUBSTANCE PARTICULAR; into ATTRIBUTE UNIVERSAL, and ATTRIBUTE PARTICULAR, to some one of which FOUR not only our *Words* and our *Ideas*, but the innumerable Tribe of *Individuals* may all of them be reduced (*a*).

A LARGE

(*a*) This method may be found in the beginning of *Aristotle's Predicaments*, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the *Predicaments* themselves.

See

A LARGE *Reduction* this, yet a Reduction which may possibly lead us into another Extreme, by rendering that Multitude, which we would confine, *too limited, too abridged*. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this Reduction might not be *enlarged*, and a second and *more perfect Method* than the last be established.

THE World, as we see, is filled with various SUBSTANCES. Each of these possesses its proper *Attributes*, and is at the same time encompassed with certain *Circumstantials*. Not to speak of *intelligible Substances* (which belong rather to *Metaphysics*), *natural Substances* appear all to be *extended*; nor that simply, but under a certain *external Figure*, and *internal Organization*. A Lion and an Oak agree as they are both *extended*; yet have they each a Figure, and Organization *peculiar*. A living Lion and a brazen Lion may have the *same* external Figure, but *within* there is a wide *Difference* from the *possession* of *Organization* on one side, and the *want* of it on the other. If then we call the Attribute of *Extension* QUANTITY, that of *Figure* and *Organization* QUALITY, we may set down these two (I mean *Quantity* and *Quality*) as the two great *essential Attributes* belonging to every Substance, whether natural or artificial.

AGAIN,

See *Aristot. Prædic.* p. 23. *Edit. Sylb.* Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένα κ. τ. λ.

The *Stagirite*, in giving this *quadruple Arrangement*, explains himself not by *Names*, but by *Descriptions*. *Substance universal* he describes, as follows—καθ' ὑποκειμένα τινός λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ' ἕδενί ἐστι—*Attribute particular*, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστὶ, καθ' ὑποκειμένα δὲ ἕδενός λέγεται—*Attribute general*, καθ' ὑποκειμένα τε λέγεται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν—*Substances particular*, ἅτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν, ἅτε καθ' ὑποκειμένα τινός λέγεται.

Those, who would see an explanation of those several *Descriptions*, and why *Aristotle* prefers them to their peculiar *Names*, may consult his *Greek Commentator*, *Ammonius*, and his *Latin one*, *Boethius*, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject.

Ch. II.

AGAIN, every *Substance*, whether natural or artificial, either from *Will* or from *Appetite*, or, where these are wanting, from such *lower Causes* as it's *Figure* or mere *Quantity*, has (in an enlarged use of the Words) a *Power to act*. Thus 'tis through *Will*, that Men study; through *Appetite*, that Brutes eat; through its *Figure*, that the Clock goes; and through its *Quantity*, that the Stone descends. Nor are they only thus capable of *acting*, but also of *being acted upon*, and that too each of them, according to its respective Character. The Mind is acted upon by *Truth*, the Appetite by *Pleasure*, the Clock by a *Spring*, and the Stone by *Gravitation*. Thus then, besides *Quantity* and *Quality*, we have found two other Attributes, common to all *Substances*, and these are ACTION and PASSION.

AGAIN, it often happens when *Substances* are not *present* to us, that we are desirous to know, *when* and *where* they existed. *When*, we asked, lived *Homer*? *Where*, we ask, stood the antient *Memphis*?—In the answer to these Questions we learn the *Time* and *Place*, which *circumscribed* the existence of these Beings. Now as all sensible *Substances* are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the *WHEN*, and the *WHERE*, as two *Circumstantials*, that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more Attributes to the number already established.

FARTHER still, in contemplating *where* things exist, we are often led to consider their *Position*, and that more especially in *living Substances* possessing the Power of Self-Motion. There is a manifest difference between *reclining* and *sitting*; between *sitting* and *standing*; and there are other Circumstances of *Position*, which extend to all
Substances

Substances whatever. And thus must POSITION or SITUATION be subjoined as another different Attribute.

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ADD to this, when *Substances are superinduced upon Substances*, we consider them under the character of *Cloathing* or HABIT. Thus in the strict sense of the word, the Glove, covering our hand, the Shoe our foot, the Coat our Body, are so many Species of *Habit*. By a more *distant* Analogy the Corn may be said to *cloath* the fields, the Woods to *cloath* the Mountains; and by an Analogy still more remote than that, the Sciences and Virtues to be *Habits*, *that cloath the Mind*.

LAST of all, in the variety of *co-existing* Substances and Attributes, there are many *whose very Existence infers the Existence of some other*. Thus in *Substances*, the Existence of *Son* infers that of *Father*; of *Servant*, that of *Master*: in *Quantity*, the Existence of *greater* infers that of *less*; in *Position*, *above* infers *below*; and in the time *When*, *subsequent* has a necessary respect to *prior*. 'Tis when we view things in these *mutual Dependencies*, in these *reciprocal Inferences*, that we discover another Attribute, the *Attribute of RELATION*.

AND thus instead of confining ourselves to the simple Division of SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE, we have divided ATTRIBUTE itself into NINE distinct sorts; some of which we have considered as *essential*, others as *circumstantial*, and thus made upon the whole (*by setting Substance at their Head*) TEN COMPREHENSIVE AND UNIVERSAL GENERA, called, with reference to their *Greek* name, CATEGORICS;

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CATEGORICS; with reference to their *Latin* name, PREDICAMENTS; and styled in the Title of this Work, PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS (*b*). When enumerated (*c*), their several Names are in order, as they follow; SUBSTANCE, QUALITY, QUANTITY, RELATION, ACTION, PASSION, WHEN, WHERE, POSITION, and HABIT.

As each of these ten Predicaments has it's subordinate distinctions, the Basis of our Knowledge will be now so amply widened, that we shall find Space sufficient, on which to build, be our Plan diversified, and extensive, as it may.

WE

(*b*) The antients gave to these ARRANGEMENTS different Names, and made also the Number of them different. Some, as *Archytas*, called them καθόλα λόγοι, *universal Denominations*; others, as *Quintilian*, Elementa, *Elements*; others, as *Aristotle*, σχήματα κατηγορίας, *Figures, or Forms of Predication*; κατηγορίαι, *Predicaments*; γένη γενικώτατα, *the most general or comprehensive Genera*, τὰ πρῶτα γένη, *the primary Genera*. They differed also as to their Number. Some made them two, *Subject* and *Accident*, or (which is the same) *Substance* and *Attribute*; others made them three, dividing *Accidents* into the *inherent* and *circumstantial*; the *Stoics* held them to be four, ὑποκείμενα, ποῖα, πῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα, *Subjects, things distinguished by Qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else*; *Plato* said they were five, εἶς, ταυτότης, ἑτερότης, κίνησις καὶ ἡσυχία, *Substance, Identity, Diversity, Motion, Rest*; others made seven; lastly, the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, maintained the Number usually adopted, that is to say, those ten which make the Subject of this Treatise.

See *Aristot. Prædic.* p. 24, et *Metaphys.* p. 79, 100, 104, &c. *Edit. Sylburg.* *Quintil.* l. iii. c. 6. *Ammon. in Prædicam.* p. 16, 17, &c. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo. 1545. *Simplic. in Prædicam.* p. 16. *V. Edit. Basil. Fol.* 1551.

As *Words*, by signifying *Things*, through the Medium of our *Ideas*, are essential to *Logic*, and are the Materials of every Proposition, the present Work may be called *Logical*. But as the Speculations extend to *Physics*, to *Ethics*, and even to the *First Philosophy*, they become for that reason something more than *Logical*, and have been called, with a view to this their comprehensive Character, not *Logical*, but PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

(*c*) Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενων, ἕκαστον ἥτοι εἰς αὐτὴν σημαίνει, ἢ ποσὸν, ἢ ποιὸν, ἢ πρὸς τι, ἢ πᾶν, ἢ ποτὲ, ἢ κείσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν, ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν. *Aristot. Præd.* p. 24. *Edit. Sylb.* The passage needs no other translation, than what appears in the Text.

WE cannot conclude this Chapter without observing, that the doctrine of these CATEGORIES, these PREDICAMENTS, these PRIMARY GENERA, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, is a valuable, a copious, and a sublime *Theory*; a *Theory*, which, when well understood, leads by *Analogy* from things *sensible* to things *intelligible*; from *Effect* to *Cause*; from that which is *passive*, *unintelligent*, and *subordinate*, to that which is *active*, *intelligent*, and *supreme*; a *Theory*, which prepares us not only to study every thing *else* with advantage, but makes us knowing withal in one respect, where *particular* studies are sure to fail; knowing in the *relative* value of things, when *compared* one to another; and modest, of course, in the estimate of our own accomplishments*.

Ch. II.
}

THIS is in fact the *necessary* consequence of being shewn *to what Portion of Being every Art or Science belongs*, and how *limited that Portion*, when *compared* to what *remains*. The want of this *general* knowledge leads to an effect the very reverse; so that men, who possess it not, though profoundly knowing in a *single Art* or a *single Science*, are too often carried by such *partial* Knowledge to a blameable *Arrogance*, as if *the rest* of mankind were busied in *pursuits of no value*, and *themselves* the *monopolizers of Wisdom and of Truth*.— But this by the way.

THE *distinct* discussion of each one of these *Categories*, *Predicaments*, *Arrangements*, or *Genera*, will become the business of the following Chapters; which discussion, joined to what has been *already*

* See the last Chapter of this Treatise, near the end.

Ch. II. *already* premised, as well as to such *future* inquiries, as shall naturally arise in consequence, will include all we have to offer upon this *interesting subject* (d).

As for PROPOSITIONS, which have for their materials *the simple Terms*, here enumerated; and for SYLLOGISMS, which have for their materials *the several Species of Propositions*; both these naturally make *subsequent* and *distinct* Parts of LOGIC, and must therefore be consigned to some future Speculation.

If we go back farther, and recur to *Theorems of Science*, or to *Sciences* themselves, these will be found *not properly Parts of Logic*, but works of a *different* and *higher* character; works, where Logic serves the Philosopher for an *Instrument* or *Organ*, as the Chizze! serves the Statuary, the Pencil serves the Painter.

At present we are to proceed to the Speculation concerning SUBSTANCE.

(d) The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three *τμήματα*, or Sections, calling the first Section, *τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the second, *τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the third, *τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας*. Ammon. in *Prædic.* p. 146.

The Latins, adhering to the same Division, coined new names, *Anti-prædicamenta*, or *Præ-prædicamenta*; *Prædicamenta*; and *Post-prædicamenta*. Sanderson, p. 22, 51, 55. Edit. Oxon. 1672.

In the present Work, the first Section begins from Chapter the first; the second Section, from Chapter the third; the third Section, from Chapter the fifteenth. Of these Sections, the second (which discusses the Predicaments, or Philosophical Arrangements) makes the *real* and *essential* part of the Speculation: the first and third Sections are only *subservient* to it; the first to prepare, the third to explain.

C H A P. III.

Concerning SUBSTANCE natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increased to three—reduced again to two—these last two, Form and a Subject, or rather Form and Matter.

TO explain how natural SUBSTANCES *originally* began, is a task too arduous for unassisted Philosophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been *continued*, is a work better suited to *Human* abilities; because to a portion of this Continuity we are *personally present*, nay within it we ourselves are all included, as so many *parts*.

Ch. III.

Now as to the manner, in which subsists the *Continuity* of natural Substances, and as to the Causes (*a*) by which that Continuity is maintained;

(*a*) The Doctrine of *Causes*, and their different Species, is treated at large in the first volume of these Miscellanies, through the whole Treatise upon *Art*, and in the Notes subjoined to the same, particularly Note xvii.

The Author desires to inform his Readers, that in the subsequent disquisitions he hath not confined himself merely to *Logic*, but has interspersed many Speculations of different kinds; acting in this view differently from the Model set him by the *Stagirite*. The *Stagirite* left no Part of Philosophy unexplored, and of course had *separate* and *distinct* Treatises for *Logic*, *Physics*, and the many other Branches of Science, as well the practical, as the speculative. Not so the Author of this Treatise: he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehensive variety of that sublime and acute Genius, whose writings made him for more than two thousand years the admiration of *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Arabians*, *Jews*, and *Christians*. Such esteem could not have been the effect either of Fashion, or of Chance.

Ch. III.

maintained; there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every Birth, every recent Production, that daily happens in the Universe, to be an absolutely fresh Creation; a realizing of Non-entity; an Evocation (if it may be so described) of something out of nothing.—What then is it?—'Tis a *Change* or *Mutation* out of Something, which was *before*. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural Substances are *continued*, is to inquire what are the Principles of *Mutation* or *Change*.

FIRST, then, let us observe, what is in fact most obvious, that there can be no Mutation or Change, were every thing to remain precisely *one* and the *same*; hot and cold, precisely as they are, one hot, the other cold; so likewise crooked and strait; black and white, &c. On the contrary, Mutation or Change is from one thing into another (*b*), from hot into cold, or from cold into hot; from strait into crooked, or from crooked into strait; and so in other instances. It follows hence, that the *Principles* of Mutation or Change are necessarily Two; one, a Principle, *OUT* of which; the other, a Principle *INTO* which.

AGAIN, these two Principles are not merely casual and temerarious (*c*). Hot changes not into Crooked, but into Cold; Crooked not

(*b*) Thus *Aristotle*—Πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστὶν ἐκ τινος εἰς τι. He then subjoins the *Etymology* of the word μεταβολή, to confirm his doctrine—δηλοῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. MET' ἄλλο γὰρ τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ, τὸ δ' ὕστερον. *Even the Name* (says he) *shews it*; for 'tis SOMETHING AFTER SOMETHING ELSE; and one of these things denotes prior, the other denotes subsequent. *Physic. lib. v. c. 1. p. 95. Edit. Sylb.*

(*c*) Thus the same Author—Ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἕδεν ἕτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἕτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχόν ὑπὸ τῶ τυχόντες, ἕδε γίνεσθαι ὅτιον ἐξ ὅτουεν—ἀλλὰ λεῦκον μὲν γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἑ λεύκη, καὶ τέτε ἐκ ἐκ πάντος, παντός,

not into Cold, but into Strait; White not into Moist, but into Black; Moist not into Black, but into Dry. The same holds in other instances more (*d*) complicated. The becoming a Statue is a Change from *indefinite* Configuration into *definite*; the becoming a Palace, a Change from Disperſion into Combination, from Disorder into Order. Already the Principles, which we inveſtigate, have appeared to be *Two*; and now it further appears that they muſt be CONTRARIES (*e*) or OPPOSITES.

AUTHORITY is not wanting to countenance this laſt poſition. The Scripture (*f*) tells us, that *the Earth* in the beginning *was without form, and void, and darkneſs was upon the face of the deep*. After this
it

παντός, ἀλλ' ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ, καὶ μῆσιόν κ. τ. λ. *Universally with regard to all Beings whatever, no one Being is formed by Nature either to act upon any other indifferently, or to be acted upon indifferently; nor is any thing produced or generated [indiscriminately] out of any thing—but white is generated or produced out of something Not white; and this, not every thing that may be ſo called, but either out of Black, or ſome of the intermediate Colours. The ſame holds as to the production of what is Muſical, &c. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 5. p. 14. Edit. Syllb.*

(*d*) Καὶ τὰ μὴ ἀπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ σύνθετα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον—ἥτε γὰρ οἰκία γίνεται ἐκ τῆ μὴ ſυμκείμεναι, ἀλλὰ διηρησθαι ταδὶ ὡδί· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρία καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσις τίς ἐστίν. *Beings too, which are not ſimple, but compoſite, admit the ſame reaſoning—for the Houſe is formed from certain Materials, which are not previously ſo compounded [as to make a Houſe], but which lie ſeparate; and the Statue, and every one of thoſe things, which have Figure given them, are formed out of ſomething, which wants that Figure; and each Production has a different Name, ſometimes 'tis ORDER, ſometimes 'tis COMPOSITION. Ariſt. Phyſ. l. i. c. 5. p. 14, 15.*

(*e*) See the ſame Author in the ſame Treatiſe, p. 11, 12, &c. See alſo the Quotation in the Text from Scripture, which immediately follows, as well as the ſubſequent Notes.

(*f*) *Genesis*, chap. i.

Ch. III. it became *enlightened*, as well as *replenished*; replenished with various *Forms* both Vegetable and Animal; *enlightened* by the sublime Command of, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT. In the whole of this Progress we may remark CONTRARIETY; *Formless* opposed to *Form*; *Void* to *Replenished*; and *Darkness* to *Light*.

AMONG the ancient Philosophers, some held the Principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a more abstracted way, to be Excess and Defect; Even and Odd; Friendship and Strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on Action and Re-action; Attraction and Repulsion; Expansion and Condensation; Centripetal and Centrifugal; to which may be added those two Principles held by many Ancients as well as Moderns, the Principles of Atoms and a Void (*g*), which two stand opposed nearly as *Being* and *Non-being*.

WE shall subjoin the following passage from a Treatise of ancient date, because in it the Force of Contraries is exemplified with elegance.

“ Some (says an ancient Author) (*h*) have wondered how the
“ World, if it be composed, as it appears, out of CONTRARY PRIN-
“ CIPLES

(*g*) Democritus, says Aristotle, holds THE SOLID and the VOID, τὸ στερεὸν καὶ κενόν, to be PRINCIPLES, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὡς ὄν, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐκ ὄν εἶναι φησι, of which he says the one is the same as BEING, the other the same as NON-BEING. See *Arist. Phys.* l. i. c. 5. p. 13. See also c. 4. p. 11. where the other Contraries are explained at large.

(*h*) See the Treatise Περὶ κόσμου—It is given to Aristotle, and always makes a part of his Works; but although it be of genuine antiquity, and truly sublime, both in language

“ CIPLES (*the Dry, the Moist, the Cold, and the Hot*) has not for
 “ ages ago been ruined and destroyed. As if indeed men should
 “ wonder how a City could subsist, composed (*as it is*) out of contrary
 “ Tribes (*I mean the Poor and the Opulent, the Young and the Aged,*
 “ *the Weak and the Strong, the Good and the Bad*), and be ignorant
 “ that this of all things is most admirable in Political Concord; I
 “ mean, that by admitting every Nature and every Fortune, it forms
 “ out of MANY dispositions ONE disposition; and out of Dissimilar
 “ ones, a Similar. Perhaps also NATURE herself has an affection for
 “ CONTRARIES, and chooses out of these to form the Consonant, and
 “ not out of things similar; so that in the same manner as she associated
 “ the Male to the Female, and not each to it's own Sex, did she
 “ establish through Contraries, and not Similar, the first and original
 “ Concord. ART too, in imitation of Nature, appears to do the same.
 “ Thus Painting, by blending the Natures of things white and black,
 “ pale and red, produces Representations consonant to their originals.
 “ Thus Music, by mixing together Sounds that are sharp and flat, that
 “ are long and short, out of different voices produces one Harmony.
 “ Thus Grammar, by forming a mixture out of Vowels and Mutes,
 “ through these hath established the whole of it's Art. And this is
 “ what

language and sentiment, yet some have thought it of a later period, and not written
 in the close manner and style of *Aristotle*. A Translation of it is extant, as old as by
 the Philosopher *Apuleius*, besides other Translations more modern. The Tract itself
 stands the fifth in the volume of *Aristotle's Physical Pieces*, according to *Sylburgius's*
 edition, and the passage here translated may be found, *cap. 5. page 12.* of that edition,
 beginning at the Words, *Καί τοι γέ τις ἐθαύμασε πῶς ποίε εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων κ. τ. λ.* In *Apuleius*
 the words are, *Et quibusdam mirum videri solet, quod, cum ex diversis, &c.* p. 731. Edit.
in Usum Delphini. Quarto.

See *Fabricius's Biblioth. Græc.* T. ii. p. 127. where the learned Author, with his usual
 labour and accuracy, has collected all the sentiments both of Antients and Moderns on
 this valuable work.

Ch. III. *“ what appears to have been the meaning of that obscure Philosopher
 “ Heraclitus. You are, says he, to connect the Perfect and the Im-
 “ perfect, the Agreeing and the Disagreeing, the Consonant and the
 “ Dissonant; and OUT OF ALL THINGS, ONE; AND OUT OF ONE,
 “ ALL THINGS.”*

THUS far this ingenious Author, with regard to whose doctrine, as well as that of the many others already mentioned, we cannot but remark, that whatever may have caused such an *Unanimity* of opinion, whether it were that men adopted it from one another by a sort of Tradition, or were insensibly led to it by the latent force of Truth; *all* Philosophers, of *all* ages, appear to have favoured CONTRARIETY, and given their sanction to the Hypothesis, that PRINCIPLES ARE CONTRARIES (*i*).

BUT farther still—’*Tis impossible for Contraries to co-exist, in the same place, at the same instant.* ’*Tis impossible, for example, that in the same place and instant should co-exist Cold and Hot; Crooked and Strait; Dispersion and Combination; Disorder and Order. As therefore the Principles of Change are Contraries, and Contraries cannot co-exist, it follows that one Principle must necessarily depart, as the other accedes. Thus in the Mutation out of Disorder into Order, when the Principle INTO WHICH, that is Order, accedes,*
the

(*i*) Πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καλυμμένας ἀρχάς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὁμῶς τὰναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. For ALL Philosophers hold the Elements and those other Causes, which they call PRINCIPLES (though they suppose them without giving a reason) to be CONTRARIES, compelled as it were to do so by Truth itself. *Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 15*

the Principle OUT OF WHICH, that is *Disorder*, departs. The same Ch. III.
happens in all other Instances.

A QUESTION then arises. If one of them necessarily depart, as soon as the other accedes, how can Nature possibly maintain *the Continuity* of her Productions? To *depart*, is to be no more, a sort of Annihilation, or *Death*; to *accede*, is to *pass into Being*, a sort of Production or *Birth*. They cannot co-exist, because they are absolutely incompatible (*k*); so that upon this Hypothesis *there can be no Continuity* at all, but every *new* Production must be a realizing of Non-entity, a fresh and genuine Evocation of something out of nothing.

IF this in the *Continuity* of Beings appear a difficulty, let us try, whether we can remove it by any aid not yet suggested. Crooked, we are told, is changed into Strait, *a Contrary into a Contrary*; one of which necessarily *departs*, and the other *accedes*. We admit it.—But is there not *Something*, which during the Change, *neither* departs *nor* accedes? Something which REMAINS, and is all along still ONE and the SAME (*l*).

THE

(*k*) Τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον, ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις, πῶς ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότηα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ αὐτὴ τὴν πυκνότηα ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὅποιαν ἔναντιότης. *That we should not make TWO PRINCIPLES only, has some appearance of reason: for a man may well doubt, how Density should be formed by nature to make Rarity, or this last, Density; and so in like manner with respect to any other Contrariety whatever. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16.*

Simplicius well observes—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν εἰς ὑπομένον τι ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ἔχ' ὑπομένει τὸ ἐναντίον—*That, which acts, acts upon something which remains; but CONTRARY DOES NOT REMAIN and wait for Contrary. Simpl. in Præd. p. 43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

(*l*) Καὶ τῶτα ὁρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἦν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀπαντα, ἐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι, καὶ τῶτα θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· ἔ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς.

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THE Stick, for example, changes from Crooked into Strait, and if there was not a *Stick*, or *something analogous*, no such Change could be effected. Yet is it *less a Stick* for becoming Strait; or was it *more so*, when Crooked? Does it not remain (*m*), considered as a Stick,

εἰς ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δὴλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τέτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν.—*And this is rightly said by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of ONE thing, it would not be possible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another; for example, that, what is hot, should become cold; or reciprocally, that this should become hot; for 'tis not the Heat or the Coldness, which change into one another, but 'tis that evidently changes, which is the SUBJECT of these Affections: whence it follows that in those things, where there is acting, and being acted upon, 'tis necessary there should belong to them some ONE Nature, their COMMON SUBJECT. Arist. de Gener. et Cor. lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. Edit. Sylb.*

Aristotle, who gives this quotation, well remarks, that it was too much to affirm this of *all* things, but that it should be confined to such things only as *reciprocally act, and are acted upon*; and so in his Comment we may perceive he restrains them.

See more of this ONE Being, the *common Subject*, or *Substratum*, in the following Chapter.

The *Diogenes* here mentioned was a contemporary of *Anaxagoras*, and lived many years before the *Cynic* of the same name. See *Diog. Laert.* ix. 57.

(*m*) Ὅτι δὲ αἰεί τι ὑποκείσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ τῷτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἓν, ἀλλ' εἶδει γε ἕχ' ἓν. (τὸ γὰρ εἶδει λέγω, καὶ λόγῳ ταυτόν.) ἔ' γὰρ ταῦτόν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἄμυσῳ εἶναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἕχ' ὑπομένει· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὑπομένει· (ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρωπῶς ὑπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἄμυσον ἕχ' ὑπομένει. 'Tis necessary that in every Production there should be a Subject [or a Substratum], and this, though One numerically, yet not One in Form (I mean, by One in Form, the same as One in Reason, in Detail, or Definition). Thus 'tis not the same thing to be a Man, and to be a Being Immusical, or Void of musical Art. [In the formation of a Musician] the one remains, the other remains not; the Subject or Substratum remains (for Man remains); the being Immusical, or Void of musical Art, remains not [for that is lost, as soon as he becomes an Artist.] *Arist. Phys.* l. i. c. 7. p. 18. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Production*, or *Formation* here spoken of, means the becoming a Musician by the acquisition of the musical Art. The same reasoning may be applied to any *other* Art or Science, which Man, as *Man*, is capable of acquiring.

Again, the same Philosopher—Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἕχ' ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τὶ τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία. Add to this (says he) there is SOMETHING [in productions of all kinds] WHICH REMAINS; but the Contrary does not remain; there is therefore some THIRD thing over and above the Contraries. *Metaph.* A. p. 196. *Edit. Sylb.*

If there appear a difficulty in the first quotation of this note, concerning a Subject being One numerically, but not so in Form, or Character, see Note on the word *Privation*, in the first part of the following Chapter.

Stick, *precisely*, in either case, *one and the same*? As therefore the Stick is to Crooked and Strait, so is the Bar of Iron to Hot and Cold; the Brafs of the Statue to Figure and Deformity; the Stones of the Palace to Order and Confusion; and *something, analogous* in other Changes, *to other Contraries, not enumerated*.

If therefore we were right in what we asserted before, and are so in what we assert now; it should seem that THE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE OR MUTATION WERE THREE (*n*); ONE, *that which departs*; ANOTHER, *that which accedes*; and a THIRD, *that which remains*. Take an example or two from Man. *The healthful departs; the morbid accedes; the Body remains. The morbid departs; the healthful accedes; the Body remains.* 'Tis thus we change reciprocally as well to better, as to worse.

It may be observed of these *three* Principles, that *two* of them, being Contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare:

Haud bene conveniunt, nec in unâ sede morantur——

the

(*n*) Διόπερ, εἴ τις τὸν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσσειεν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τῆτον ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτὰς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον.—If any one therefore think the former Reasoning, and the present Reasoning, to be each of them true; 'tis necessary, in order to preserve both of them intire and unimpeached, to lay down and establish some THIRD PRINCIPLE.

He soon after adds—τὸ μὲν ἔν τρία φάσαι τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ἕκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖσι δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. To say therefore that the ELEMENTS [or Principles of Things] are THREE, may appear to have some foundation to those, who speculate from these and other Reasonings of like sort. *Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 6. p. 16, 17. Edit. Sylb.*

And again more explicitly in his *Metaphysics*—Τρία δὲ τὰ αἷτια, καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί· δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντιώσις (ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ σέρησις) τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.—Wherefore the Causes of Things are THREE, and the Principles are THREE; two, the CONTRARIETY (of which Contrariety one part is the DEFINITION and FORM; the other part, the PRIVATION); and the third Principle, the MATTER. *Metaph. A. p. 197. Edit. Sylb.*

Ch. III. the *third*, like a neutral Power, preserves an intercourse with both, and sometimes associates with one, and sometimes with the other. It may be observed also of the two *hostile* or *contrary* Principles, that one of them appertains *for the most part* to the *better* Co-arrangement (*o*) of things, and one to the *baser*; to the *better* appertains Figure; to the *baser*, Deformity; to the *better*, Order; to the *baser*, Confusion; to the *better*, Health; to the *baser*, Disease. Now if we call those of the better Tribe by the common name of FORM, and those of the other Tribe by the common name of PRIVATION (*p*), distinguishing the neutral Principle withal by the name of SUBJECT, we shall then find *the three Principles of Mutation, or Change*, to be FORM, PRIVATION, and a SUBJECT.

OF these *three*, if we compare FORM to PRIVATION, we shall find FORM to be *definite* and *simple*; PRIVATION to be *infinite* and *vague*.

(*o*) CO-ARRANGEMENT.—So I here ventured to translate the word Συνοικία, or Συνοικεία, for it is written both ways in *Aristotle*. See *Metaph.* l. i. c. 5. p. 13. l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Pythagoreans*, observing through the world a difference in things as to *better* and *worse*, and that this difference often led to a sort of *Contrariety* or *Opposition*, arranged them into two *Classes*, a *better* Class and a *worse*; and, placing the two *Classes* by the side of each other, called them συνοικία, or Co-arrangements. In the *better* Class they put *Unity, Bound, Friendship, Good, &c.*; in the other they put *Multitude, Boundless, Strife, Evil, &c.* Some of this school limited the Number, others left it indefinite, considering all things *as double, one against another*, according to the Language of *Ecclesiasticus*, chap. xxxiii. v. 14, 15. and chap. xlii. v. 24.

See (besides the quotations mentioned already) *Ethic. Nicom.* l. i. c. 6. p. 15. *Edit. Oxon.* 1716. and *Eustratii Com. in Ethic. Nic.* p. 13. B.

(*p*) Τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ ἐτέρα συνοικία, ἑξήσεις.—The OTHER CO-ARRANGEMENT of Contraries is PRIVATION. *Aristot. Metaph.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb.*

By the word *other*, he means the *baser* and subordinate Class, to which Class he gives the common name of PRIVATION, as including all the Genera therein enumerated, *Strife, Evil, &c.* And hence it is, that Privation is in this Treatise soon after called *infinite and vague*; for τὸ ἄπειρον, *Infinite*, made one in this *baser* Arrangement. See *Blemmidæ Epitom. Physic.* p. 60. *Philop. in Arist. Phys.* lib. i. *sub fin.*

vague. Thus *there* are *infinite* ways of being *diseased*, though but one of being healthy; *infinite* ways of being *vicious*, though but one of being virtuous (*q*).

SHOULD it be asked, how PRIVATION is ONE, having this *infinite* and *vague* Character; we may answer, because as *Privation*, it is nothing more than the simple *Absence* of that *Form*, to which it is opposed. Thus to be *diseased* (though the ways are *infinite*) is nothing more than the *Absence* of *Health*; to be *vicious*, (though the ways are *infinite*) nothing more than the *Absence* of *Virtue*.

AND hence, perhaps, it may be possible to reject PRIVATION for a Principle, and supply it's place, when wanted, by it's Opposite, that is to say FORM; not however by the specific Form then actually tending to existence, but by every other congenial Form, of which this Specific Form is the Privation. Thus in the producing of the Sphere, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Pyramid, or of any Figure, besides the Sphere, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that Harmony called the Diapason, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Diapente, or of any other Tensions, besides those of the Octave, be they consonant or dissonant. 'Tis certain that by such a reciprocal acceding and receding of all possible Forms, by such an Absence and Presence (*r*),
by

(*q*) Ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. Theognis.

(*r*) — Ἰκανὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ ἀπυσίᾳ καὶ παρυσίᾳ τὴν μεταβολήν. — One of the two Contraries (that is to say FORM) will be sufficiently able, by it's ABSENCE and it's PRESENCE, to effect Mutation. Aristot. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 20. Edit. Syll.

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by such a continued Revolution and periodical Succession, supposing a proper SUBJECT *withal* to receive and give them up, we may conceive how Changes may be performed, and new Substances produced, though (as we have said already) the Principle of Privation were to be withdrawn. No harm accrues to the Doctrine from a supposition like this; only, if we admit it, we again reduce the PRINCIPLES from

On this passage, *Themistius* thus comments.—Having inserted the words above quoted, he subjoins—ὥστε τὸ Εἶδος τὴν χώραν ἀποπληροῖ καὶ τῆς Στερήσεως· ἡ γὰρ Στέρησις ἐ φύσις τις καὶ Εἶδος ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀπασία τῷ Εἶδει. So that the FORM supplies also the place of the PRIVATION; for the PRIVATION is itself no particular Nature or Form, but rather THE ABSENCE OF THE FORM [which is then passing into existence]. *Themist. in Arist. Phys.* p. 21. B. Edit. Ald.

Simplicius on this occasion explains himself as follows—ἐ μέντοι ἡξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεῖναι τὴν Στέρησιν καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν μὴ ὄν, διότι ἀπασία μόνον ἐστὶ τῷ πεφυκότῳ, ἐδὲν ἄλλο ἐαυτῇ συνεισάγασα· ἡρεσέθη δὲ τῷ Εἶδει μόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς, τῇ παρυσίᾳ τῇ ἐαυτῷ καὶ τῇ ἀπασίᾳ δυναμένῳ τὴν γενεσὶν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀποδιδόναι.—*Aristotle* has not deigned to place among the Elements [of Natural Productions] PRIVATION, and that Mode of Non-being, which is consonant to it; because Privation is no more than the Absence of the thing produced, introducing along with itself no other particular Attribute. He himself also has been satisfied with the FORM alone, as being able by it's PRESENCE and it's ABSENCE to effect both Generation and Dissolution. *Simplic. in Aristot. Phys.* lib. i. p. 54. Edit. Ald. Fol. 1526.

Perhaps *Simplicius* alludes to what *Aristotle* says in the following passage.—Ἡ δὲ γε μορφή καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στερήσις εἶδος πως ἐστίν. The Terms FORM and NATURE have a double meaning: for in one Sense even PRIVATION is FORM. *Physic. Aristot.* l. ii. c. 1.

Philoponus gives a pertinent instance to explain, how PRIVATION may be FORM. He tells us—ἡ γὰρ Λύδιος ἀρμονία γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμονίας τῆς Λυδίας· ἀλλ' ἡ Λύδιος ἀναρμονία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγιος ἀρμονία, ἢ ἑτέρα τις· δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀναρμονία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὅπως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τῷτο ποικίλως ἄλλῃ ἄλλως ἐπιτεταμένων μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνεκμένων.—The Lydian Mode or Harmony is made out of Lydian Dissonance [that is, before the strings of a Lyre were tuned to that Mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, Lydian Dissonance]. Now Lydian Dissonance may be the Phrygian Mode or Harmony, or it may be any other of the Modes [Doric, Ionic, &c.]; it may also be simply the Dissonance of the Strings under any casual tension, and that in various and different ways, either as they are more stretched, or more relaxed [that is, either sharper or flatter.] *Philop. in Physic.* l. i. p. 45.

This shews that the Phrygian Mode in this example, though clearly a Form of Harmony, is nevertheless, when referred to the Lydian Mode, as much a Privation, as any casual Tension of the Strings, totally void of all Concord.

from THREE to TWO; not however the *former two*, those that exist in CONTRARIETY, for now we adopt the more *amicable* ones, those of a FORM and a SUBJECT (*t*), or (if we take *Matter* in it's proper meaning) those of FORM and MATTER. Ch. III.

'Tis in these we behold the *Elements* of those *composite* Beings, NATURAL SUBSTANCES. The Disquisition makes it expedient to confider each of the two apart, and this we shall therefore do by beginning with MATTER.

(*t*) This is implied in the words—'Οτι γίνεται ἅπαν ἐκ τε τῆς ὑποκειμένης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς. *That every thing is made or produced out of a SUBJECT and a FIGURE. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 7. p. 19.*

FIGURE, Μορφή, means the same with Εἶδος, FORM; ὑποκείμενον, SUBJECT, means the same with ὕλη, MATTER. See the Treatise just quoted, particularly towards the conclusion of the first Book.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning MATTER—An imperfect Description of it—it's Nature, and the Necessity of it's existence, traced out and proved—first by Abstraction—then by Analogy—Illustrations from Mythology.

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MATTER is that Elementary Constituent in composite Substances, which appertains in COMMON (a) to them all, without distinguishing them from one another.—But 'tis fitting to be more explicit.

EVERY thing generated or made, whether by Nature or Art, is generated or made out of *something else*; and this *something else* is called it's SUBJECT or MATTER. Such is Iron to the Saw; such is Timber to the Boat.

Now

(a) If we compare the beginning of this Chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though MATTER and FORM are the ELEMENTS, or *inherent Parts* of every composite Substance, yet they essentially differ, in as much as *Matter* being COMMON, *Form* PECULIAR, *Form* gives every such Substance it's Character, while *Matter* gives it none.

Thus Philoponus—κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ [τὸ Εἶδος scil.] χαρακτηρίζονται τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην ἕδεν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι.—By FORM things are characterised; by MATTER they differ not one from another. Com. in Phys. Arist. p. 55. d.—And soon after—διότι αὐτὸ χαρακτηριστικόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκάστης οὐσίας· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη, κοινή.—This [that is, the FORM] is CHARACTERISTIC of every Being's Essence; for as to the MATTER, it is COMMON [and runs through all.]

Ammonius says expressly—ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη κοινότηας ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δὲ Εἶδος διαφορᾶς.—MATTER with regard to things is the Cause of their general COMMUNITY, or COMMON NATURE; FORM, the Cause of their peculiar DIFFERENCE. Ammon. in Cat. p. 25. B.

Now this *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing, being *necessarily previous* to that thing's existence, is *necessarily different* from it, and *not the same*. Thus Iron, as Iron, is *not* a Saw; and Timber, as Timber, is *not* a Boat. Hence then one character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, that is, the Character of NEGATION or PRIVATION.

AGAIN, though the *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing be not that thing, yet were it incapable of becoming so, it could not be called its *Subject* or *Matter*. Thus Iron is the *Subject* or *Matter* of a Saw, because, though *not* a Saw, it may still *become* a Saw. On the contrary, Timber is *not* the *Subject* or *Matter* of a Saw, because it not only (as Timber) is *no* Saw, but can never be made one, from its very nature and properties. Hence then, besides *Privation*, another Character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, and that is the Character of APTITUDE or CAPACITY.

AGAIN, when *one* thing is the *Subject* or *Matter* of *many* things, it implies a *Privation* of them *all*, and a *Capacity* to them *all* (b).

Thus

(b) PRIVATION and CAPACITY are essential to every thing, which bears the name of MATTER; and this is the meaning of the following passage — *Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο* — The SUBJECT or MATTER is ONE numerically, but in character it is Two, that is to say, Two, as it has a Capacity to become a thing, and yet is under a Privation, till it actually become so. *Arist. Physic. l. i. p. 17.* — And soon after, he says — *ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῷ ἀμύσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἀσχηματίζῳ καὶ χαλκῷ. 'Tis a different thing to be a Man, and to be Void of the musical Art; 'tis a different thing to be Void of Figure, and to be Brass.* — As much as if he had said, that the Man, before he became a musical Artist, had both a Capacity for that character, and a Privation of it; the Brass a similar Capacity and Privation, before it was cast into a Statue.

Thus too *Themistius* — *Καὶ τοι λέγομεν τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ δυνάμει· ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ γερήσεως· ἂν δὲ γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις εἴη, μὴ σὺν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τῆς γερήσεως νοκμένης* — We say the Essence

Ch. IV. Thus Iron, being the Subject or Matter of the Saw, the Axe, and the Chiffel, implies *Privation* and *Capacity* with respect to all three.

AGAIN, we can change a Saw into a Chiffel, but not into a Boat; we can change a Boat into a Box, but not into a Saw. The reason is, there can be no Change or Mutation of one thing into another, where the *two changing* Beings do not participate the *same Matter* (c). But even here, were the Boat to moulder and turn to Earth, and that Earth by natural process to metallize and become Iron, through such progression as this, we might suppose even the Boat to become a Saw. Hence therefore it is, that ALL CHANGE is by *immediate* or *mediate participation* of THE SAME MATTER.

HAVING advanced thus far, we must be careful to remember—first, that every SUBJECT or MATTER implies, as such, PRIVATION and

of MATTER is in CAPACITY; and CAPACITY is evidently connected with PRIVATION; since it would no longer be Capacity, could Privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it. *Themist. in Arist. Physic.* p. 21. *Edit. Ald.*

See before, Note p. 32, and Note p. 41, 42.

(c) This reasoning has reference to what the Ancients called ὅλη προσεχής, THE IMMEDIATE MATTER, in opposition to ὅλη πρώτη, THE REMOTE OR PRIMARY MATTER, of which more will be said in the course of this Speculation.

'Tis of the *immediate* Matter we must understand the following Passage—Ἐνδέχεται δὲ, μίας τῆς ὕλης ἕως, ἑτέρα γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινῆσαν αἰτίαν· οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κλωτῶς καὶ κλινῆς ἐνίων δὲ ἑτέρα ἢ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἑτέρων ὄντων· οἷον πρίων ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, εἰδ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει αἰτία τῆτο. —'Tis possible, that, the MATTER being one and the same, different things by the Efficient Cause should be formed out of it; as, for example, that out of Wood should be formed a Box and a Bed. But then with regard to some things, which are different, the Matter is of necessity different also. 'Tis thus, for example, that a Saw cannot be made out of Wood; nor is this a work in the power of the Efficient Cause. *Arist. Metaph.* H. κεφ. δ. p. 138. *Edit. Sylb.*

and CAPACITY—and next, that *all* CHANGE or *Mutation* of Beings into one another, is *by means of their participating the same common Matter*. This we have chosen to illustrate from Works of Art, as falling more easily under human cognizance and observation. 'Tis however no less certain as to the Productions of Nature, though the superior Subtlety in these renders examples more difficult.

THE Question then is, whether in the World which we inhabit, it be not admitted from Experience, as well as from the Confession of all Philosophers, that Substances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately pass one into another; that we suppose at present no Realizings of Non-entity, but that reciprocal Deaths, Dissolutions, and Digestions, support by turns all Substances out of each other, so that, as *Hamlet* says, from the Idea of this rotation,

*Imperial Cæsar, dead and turn'd to clay,
May stop a hole, to keep the winds away.*

The Question in short is, *whether in this World which we inhabit, there be not an universal Mutation of all things into all (d)*. If there be, then

(d) The *Peripatetics*, according to the erroneous Astronomy by them adopted, supposed the fixt Stars, the Planets, the Sun, and the Moon, to move all of them round the Earth, attached to different Spheres, which moved and carried them round, the Earth itself being immoveable, and placed in the Centre of the Universe. This Motion, purely and simply *local*, was the only one they allowed to these *Celestial* Bodies, which in *Essence* they held to be perfectly *unchangeable*. Things on the surface of this Earth (such as Plants and Animals), and things between that surface and the Moon (such as Clouds, Meteors, Winds, &c.) these they supposed obnoxious to *Motions of a more various and complicated character*; Motions, which changed them in their *Qualities* and *Quantities*, and which even led to their *Generation* and *Dissolution*, to Life and to

Ch. IV. then must there be some ONE PRIMARY MATTER, *common to all things*; I say, some ONE PRIMARY MATTER, and that COMMON TO ALL THINGS, since, without some *such* Matter, *such* Mutation would be wholly impossible.

BUT if there be some *one Primary Matter*, and that *common to all things*; this *Matter* must imply, not (as particular and subordinate Matters do) a *particular* Privation, and a *particular* Capacity, but, on the contrary, UNIVERSAL PRIVATION, and UNIVERSAL CAPACITY (e).

IF

Death. Hence the whole Tribe of these mutable and perishable Beings were called SUBLUNARY, because the Region of their existence was *beneath the Sphere of the Moon*. 'Twas here existed those Elements, which, as *Milton* tells us,

————— in quaternion run
Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix
And nourish all things————— Par. Lost.

'Twas here that *Aristotle* held — *ὅτι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ γίνεσθαι πέφυκε*, that every thing was naturally formed to arise out of every thing. *Lib. de Ortu et Int.* p. 39. *Edit. Syll.*

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from *Archytas Timæus*, and the other *Pythagoreans*, both *Plato* and *Aristotle* borrowed much of their Philosophy) elegantly calls this imaginary Sphere of the Moon's orbit, *ἰσθμὸς ἀθανασίας καὶ γενέσεως*, the *Isthmus of Immortality and Generation*, that is, the Boundary, which lies between things *immortal*, and things *transitory*. *Gale's Opusc. Mythog.* p. 516.

The *Stoics* went farther than this *Isthmus*.—They did not confine these Changes to a *Part* only of the Universe; they supposed them to pass through the *whole*; and to continue without ceasing, till all was at length lost in their *Ἐκπύρωσις*, or general *Conflagration*, after which came a *new World*, and then a *new Conflagration*, and so on periodically. *Diog. Laert.* vii. 135, 141, 142.

(e) *Τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, δυνάμενον ἀπάσας δέχεσθαι τὰς μορφάς, ἐν τέρῃσει μὲν εἶναι ἀπασῶν—*
The PRIMARY SUBJECT or MATTER, having a CAPACITY to admit all Forms, exists in a PRIVATION of them all. *Themist. in Arist. Phys.* p. 21.

Themistius well distinguishes between two words, expressing the same Being, I mean *ὑποκείμενον* and *ὕλη*. The first he makes the Subject or Substratum of Something ACTUALLY existing;

IF the notion of such a Being appear strange and incompre-
 henfible, we may farther prove the *necessity* of it's existence from the
 following confiderations. Ch. IV.

EITHER there is no such general Change, as here spoken of, which is contrary to fact, and would destroy the Sympathy and Congeniality of things; or if there be, there must be a *Matter* of the character *here* established, because without it (as we have said) such Change would be *impossible*.

ADD to this, however hard *universal* Privation may appear, yet had the *Primary Matter* in it's proper nature any one *particular* Attribute, so as to prevent it's *Privation* from being unlimited and universal, such *Attribute* would run thro' all things, and be conspicuous in all. If it were white, all things would be white; if circular, they would be circular; and so as to other Attributes, which is contrary to fact (*f*). Add to this, that the *Opposite* to such Attri-
 bute

existing; the other, that *Matter* which has a CAPACITY of becoming many things, before it *actually* becomes any one of them.

This is that ONE Being, mentioned by *Diogenes*, whose words we have quoted in the preceding Chapter, p. 32, in the Note.

(*f*) This Argument is taken from *Plato*.—Speaking of the *primary Matter*, he says—
 ὁμοιον γὰρ ὂν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τὰ τε τῆς παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως, ὅπουτ' ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον, κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτὴ παρεμφαίνων ὄψιν—Were it like any of those things that enter into it, in such case, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itself, it would exhibit them ill, by shewing IT'S OWN NATURE ALONG WITH THEM at the same time. *Plat. Tim.* p. 50.

Thus *Chalcidius*, in commenting the Passage here quoted—*Si sit aliquid candidum, ut ὑμνύθιον, deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, vel diversum, ut ruborem sivi pallorem, vel contrarium, ut atrum; tunc candor non patietur introeuntes colores synceros perseverare, sed permixtione sui faciet interpolatos.* *Chalcid. in Tim. Com.* p. 434.

Ch. IV. bute could *never* have existence, unless it were possible for the *same thing* to be *at once* and in the same instance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. since this *inseparable* Attribute would necessarily be *every where*, because the *Matter*, which implies it, is *itself every where*, at least may be found in all things, that are generated and perishable.

HERE then we have an Idea (such as it is) of that singular Being, ΤΑΗ ΠΡΩΤΗ, the PRIMARY MATTER; a Being, which those Philosophers, who are immersed in sensible Objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it (*g*); a Being, which flies the Perception of every *sense*, and which is at best even to

Hence we see the propriety of those descriptions, which make the primary Matter, to be *void of Body, of Quality, of Bulk, of Figure, &c.* ἀσώματον, ἄποιον, ἀμεγέθους, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἀμορφόν, &c. τ. λ.

(*g*) So strange a Being is it, and so little comprehensible to common Ideas, that the *Greeks* had no name for it in their language, 'till ΤΑΗ came to be adopted as the *proper* word, which was at first only assumed by way of *Metaphor*, from signifying *Timber* or *Wood*, the common materials in many works of Art. Hence it was that *Ocellus*, *Timæus*, and *Plato*, employ various words, and all of them after the same metaphorical manner, when they would express the nature of this mysterious Being; *Ocellus* calls it Πανδεχὲς καὶ Ἐκμαγεῖον τῆς γενέσεως, *the universal Recipient, and Impression of things generated*, as Wax receives Impressions from various Seals. *Timæus* uses the word ΤΑΑ in the *Doric* Dialect, and explains it (like *Ocellus*) by Ἐκμαγεῖον, to which he adds the Appellations of Μᾶτέρα καὶ Τιθάναν, *Mother and Nurse*. *Plato* calls it first πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθίνην, *the Receptacle of all Generation, as it's Nurse*—then παντὸς αἰσθητῆς μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν—the *Mother and Receptacle of every sensible Object*. *Gale's Opusc. Mytholog.* p. 516. 544. *Platon. Tim.* p. 47. 51. *Edit. Serr.* See *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. I. Note (*c*) &c.

Aristotle also observes, consistently with one of the above expressions—ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένεσσα, συναίτια τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομένων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μήτηρ—that the MATTER, by remaining, is in concurrence with the Form, a Cause of things generated, under the character of a MOTHER *Phys.* l. i. c. 9. p. 22. *Edit. Sylb.*

to the *Intellect* but a *negative* object, no otherwise *comprehensible* than either by ANALOGY or ABSTRACTION.

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WE gain a glimpse of it by ABSTRACTION, when we say that *the first Matter* is *not* the Lineaments and Complexion, which make the beautiful Face; *nor yet* the Flesh and Blood, which make those Lineaments, and that Complexion; *nor yet* the liquid and solid Aliments, which make that Flesh and Blood; *nor yet* the simple Bodies of Earth and Water, which make those various Aliments; but *Something*, which being *below* all these, and *supporting* them all, is yet *different* from them all, and *essential* to their existence (*h*).

WE obtain a sight of it by ANALOGY, when we say, that as is the Brass to the Statue, the Marble to the Pillar, the Timber to the Ship, or any one *secondary Matter* to any one *peculiar Form*; so is the FIRST and ORIGINAL MATTER to all Forms in general (*i*).

AND

(*h*) ABSTRACTION appears to have been used by *Plato*—Διὸ τὴν τῆ γεγονότῃ ὁρατῆ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητῆ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν, μήτε αἶρα, μήτε πῦρ, μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τῶτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ' ἀόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχὲς· μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώταίᾳ πῃ τῆ νοητῆ, καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες, ἃ ψευδόμεθα.—Let us therefore say that THE MOTHER and RECEPTACLE of every visible, nay of every sensible Production, is neither Earth, nor Air, nor Fire, nor Water, nor any of the things which arise out of these, nor out of which these arise, but a certain INVISIBLE AND FORMLESS BEING, THE UNIVERSAL RECIPIENT; concerning which Being, if we say it is in a very dubious way intelligible, and something most hard to be apprehended, we shall not speak a falsehood. *Plat. Tim. p. 51. Edit. Serr.*

Thus *Chalcidius*—*Sublatis quæ sunt singulis, QUOD SOLUM REMANET, IPSUM ESSE, QUOD QUÆRITUR. In. Tim. Com. p. 371.*

(*i*) The Method of reasoning on this Subject by ANALOGY was used by *Aristotle*.—
ἢ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκός, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφήν ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν· ἔτις αὕτη πρὸς ἐσίαν·
ἔχει.

Ch. IV. AND here, if a Digression may be permitted, let us reflect for a moment on the character of old PROTEUS.

Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,

Ignemque, horribilemque feram, fluviumque liquentem. Georg. IV.

Thus

ἔχει, καὶ τὸ τὸδε τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν. *Phys.* l. i. c. 7. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.*—The Subject—Nature, (that is, the PRIMARY MATTER) is knowable in the way of ANALOGY: for as is the Brass to the Statue; the Timber to the Bed; or the immediate and formless Material to any of those things which have Form, before it assumes that Form; so is THIS [general and primary] MATTER to SUBSTANCE, and to each particular Thing, and to each particular Being.

Not that Aristotle rejected the Argument from ABSTRACTION.—Λέγω δ' ὅλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τι, μήτε ποσόν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὄρεται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γάρ τι, καθ' ὃ καὶ κατηγορεῖται τῶν ἑκάστων, ὃ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστη—I mean by MATTER, that which of itself is not denominated either this particular Substance, or that particular Quantity, or any other of those Attributes, by which Being is characterised. It is indeed that, of which each one of these is predicated, and which has an Essence different from every one of the Predicaments. *Metaph. Z.* p. 106. *Edit. Sylb.*

And here we may observe, that as ABSTRACTION and ANALOGY are the two Methods, by which this strange Being (as it has been called) was investigated by the ancient Philosophers, so for that reason *Timæus* tells us, that it was made known to us λογισμῷ νόθῳ, by a spurious kind of Reasoning, p. 545.—Plato says the same, only he is more full.—Matter, according to him, was μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν, λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ μόγις πιστόν—Something tangible without Sensation, something hard to be believed, and that by means of a spurious kind of reasoning. *Tim. Plat.* p. 52. *Edit. Serr.*

This spurious Reasoning is explained by *Timæus*, who says that MATTER is so comprehended τῷ μήκῳ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, by it's not being understood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication. *Opusc. Myth. Gale*, p. 545.

As to the being tangible without Sensation, this means, that though it be an essential to Body, which appears to make it tangible, yet the Abstraction makes it stand under the same character to the Touch, as Darkness stands to the Sight, Silence to the Hearing; we cannot be said to see the one, nor to hear the other; and yet without the help of those two Senses we could have no Comprehension of those two Negations, or perhaps more properly, those two sensible Privations.

Both *Timæus* and *Plato* drop expressions, as if they considered MATTER to be PLACE. *Timæus* calls it τόπος and χώρα; *Plato* calls it χώρα and ἰδέα. *Opusc. Myth.* p. 544. *Plat. Timb.* p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the Predicaments, and serves for a support to each. *Essentia est, ut opinor, cum eam Species, &c.* See *Com. in Tim.* p. 438.

Thus VIRGIL—thus, before him, HOMER:

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Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
Ἐρπετὰ γίνονται, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θεσπιδαῖς πῦρ. Οδυσ. Δ. 417.

*Made into all things, all he'll try; become
Each living thing, that creeps on earth; will glide
A liquid Stream, or blaze a flaming Fire (k).*

WHAT wonder, if this *singular Deity* suggest to us that *singular Being*, which we have been just attempting to describe? The Allegory was too obvious to escape the Writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted (*l*).

(*k*) To the Poets here quoted may be added *Horace Sat. lib. ii. S. 3. v. 73.* *Ovid. Metam. viii. 730.*

That great Parent of *Mythology* as well as *Poetry*, *Homer*, not only informs us concerning *PROTEUS*, but concerning his daughter *EIDOTHEA*, who discovered her father's abode.

We shall perceive in the Explanations which follow, how this Fable applies itself to the Subject of the present Chapter.

(*l*) Some, says *Eustathius*, when he comments the passage above cited from *Homer*, hold, “*PROTEUS to be that original MATTER, which is the Receptacle of Forms; that, which being IN ACTUALITY NO ONE of these Forms, is yet IN CAPACITY all of them—WHICH PROTEUS (they add) EIDOTHEA his Daughter is elegantly said to discover, by leading him forth out of Capacity into Actuality; that is, she is that PRINCIPLE OF MOTION, which contrives to make him RUSH INTO FORM, and be moved and actuated.*”

Heraclides Ponticus having adopted the same Method of explaining, subjoins—“*that hence it was with good reason, that the FORMLESS MATTER was called PROTEUS; and that PROVIDENCE, which modified each Being with it's peculiar Form and Character, was called EIDOTHEA.*”

The words of *EUSTATHIUS* in the original are—ΠΡΩΤΕΑ τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἔσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ πάντα—ὃν δὲ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑ ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῆς δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν προαγωγῆς· ἥ γὰρ ἢ κίνησις, ἢ Εἰς Εἶδος

Ch. IV. ΕΙΔΟΣ ΘΕΕΙΝ αὐτὸν, καὶ κινεῖσθαι μηχανώμενη. *Eustath. in Hom. Odyss. p. 177. Edit. Basil.*

We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the Etymology here given of ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑ, εἰς εἶδος δέειν, to *rush into Form*, is invented, like many other ancient Etymologies, more to explain the word *philosophically*, than to give us its *real* origin. 'Tis perhaps more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of *Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics*.

The words of *Heraclides* are—ὥς εὐλοῖον, τὴν μὲν ἀμορφὸν ὕλην ΠΡΩΤΕΑ καλεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' εἰδωλοπλασθήσασαν ἑκάστα Πρόνοιαν ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑΝ. *Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo.*

To these *Greeks* may be subjoined a respectable Countryman of our own.

Lord *Verulam* tells us of *PROTEUS*, that he had his Herd of Seals, or Sea-calves; that these 'twas his Custom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a Cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following Explanation—"that under the Person of *PROTEUS* is signified *MATTER*, the most ancient of all Things, next to the Deity—"that the Herd of *Proteus* was nothing else, than the ordinary *SPECIES* of Animals, Plants, and Metals, into which *MATTER* appears to diffuse, and as it were to consume itself; so that after it has formed and finished those several Species (its task being in a manner complete) it appears to sleep and be at rest, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any Species farther." *De Sapientiâ Vet. c. 13.*

The Author's own words are—*sub PROTEI enim personâ MATERIA significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima. —PECUS autem, sive GREX Protei non aliud videtur esse, quam SPECIES ordinariæ Animalium, Plantarum, Metallorum, in quibus Materia videtur se diffundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas Species effinxerit, et absolverit (tanquam penso completo) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius Species moliri, tentare, aut parare.*

C H A P. V.

Concerning FORM—An imperfect Description of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Physical—how they differ—Essential Forms—Transition to Forms of a Character superior to the passive and elementary.

FORM is that elementary Constituent in every composite Substance, by which it is DISTINGUISHED and CHARACTERIZED, and known from every other (a). But to be more explicit.

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THE first and most simple of all Extensions is a Line. This, when it exists united with a second Extension, makes a Superficies; and these two, existing together with a third, make a Solid. Now this last and complete EXTENSION we call the first and simplest FORM; and when this first and simplest Form accedes to the first and simplest Matter, the Union of the two produces BODY, which is for that reason defined to be Matter triply extended. And thus we behold the rise of pure and original BODY (b).

It

(a) See the first Note in the preceding Chapter, and page 52.

(b) Original Body, when we look downwards, has reference to the primary Matter, it's Substratum; when we look upwards, becomes itself a *ὑλη*, or Matter to other things; to the Elements as commonly called, Air, Earth, Water, &c. and in consequence, to all the variety of natural Productions.

Hence it is, that Ammonius, speaking of the first Matter, says—*αὐτὴ ἓν, ἐξολωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διατάξεις, ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ἀποιοῦν σῶμα*—This [that is, THE FIRST MATTER] being

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It must be remembered however, that *Body* under this character is something *indefinite* and *vague*, and scarcely to be made an *Object of scientific Contemplation*. 'Tis necessary to this end, that it's *Extension* should be *bounded*; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the *Bound* or *Limit* of *Simple Body* is *Figure*; and thus it is that *FIGURE*, with regard to *Body*, becomes the next *Form* after *Extension*.

IN *Body* thus bounded by *Figure*, every other of it's *Attributes* being *abstracted* and *withdrawn*, we behold that *Species* of *Body*, called *BODY MATHEMATICAL*; a name so given it, because the *Mathematician*, as such, considers no other *Attributes* of *Body*, except it be these two *Primary*, it's *Extension* and it's *Figure* (c).

BUT

embulked with three extensions, makes THE SECOND MATTER OR SUBJECT, that is to say, BODY VOID OF QUALITY.

After having shewn how *natural Qualities* and *Attributes* stood in need of such a *Subject* for their existence, he adds (which is worth remarking) — εἰς ὅτι ἦν ποτε ἐνεργεία ἢ ὕλη ἀσώματ'· ἢ σῶμα ἀποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωρῶντες φαιμέν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διακρίντες ταῦτα, τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀχώριστα — not that there ever was IN ACTUALITY either *Matter* without *Body*, or *Body* without *Quality*; but we say so, as we contemplate the well ordered *Generation* of things, dividing those things in *Imagination*, which are by *Nature* inseparable. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 62. See below, p. 52.

(c) In *Body Mathematical* all *Qualities* being abstracted but *Figure* and *Extension*, we may hence perceive the reason why the *Contemplation* of such *Body* (which *Contemplation* makes so large a part of the *Mathematical Sciences*) is more accurate and certain, than that of any other *Body*. It is, because of all *Bodies*, *Mathematical Body* has the fewest, the most obvious, and the most precise *Attributes*.

Hence too we may perceive the difference between a *Mathematician*, and a *natural Philosopher*. They differ, as their *Subjects* differ; as the *Subject* of the first is simple; of the last is complicated; as the *Attributes* of *Mathematical Body* are few and known; of *Physical Body* are unknown and infinite. *Vid. Arist. Phys.* l. ii. c. 2.

BUT though the *bounding* of Body by *Figure* is one step towards rendering it more *definite* and *knowable*, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of *Nature*. 'Tis necessary *here*, that not only it's *External* should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to it's *Internal*. This *internal Adjustment, Disposition, or Arrangement* (denominate it as you please) is called ORGANIZATION, and may be considered as the *third* Form, which appertains to Body. By it's accession we behold the rise of BODY PHYSICAL or NATURAL, for every *such* Body is some way or other *organized*.

AND thus may we affirm that these *three*, that is to say, EXTENSION, FIGURE, and ORGANIZATION, are the three ORIGINAL FORMS to BODY PHYSICAL or NATURAL, *Figure* having respect to it's *External*; *Organization* to it's *Internal*; and *Extension* being common both to one and to the other. 'Tis more than probable that from the Variation in these *universal*, and, as I may say, *Primary Forms*, arise most of those *secondary* Forms usually called QUALITIES SENSIBLE, because they are the *proper* Objects of our several Sensations. Such are Roughness and Smoothness, Hardness and Softness, the tribes of Colours, Savours and Odours, not to mention those Powers of Character more *subtle*, the Powers Electric, Magnetic, Medicinal, &c.

HERE therefore we may answer the Question, how *natural* Bodies are distinguished. Not a single one among them consists of *Materials in Chaos*, but of Materials wrought up after the most exquisite manner,

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manner, and that conspicuous in their *Organization* (d), or in their *Figure*, or in *both*.

As therefore every *natural Body* is distinguished by the *Differences* just described; and as these *Differences* have nothing to do with the *original Matter*, which being every where similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not hence infer the expediency of *ESSENTIAL FORMS*, that every *natural Substance* may be *essentially characterized*? 'Tis with deference to my Contemporaries, that I surmise this assertion. I speak perhaps of Spectres, as flocking to some Philosophers, as those were to *Eneas*, which he met in his way to Hell:

Terribiles visu Formæ.

Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these *Forms SELF-EXISTENT*; things, which *Matter may slip off*, and fairly leave to themselves,

Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ (e).

They rather mean something, which, though differing from Matter, can yet *never subsist without it (f)*; something, which, *united* with it,

(d) No where perhaps is the force of *Organization* more conspicuous, than when we perceive different Grafts, upon the same Tree, to produce different Species of Fruit.

(e) *Lucr.* iv. 56.

(f) See Note the second of this Chapter. 'Tis a uniform Position in the Physics of the old Peripatetics, ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη, that the *Affections* [of Body] are inseparable from

it, helps to produce every *composite* Being, that is to say in other words, every *natural Substance* in the visible world. Ch. V.

It must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the FORM in this Union, which is the *Source of all Distinction**. 'Tis by *this*, that the Ox is distinguished from the Horse, not by that Grass, on which they subsist, *the common Matter* to both. To which also may be added, that as Figures and sensible Qualities are *the only objects of our Sensations*, and these all are *Parts of natural Form*; so therefore (contrary to the sentiment of the Vulgar, who dream of nothing but of *Matter*) 'tis *Form which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel*; nor is mere *Matter* any thing better, than an *obscure imperfect Being*, knowable only to the *reasoning Faculty* by the two methods already explained, I mean that of *Analogy*, and that of *Abstraction* (g).

HERE therefore we conclude with respect to SENSIBLE FORMS, that is to say, FORMS IMMERGED in *Matter*, and ever inseparable from it. In *these* and *Matter* we place THE ELEMENTS OF (h)
NATURAL

from it. See *Arist. Phys.* l. i. 'Tis one thing to be a Cube, another thing to be Iron, or Silver, or Wood, or Ivory. The Cube is most evidently and certainly *no one* of these, yet is it absurd and impossible to suppose the Cube should ever exist without one of these, or something similar to support it. See before, page 45.

* P. 38, 49.

(g) See before p. 44, 45.

(h) ELEMENTS are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, *the inherent*, or (if I may use the expression) *the in-existing Causes*, such as MATTER and FORM, of which we have been treating. There are other Causes, such as the Tribe of EFFICIENT CAUSES, which cannot be called

Ch. V. NATURAL SUBSTANCE, and thus finish the first part of the Inquiry we proposed.

WE are now to engage in Speculations of another kind, and from the *Elements* of Natural Substance to inquire after it's EFFICIENT CAUSE (*i*), that is to say, that Cause, which *associates* those Elements, and which *employs* them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar Characters.

called Elements, because *they make no part* of the Substances, which they generate, or produce. Thus the Statuary is no part of his Statue; the Painter, of his Picture. Hence it appears that ALL ELEMENTS are *Causes*; but not ALL CAUSES, *Elements*.

(*i*) *Aristotle* having reduced his three Principles of natural Productions to *two*, which two we have treated in this, and the preceding Chapter, adheres not so strictly to this Reduction, but that he still admits the *Three*.—Thus in his *Metaphysics*, he tells us—*ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ εἰρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη*—that *the Form, the Privation, and the Matter, are three PRINCIPLES*. He calls them ELEMENTS, because they have no Existence, but in the Substance to which they belong. To these he adds the EFFICIENT CAUSE, which as it exists *externally*, that is, *without* the Subject, he will not for that reason allow to be an *Element*.—Hence he observes, *ὥς Στοιχεῖα μὲν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαί τέσσαρες*—that *the ELEMENTS were THREE; the CAUSES and PRINCIPLES were FOUR*. His instances are—Health, *the Form*; Disease, *the Privation*; the human Body, *the Subject*. In these *three Causes* we have *the ELEMENTS*: Add to these Causes *the fourth*, that is, *the Efficient*, the Art of Medicine; and then we have THE FOUR CAUSES required.—Again—call the Plan of the House, *the Form*; the previous want of Order, *the Privation*; the Bricks, *the Materials*; add to these the *fourth Cause*, the Architect's Art, and again we have THE FOUR CAUSES required. *Metaph. Δ. p. 198, 199. Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis this *Efficient Cause*, that will make the Subject of the following Chapter.

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Concerning FORM, considered as an EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE—Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeless—Ovid, a philosophical Poet—Farther Description of the animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, and Effects—Virgil—The Active and the Passive Principle run thro' the Universe—Mind, Region of Forms—Corporeal Connections, where necessary, where obstructive—Means and Ends—their different Precedence according to different Systems—Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Aristotle, &c.—Providence.

LET us suppose an artificial Substance, for example a musical Pipe, and let us suppose to this Pipe *the Art* of the Piper to be united, not separated as now, but *vitally* united, so that the Pipe by it's *own* Election might play, whenever it pleased.—Would not this Union render it a kind of *living* Being, where the Art would be an *active* Principle, the Pipe a *passive*, both *reciprocally* fitted for the purposes of each other?—And what, if instead of the Piper's Art, we were to substitute that of the Harper?—Would this *new* Union also be *natural* like the former? Or would not rather the *Inaptitude* of the Constituents prevent any Union at all? It certainly would prevent it, and all *Melody* consequent; so that we could now by no analogy consider the Pipe as *animated*.

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'Tis in these and other Arts, considered as *efficient* Habits, we gain a glimpse of those Forms, which characterise not by *visible* Qualities, but by their respective *Powers*, their Operations and their Energies. As is the Piper's *Art* to the Pipe, the Harper's to the Harp, so is the *Soul* of the Lion to the *Body* Leonine, the *Soul* of Man to the *Body* Human; because in neither case 'tis possible to commute or make an exchange, without subverting the very End and Constitution of the Animal (*a*).

AND thus are we arrived at a *new order of Forms*, the tribe of animating Principles (*b*); for there is nothing which *distinguishes* so eminently as these; and 'tis on the power of *Distinction*, that we rest the very *Essence* of FORM.

'Tis here we view *Form* in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a *passive elementary* Constituent, a mere inactive and sensible Attribute.

(*a*) See *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 3. p. 13. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Stagirite* uses upon this occasion the following Similitude—*παραπλήσιον γὰρ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλὰς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τεχνὴν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι*—*They* [who adopt the Notion of placing *any* Soul in *any* Body] *talk the same, as if a Person was to say the Carpenter's Art might enter into a Musician's Pipe: now 'tis necessary that every Art should use it's proper Instruments, and every Soul it's proper Body.*

(*b*) *Alexander Aphrodisiensis* has an express Dissertation to prove, *ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ψυχὴ, that the Soul is a Form.* *Alex.* p. 124. *B. Edit. Ald. Ven.* 1534. It was so called, not with the least view to it's having a *Figure*, as if, for example, it were a Spherical Body, but because it was able not only by it's *perceptive* Powers to *secrete* Forms, but by it's *productive* Powers to *impart* them; whence, being considered as full of them, it was elegantly described to be *τόπος Ἐίδων, the Region of Forms.* *Arist. de Anim.* l. iii. c. 4. —See also. l. ii. c. 1.

See *Hermes*, Chap. I. Book III.

Attribute. 'Tis here it assumes the dignity of a *living motive Power*, of a Power destined by it's nature to use, and not be used. 'Tis to the Diversity of *Powers* in these animating *Forms*, that the *Diversity* of the *Organizations* in the corporeal World has reference. That strong and nervous Leg, so well armed with tearing Fangs, how perfectly is it correspondent to the fierce Instincts of the Lion? Had it been adorned, like the Human Arm, with Fingers instead of Fangs, *the natural Energies of a Lion* had been all of them defeated. That more delicate structure of an Arm, terminating in *Fingers* so nicely diversified, how perfectly does it correspond to the pregnant Invention of the *human Soul*? Had these Fingers been Fangs, what had become of poor *Art*, that by her Operations procures us so many Elegancies and Utilities? 'Tis here we behold the *Harmony* between the Visible World and the Invisible; between the Passive and the Active; between the Lifeless and the Living. The whole Variety in *Bodies* as well natural as artificial, is solely referable to the *previous* Variety in these their *animating* Forms. 'Tis for the sake of these they *exist*; 'tis by these they are *employed*; and without them they would be as useless, as the Shoe without the Foot.

'Twas perhaps owing to this use of the word FORM, in order to denote *an animating Principle*, that the Poet OVID (who appears by his works not unacquainted with Philosophy) opens his *Metamorphosis* with those lines, so perplexing to his Commentators:

In NOVA fert ANIMUS mutatas dicere FORMAS
CORPORA——

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Ch. VI. *“ My Mind (says he) carries me to tell of FORMS changed into NEW BODIES;”* not of *Bodies* changed into *new Forms*, but of *Forms*, that is to say, *SOULS*, transferred into *NEW BODIES*. The *Bodies* it seems were new, but the *Souls* or *Forms* remained *the same*, of which throughout his Work we have perpetual testimony. Thus, when he speaks of *Callisto*,

MENS ANTIQUA tamen factâ quoque mansit in ursâ.

Metam. ii. 485.

Of *Arachne*,

— ANTIQUAS exercet Aranea TELAS.

Ibid. vi. 145.

Of the *Ants*, that became *Men*,

— MORES, QUOS ANTE GEREBANT,

NUNC quoque habent; parcumque genus, patiensque laborum.

Ibid. vii. 656.

And so in many other places (c), which those who favour this Conjecture, may easily discover.

As nothing can become known by that, which it has not, so it would be absurd to attempt describing these animating Forms by any

(c) Ovid appears by these quotations to have used the word *FORMA*, when he opens his Poem, in a sense *truly* Philosophical. His Doctrine, that this *Form* or *Soul* might be transferred from one *Body* into another was PYTHAGOREAN, but which the PERIPATETICS rejected from the reasons above alleged, in the first Note of this Chapter.

any *visible* or other Qualities, the proper Objects of our Sensations. The Sculptor's Art is not Figure, but 'tis that, through which Figure is imparted to *something else*. The Harper's Art is not Sound, but 'tis that, through which Sounds are called forth from *something else*. They are of themselves no objects either of the Ear or of the Eye; but their nature or character is understood in this, that were they never to exert their proper Energies on their proper Subjects, the Marble would remain for ever shapeless, the Harp would remain for ever silent (*d*).

'Tis the same in natural Beings (*e*). The ANIMATING FORM of a natural Body is neither it's Organization, nor it's Figure, nor any other of those inferior Forms, which make up the System of it's visible Qualities; but 'tis the Power, which, *not being* that Organization, nor that Figure, nor those Qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to employ them. 'Tis therefore the Power, which

(*d*) See Maximus Tyrius, Diff. I. who eloquently applies this Reasoning to the SUPREME BEING, the Divine Artist of the Universe—Εἰ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἤδη μαθεῖν ἔρᾳς τὴν ἐκείνης φύσιν, πῶς τις αὐτὴν διηγήσεται; καλὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν τὸ φανώτατον· ἀλλ' ἔσῳμα καλὸν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ τῷ τῶματι ἐπιρρεῖ τὸ κάλλος· ἔδὲ λειμῶν καλός, ἀλλ' ὅθεν καὶ ὁ λειμῶν καλός· καὶ πόσιμα καλὰ, καὶ θαλάττης, καὶ ἑρανῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἑρανῶν θεῶν, πᾶν τὸ κάλλος τῆτο ἐκεῖθεν ρεῖ, οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς ἀενάης, καὶ ἀκηράτης· καθόσον αὐτῇ μετέσχευεν ἕκαστα, καλὰ, καὶ ἐδραῖα, καὶ σώζόμενα· καὶ καθόσον αὐτῇ ἀπολείπεται, αἰσχροῦ, καὶ διαλυόμενα, καὶ φθειρόμενα.—But if even now you wish to learn the nature of this SOVEREIGN BEING, after what manner shall any one be able to explain it? DIVINITY itself is surely beautiful, and of all Beauties, &c. &c.

Those, who chuse to see the remaining part of this elegant original, elegantly translated, may find it in the second Volume of Lord Shaftesbury's Characteristics, p. 295.

(*e*) Here an attempt is made to explain the three great Principles of the SOUL, anciently called τὸ νοητικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the Intellectual, the Sensitive, and the Nutritive. The Nutritive is treated first, then the Sensitive, then the Intellectual.

See below, note on the word Intellectual, p. 61.

Ch. VI. which *first* moves, and then conducts that latent Process, by which the Acorn becomes an Oak, the Embryo becomes a Man. 'Tis *the Power*, by which the Aliment of Plants and Animals is *digested*, and by such digestion *transformed* into a part of themselves. 'Tis *the Power*, as oft as the Body is either mutilated or sick, that co-operates with the Medicine in effecting the Cure. 'Tis *the Power*, which departing, the Body *ceases to live*, and the Members soon pass into putrefaction and decay.

FARTHER still, as putrefaction and decay will *necessarily* come, and Nature would be at end, were she not maintained by a supply; it is therefore *the Power*, that enables every Being to produce another like itself, the Lion to produce a Lion, the Oak to produce an Oak; so that, while Individuals perish, the Species still remains, and THE CORRUPTIBLE, as far as may be, PARTAKES OF THE ETERNAL AND DIVINE (f).

IN

(f) This ETERNAL and DIVINE is what, as Aristotle says, all Beings desire, and for the sake of which they act whatever they act agreeably to Nature. Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνους (scil. τῷ αἰεὶ καὶ τῷ θεῷ) ὁρῶμεν ἐνεκα πράττειν ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει. De Anim. l. ii. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Syll.

Immediately afterwards he subjoins the following remarkable passage, by which he appears to refer the whole System of natural Production or Generation to that one great Principle.—ἐπεὶ ἔν κοινῶν ἐν ἀδυνατεῖ τῷ αἰεὶ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχασθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἢ μετέχειν δύναται ἕκαστον, ταύτῃ κοινῶν, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἧττον καὶ διαμένει ἐκ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό· ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἔχ' ἐν, εἶδει δὲ ἐν.—In as much therefore as these Beings (meaning the subordinate and inferior) cannot participate of the ETERNAL and the DIVINE in uninterrupted Continuity, from it's being impossible that any thing perishable and transient should remain the same and one numerically; hence it follows that as far as each is capable of sharing it, so far it participates, one thing in a greater degree, and another in a less; and that each thing remains not precisely the same, but as it were the same, not NUMERICALLY ONE, but ONE IN SPECIES.

To this Virgil alludes,

At GENUS IMMORTALE manet —

Georg. iv.

See Plat. Conviv. p. 1197. C. Ed. Fic.

IN all the *Energies* here enumerated it extends through *Vegetables* as well as *Animals*. But with *Animals*, taken apart, it is that *higher Active Faculty*, which, by employing the *Organs of Sense*, peculiar to them as *Animals*, distinguishes them as *Beings sensitive* from *Vegetables* and *Plants*. Farther than this, with *Man alone* above the rest it is that still *superior and more noble FACULTY*, which by its own divine Vigour, *unassisted perhaps with Organs*, makes and denominates him a *BEING INTELLECTIVE and RATIONAL (g.)*

AND so much for the description of those Forms, which, being *purely invisible*, and (it may be said) *totally insensible*, are no otherwise to be known, *Consciousness* alone excepted, than by *sensible Operations and Energies (h)*, perceived in things corporeal.

As

(g) Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. — As to the Powers of the Soul here described, they exist ALL of them in some Beings; SOME of them only in other Beings; and in some Beings ONLY ONE of them. *Arist. de An.* l. ii. c. 3. p. 26. *Edit. Sylb.* That is to say, Man possesses all; Brutes possess some; Plants, one only—Man has the Vegetative, the Sensitive, and the Intellectual Faculty; Brutes only the Vegetative and the Sensitive; Plants, the Vegetative alone.

See soon after, p. 28—ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ τῆ θρεπτικῆς, κ. τ. λ.

Ideoque ob consortium corporis est inter homines, bestiasque, et cetera vitâ carentia, Societas communioque corporeorum proventuum. Siquidem NASCI, NUTRIRI, CRESCERE commune est hominibus cum cæteris; SENTIRE vero ET APPETERE, commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum, et ratione carentibus animalibus. CUPIDITAS porro atque IRACUNDIA vel agrestium vel mansuetorum, APPETITUS IRRATIONABILIS est: Hominis vero, cujus est proprium rationi mentem applicare, RATIONABILIS: RATIOCINANDI enim atque INTELLIGENDI, SCIENDIQUE VERUM APPETITUS proprius est Hominis, quia a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum distat. Illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus, et multo quidem acriora, cernuntur: RATIONIS autem PERFECTIO et INTELLECTUS, propria DEI et HOMINIS tantum. *Chalcid. in Plat. Tim.* p. 345. *Edit. Fabric.*

(h) See the Passage just before quoted from *Maximus Tyrius*. Nothing can be of greater importance, than a due attention to this Distinction; I mean the Distinction between Effects and Causes; between Effects which are visible, and Causes which are invisible;

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As in their very Effence they imply *Activity*, as much as *Matter*, upon which they operate, implies *Passivity*; hence in every natural Composite, we may discern the influence of *two such Principles*, while, under different Proportions, and in different Degrees, *THE ACTIVE enlivens the Passive, and THE PASSIVE depresses the Active.*

'Tis to this that VIRGIL nobly alludes, when he tells us, that to every *enlivened substance*, every *animated Being*, there was something appertaining of *etherial Vigour*, and *heavenly Origin*, as far forth as not retarded by it's *mortal and earthly Members*.

IGNEUS est ollis VIGOR, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus, quantum nox NOXIA CORPORA TARDANT,
TERRENIQUE hebetant ARTUS, moribundaque membra.

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invisible; between *Effects*, the natural Objects of *all* our Sensations; and *Causes*, which are Objects of *no Sensation at all*.

'Tis with reference to this Distinction that *Cyrus* is made to reason in his last moments by *Xenophon*, his philosophical Historian, who thus describes him addressing his Children.

Οὐ γὰρ δήπερ τὸτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἶδέναι, ὡς ἔδεν ἔσομαι ἐγὼ ἔτι, ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἀνθρωπίνη βίη τελευτήσω· εἰδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οἷς διεπράττετο, τέτοις αὐτὴν ὡς ἔσται κατεφωρᾶτε—Thus excellently translated by my honourable Relation, Mr. ASHLEY:—*You ought not to imagine you certainly know, that, after I have closed the period of Human Life, I shall no longer exist. For neither do you NOW see my Soul; but you conclude FROM IT'S OPERATIONS, that it DOES EXIST.* Cyropædia, l. viii.

Cicero has translated the same passage with great elegance, but in a manner less strict, less confined to the original.

Nolite arbitrari O! mihi carissimi filii, me, cum a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fere; nec enim, dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed cum esset in hoc corpore, EX IIS REBUS, QUAS GEREBAM, intelligebatis: eundem igitur esse creditote, etiamsi nullum videbitis. De Senect. c. 22.

Nothing is more certain than that many things, which have *no sensible Qualities*, may be described accurately, and comprehended adequately, by *their Energies and Operations upon sensible Objects*.

COULD we penetrate that Mist, which hides so much from human Eyes, and follow these *Composites* to their different and original Principles, we might gain perhaps a glimpse of *two* objects worth contemplating; of that which is FIRST, and that which is LAST, in the general Order of Being; of *pure Energy* in the SUPREME MIND, the *first* Mover of all Efficients; of *pure Passivity* in the LOWEST MATTER, the *ultimate* Basis of all subjects (*i*).

BUT lest these should be esteemed Speculations rather foreign, 'tis sufficient to mark the *Analogy* between things *Natural* and *Artificial*;

(*i*) Thus the *Stoics*—δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. τὸ μὲν ἐν πάσχειν εἶναι τὴν ἀποιοῦν ἔσσαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν. — *Their opinion is, that the Principles of all things are two, THE ACTIVE Principle and THE PASSIVE; that the Passive Principle is that Substance void of all Quality, MATTER; the Active Principle, that Reason, which exists within it, GOD. Diog. Laert. vii. 134.*

The following Passage from *Ammonius* is remarkable, and well applies to the present Subject.—Διὸ φασὶ τὴν ὕλην τῷ θεῷ ἀνομοίως ὁμοιωθῆναι ὁμοιωθῆναι μὲν, ὅτι δι' ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἄλλων σημαίνεται ἐκάτερον, ἀνομοίως δὲ, ὅτι τὴ μὲν, κρείττον' ὄντ', ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀποφάσκομεν πάντα, τῆς δὲ ὕλης, χείρον' ἔσσης ἢ κατὰ πάντα, ταῦτα ἀποφάσκομεν. — *For this reason they say that MATTER is DISSIMILARLY SIMILAR to the DIVINITY; is SIMILAR, because each of them is explained by a Negation of all other things; DISSIMILARLY so, in as much as we deny all things of the Divinity, by it's being better than all things; we deny them of Matter, by it's being worse. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 50. B.*

Archytas thus expresses himself in his *Doric Dialect*.

Τὸ μὲν ἐντὶ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυσικαῖς ποιεῖν μὲν ὁ θεός, πάσχειν δὲ ἡ ὕλη, καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, τὰ στοιχεῖα. — *There is something, which is AGENT; and something, which is PATIENT; thus among natural Beings GOD is the AGENT; MATTER the PATIENT; but the ELEMENTS are both Agent and Patient united.*

Upon this *Simplicius* observes—Σαφὲς δὲ ὄντ' τὰ λεγόμενα, παραδείγματα ἀρχηγικώτατα παρέθετο, ποιεῖν μὲν τὸν θεὸν εἰπὼν, ὃ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ποιητικὰ αἷτια συνετέτα, πάσχειν δὲ τὴν ὕλην, δι' ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μετέχει τὴ πάσχειν, καὶ ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὡς ἀν' δὴ μετέχοντα καὶ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους. — *Tho' what has been said is evident, he has adduced (to explain himself) the two highest and most leading Instances, saying, that GOD is AGENT, whom all other Active Causes follow; and MATTER PATIENT, thro' which other Beings partake of Passion; and that the ELEMENTS are both AGENTS and PATIENTS, in as much as they participate both of Matter and of Form. Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

Ch. VI. *Artificial*; how, that as there are no FORMS of *Art*, which did not *pre-exist* in the *Mind of Man*, so are there no FORMS of *Nature*, which did not *pre-exist in the Mind of God*. 'Tis through this we comprehend, how MIND or INTELLECT IS THE REGION OF FORMS (*k*), in a far more noble and exalted sense, than by being their *passive* Receptacle through Impressions from Objects without. It is their *Region*, not by being the Spot into which they migrate as *strangers*, but in which they dwell as αὐτοχθόνες, the *original Natives* of the Country. 'Tis in *Mind* they first exist, before *Matter* can receive them (*l*); 'tis *from Mind*, when they adorn *Matter*, that they *primarily* proceed: so that, whether we contemplate the works of *Art*, or the more excellent Works of *Nature*, all that we look at, as *beautiful*, or listen to, as *harmonious*, is the genuine EFFLUENCE OR EMANATION OF MIND (*m*).

AND

(*k*) See *Aristotle* already quoted, p. 56, in his Tract *De Animâ* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* In the eighth Chapter of the same Book, p. 62, he calls the Soul ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, and that not only from it's being that *supreme characterising Power*, which gives to subordinate Beings their *peculiar Form or Character*, but as it *uses* them, when made, agreeably to their respective Natures. In this last acceptance it is the *Form of Forms*, as the *Hand* appears to be the *Organ of Organs*; to be that superior Instrument, which *uses* the rest, the Chissel, the Pencil, the Lyre, &c. all which inferior Organs or Instruments, *without this previous and superior one to employ them*, would be inefficacious, and dead, and incapable of producing any single Effect. — ἡ ψυχὴ ὡςπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστὶ καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων. *Arist. in loc.*

(*l*) In the *Scriptural* account of Creation, *Light*, previously to it's existence, is commanded to exist—*And God said, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT.* So also *Vegetables* and *Animals*, *previously* to their existing, are *commanded* to exist. Now, whether by these Commands we suppose certain *verbal Orders*, or (what seems far more probable) only a *Divine Volition*, respect must needs have been had to certain PRE-EXISTING FORMS, else *such Words* or *such Volitions* must have been *devoid of all Meaning*.

(*m*) A proof, that these transcendent Objects are of an Origin truly *mental*, is, that nothing but MIND or INTELLECT can recognize or comprehend them. And hence it follows

AND now to recapitulate what we have said concerning FORM. We have traced it's Variety from the *Lifeless* and *Inanimate* up to the *Living* and *Animating*; from Figures, Colours, and sensible Qualities, up to the *Powers only knowable through their Energies and Operations*; in other words, from those *Forms*, which are but *passive Elements*, up to those, which are *Efficient Causes*.

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EVEN in these active, animating, and efficient *Forms*, besides the Differences which we have remarked, there is still another worth regarding. Some of them cannot act without *corporeal* Connections, while to others such Connections appear to be no way requisite. What for example is the *vegetative* Power in Plants, without a *natural Body* for it to nourish and enliven? What the *sensitive* Powers of hearing or of seeing, without the corporeal Organs of an Ear, or an Eye? These are *animating Forms*, which though themselves not Body, are yet so far inseparable from it, that were their Connection dissolved, they would be as unable to exert themselves, as the Painter, deprived of his Pencil, or the Harper of his Harp. 'Tis not so with that *perceptive Power*, UNMIXED AND PURE INTEL-
LIGENCE,

follows that, if this *intellective* Faculty be wanting, as it is to inferior Animals, or be unhappily debased, as too often happens to our own Species; tho' their *sensitive* Organs may be *exquisite* to a degree, yet are such Beings to such Objects, as if they had no Organs at all. *Eyes have they, and see not, &c.*

And hence the meaning of that fine Trochaic Verse in the *Sicilian* Poet and Philosopher, *Epicharmus*;

Νῆς ὀρᾷ καὶ νῆς ἀκέει· τ' ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

'Tis MIND ALONE, that sees, that hears; all things beside are deaf and blind.

Clem. Alex. t. i. p. 442. *Edit. Pott. Max. Tyr.* *Edit.* 8vo. p. 12. *Edit.* 4to. p. 203.

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Ch. VI. **L**IGENCE, the Objects of which being purely intelligible, are all congenial with itself. *Corporeal* Connections appear so little wanted here, that perhaps 'tis then in it's *highest* Vigour, when it is wholly *separated* and *detached*. 'Tis in *this* part of our animating Form, that we must look for **THE IMMORTAL AND DIVINE** (n); 'tis *this* indeed is

(n) 'Ο δὲ Νῆς ἔοικεν ἐγίγνεσθαι, ἡσία τις ἔσα, καὶ ἂ φθείρεσθαι—MIND seems to be implanted [into the Body] being a PECULIAR SUBSTANCE OF ITSELF, and not to be corrupted or to perish (as the Body does). *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 4. p. 15—And soon after, when he has told us that the *Passions* perish with the *Body*, to which they are inseparably united, he adds—'Ο δὲ Νῆς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές. But the MIND perhaps is something MORE DIVINE, and free from *Passion*, or being acted upon.

In another part of the same Work he distinguishes between the original *Capacity* of the *sensitive* Part, and that of the *Intellective* Part: *Sensation* (he tells us) is impaired by the *Violence* of *sensible* Objects: Excessive Sounds, excessive Light, excessive Smells, prevent us from hearing, from seeing, or from smelling.—Αλλ' ὁ Νῆς, ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητὸν, ἐχ' ἥτιον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδέεστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ ἄνευ σώματι, ὁ δὲ Νῆς χωριστός.—But MIND, when it contemplates any thing clearly and strongly intelligible, does not for that reason LESS comprehend inferior Objects of *Intellection*, but even MORE; the Cause is, the SENSITIVE Principle exists not WITHOUT A BODY (it's Organs being all Bodily); but MIND on the contrary is SEPARABLE AND DETACHED. *Ibid.* l. iii. c. 4.

Cyrus, in the Speech attributed to him by *Xenophon*, and quoted before, p. 62, speaks as follows.

Οὔτοι ἐγώ γε, ὦ παῖδες, εἰδὲ τῆτο πάποτε ἐπίσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἔω μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ Σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ· ὅταν δὲ τέτε ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθηκεν. Ὅρῳ γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα παρέχεται. Οὐδὲ γε, ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσαι ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὴν τῷ ἄφρονι Σώματι δίχα γένηται, εἰδὲ τῆτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀμείβῃ καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νῆς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἶδος αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένη δὲ ἀνθρώπου, δὴλὰ ἐστὶν ἑκαστα ἀπὸνία πρὸς τὸ ὁμοφύλον, πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· αὕτη δὲ μόνη ἔτε παρῆσα ἔτε ἀπῆσα ὁρᾶται. *Ξενοφ. Κύρου Παιδ.* H. p. 655. *Edit. Hutchinson.* 4to. Oxon. 1727.

Thus translated by the abovementioned excellent Translator.

No! Children! I can never be persuaded, that the Soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal Body, and that it dies on Separation. For I see that the Soul communicates Vigour and Motion to mortal Bodies, during it's continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded, that the Soul is divested of Intelligence, on it's Separation from this gross senseless Body; but it is probable, that WHEN THE SOUL IS SEPARATED, it becomes pure and intire, and is then MORE INTELLIGENT. It is evident, that, on Man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the Soul:

is all of it, that a rational Man would wish to preserve, when he would be rather thankful to find his Passions and his Appetites extinct.

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AND thus having traced the various order of FORMS from the lowest and basest up to the highest and best, and considered how, though differing, they *all agree* in this, that *they give to every Being it's peculiar and distinctive Character*, we shall here conclude our Speculations concerning FORM, the second Species of Substance, and

THAT ALONE IS INVISIBLE, BOTH DURING IT'S PRESENCE HERE, AND AT IT'S DEPARTURE. *Cyropæd.* p. 326, 327.

Thus translated by Cicero—*Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potest animos, dum in corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere; cum exissent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum esse insipientem, cum ex insipienti corpore evasisset; sed, cum, OMNI ADMIXTIONE CORPORIS LIBERATUS, purus et integer esse cœpisset, tum esse SAPIENTEM. Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur, cæterarum rerum perspicuum est quo quæque discedant; abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta sunt: ANIMUS AUTEM SOLUS, NEC CUM ADEST, NEC CUM DISCEDIT, APPARET.* *De Senectute*, cap. 22.

These Speculations of Cyrus may more properly be called the Speculations of *Xenophon*, who derived them without doubt (as he did the rest of his Philosophy) from his great Master, *Socrates*. They passed also into other Systems of Philosophy, derived from the same Original; such for example as the Philosophy of *Aristotle*, who was a hearer and a disciple as well of *Socrates* as of *Plato*.

Besides what has been offered in the beginning of this Note, the following Remark and Quotation may perhaps inform us farther in the Sentiments of the *Stagirite*, and his School.

The HUMAN INTELLECT was supposed by the *Peripatetics* to be *pure and absolute CAPACITY*; to be *no particular thing*, till it began to comprehend things; *nor to be blended with Body*, because, if it were, it would have *some Quality of Body* adhere to it (such as hot, cold, and the like), which *Quality* would of course obstruct it's operations. On the contrary they held it to receive it's impressions, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον, *as impressions are made in a WRITING TABLET, WHERE NOTHING AS YET IS IN ACTUALITY WRITTEN.* *Aristot. de Animâ*, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 58. *Edit. Sylb.*

But this in the way of digression—'Tis only the short Specimen of an ancient Speculation, which gives us reasons, why the *human Intellect* can have no *Innate Ideas*.

Ch. VI. and which appears *in part* to be an ELEMENT, *in part* an EFFICIENT CAUSE (o).

AND yet we cannot quit these Speculations, the latter part of them at least, without a few observations on their dignity and importance.

THEIR principal object has been to shew, that in the great *intellectual* System of the Universe, MEANS do not lead to ENDS, but ENDS lead to MEANS; that it was not the Organization of the Sheep's Body, which produced the *gentle* instincts of the Sheep; nor that of the Lion's Body, which produced the *ferocious* Instincts of the Lion (p); but, because in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole, such respective *animating* and *active Principles* were wanting, it was therefore necessary that they should be furnished with such peculiarly *organized Bodies*, that they *might* be enabled to *act*, and to perform their part, agreeably to their respective natures, and their proper business in the World.

THE ancient System of Atheism supposed the Organs to come *first** before any thing *farther* was thought of; which Organs, being all of them formed *fortuitously*, some of them *luckily* answered an end, and others answered none: those that answered, *for a while subsisted*; those that failed, *immediately perished*.

EMPEDOCLES

(o) See the two last Notes of the preceding Chapter.

(p) See before, in the beginning of this Chapter, page 57.

* See *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. IV. § 3.


EMPEDOCLES (which is somewhat surprising, if we consider some of his better and more rational Doctrines) appears to have favoured this opinion: καὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ζώων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα φησίν. *He says, (as Aristotle tells us) that the Limbs of Animals were the greater part of them MADE BY CHANCE.* Soon after this Aristotle proceeds in explaining this strange System—ὅπερ μὲν ἐν ἅπῃσιν συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἐνέκᾳ τῆς ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτομάτης συζάντας ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔτῳ, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βεγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα—*When therefore these Limbs all co-incided, as if they had been made for the purpose, they were then saved and preserved, having been thus aptly put together by the Operation of CHANCE; but such as co-incided not, these were lost, and still [as fast as they arise] are lost; according to what Empedocles says concerning [those monstrous Productions] the Bull Species with Human Heads. Arist. Physic. l. ii. c. 4. 8.*

LUCRETIVS advances the same Doctrine, which was indeed suitable to his Ideas of the World's production. *The Earth, he tells us in his account of Creation, aimed at the time to create many portentous Beings, some with strange Faces and Members; others deficient, without either Feet or Hands; but the endeavours were fruitless, for Nature could not support, and carry them on to Maturity.*

*Multaque tum Tellus etiam portenta creare
Conata est, mirā facie, membrisque coorta;
Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim:*

— — — — —
Nequicquam, quoniam Natura absterruit auctum,

Nec



Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,

Nec reperire cibum, &c.

LUCRET. V. 835, &c.

'Tis more exprefly in contradiction to the Doctrines inculcated through this whole Tract, *that he denies FINAL CAUSES*; that he holds Eyes were not made for feeing, nor Feet for walking, &c. that he calls fuch explanations a *prepofterous* and inverted order, the exiftence of the USE (according to him) not leading to the production of the THING, but the CASUAL PRODUCTION of the THING leading to the exiftence of the USE.

LUMINA ne facias oculorum clara creata,

Profpicere ut poffimus, et, ut proferre viai

Proceros paffus, ideo, &c.

Cætera de genere hoc inter quæcunque pretantur,

Omnia perversâ PRÆPOSTERA funt ratione:

Nil adeo quoniam natum'ft in Corpore, UT UTI

Poffimus; fed quod NATUM'ST, ID procreat USUS.

LUCRET. IV. 822, 30.

AN elegant Poet of our own ftates this doctrine with his ufual humour.

Note here, Lucretius dares to teach

(As all our Youth may learn from CREECH)

That Eyes were made, but could not view,

Nor Hands embrace, nor Feet purfue;

But

But HEEDLESS *Nature* did produce
The Members FIRST, and THEN *the use* :
What each must act, was yet unknown,
Till all was moved by CHANCE alone.

A Man first builds a *Country seat*,
 Then finds the *Walls* not fit to eat ;
Another plants, and wond'ring sees
Nor Books, nor *Medals* on his *Trees*.
Yet Poet and Philosopher
Was He, who durst such whims aver.
Blest, for his *Sake*, be *Human Reason*,
Which came at last, tho' late, in *season*.

PRIOR'S *Alma*, Canto I.

THE Poet had cause to be thankful, that a time came, when Men of Sense opposed Reason to such Sophistry ; but the Opposition was not so late, nor so long in coming, as he imagined. *Galen*, many Centuries ago, in his excellent Treatise *De Ufu Partium* ; *Cicero*, in the best and most conclusive part of his Treatise *De Naturâ Deorum* ; and before them both, as well as before *Lucretius*, *Aristotle*, through every part of his Works, and above all in those respecting the History of the *Members*, and the *Progression* of *Animals*, had inculcated with irresistible strength of Argument the great Doctrine of FINAL CAUSES ; which if we allow with regard to *ourselves*, but deny to *Nature*, we totally annihilate through the Universe any DIVINE OR INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE. For nothing can be *Divine*, which is not *Intelligent* ; nor any thing

Intelligent,

Ch. VI. *Intelligent*, which has not a *Meaning*; nor any Being have a *Meaning*, which has no *Scope*, or *Final Cause*, to govern and direct it's Energies and Operations.

A PAINTER, painting a hundred Portraits, succeeds in ninety-nine, and fails in one. We may possibly impute *the single Failure* to CHANCE; but can we possibly impute to CHANCE his success in the *ninety-nine*? How then can we dream of CHANCE in the Operations of NATURE; Operations so much more *accurate*, tho' withal so much *greater*, and more *numerous*, than those of the Painter? CHANCE is never thought of in that which happens *always*; nor in that which happens *for the most part*; but, if any where, in that which happens *unexpectedly* and *rarely* (*q*).

AND so much for those Philosophers, recorded for having hardily *denied* a Providence.

THERE are others, who, tho' they have not denied one, have yet made *Systems, that would do without one*; seeming to think concerning

(*q*) See Vol. i. in the Notes on Treatise the First; Note VII. where the Doctrine of CHANCE and FORTUNE is discussed at large upon the *Peripatetic Principles*, and where an attempt is made to explain that most subtle and ingenious Argument of the *Stagirite*, by which he proves that CHANCE and FORTUNE are so far from supplanting MIND, or AN INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, that the Existence of *the two former* necessarily infers the Existence of *the latter*.

'Twas consonant to the Reasoning there held, that PLATO, long before, is said to have called FORTUNE σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, a SYMPTOM, or THING CO-INCIDENT either with Nature, or the Human Will. See *Suidas* in the Word, Εἰμαρμένη. Plato's Account will be better understood perhaps, by recurring to the Quotation in the former part of this note.

concerning the trouble of governing a World, as Queen *Dido* did of old, Ch. VI.

Scilicet is superis labor est; ea cura quietos

Sollicitat? — (r).

A THIRD fort, with more decency, have neither denied a Providence, nor omitted one; yet have feldom recurred to it, but upon pressing occasions, when difficulties arose, which they either happened to find, or had happened to make. They appear to have conducted themselves by *Horace's* advice;

Nec Deus interfit, nisi dignus vindice nodus (s).¹

A FOURTH Philosopher remains, and a respectable one he is, who supposes *Providential Wisdom* never to cease for a single moment, and who says to it with reverence, what *Ulysses* did to *Minerva*,

——— ἐδέ' σε λήθω

Κινύμεν. (t)

— Nor can I move, and 'scape

Thy Notice—

BUT

(r) *Virg. Æn.* iv.

(s) *Hor. Art. Poet.*

(t) *Hom. Iliad.* 10. v. 279. See *Arrian's Epictetus*, lib. i. c. 12, both in the *Original*, and in *Mrs. Carter's* excellent Translation. See also the Comment of my worthy and learned Friend *Upton*, on this Chapter, in his valuable Edition of that Author, tom. ii. p. 40, 41. See also *Psalms* cxxxix.

Ch. VI. BUT to quit Philosophers and Poets, and return from a Digression, to which we have been led insensibly by the latent connection of many different ideas.

THERE remains nothing further, in the treating of SUBSTANCE, than to say something of those characters, which are usually ascribed to it by *Aristotle* and his followers, when they consider it not in a *physical*, but in a *logical* view.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning the Properties of Substance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic.

THE ancient Logicians, or rather ARISTOTLE and his School, Ch. VII.
have given us of SUBSTANCE the following Characters.

THEY inform us that, as SUBSTANCE, *it is not susceptible of more and less (a)*. Thus a Lion is not more or less a Lion, by being more or less bulky; a Triangle is not more or less a Triangle, by being more or less acute-angled. The Intentions and Remissions are to be found in their *Accidents*; the *Effences* remain *simply* and immutably the same, and either absolutely *are*, or absolutely *are not*.

AGAIN, SUBSTANCE, they tell us, *admits of no Contraries (b)*. 'Tis to this that *Milton* alludes, when, after having personified *Substance*, he tells us,

TO FIND A FOE IT SHALL NOT BE HIS HAP,
And Peace shall lull him in her flow'ry lap (c).

THE

(a) Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. — *Arist. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Syll.*
See *Hermes*, Book I. Chap. XI.

(b) Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. *Arist. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Syll.*

(c) *Milt. Poems*, No. II.

Ch. VII.

THE Affertion is evident in *compound Beings*, that is to say, in substances *natural*; for what is there contrary to Man considered as Man, or to Lion considered as Lion? This is true also in the Relation borne by MATTER to FORM; for while Contraries by their co-incidence destroy each other, these two, *Matter* and *Form*, *coalesce so kindly*, that no Change to either arises from their Union. Thus the Marble, when adorned with the *Form* of a Statue, is as precisely Marble, as it was before; and the Oak, when fashioned into the *Form* of a Ship, is as truly Oak, as when it flourished in the Forest. If there be any Contrariety in Substance it is that of FORM to PRIVATION, where *Privation* nevertheless is nearly allied to *Non-entity*.

LASTLY, SUBSTANCE they tell us is Something, which, though it have no Contrary, yet is *by nature susceptible of all Contraries, itself still remaining one and the same (d)*.

WE cannot forget that description, given by VIRGIL, of the *Cumean Prophets*.

—— *Subito non vultus, non color unus,
Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus anhelum,
Et rabie fera corda tument (e).*

Here we see her countenance and complexion perpetually *changing*, her hair dishevelled, her breast panting, and a transition too in

(d) Μάστιγα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς ἡσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δευτικόν. *Arist. Præd. p. 29. Edit. Sylb.*

(e) *Æn. VI.*

in her manners from *sobriety* to *distractiōn*. How different is all this from the appearance of that *Sibyl*, who first so courteously received *Eneas* at *Cumæ*, and afterwards so prudently attended him to the Shades? Yet, *amidst all these Contrarieties*, was she still the same *Sibyl*; she was susceptible of them all, without becoming another woman. Ch. VII.

THIS last Character of Substance appears to be the most *essential*: for what is the *Support of Contraries*, or indeed of every Attribute, but *Substance*? Motion and Rest, Heat and Cold, Health and Sickness, Vigour and Decay, are all to be found at times in each Individual of the human race. Most of the same Contraries are to be found among Brutes, and some of them descend even to the race of Vegetables.

IF we descend from these minuter *Substances* to our terraqueous Globe, here Tempest and Calm, Frost and Thaw, Rain and Drought, Light and Darkness, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their seeming Contest, *the same* individual Globe, and not another. Thus the *Poet*, we have already quoted, still considering *Substance*, as a *Person*—

Yet he shall live in strife, and at his door

Devouring War shall never cease to roar:

Yea, it shall be his nat'ral property,

TO HARBOUR THOSE THAT ARE AT ENMITY (f).

IF

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IF we extend our views beyond the Spot which we inhabit, what is the whole visible Universe, but the comprehensive Receptacle of every Contrary conceivable? Within this immense Whole they all distributively exist, while each of them by succession fulfils it's allotted period, without disturbing the general Order, or impairing the general Beauty.

BUT if we ascend from *passive* and *material Substances* up to such as are *active* and *immaterial*, here we shall find no Distribution, no succession of Contraries; but Motion and Rest, Equality and Inequality, Similarity and Dissimilarity, Identity and Diversity, will appear, each pair co-existing within *the same* Being in *the same* instant, and that by an amazing Connection of *both together under One*.

'Tis by virtue only of this combining, this *unifying* Comprehension (and which for that reason can only belong to a Being *unextended* and *indivisible*) that the Mind or Intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were such Propositions, instead of being comprehended *at once* by something *Indivisible* and *One*, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of something *Divisible*; or were they to be comprehended by a Power indivisible, yet *not at once*, but *in a Succession*; 'twould be as impossible either way to comprehend the real Propositions, as it would, if they were to be recognized in part by a Man in *England*, in part by one in *China*; or else in part by a Man in the *present* Century, in part by one of the *succeeding*. It may be asked in such instances, *who is it that comprehends THE WHOLE (g) ?*

LASTLY,

(g) See *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. IV. Note (f). See also *Aristot. de Animâ*, l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb. Themist. Paraph.* p. 85. a. b.

LASTLY, much more in the SUPREME MIND may we find such *Coincidence*, since here not only Contraries, but all things whatever *co-exist*, and that too after a manner peculiarly transcendent; not by a Knowledge which is partial, but by one which is universal; not with *occasional* remissions, but in one uniform unremitting Energy (*h*); not by subsequent Impressions from things already *pre-existing*, but by that *original Causality*, through which it makes all things to exist.

A NOBLE field for speculating opens upon this occasion; which, tho' arising out of our Subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we shall omit, and return to our *Logical Inquiries*, concluding here what we have to advance in our Theory concerning SUBSTANCE (*i*).

WE are now to consider the remaining GENERA, PREDICAMENTS, OR ARRANGEMENTS, that is to say *Quality, Quantity, Relation, Site, &c.*

SOME of these are *at all times* no higher than *Accidents*; such for example as *Site* or *Position*, the Time *When*, and the Place *Where*. Others upon occasion *characterize*, and *essentiate*; such for example
as

(*h*) See the Chapter on *Quality*, where the Verses of *Empedocles* are quoted.

(*i*) The Author, in the representing of ancient Opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his Treatises *consistent*, and *explanatory* one of another. Those, who would see what he has already written on the *two great Elements of Substance*, discussed in this and the three preceding Chapters, may search the Index of *Hermes* for the Words, MATTER and FORM; and the Index of his first Volume, for the Word CAUSE.

Ch. VII. *as Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and many Qualities. Thus a triply extended Magnitude is essential to Body; Angularity to a Cube; Heat to Fire; and Colour to every Superficies not transparent. In all such Instances, they make a part of the Characteristic Form, and in that Sense are to be considered rather as Substances than as Accidents. However as this holds not always, and that they are sometimes as merely and as strictly Accidents, as any of those which are so always, we choose under that common Denomination to speculate upon them all, beginning according to Order first from the first.*

C H A P. VIII.

Concerning QUALITIES—corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of Capacity, and Completion—Transitions immediate, and through a medium—Dispositions, Habits—Genius—Primary and imperfect Capacity—Secondary and perfect—where it is, that no Capacities exist—Qualities, penetrating, and superficial—Essential Form—Figure, an important Quality—Figures intellectual, natural, artificial, phantastic—Colour, Roughness, Smoothness, &c.—Persons of Quality—Properties of Quality—Some rejected, one admitted, and why.

AS SUBSTANCE justly holds the *first* rank among these Predi- Ch. VIII.
caments, or *universal Arrangements*, by being the single one
among them that exists *of itself*, so the next in order, as some have
asserted (*a*), is QUALITY, because *Quality* is said to be an Attribute,
from which no Substance is exempt.

THERE

(*a*) This was the Opinion of *Archytas*—Πρώτα μὲν τέτακται ἔσας—δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ποιότης—*the first in Order is SUBSTANCE; the second, QUALITY. Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat. p. 31. Edit. Basil. Simplicius adds—ὥσπερ ἡ Οὐσία τῷ Ποσὶ προπάρχει, διότι τὸ εἶναι τῷ ποσὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔσας ἐνδίδεται ἕτως καὶ μετὰ τὸ Ποιὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ Ποσὸν, ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ιδιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἔχει—As SUBSTANCE PRECEDES Quantity, because Being is imparted to Quantity from Substance, so also must Quantity succeed and COME AFTER QUALITY, in as much as it derives from Quality its very Character, and distinctive Peculiarity.—Ibid.—Τὸ ποιὸν λέγεται ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς ἔσας—The DIFFERENCE, which attends each Substance, is called QUALITY. Arist. Metaph. Δ. c. 14. He explains it immediately—Man is a Biped Animal; Horse, a Quadruped.*

Ch.VIII.

THERE may be *Substances*, they tell us, *devoid of Quantity*; such, for example, if we admit them, as the *intellective*, or *immaterial*. But that there should be *Substances devoid of Quality*, is a thing hardly credible, because they could not *then* be *characterized*, and distinguished one from another.

ON this reasoning it is maintained, that, altho' we have no Idea of *Quantity* suggested to us in that *animating Principle*, THE SOUL, yet can we discern that this Principle has many different *Qualities*, and that Animals from these *Qualities* derive their distinct and specific Characters. There is for example a *social Sympathy* in the Soul of Man, which prompts the individuals of our Species to congregate, and form themselves into Tribes.

Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto (b).

WE can trace the same congregating Quality in the Bee, in the Beaver, and even in the ferocious Wolf. It is however less frequent in those of ferocious character; the greater part of whom, if we except those seasons while they breed and nurture their young, seem to feel no other instincts, but such as lead them to be *solitary*. 'Twas under this unfeeling and gloomy character that *Homer* describes *Polypheme*, and his giant-brethren—

—Θεμισεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

Παίδων, ἢ δ' ἀλόχων· εἰδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγχι.

—Each

(b) *Terent. Heauton. Act. I.*

——— *Each lords it o'er*
His children and his wives; NOR CARE THEY OUGHT
ONE FOR ANOTHER (c).

IT is no less obvious on the other hand, that there are QUALITIES which may be considered as peculiar to BODY. If we admit Figures, Colours, and Odours for *Qualities*, and such undoubtedly they are; we must admit of course, that among *Animal Bodies* there is one Figure to the Serpent, another to the Horse; one Colour to the Swan, another to the Parrot. Even in the *vegetable Race*, the Rose has one Odour, the Jessamine another; there is one Figure to the Orange, another to the Fig.

IT follows, therefore, that as QUALITIES help to *distinguish* not only one *Soul* from another *Soul*, and one *Body* from another *Body*, but (in a more general view) every *Soul* from every *Body*; it follows (I say) that QUALITIES, by having this common reference to *both*, are naturally divided into CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL.

'TWAS the judgment of *Shakespear* to unite them in the character of *Richard* the third, when he makes *Buckingham* relate, in what manner he recommended him to the Citizens of *London*:

Withal I did infer your lineaments,
Being the right Idea of your Father,
Both in your FORM, and NOBLENES OF MIND (d).
Virgil

(c) *Odyf.* l. ix. v. 114.

(d) *Shakef. Rich.* III.

Ch.VIII. *Virgil* does the same with respect to *Eneas*, when he makes his heroic *Virtue* and his graceful *Person* have so powerful an effect upon the unfortunate *Dido*.

Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?

Quàm sese ORE ferens, quàm FORTI PECTORE et armis? (e)

THE *Qualities* abovementioned admit of another division, and that is into NATURAL and ACQUIRED. Thus in the *Mind*, *Docility* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Science*, an *acquired one*: in the human *Body*, *Beauty* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Gentility*, an *acquired one*. This distinction descends even to Bodies *inanimate*. To transmit Objects of Vision is a *Quality natural* to Crystal; but to enlarge them, while transmitted, is a character *adventitious*. Even the same *Quality* may be *natural* in one Substance, as Attraction in the Magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the same Attraction in the Magnetic Bar.

ALL the above *Qualities* have not only their *Completion*, but their *Capacity (f)*. Thus not only the Grape, when complete (that is to say, when mature) possesses a delicious Flavour; but there is a *Capacity* also to produce it, residing in a simple Grape-stone. Even in *artificial* Substances, there are in like manner *Capacities*. A Grain of

(e) *Æn.* iv. 10, 11.

(f) Thus we translate the Words *Ἐντελέχεια* and *Δύναμις*. Sometimes we read τὰ μὲν Δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ Ἐνεργείᾳ. Δύναμις, POWER, is seen in ὕλη, MATTER; Ἐντελέχεια, COMPLETION, in εἶδος, FORM.

The Division abovementioned into *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal*, is taken from *Plotinus*, as we learn from *Simplicius in Præd.* p. 69. B.

of Gun-powder has the *Capacity* of explosion; a musical Instrument, that of rendering Harmony. If, leaving these *artificial* and *vegetative* Substances, we go still higher; we shall in *Animals* find *Capacities*, commonly known by the name of *Instincts*, to which the frame of every Species is peculiarly accommodated, and which Frame such *Instincts* internally actuate.

Ch.VIII.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nisi INTUS

Monstratum? — (g)

IN MAN there is a *Capacity to Science and Virtue*; and well would it be for him, if not also to their *Contraries*. Yet such is our Nature, such the peculiar character of the *Reasoning* Faculty, belonging to us as *Men*; it is capable of *either* Direction (*h*), and may be employed, like the same Weapon, as well to Evil as to Good.

NOR are there such *Qualities* only as *Capacities*, but there is a *contrary and negative* Sort, which may be called INCAPACITIES (*i*);
and

(g) Horat. Sat. ii. 1. 52.

(h) Ἐπαμφοτερίζει πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ [δύναμις] — Every POWER of the RATIONAL kind has a Capacity either way, that is, a double Capacity. Ammon. in Præd. p. 127. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ μετὰ λόγον δυνάμεις, αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων — The POWERS, that are connected with the REASONING Faculty, are THE SAME with respect to various and CONTRARY Operations. Arist. de Interpr. p. 75. Edit. Sylb.

'Tis thus Medicine, as an Art, can cause Sicknefs, as well as Health; Music, as an Art, can cause Discord, as well as Harmony. — And why this? — Because they are both founded in Reason; and 'tis the same Reason, in all instances, which shews us the Thing, and shews us also it's Privation. — Ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν γένησιν. Arist. Metaph. ix. 2. p. 143. Edit. Sylb. See also pages 147, 153, of the same Work.

(i) Δυνάμεις, Ἀδυναμίαι. Arist. Præd. p. 41. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.VIII. and these also of different Kinds, some for *better*, some for *worse*; so that where the *Capacities* do honour, there the *Incapacities* debase; where the *Capacities* debase, there their Opposites do honour. Thus to the Power of being taught, an *honourable* Capacity, is opposed the Incapacity of being taught, a *debasing* one; and hence is *Man* distinguished from an Insect, and the one called *docil*, the other *indocil*. Again, to the Power of *dying*, a *debasing* Capacity, is opposed the *Inability* of dying, a *superior* one; and thus are superior Beings called *immortal* (*k*) in the way of excellence, whilst *Man* is called *mortal*, with a view to subordination.

THE Transition from *Qualities* of Capacity to those of *Completion*, is sometimes *immediate*, sometimes *through a Medium*. Thus in a Grain of Gun-powder, the Transition from the *power* of exploding, to *actual* explosion, is *immediate*; so from the *power* of hearing, to *actual* hearing; from the *power* of seeing, to *actual* sight; and the same in the other *Senses* (*l*), all which we seem to possess in a sort of *perfection*

(*k*) *Suppho*, the celebrated Poetess, has a singular Sentiment upon this Subject.—Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ ἔτιω κερύκασιν· ἀπεθνήσκον γὰρ ἄν.—To die, is an Evil; the Gods have so determined it, or else they would die themselves. *Arist. Rhet.* l. ii. c. 22. S. 27.

(*l*) The *Peripatetics* made two Sorts of Capacity, both of which have a foundation in Nature, and yet are evidently distinguished the one from the other. *Man*, as a rational Being, is capable of Geometry.—This is the *first Capacity*.—After he has acquired the Science of Geometry, he possesses it, even when he *does not* geometrize.—This is the *second Capacity*; a Capacity acquired indeed by Labour, but when once acquired, called forth in an instant; a Capacity founded on the original one, but yet in every view of it far *superior* and more valuable.

All this holds with regard to the INTELLECT or MIND, but by no means with regard to the SENSES, for these are *perfect*, or *nearly so*, from the beginning, and require neither Time, nor Teaching, for their Maturity.

perfection from the beginning. But there are *other* Capacities, and those none of the meanest, where the Transition to Completion is necessarily through a Medium. Ch.VIII.

*Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
Multa tulit, fecitque puer—— (m).*

IF an *Art* be our End, there are many Energies to be practised; if a *Science*, many Theorems to be understood; if *Moral Virtue*, many Appetites to be curbed, many Opinions to be eradicated, before we can attain the wished for Goal. The *Qualities*, which distinguish any Being, during this *changeable* period, may be called TENDENCIES, DISPOSITIONS, or PROGRESSIVE QUALITIES. They are too, as well as *Capacities*, of a different colour, some *good*, some *bad*. There is a kind of laudable Progreffion, before we arrive at perfect Virtue; as there is a kind of degenerating Interval, before we sink into perfect Vice.

OUR

“Ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι τῷ θεωρεῖν—As soon as any one is born, he immediately possesses Sense, as he would actual Science; and the Energy of Sensation has a similar meaning with that of actual scientific Speculating. *Arist. de An.* ii. 5. He means by this, that every Man originally sees with the same ease, as an able Geometrician goes thro’ a Theorem. There is none of the fatigue and labour and delay of a Learner: Seeing and Hearing have no need to be taught us.

Animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut Corpus: Sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adjumento ullo ad suam conformationem indigeret. Quod autem in homine præstantissimum et optimum est, id, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. v. c. 21.

And here, by the way, we may perceive a capital Distinction between those two Powers or Faculties of the Soul, SENSE and INTELLECT, which Faculties in vulgar Speculations are too often confounded. In INTELLECT there is an *Advance to better and more complete*; a *Progreffion* wholly unknown to the Powers of SENSE, which is *complete* from the very beginning, through all it’s Operations.

(m) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.

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OUR *Tendencies* during these intervals are easy to be *interrupted*. As the Wiles of Pleasure, and an ill-directed Shame, are often fatal Checks to a young Proficient in Virtue; so are Conscience and a better Shame to young Beginners in Vice. And hence we may perceive the *true* character of these *Tendencies*; which is, that of all *Qualities* they are the *least steady* and *permanent*. Horace well describes this state of fluctuation:

————— *Si toga diffidet impar,*

Rides: Quid, mea cùm pugnat sententia secum;

Quod petiit, spernit; repetit, quod nuper omisit;

ÆSTUAT, ET VITÆ DISCONVENIT ORDINE TOTO (n).

'Tis to the same *mutable* Condition that *Epictetus* alludes, where, having *spoken* upon Proficiency, he subjoins the following advice—
 “ That after a certain time his young Philosopher should exhibit
 “ himself, to see how far the Fancies overpowered him, as they did
 “ before; and how far he was now able to resist their influence. He
 “ advises him, however, to fly at first such Conflicts, as would put
 “ his Virtue to a trial too severe; and quotes the proverb on the
 “ occasion, that the Metal Pot and the Stone Pot do not with
 “ safety accord (o).”

SUCH *therefore* is the character of these *Tendencies*, or *Dispositions* (p). But different is the case, when their course is finished,
 and

(n) Horat. *Epist.* l. i. 96.

(o) Arrian. *Epictet.* l. iii. c. 12.

(p) Διαθεσις, *Disposition*; Ἔξις, *Habit*. Arist. *Cat.* p. 40. Edit. Syll.

and when they may be said to have attained their *Maturity* and *Completion*. The Man *completely virtuous* dreads no allurements; the Man *completely vicious* feels no compunctions. Like sturdy Oaks, they defy that force, which could easily have bent them, while they were but saplings.

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AND hence, as we are not said to *have* an Estate, because we are walking upon it, or to *have* a Picture, because we are holding it; but to *have* them, implies a superior, a more *permanent possession*, such as either cannot be defeated, or at least not easily; hence I say these *Completions*, whether virtuous or vicious, are called, from their *steadiness* and *permanence*, HABITS (*q*). They are *Possessions*, which their owner may properly be said TO HAVE, and by which we call him *habitually good*, or *habitually bad*. The Professors of Medicine find this Distinction in human Bodies. 'Tis not *any* Health, (such as health just recovered, or with difficulty preserved) but 'tis *confirmed* and *steady* Health, which they call a GOOD HABIT

OF

(*q*) Διαφέρει Ἐξίς Διαθέσεως τῇ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον, καὶ δυσκίνητότερον. HABIT differs from DISPOSITION, as the latter is easily moveable, the former is of longer duration, and more difficult to be moved. Arist. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Sylb.

And just after, having spoken of Warmth and Cold, of Health and Sicknefs, and shewn how far these, when they are *mutable* and shift easily, may be called *Dispositions*, he subjoins, that so it is — ἢν μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τέτων τυγχάνει διὰ χρόνον πλεονῶν ἤδη συμπεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατ' (legitur ἀκίνητ'), ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητ' ἔσται, ἢν ἀντις ἴσως ΕΞΕΙΝ ἤδη προσαφορεύοι — Unless any one of these very affections should by length of time become naturalized, and grow either immoveable, or only to be removed with difficulty; which perfection then perhaps we may call a HABIT. Arist. Præd. p. 41. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.VIII. OF BODY. They have reference in Diseases to the same *Permanence*, when they talk of HECTIC Coughs, and HECTIC Fevers, Complaints not casual, but which *make a part* (as it were) of the Constitution.

AND thus besides the Distinctions of CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL, of NATURAL and ACQUIRED, may all QUALITIES be considered as CAPACITIES, as TENDENCIES, and as HABITS; as *Capacities* only and *Habits*, where the *transition* is *immediate*; as *all three successively*, where the transition is *through a Medium*.

IT is worth while to observe in the human Mind the *successive* appearance of *these Qualities*, where during the Transition there exists a *Medium* or *Interval*. The *original* Power, which the Mind possesses of being taught, we call NATURAL CAPACITY; and this in some degree is common to *all* Men. The *superior Facility* of being taught, which *some* possess above the rest, we call GENIUS. The *first* transitions or advances from *natural* Power, we call PROFICIENCY; and the End or *Completion* of *Proficiency* we call HABIT.

IF such *Habit* be conversant about Matter purely *Speculative*, it is then called *Science*; if it descend from Speculation to *Practice*, it is then called *Art*; and if such *Practice* be conversant in regulating the *Passions* and *Affections*, it is then called *Moral* Virtue.

EVEN

EVEN all these *Habits*, after having been thus acquired, can Ch.VIII.
return at times into Capacity, and there lie dormant and for a time
 unperceived.

———— *Alfenus vafer, omni*
Abjecto instrumento artis clausaque tabernâ,
Sutor erat———— (r)

WIDE however is the difference between this *habitual, secondary* Capacity (s), and that which is *natural and original*. The *habitual* can pass AT ONCE, when it pleases, into *perfect Energy*; the *natural*, only thro' the Medium of *Institution* and REPEATED PRACTICE.

THE several *Qualities* thus variously distinguished are to be found only in Beings of *subordinate* Nature. But if there be a BEING, whose Existence is *all-perfect* and *complete*, and such must that Being *necessarily* be, the Source of Perfection to all others; with the nature of such Being *this Variety* will be incompatible. In Him are no *Powers* or *dormant Capacities*, no *Proficiencies* or *Transitions* from worse to better, and still much less from better to worse; *but a full and immutable Energie thro' every part of Space*. 'Twas concerning this divine Principle that *Empedocles* sung of old.

Οὔτε

(r) *Horat. Sat. i. 3. 130.*

(s) See before Note, p. 86 — ἐχ' ἀπλῆ ὄντ' τῆ δυνάμει λεγόμενῃ, ἀλλὰ τῆ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴπομεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τῆ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα — CAPACITY or POWER is not a simple Term of one Meaning only, but there is one Sort, when we say of a Child, he has a Capacity to be a military Leader; another, when we say so of a Man, who is in complete Maturity. *Arist. de An. l. ii. c. 5. p. 33. Edit. Sylb.*

Ch. VIII.

Οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέη κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασαν,
 Οὐ μὲν ἀπαὶ νώτων γε δύο κλάδοι αἴσσεσιν,
 Οὐ πόδες, ἔθ' ἰδοὶ γένα, ἔθ' μήδεα λαχνηέηλα,
 Ἀλλὰ φρενὶ ἱερῇ, καὶ ἀθέσφατ' ἔπλετο μένον,
 Φροντίσι κόσμον ἀπαντὰ καταΐσσεσθαι δοῖσι.

*No Limbs hath he, with human head adorned;
 Nor from his Shoulders branch two sprouting Arms;
 To him belong nor feet, nor pliant knees;
 But MIND ALONE he was; ineffable,
 And HOLY MIND; that rapidly pervades
 With providential cares the mighty World (t).*

THE Speculations of this Genus, or Arrangement, having now carried us to the sublimest of all Objects, ought here to end. But as there still remain a few observations, and besides these a disquisition into the *Properties of the Genus*, and that the apparent, as well

(t) See *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 199. B. and *Poet. Philosoph. Hen. Step.* p. 30, where, instead of ἔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέη, we read ἔθ' μὲν γὰρ βροτή.

And here it may be observed by way of digression, that in this part of *Ammonius*, a part truly valuable, and deeply philosophical, we meet in the printed text two Chasms, which much impair the meaning. The first occurs p. 199. B. line 19, between the words τῶν—καὶ τῶν. Here a MS. Collation supplies the word ἀφανῶν. The second occurs p. 200, line 2, after the word συνιέντων. Here the same MS. supplies the following valuable Reading, which lies far beyond the reach of the most acute Conjecture. The words are—ἔθ' συνιέντων [ὅτι περιπετάσματα τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσι.]

There is a third Reading from the same Authority, in the fourth line of the same page, which is ἀπ' ἐκείνων, instead of ἐπ' ἐκείνων, a Reading manifestly better, though not so important as the former.


The Edition of *Ammonius*, here referred to, is that of *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1545. The same places may be found in the Edition of *Aldus* at *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1546, page 172, B. p. 173, and in the *Fol. Edition* of the same *Aldus*, in the year 1503, where the pages are not marked, but where the above Chasms easily shew themselves to the Reader's eye.

well as the real; we cannot quit the subject, till these inquiries have been first satisfied. Thus then the Treatise proceeds. Ch.VIII.
}

WITH respect to QUALITIES PURELY CORPOREAL, they may be considered either as *penetrating* Body, such as Gravitation, Heat, Flavour, and the like; or else as *confined to the Surface*, such as Figure, Colour, Smoothness, Roughness, &c. Those *internal Qualities* which pervade the *whole*, (whether they arise merely from Organization, or include that, and something more) constitute what we call *essential Form* or *natural Essence*. And hence the just Idea of *natural Essence*, or *essential Form (u)*, which consists in giving a *Character* to the subject, which it pervades. 'Tis thro' this *internally pervading Character*, that Substances are 'what they are; that they become not only distinguished from one *another*, but from the nicest Mimicries of *Art*; the *real* Orange from the Orange of Wax, the *living* Lion from the Lion painted.

INDEED one of the capital Distinctions between Operations *Natural* and *Artificial*, is, that *Nature penetrates*, while *Art stops at the surface*. 'Tis the Surface of the Canvas, which the Painter covers; the Surface of the Gem, which the Jeweller polishes; the Surface of the Steel, to which the Smith gives a Figure; and the Surface of the String, to which the Musician applies his Bow. There is hardly *any* deviation from this rule with respect to *Arts*, if we except *those only*, (such as Cookery and Medicine) the business of which consists principally in *compounding* natural Materials. Here indeed the Proportions pass thro' the *whole* Composition, and the
more

(u) See before, p. 51, 52.

Ch.VIII.  more accurate these Proportions, the greater of course the merit of each Artift.

It must be remembered however, that tho' *artificial Qualities* are mostly *superficial*, yet are not *all natural Qualities* to be considered as *internal*. The FORM or ESSENCE of every *natural Substance* (that is to say, in other words, *it's System of internal Qualities*) extends itself *outwardly (x)* every way from *within*; and, as it must necessarily *stop somewhere*, (every individual being finite) so according to the *different points*, at which it stops in it's *Evolution*, it communicates to each Substance a *different* and *peculiar Figure*. And hence the true character of every NATURAL and SPECIFIC FIGURE, which ought not to be considered merely as a *Surface*, but as a *Bound*; the Bound, to which the *internal Essence* or *Form* every way extends itself, and at which, when it is arrived, it finally terminates.

For this reason it is, that of all the *external Qualities* there is none so capital, so characteristic, as FIGURE. 'Tis a kind of *universal Signature*, by which Nature makes known to us the several Species of her Productions; the primary and obvious test, by which we pronounce this a Vegetable, and that an Animal; this an Oak, and that a Lion: so that if we neither suspect fraud, nor the fallibility of our own Organs, we commonly rest here, and inquire no farther.

IF

(x) "Ὡς περ δὲ τῆς διατάξεως τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ Σχῆμα, ἥτοις ἢ τῶν ὅλων εἶδος ἀποτελεύτησις ἄχρι τῆς ἐπιφανείας τὴν Μορφήν ἀπεγένησεν, ἔσται αὐτὴν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔχον τὰς Εἶδας, καὶ τελευταίαν ἔκτασιν τῆς τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς προόδου—Simplic. in Præd. p. 69. B. Edit. Basil.—For as the End or Extremity of any Extension is the FIGURE, so the Ending of a complete Form, at it's Surface, produces SHAPE; Shape being itself the apparent Vestige of that Form, and the ultimate Extent of that Progression, which the internal Ratio makes outwards.

IF we pass from these *natural* Subjects to contemplate FIGURE in works of *Art*, we shall discover it to be *almost* all, that *Art* is able to communicate. 'Tis to this that the Painter arrives by *Addition*; the Sculptor by *Detraction*; the Founder by *Fusion*; and the Stucco-Artist by *Moulding*. Even when we contemplate the Tools of Art, it will appear that as 'tis by virtue of their *Figure* alone the Saw divides, the Hammer drives, and the Pincers extract; so is it from these several *Figures*, that they derive their Character and their Name, not from their *Matter*, which Matter is often the *same*, when the Tools are totally different, and distinct one from another*.

NOR are these *artificial* the only *Figures*, with which Man is found conversant. Among the various *possibilities*, which the Mind suggests, there is a *more accurate* tribe of *Figures*, which it recognizes and defines, and *which*, it may be justly questioned, *whether Matter ever possessed*; for example, the *perfect* Triangle, the *perfect* Circle, the *perfect* Pyramid, the *perfect* Sphere, with the rest of those FIGURES commonly called MATHEMATICAL†. These are not sought out by *Experiments*, nor are the *Truths* dependent on them derived from Experiments, being in fact the result of a *more authentic* Knowledge, that is to say in other words, of the purest *Demonstration*. On these Figures, and their dependent Truths, rests the whole of *Mechanics*, so highly useful to human life; rest *Astronomy* and *Optics*, and a large part of *Physics*, some of the noblest subjects among the *corporeal* for contemplation.

THE

* See before, Chap. IV.

† See Vol. I. Treatise the Third, (Concerning Happiness) Part I. §. 4. and in the Notes.

Ch.VIII.

THE industry of Man stops not even here, but prompts him to search for *Figures*, not only in his *Intellect*, but in a *lower* faculty.

The Poet's Eye in a fine Phrenzy rolling
Doth glance from Heav'n to Earth, from Earth to Heav'n,
And as IMAGINATION bodies forth
 THE FORMS OF THINGS UNKNOWN, *the Poet's Pen*
Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy nothings
A local Habitation and a Name (z).

And hence that tribe of FIGURES, which are neither *natural*, nor *artificial*, nor *intellectual*, but which make a *fourth* sort, that may be called PHANTASTIC, or IMAGINARY; such as Centaurs, Satyrs, Sphinxes, Hydras, &c.

AND so much for FIGURE, that most *capital Quality* of all the *superficial*.

THE next *Quality* of this sort after *Figure* is COLOUR, the Source, like *Figure*, of many Varieties and Distinctions. Yet that it is inferior to *Figure*, is obvious from this: in the Sketches of a Painter, we know things by their *Figures alone*, without their Colours; but not by their *Colours alone*, when divested of their Figures.

As for Roughness, Smoothness, Hardness, Softness, tho' they may be said perhaps to penetrate farther than the Surface, yet are they, to Man's Sensation at least, so many *Qualities superficial*.

AND

(z) *Shakesf. Midf. Night's Dream, Act. V. Sc. I.*

AND now with respect to *all* kinds of QUALITIES whether corporeal or incorporeal, there is one thing to be observed, that *some* degree of *Permanence* is always requisite; else they are not so properly *Qualities*, as *incidental Affections* (a). Thus we call not a man *passionate*, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is *prone to frequent anger*; nor do we say a man is of a *pallid* or a *ruddy* Complexion, because he is *red* by immediate *exercise*, or *pale* by sudden *fear*, but when that Paleness or Redness may be called *constitutional*.

WE have said already, that it was *the Essence of all Qualities to CHARACTERIZE and DISTINGUISH*. And hence the Origin of that Phrase, *a Person of Quality*; that is to say a Person distinguished from the *Vulgar* by his Valour, his Wisdom, or some other capital Accomplishment. As these were the *primary* Sources of those *external* Honours, paid to eminent Men in Precedencies, Titles, and various other Privileges; it followed that these *Honours* by degrees grew to represent the *things honoured*; so that as *Virtue* led originally to *Rank*, *Rank* in after days came to infer *Virtue*; particular Ranks, particular Virtues; that of a Prince, *Serenity*; of an Ambassador, *Excellence*; of a Duke, *Grace*; of a Pope, *Holiness*; of a Justice or Mayor, *Worship*, &c. &c.

As

(a) These Aristotle calls Πάθη.—Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὰ αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, ἔτε ὁ ὀχρεῖων διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ὀχρείας· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονημένοι τι· ὥτε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ ἔ. — Neither is the Man, who blushes from being ashamed, called of a Reddish Complexion; nor is he, who turns pale from being frightened, called of a Palish Complexion, but they are rather said to have been particularly affected; for which reason such Events are called incidental AFFECTIONS, and not QUALITIES. *Aristot. Præd. p. 43. Edit. Sylb.*

Ch.VIII.

As to the GENERAL PROPERTIES of QUALITY, they may be found among the following.

CONTRARIETY appertains to it (*b*). Thus in the *corporeal Qualities*, Hot is contrary to Cold, and Black to White. So too in *mental Qualities*, Wisdom is contrary to Folly, and Virtue to Vice: subordinate Virtues to subordinate Vices; Liberality to Avarice, Courage to Cowardice. Even *Vices* themselves are contrary one to another; Cowardice to Temerity; Avarice to Profusion. It may be doubted, however, whether this character of Quality be *universal*; for what among *Figures* is there *Contrary* in one *Figure* to another, either in the Square to the Circle, or in the Circle to the Square?

ANOTHER *Property* of *Qualities* is TO ADMIT OF INTENSION AND REMISSION (*c*). Thus of *two* Persons handsome, there may be one *the handsomer*; and among *many* handsome, one the *handsomest*.

Πασάων δ' ὕπερ ἦγε κάρη ἔχει, ἥδ' ἐ μέτωπα,
'Ρεῖα δ' ἀριγνώτη πέλεται, καλαὶ δέ τε πᾶσαι (*d*).

*Far above all she bears her tow'ring head,
With ease distinguish'd, tho' they all are fair.*

So

(*b*) Ὑπάρχει δὲ Ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν, κ.τ.λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 44. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*c*) Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τὰ ποιά κ.τ.λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*d*) *Hom. Odys.* Z. 107.

So Sir John Falstaff, speaking to his Companion, the young Prince—I am not John a Gaunt, your Grandfather; and yet I am no Coward (e). Ch.VIII.

It appears, however, that the above-mentioned Species of Quality called *Figure* no more admits this Property, than it did *Contrariety*. The Figures, which are Triangles, are not *more so* one than another; no more are the Circles, Circles; the Squares, Squares, &c. which seems indeed to arise from their *definitude* and *precision**.

BUT there is a *Property* to be found, which may justly deserve the name, by being *common at least to the whole Genus*, if not *peculiar to that only*: and this Property is, that BY VIRTUE OF THEIR QUALITIES THINGS ARE DENOMINATED LIKE and UNLIKE (f). 'Tis thus that the Swan by his *Quality* of Whiteness resembles the Snow; that Achilles by his *Quality* of fierceness resembles a Mastiff; and that the Earth by her *Quality* of Figure is like to a Bowl,

FROM this Property we see the reason, why there is no *Arrangement*, to which the Poets are so much indebted, as to this; since hence they derive those innumerable Images, which so strongly distinguish Poetry from every other Species of Writing. For example: let us suppose a young Hero just slain; let us suppose him lying,

(e) Shakef. Hen. IV.

* See *Hermes*, Book I. Chap. XI.

(f) Ὅμοια δὲ ἢ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητες λέγεσθαι ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐστὶ κατ' ἄλλο ἕτερον, ἢ καὶ ὁ ποιόν ἐστιν. *Arist. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ch.VIII. lying, with a drooping head, a face divested of life and bloom, yet still retaining traces both of beauty and of youth. The Poet would illustrate this pathetic Image by finding something that *resembles* it. And where is he to search, but where he can discover *similar Qualities*? He finds at length an *assemblage* of them in a flower just gathered: the same drooping head, the same lifeless fade, the same relicts of a form that was *once* fair and flourishing.

Thus then *Virgil*, speaking of young *Pallas*—

Qualem virgineo demessum pollice florem

Seu mollis violæ, seu languentis hyacinthi,

Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua forma recessit;

Non jam mater alit tellus, viresque ministrat (g).

AGAIN, what would *Milton* have us conceive, when he describes the tremendous *Shield of Satan*?—Those conspicuous Characters of *Brightness, Vastness, and Rotundity*. To what subject then ought he to refer, that we may comprehend what he would describe? It must be to one, that eminently possesses an *assemblage of the same Qualities*. Let the Poet in his own Words inform us *what* this Subject is:

————— *The broad Circumference*

Hung on his Shoulders, LIKE THE MOON (h).

THE

(g) *Æn.* xi. 68.

(h) *Par. Lost*, l. i. 286.

THE reason of this *Property* may be perhaps as follows. *To be like* is something *less* than to be perfectly *the same*, and something *more* than to be perfectly *different*. And hence it is, that when two things are called *like*, there is implied in their nature something of *Sameness*, and something of *Diversity*. If it be asked what the *Sameness* is, we answer, it must be something *more definitive* than those *transcendental Samenesses*, which run thro' all things. We say not that a piece of Ebony is *like* a Swan, because they both *are*; or that a Crow *resembles* a Snow-ball, because each of them is *One*, and not two. The *Identity* must be sought from among the number of those *Qualities*, the nature of which is less extensive, and *more* confined to particular *Species*. Let *Blackness*, for example, be a *Quality* of this character in that union of *Qualities*, which constitutes *Ebony*; and let *the same Quality* be one also in *that union*, which constitutes a *Crow*. So far then the *Ebony* and the *Crow* are the same; thro' every other *Quality* perhaps they are different; and thro' *Sameness*, thus temper'd by *Diversity*, they become, and are called *LIKE* (i).

THE same happens to the *Earth* and a *Bowl*, from their *common Rotundity*; to the *Hero* and the *Mastiff*, from their *common Ferocity*.

AND so much for the *second universal Genus, Arrangement*, or *Predicament*, the *Genus of QUALITY*, it's various *SPECIES*, and it's different *PROPERTIES*.

(i) See Note, p. 52. and Note, p. 108.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning QUANTITY—it's two Species—their characters—Time, and Place—their characters—PROPERTY of Quantity, what—Quantities relative—Figure and Number, their Effect upon Quantity—Importance of this Effect—Sciences Mathematical appertain to it—their use, according to Plato—how other Beings partake of Quantity—Analogy, found in Mind—Common Sense and Genius, how distinguished—Amazing Efficacy of this Genus in and thro' the World—Illustrations.

Ch. IX.

THE Attribute of *Substance*, standing in Arrangement next to *Quality*, is QUANTITY; the former having precedence, as being supposed *more universal*; while the latter, at least in appearance, seems not to extend beyond *Body*.

OUT of *natural Bodies* is the visible *World* composed, and we may contemplate them in different manners; either *one Body* taken by *itself* and *alone*; or *many Bodies* taken *collectively*, and at once. When *Virgil* says of the Oak,

— QUANTUM vertice ad auras
Ætherias, TANTUM radice ad Tartara tendit— (a)

OR

(a) *Geor.* ii. 291.

or when *Milton* informs us, that

Ch. IX.

Behemoth, biggest born of Earth, upheaved
HIS VASTNESS—— (b).

in these instances we have *only one Body*, taken by *itself* and *alone*, and this naturally suggests the Idea of *MAGNITUDE*. But when in *Virgil* we read,

Quàm MULTA in sylvis autumnni frigore primo
Lapsa cadunt folia—— (c).

or when in *Milton*,

THICK as autumnal leaves, that strew the brooks
In Vallombrosa—— (d).

in these instances we have *many Bodies* taken *collectively* and *at once*, and this naturally suggests the Idea of *MULTITUDE*.

HORACE gives the two Species together in his fine address to *Augustus*:

Cum TOT sustineas et TANTA negotia—— (e).

Now in *MAGNITUDE* and *MULTITUDE* we behold these two primary, these *two* grand and comprehensive Species, into which the
Genus

(b) *Par. Lost*, vii. 471.

(c) *Æn.* vi. 309.

(d) *Par. Lost*, i. 302.

(e) *Horat. Epist.* l. ii. 1.

Ch. IX. *Genus of Quantity is divided; MAGNITUDE, from it's Union, being called QUANTITY CONTINUOUS; MULTITUDE, from it's Separation, QUANTITY DISCRETE (f).*

OF the *Continuous* kind is every *Solid*; also the *bound* of every *Solid*, that is, a *Superficies*; and the *bound* of every *Superficies*, that is, a *Line*; to which may be added those two *concomitants* of every *Body*, namely *Time* and *Place*. Of the *Discrete* kind are *Fleets*, *Armies*, *Herds*, *Flocks*, the *Syllables* of *Sounds* *articulate*, &c.

WE have mentioned formerly (g), when we treated of *Time*, that every *Now* or present *Instant* was a *Boundary* or *Term*, at which the *Past* ended, and the *Future* began; and that 'twas in the *Perpetuity* of this *Connection*, that *Time* became *continuous*. In like manner *within every Line* may be assumed infinite *such Connectives*, under the character of *Points*; and within every *Superficies*, under the character of *Lines*; and within every *Solid*, under the character of *Superficies*; to which *Connectives* these *Quantities* owe their *Continuity*. And hence a *Specific Distinction*, attending all *Quantities continuous*, that their *several Parts every where coincide in a common Boundary or Connective (h)*.

It

(f) Τῆ δὲ Ποσὶ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές. *Aristot. Præd. p. 30. Edit. Sylb.*

(g) See *Hermes*, Book I. Chap. VII.

(h) See *Arist. Prædic. p. 31. Edit. Sylb.* — ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχὴς ἐστίν, κ. τ. λ. This Character is described to be — πρὸς τινὰ κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτεσθαι. — *Ibid.*

IT is not so with *Quantities discrete*: for here such *Co-incidence* is plainly impossible. Let us suppose, for example, a Multitude of

Squares; x, y, z , &c: $\begin{array}{c} \text{A} \quad \text{C} \quad \text{E} \quad \text{G} \\ \boxed{x} \quad \boxed{y} \quad \boxed{z} \\ \text{B} \quad \text{D} \quad \text{F} \quad \text{H} \end{array}$

Here if the Line AB, where the Square x ends, were the same with the Line CD, where the Square y begins, and EF in like manner the same with GH; they would no longer be a *Multitude* of Squares,

but one continuous Parallelogram, such as $\begin{array}{c} \text{K} \quad \quad \quad \text{N} \\ \boxed{\quad} \boxed{\quad} \boxed{\quad} \\ \text{M} \quad \quad \quad \text{L} \end{array}$ the figure KMNL.

ANOTHER *Specific* Character belonging to the Solid Body, the Superficies, and the Line, (*all of which* are *Quantities Continuous*) is, that *their Parts have a definite Position within some definite Whole (i)*; while in *Quantities discrete*, that is in *Multitudes*, such Position is no way requisite. In the most perfect continuous *Quantities*, such as Beams of Timber, Blocks of Marble, &c. 'tis with difficulty the Parts can change Position, without destruction to the *Quantity*, taken as continuous. But a herd of Cattle, or an Army of Soldiers, may change Position as often as they please, and no damage arise to the *Multitude*, considered as a *Multitude*.

IT must be remembered however, that *this Character of Position extends not to TIME*, tho' Time be a *Continuous Subject*. How indeed should

(i) "Ἐτι, τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε· οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα, κ.τ.λ. Arist. Præd. p. 31. Edit. Sylb.

Ch. IX. should the Parts of *Time* have *Position*, which are so far from being permanent, that *they fly* as fast as they arrive? Here therefore we are rather to look for a *Sequel in just Order* (k); for a Continuity not by *Position*, as in the Limbs of an Animal, but for a Continuity by *Succession*;

————— *velut unda supervenit undam* (l).

AND thus are the two Species of *Quantity*, THE CONTINUOUS and THE DISCRETE distinguished from each other.

BESIDES this, among the *Continuous themselves* there is a farther *Distinction*. BODY and it's Attributes, the Superficies and the Line, are continuous Quantities, capable all of them of being *divided*; and by being divided, of becoming a *Multitude*; and by becoming a *Multitude*, of passing into *Quantity Discrete*. But those continuous Quantities, TIME and PLACE, admit not, like the others, even the possibility of being divided. For grant *Place* to be divided, as *Germany* is divided from *Spain*: what *interval* can we suppose, except it be *other Place*?—Again, suppose *Time* to be divided, as the Age of *Sophocles* from that of *Shakespeare*: what *Interval* are we to substitute, except it be *other Time*? PLACE therefore and TIME, tho' continuous like the rest, are incapable of being divided, because they admit not, like the rest, to have their Continuity broken (m).

BUT

(k) "Ο δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τῷτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μάλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τῷ χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον. *Arist. Præd.* p. 32. *Edit. Sylb.*

(l) *Horat. Epist.* ii. 2. 176.

(m) They cannot be divided ACTUALLY, from the reasons here given;—but they may be divided IN POWER, else they could not be CONTINUOUS; nor could there exist such Terms, as a Month, a Year, a Cubit, a Furlong, &c.


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BUT to proceed. Let us imagine, as we are walking, that at a distance we view a Mountain, and at our feet a Mole-hill. The Mountain we call *Great*, the Mole-hill *Little*; and thus we have two *opposite* Attributes in *Quantity Continuous*. Again, in a meadow we view a Herd of Oxen grazing; in a field, we see a Yoke of them ploughing the land. The Herd we call *Many*, the Yoke we call *Few*; and thus have we two *similar Opposites* in *Quantity Discrete*.

OF these four Attributes, *Great* and *Many* fall under the common name of *Excess*; *Little* and *Few* under the common name of *Defect*.

Again,

In this Sense of *potential* Division, they may be divided *infinitely*, as appears from the following Theorem.



Let A and B be two Spheres, that are moving, and let A be the *quicker* moving Sphere; B, the *slower*; and let the slower have moved thro' the Space $\gamma\delta$ in the Time $\zeta\eta$. 'Tis evident that the quicker will have moved thro' the same Space in a less Time. Let it have moved thro' it in the Time $\zeta\theta$. 'Tis thus *the Sphere A divides the Time*. Again, in as much as the quicker A has in the Time $\zeta\theta$ past thro' the whole Space $\gamma\delta$, the slower B in the same Time will have past thro' a smaller Space. Let this be $\gamma\kappa$. 'Tis thus *the Sphere B divides the Space*. Again, in as much as the slower Sphere B in the Time $\zeta\theta$ has past thro' the Space $\gamma\kappa$, the quicker Sphere A will have past thro' it in a less Time; so that the Time $\zeta\theta$ will be again divided by the quicker Body. But this being so divided, the Space $\gamma\kappa$ will be divided also by the slower Body, according to the same Ratio. And thus it will always be, as often as we repeat successively what has been already demonstrated: for the *quicker Body* will after this manner divide *the Time*; and the *slower Body* will divide *the Space*; and that, in either case, *to Infinite*, because their *Continuity is infinitely divisible in power*. See the Original of this Theorem in *Aristotle's Physics*, lib. vi. cap. 2. p. 111. *Edit. Sylb.* "Ἐστὼ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ᾧ α, κ. τ. λ.

Ch. IX. Again, *Excess* and *Defect*, tho' they include these four, are themselves included under the common name of *Inequality*. Farther still, even *Inequality* itself is but a Species of *Diversity*; as it's Opposite, *Equality*, is but a Species of *Identity*. They are subordinate Species confined always to *Quantity*, while *IDENTITY* AND *DIVERSITY* (their *Genera*) may be found to pass thro' all things (n).

Now 'tis here, namely in these two, *Equality* and *Inequality*, that we are to look for that *PROPERTY*, by which *this Genus is distinguished*. It is from *QUANTITY ONLY* that things are denominated *EQUAL* or *UNEQUAL* (o).

FARTHER still—Whatever is *Equal*, is equal to *something else*; and thus is *Equality* a *RELATIVE* Term. Again, if we resolve *Inequality* into it's several *Excesses* and *Defects*, it will be apparent that each of these is a *Relative* Term also. 'Tis with reference to *Little* that *Great* is called *Great*; with reference to *Few*, that *Many* are called *Many*; and 'tis by the same habitudes inverted exist *Little* and *Few*. And thus is it that, thro' the Property here mentioned, the Attribute of *QUANTITY* passes insensibly into that of *RELATION* (p); a fact not unusual in other Attributes as well

(n) The following Characters of the three first great Arrangements, or universal Genera, are thus described by Aristotle.—Ταυτὰ μὲν γὰρ, ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία· ὅμοια δ', ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία· ἴσα δὲ, ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἓν.—Things are the SAME, of which the SUBSTANCE is one; SIMILAR, of which the QUALITY is one; EQUAL, of which the QUANTITY is one. *Metaph. Δ. κεφ. ιε.* p. 88. Edit. Syll.

(o) —ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τῷ ποσῷ, τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι—*Arist. Præd.* p. 34.

(p) Aristotle says expressly of the Things here mentioned, that no one of them is *Quantity*, but exists rather among the Tribe of *Relatives*, in as much as nothing is *Great*

well as these, from the universal Sympathy and Congeniality of Nature. Ch. IX.

NAY so merely *relative* are many of these Excesses and Defects, that the *same* subject, from it's different *Relations*, may be found susceptible of *both at once*. The Mountain, which by it's Relation to the Mole-hill, was *great*; by it's Relation to the Earth, is *little*: and the Herd, which were *many* by their Relation to the single Yoke, are *few* by their Relation to the Sands of the Sea-shoar (*q*). And hence it appears that the Excesses and Defects, which belong to *Quantity*, are not of a *relative* Nature only, but of an *indefinite* one likewise. The truth of this will become still more evident, when it is remembered, that every Magnitude is *infinitely divisible*; and that every Multitude is *infinitely augmentable*.

WHAT then is to be done? How is it possible that *such* Attributes should become the Objects of *Science*? 'Tis then only we are said to *know*, when our Perception is *definite* (*r*); since whatever falls short of this, is not *Knowledge*, but *Opinion*. Can then the Know-
lege

Great or Little of itself, but merely with reference to something else.—Τῶν δὲ ἑνὲν ἐστὶ ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τι, ἑνὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτό· κ.τ.λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 33. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*q*) *Aristotle's* Instance goes farther, and shews how a *smaller* Number may be called *Many*; a *larger* Number be called *Few*.—ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φαμέν εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγας, πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλὰς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγας, πολλῶν πλείους αὐτῶν ὄντας.—*We say there are MANY Men in a Village; and but FEW in Athens, tho' the Number in this last be many times larger; so too we say there are MANY Persons in a House, and but FEW in the Theatre, tho' the Number in this last may be many times more.* *Ibid.*

(*r*) See before, page 14, 15; and *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. IV. § 1.

Ch. IX.

lege be *definite*, when it's Object is *indefinite*? Is not this the same, as if we were to behold an Object as strait, which was in itself crooked; or an Object as quiescent, which was in itself moving? We may repeat therefore the question, and demand, what is to be done?—It may be answered as follows: *Quantity Continuous* is circumscribed by FIGURE, which, being the natural boundary both of the Superficies and the Solid, gives them the distinguishing Names of Triangle, Square, or Circle; of Pyramid, Cube, or Sphere, &c. By these FIGURES not only the *Infinity of Magnitude* is limited, but the means also are furnished for its most exact Mensuration. Again, the *Infinity of Quantity Discrete* is ascertained by NUMBER, the very Definition of which is πλῆθος ὁρισμένον, that is, *Multitude circumscribed or defined*. Thus, if, in describing a Battle, we are told that *many* of the Enemy were slain, and but *few* saved; our Knowledge (if it deserve the name) is perfectly vague and *indefinite*. But if these indefinite *Multitudes* are defined by Number, and we are told that the slain were a *thousand*, the saved a *hundred*; in such Case our Knowledge becomes adequate and *complete*.

'Tis in the contemplation of these two *Quantities* thus defined, the Continuous by *Figure*, the Discrete by *Number*, that we behold them rendered subjects for the two *noblest* of Sciences, the first of them for GEOMETRY, the second for ARITHMETIC (*s*); from which two (and not from mere Experiments, as some have hastily asserted) both the Knowledge of Nature, and the Utilities of common Life, are in the greatest part derived.

'Tis

(s) See *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. IV. § 1.

'Tis here we see the rise of those *Mathematical* Sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, &c. which the Ancients esteemed so essential to a liberal Education. Nor can we believe there is any one now, but must acknowledge, that a Mind properly tinged with such noble Speculations (supposing there be no want of Genius, or of Courage) is qualified to excel in every superior Scene of Life. Far more honourable they surely are, than the Arts of riding a Horse, or of wielding a Sword, those Accomplishments usually assigned to our Youth of Distinction, and for the sake of which alone they are often sent into distant Countries, as if there were nothing to be taught them *at home*, nor any thing in a Gentleman worth cultivating, but his Body. We would not undervalue these *bodily* Accomplishments (for Perfection of every sort is certainly worth aiming at); but we would wish them to be rated as much below the *mental*, as the *Body* itself is inferior to the *Mind*.

THERE is an elegant account of the Sciences abovementioned in the Republic of *Plato*. *Glaucus* (one of the Persons in the Dialogue) takes pains to recommend them from their Usefulness in human life: Arithmetic for accounts and distributions; Geometry for incampments and mensurations; Music for solemn festivals in honour of the Gods; and Astronomy for agriculture, for navigation, and the like. *Socrates*, on his part, denies not the truth of all this, but still insinuates, that they were capable of answering an end more sublime. "You are pleasant, says he, in your seeming to fear the multitude, lest you should be thought to enjoin certain Sciences, that are useless. 'Tis indeed no contemptible matter, tho' a difficult one, to believe, that thro' these particular Sciences the Soul has an
" Organ

Ch. IX. *“ Organ purified and enlightened, which is destroyed and blinded by
 “ Studies of other kind; an Organ better worth saving than a thousand
 “ Eyes; in as much as TRUTH becomes visible thro’ THIS ALONE” (t).*

THESE, that we have here mentioned, appear to be the *only* Species of *Quantity*; in as much as other things are called *Quantities*, not from *themselves*, but with reference to *these*. Thus we say that there is *much* White, because the *Superficies*, which it covers, is *much*; and that an *Action* was *long*, because *the Time* was long, during which it was transacted. And hence it is, that, if any one is to explain the *Quantity of an Action*, as for example the length of the *Trojan War*, he explains it by the *Time*, saying it was a War of ten *Years*. So when we give the *Quantity* of any thing White, we define it by the *Superficies*, because, as that is in *Quantity*, so also is the *White* (u).

WE farther observe that *Quantity Continuous* and *Discrete* may be said to *blend* themselves with all things. Thus in *Substances*, let Mount *Athos* represent the former; the Army of *Xerxes*, the latter. In *Colours*, let us view the former in the uniform *Blueness* of a clear sky; the latter, in the many and diversified Tints of a Rainbow.

In

(t) The above is an attempt to translate the following elegant Passage of *Plato*.—
 Ἦδὺς εἶ, ὅτι εἰκας δεδιότι τὰς πολλὰς, μὴ δοκῆς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προσάτειν· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πᾶν φαῦλον,
 ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πειθεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐν τέτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκαστοῖς ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται, καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται,
 ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλάμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον δὲ σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ
 αὐτῷ Ἀλήθεια ὁράται. *Plat. de Repub. lib. vii. p. 527. Edit. Serran. Hermes, Book II. Chap. V.*

(u) Κυρίως δὲ Ποσὰ ταῦτα λέγεται μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποβλέποντες, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα Ποσὰ λέγομεν· οἷον πολὺ τὸ λεῖκον λέγεται, τῷ γε τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
 πολλὴν εἶναι· καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ, τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. *Aristot. Præd. p. 32. Edit. Sylb.*

In *Sounds* we find *Quantity Discrete* belonging to *Speech* or *Language*, it being the Effence of Articulation, that every Syllable should be distinct. *The Continuous*, on the contrary, naturally suggests itself to our Ears, when we hear Yellings, Howlings, and heavy Pfalmody. In *Motions*, when a Grasshopper moves *by leaps*, we behold *Quantity discrete*; when a Ship sails *smoothly*, we behold *Quantity Continuous*. The motion of all Animals, that have feet, (whether they leap or not) by being *alternate*, is of the *discrete* kind: but 'tis fabled of the Gods, that, when they moved as Gods, 'twas under *one continued progression* of their whole frame together; to which *Virgil* they say alludes in speaking of *Venus*,

Et vera INCESSU patuit DEA—(x).

THE MIND, tho' devoid of *Corporeal* Extension, admits what is *analogous* to these two Species of *Quantity*, and recognizes their force even within the sacred recesses of itself. For what can be more truly united in *perfect Continuity*, than the Terms which compose a *Self-evident Truth*? And how is this *Continuity* still farther extended, when by the Union of two such Truths there is produced a third, under the indissoluble Connection of a *Demonstrative Syllogism*? If there was not this *Syllogistic Continuity*, there might indeed be other Continuities, but it would never be in our power to prove any thing concerning them. Again, when we consider either *many Propositions*, without reference to a *Syllogism*; or *many independent Terms*,

(x) *Æn.* I. 411.

Ch. IX. Terms, without reference to a *Proposition*; what have we then but *Quantity discrete*? PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS? Treasures, as capable of being *number'd*, estimated, and recorded, as those which the Miser commits to his coffers.

'Tis indeed by the help of an *innate* power of *Distinction*, that we recognize the *Differences* of things, as 'tis by a *contrary* power of *Composition*, that we recognize their *Identities* (*y*). These powers, in some degree, are *common to all Minds*; and as they are the Basis of our whole Knowledge (which is of necessity either *affirmative* or *negative*) they may be said to constitute what we call COMMON SENSE (*z*). On the contrary, to possess these Powers in a *more eminent* degree, so as to be able to perceive *Identity* in things *widely* different, and *Diversity* in things *nearly* the same; this 'tis that constitutes what we call GENIUS, that Power divine, which thro' every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another.

It was from Speculations of this kind, that some of the Ancients were induced to consider QUANTITY in a far higher rank than is usual in common Speculations. " They considered *both Species*
 " under *the common* character of a BOUND or MEASURE, and as
 " such to be conspicuous throughout the whole Universe; the nature
 " of the *Continuous*, called MAGNITUDE, being seen in UNION
 " and CONNECTION; that of the *Discrete*, called MULTITUDE,
 " in

(y) See Vol. I. *Hermes*, Note (f).

(z) See Vol. I. *Notes to Treatise the third*, Note iv.

“ in ACCUMULATION and JUXTAPOSITION;—that by virtue of Ch. IX.
 “ *Magnitude* the WORLD or Universe was ONE; was extended and
 “ connected every where thro’ its most *distant* Parts;—that by virtue
 “ of *Multitude* it was DIVERSIFIED WITH THAT ORDER AND FAIR
 “ ARRANGEMENT, seen in the amazing variety of Stars, of Ele-
 “ ments, of Plants, of Animals; of *Contrarities* on one side, and
 “ of *Similarities* on the other;—that if these *Quantities* were thus
 “ distinguishable in the *Copy* or *Image*, (for such was this *World*,
 “ when compared to it’s *Archetype*) much more so were they in
 “ those PURE and IMMATERIAL FORMS, the invariable and imme-
 “ diate Objects of the SUPREME INTELLECT. The whole Pro-
 “ duction of *Quantity* (as of every thing else) they referred with
 “ reason to this *Primary Intelligent Cause*;—whose *virtual* Efficacy,
 “ as far as it passes thro’ all things *without dividing* itself or stopping,
 “ they supposed to generate CONTINUITY and UNION;—as far as
 “ it *stops in it’s progress* at every particular, and communicates to
 “ each a peculiar Form of its own, they held to generate DISTINC-
 “ TION and MULTITUDE;—and as far as it perpetually exerts *at*
 “ *once* these two *distinct* and *opposite* *Energies*, they considered as for
 “ *ever* rendering THE UNIVERSE both MANY and ONE; MANY,
 “ thro’ it’s *Order* and fair Variety; One, thro’ it’s *Connection* and
 “ general Sympathy.” (a)

AND

(a) The Authors, from whom the preceding Sentiments are taken, are *Plotinus* and *Jamblichus*, in the Commentary of *Simplicius* upon this Predicament of *Quantity*.

Ἔτι δὲ ὁ ΠλωτῖνⓄ — ἰδίᾳ γὰρ καὶ φύσις ἐκάστω, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖται, τῷ μὲν συνεχῶς ἢ φύσις, ἣτις καλεῖται μέγεθος, κατὰ ἔνωσιν καὶ ἀλληλεχρίαν· τῷ δὲ διωρισμένῳ, ἣτις καλεῖται πλῆθος, κατὰ σῶρειαν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῷ μεγέθους ἑστίαν, εἰς ὃν κόσμῳ ἐξί τε καὶ νοεῖται, σφαιρικός καὶ συμπεφυκὼς ἑαυτῷ, διατεταμένῳ τε καὶ ἀλληλεχόμενῳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἥτε σύνταξις καὶ

Ch. IX.

AND so much for the *third* UNIVERSAL GENUS, OF PREDICAMENT, that of QUANTITY, it's various *Species*, and it's peculiar *Properties* (b).

WE cannot however quit this and the preceding *Predicament* (I mean the *Predicaments* of *Quality* and *Quantity*) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the Universe, so Writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and profane, appear to have expressed their force, and that often *at the same time*, as the *Predicaments themselves* often exist so in nature.

O! Lord, how MANIFOLD are thy Works? IN WISDOM hast thou made them all (c).

HERE [*manifold*] denotes the Quantity of the Divine Works; [*made in Wisdom*] denotes their Quality.

Quintilian

καὶ ἡ διακόσμησις, ἢ ἐκ τούτωνδε φέρε εἰπεῖν τοιχείων, καὶ ζώων ἢ φυτῶν θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐναντιωτήτων ἢ ὁμοιοτήτων τούτων καὶ τούτων· εἰ ἔν ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἔτω ταῦτα κεχώρισται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς νοημένοις γένεσι· καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ἐν τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ αἰσθητοῖς εἶδεσι διέστηκε, κοινὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς εἶρηται, τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πῆρας. *Simplic. in Præd. p. 32. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἰαμβλικός ——— ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐνὸς δύναμις, ἀφ' ἧς πᾶν τὸ ποσὸν ἀπογεννᾶται, διατείνεται δι' ὅλων ἢ αὐτῇ, καὶ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον προῖστα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἢ μὲν δι' ὅλων διήκει παντάπασιν ἀδιαρέτως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑφίστησι, καὶ ἡ τὴν πρόσσόδον ποιεῖται μίαν, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀνευ διωρισμῶ· ἢ καὶ προῖστα ἴσεται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ποιεῖ, ταυτὴ τὸ διωρισμένον παράγει. ——— ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννᾶ. περιέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω τὰ μένοντα καὶ προϊόντα ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. *Simplic. in Præd. p. 34. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

As the above Sentiments are expressed in the Text, a verbal Translation of them is omitted. It may however be acceptable to the curious to see them in their Originals, and for that reason they have been subjoined.

(b) See before Note (o) of this Chapter, p. 108.

(c) *Psalms* civ. v. 24.

Quintilian—*Nam et QUALIS in cuiusque rei naturâ, et quæ forma, quæritur: an immortalis anima, an humanâ Specie Deus: et de MAGNITUDINE et NUMERO: quantus, Sol; an unus, Mundus (d).* Ch. IX.

WHERE the Critic not only delineates the two great *Predicaments* here mentioned, but divides also *Quantity* into it's two capital Species, I mean *Magnitude* and *Number*.

CICERO goes farther in his *Tusculan Disputations*, not only producing *QUALITY* and *QUANTITY*, but *SUBSTANCE* also, their support; which he places first, according to it's proper order. *Si QUID sit hoc, non vides; at QUALE sit, vides: scilicet ne id quidem; at QUANTUM sit, profectò vides (e).*

EVEN comic writers have expressed the force of *these two Predicaments*.

QUANTAM et quam VERAM laudem capiet Parmeno (f)?

HOW GREAT, and HOW TRUE praise will Parmeno acquire?

Great indicates *QUANTITY*; *True* indicates *QUALITY*; for what *QUALITY* in praise is more valuable, than *Truth*?

THE Poets, who dealt in Subjects more exalted than Comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same Language.

Thus

(d) *Instit. Orat.* l. vii. c. 4.

(e) *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. 25.

(f) *Terent. Eunuch.* v. 4. 3.

Ch. IX. Thus *Tibullus*, speaking of *Bacchus*——

—QUALIS QUANTUSQUE *minetur* (g).

Ovid, of *Jupiter*——

—QUANTUSQUE *et* QUALIS *ab altâ*

Junone excipitur—— (h)

Virgil, of *Venus*——

——QUALISQUE *videri*

Calicolis, et QUANTA *folet*—— (i)

The same, of *Polypheme*——

—QUALIS, QUANTUSQUE *cavo Polyphemus in antro* (k).

Homer (whom 'tis probable the rest all copied) speaking of *Achilles*——

*Ητοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμῳ Θάύμαζ' Ἀχιλῆα,

ΟΣΣΟΣ ἔην, ΟΙΟΣ τε θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄνλα ἑώκει (l).

Nor less the royal Guest the Hero eyes,

His godlike aspect, and majestic size (m).

THESE

(g) *Tibul.* l. iii. *Eleg.* vi. v. 23.

(h) *Metam.* iii. 204.

(i) *Æn.* ii. 589.

(k) *Æn.* v. 641.

(l) *Iliad.* xxiv. 629.

(m) *Pope's Homer*, B. xxiv. v. 798. The Translation we see renders the words ὄσσοι and οἷοι by a *Periphrasis*, and it should seem with some propriety, as the God-like aspect

THESE Attributes, given by Poets to Gods and Heroes, have been found by *Euclid* in Figures *Geometrical*. He has a Problem, to teach us *how to describe a rectilineal Figure, which to one given rectilineal Figure shall be SIMILAR, to another shall be EQUAL (n).* Ch. IX.

SIMILAR is a Property of QUALITY; EQUAL, of QUANTITY (o).

BUT 'tis time to finish, and proceed to the Arrangement next in order.

aspect of *Achilles* is clearly among his *Qualities*, and his *Majestic Size* evidently respects his *Magnitude*, that is to say, his *Quantity*. It must be confessed however, that much of the force of the Original will necessarily be lost in the Translation, where *single* words in one Language cannot be found corresponding to *single* words in the other.

(n) *Euclid* vi. 25.

(o) See before page 99, and page 108.

CHAP. X.

Concerning RELATIVES (a) — *their Source—Relatives apparent—real—their Properties, reciprocal—Inference, and Co-existence—Force of Relation in Ethics—in matters Dramatic—in Nature, and the Order of Being—Relations, amicable and hostile—Evil—Want—Friendship—Strife—Relation of all to the Supreme Cause—extent and use of this Predicament, or Arrangement.*

Ch. X. **T**HRO' the three universal Genera, Predicaments, or Arrangements already described, subordinate Beings may be said to attain their Completion; thro' Substance they exist; thro' Quality they are distinguished; and thro' Quantity they acquire a Magnitude, and become a certain Multitude.

YET when Beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like Pebbles upon the Shoar, dispersed and scattered, without Dependence or mutual Sympathy. 'Twould be difficult out of such to compose a Universe or perfect Whole, because every perfect Whole has a respect to it's Parts, as well as the Parts a respect both to such Whole, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that

Genus

(a) The Title of this ARRANGEMENT is expressed by a *Plural*, and not a singular (like *Quality* and *Quantity*) because *all Relation is necessarily between Two*.—ἡ δὲ Σχέσις τοῦλάχιστον ἐν δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖται. Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.—ἴδιον γὰρ τῆς σχέσεως μόνως, τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ὑφεστάναι μόνως, ὅπερ ἔδεμει πρότερον τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.—'Tis a Peculiarity of Relation only, to have it's existence in MANY, which is the case with no one else of the Predicaments. Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

Genus called *RELATION*, a *Genus* which *runs thro' all things*, holding *all of them together*, in as much as there is no Member of the Universe either so great or so minute, that it can be called *independent*, and *detached* from the rest.

Now in all *RELATION* there must be a Subject *whence* it commences, for example *Snow*; another, *where* it terminates, for example a *Swan*; the *Relation itself*, for example *Similitude*; and lastly the *Source* of that *Relation*, for example *Whiteness (b)*; the *Swan* is related to *Snow*, by being both of them *White*.

THE Requisites to *Relation* being in this manner explained, it will appear that *those only* are the *true Relatives*, which express in their very *Structure* the *relative Source*, and whose very *Essence* may

(b) This Source may be sought for among the Differential Characters of Being, in whatever *Predicament* or *Arrangement* they happen to exist, be it in *Quality*, as the Character of *Whiter*; in *Quantity*, as that of *Greater*, that of *more Numerous*; in *Time*, as that of *Older*; in *Place*, as that of *Upper*, &c.

This is what *Simplicius* means, when he says — ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν (scil. τὴν σχέσιν) ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν χαρακτηρὶ ἐνυπάρχειν. *Simpl. in Cat.*

Hence too we may see why *RELATION* stands next to *Quantity*; for in strictness the *Predicaments* which follow are but different *Modes of Relation*, marked by some peculiar Character of their own, over and above the relative Character, which is common to them all.

Even in the two *Predicaments* that precede this of *Relatives*, I mean *QUALITY* and *QUANTITY*, tho' they have an existence void of *Relation*, we cannot say so of their characteristic Peculiarities; for *LIKE* is a *Relative Term*, and so is *EQUAL*. Hence *Simplicius* — ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἴσον παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὅμοιον παρὰ τὸ ποιόν — *EQUAL* is something else beside *QUANTITY*; *LIKE*, something else beside *QUALITY*. *Simpl. in Præd.* By something else he means they are *Relatives*.

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may be found in this their reciprocal *Habitude* (c). But this perhaps will be better understood by a few examples.

THE Swan ('twas said before) was in Whiteness like Snow. Here the Swan and the Snow were produced, as *Relatives*. We produce others of like kind, when we assert that *London* is larger than *York*, a Lemon equal to an Orange, &c.

BUT the truth is, these Subjects are none of them *properly Relatives of themselves*, but then *only* become such (as indeed may every thing else) when a *Relation* is raised between them through the Medium of a *Relative Attribute*. *London*, we say, is larger than *York*. The Relation subsists in *Larger*, which being attributed to *London*, makes it a Relative to *York*, which is in fact something *less*. The same holds in the Lemon and Orange, and in all possible instances. To whatever Subject we associate any of the *Relative Attributes*, we immediately render the Subject by such *Association* a *Relative*. Such a Subject therefore is only a *Relative incidentally*.

BUT the *true* and *real* Relatives are those Attributes *themselves*, the Terms *Larger*, *Equal*, *Like*, &c. for these in their very *Structure* express the *relative Source*, and only exist in a *joint* and *reciprocal Habitude* one to another.

THERE

(c) Πρὸς τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα, αὐτὰ ἅπερ εἶναι, ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὅπως ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. —
Such things as these are said to be RELATIVES, namely as many as are said TO BE, WHAT THEY ARE, by being THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER THINGS, or which in any other sense have reference to something else. *Arist. Præd. p. 34. Edit. Sylb.*

THERE are also *relative Substances*, as well as *relative Attributes*; that is to say, Terms *which indicate at once both a Substance and a Relative*. Such are Master and Servant, Preceptor and Disciple: *Master* implies a *Man*; and not only that, but a *Man having Dominion*: *Servant* implies a *Man*, and not only that, but a *Man rendering Service*; and the same may be said of the other example alleged.

Now a distinguishing PROPERTY of these *real Relatives*, is, that they *reciprocate in their Predication* (d). Every Master is the Master of a Servant, and every Servant the Servant of a Master: every Preceptor the Preceptor of a Disciple; and every Disciple, the Disciple of a Preceptor. The same holds in the *relative Attributes* as well as in the *Substances*, Greater being always Greater than Less, and Less being always Less than Greater. That this is a *Property, which never fails*, will better appear, if from any *relative Substance* we subtract the *relative Attribute*, and substitute in it's room the *Substance alone*. For example, from the relative Substance, Master, let us subtract the relative Attribute, Dominion, so that *Man only* shall remain, divested of that Attribute. We cannot affirm of every Man, as we can of every Master, that *merely as a Man*, he is the Master of a Servant (e).

FROM

(d) Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιγέγοντα λέγεται. *Arist. Præd.* p. 35.

(e) *Aristotle* finds an instance in the same Term, *Servant*. — οἷον ὁ δῆλός, εἰ μὴ δεσπότης ἀποδοῖν δῆλός, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπος, ἢ δίποδος, ἢ ὅταν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀντιγέγονται: ἔστι γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἶναι — For example, the Term *Servant*, if he be not described as the Servant of a Master, but of a Man, or of a Biped, or of any other such thing, does not reciprocate, because the Description

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FROM this necessity of *reciprocal* Predication, another *Property* of Relation follows, that *we cannot understand one Relative, without understanding it's companion*; and that *in proportion as our Knowledge of one Relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other (f)*. I cannot know for example that A is greater than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half; and if with still farther precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four (g).

AND

Description returned is not necessary and essential—that is, we cannot say, the *Man* of a *Servant*, or the *Biped* of a *Servant*, as we say the *Master* of a *Servant*. *Arist. Præd.* p. 37, where much more is subjoined, worth reading.

(f) *Relata sunt simul COGNITIONE. Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum; (idque EODEM plane MODO, et MENSURA COGNITIONIS) et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. Compend. Saunderson, p. 41. Edit. Oxon. 1672.*

I have quoted *Saunderson*, as he was an accurate Logician, but *Aristotle's* own words are, as follows—*ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὁρισμένως τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ κείνο, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ὁρισμένως εἴσεται*—*If any one know with precision any one of two Relatives, he will know also the other Relative which it refers to, with equal precision. Arist. Prædic. p. 39. Edit. Sylb.*

(g) And here by the way it is worth observing, that as *all Relatives* are recognized in combination, while *every Object of Sense* is perceived distinct and independent; it follows that *all Relatives are properly Objects of the Intellect*, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we should know nothing concerning them. Let A for example be supposed the master of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These last characters only are visible to the Eye, nor does the Eye see *more*, while the Relation *subsists*, or *less*, when the *Servant dies*, and the Relation *is at an end*. Were there a change in the Master's person, were he to become deformed from being well-shaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the Eye be able to recognize what had happened. But 'tis a singular property of this Genus, that a Relative may change, or lose it's Relations, without change or loss within itself. Let the corresponding Relative but vary, or cease to exist; let the Master lose his Servant, or the Preceptor his Disciple; let those, who stood on my right remove themselves to my left, or those, who stood above me, place themselves below; and 'tis easy to conceive a Subject, after having lost or varied *every one* of these Relations, still to remain itself invariably the same.

AND this naturally leads to that fundamental *Property* of Relation, on which the rest all depend, namely, *the necessary and universal Co-existence of Relatives (h)*, which always commence *together*, subsist *together*, and cease *together*. *Ulysses*, in his Speech to *Thersites*, says in anger, *May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c.* And how does he express this sentiment?

Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένῳ εἶην.

May I no longer be called THE FATHER OF TELEMACHUS (i).

He well knew he could only lose that *Relative Denomination*, by losing his Son, with whose birth and duration it was indissolubly connected. It was not that *Ulysses* might not have survived *Telemachus*, or *Telemachus, Ulysses*; the *Co-existence* being only attached to the *Relative Characters*, those of Father and Son.

AND hence we may collect that the *Co-existence* here mentioned is not like that of *Substance* and its *essential Properties* (as *Rationality* for example *co-exists* with *Man*, or *Sensation* with *Animal*); but a *Co-existence* less intimate by far than that is, because it subsists between Beings actually distinct one from another.

AND hence it has followed, that some Logicians have treated it as possessing less of the *real*, than any one of the other Genera. They tell us, *Relatio est Ens minimæ Entitatis (k)*.

YET

(h) Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. *Arist. Præd.* p. 37.

(i) *Iliad*, B. v. 260.

(k) *Fell's Logic*, p. 92.

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YET we must be careful how we undervalue it (1), in consequence of such a notion; since with those, who well attend to it's amazing efficacy, it is more likely to acquire a rank perhaps above it's real merit.

WHAT

(1) Thus *Simplicius* in his Comment on this Categoriæ—*Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ὡς παραφρομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις, τὴν τῆς πρὸς τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσι καὶ τοὺς προηγεμένην ἔσαν, καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκείαν θεωρούμενην. Αὕτη γὰρ κοινότης ἐστὶ διὰ πάντων διήκονσα, τῶν τε ἐναντίων, καὶ τῶν ὁποσὺν διαφερόντων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων γενῶν, καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ τεταγμένων· ἥτις εἰ μὴ παρῇν, διεσπάρσθη ἂν πᾶντι (l. πᾶντα) ἀπὸ πάντων.*—And hence some conceive the Predicament of RELATION, by it's growing on as it were to the rest, to be something episodic and adventitious, altho' it be in fact truly PRINCIPAL, and an Object of Contemplation from it's own distinctive Character. 'Tis this indeed is that Band of COMMUNITY WHICH PASSES THRO' ALL THINGS; thro' Contraries, thro' things in any way different, thro' whole Genera, and thro' the several Beings, arranged beneath them—that Principle, which, were we to suppose away, all things in that instant would be dissipated and torn from all things. *Simplic. in Prædic. p. 44. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

See also the same Author in the same Comment.

Οὐτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, ἔτε τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄντα, κοινωνίαν ἔχει τινὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μὴ τις σχέσις ἢ λόγος ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν. Ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἀναιρεῖν, ἢ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθόγοις μόνην, ἔδδ' τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἰσῖαις καὶ δυνάμεσι πᾶσαις καὶ ἐνεργείαις, ἥτις ἐγγινομένη τοῖς ἔσι, συνήγαγεν εἰς ταυτὸν, καὶ σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργασάτο· ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἐπιστητὸν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ μουσικὴ περὶ σχέσεις ἔχουσιν, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αὐταί· καταγέλαστοι ἂν εἴεν ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τὰ ἀνυπόστατα καλῶνόμενοι. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῶ ἐφιεμένῳ.—For neither the Universal Genera, nor the things included under them, can have any Connection one with another, if there exist not in things the Ratio of HABITUDE or RELATION. But 'tis absurd to take away the Connection of things that differ one from another: absurd also to take away Harmony, not that only which exists in Sounds, nor that which exists in Numbers, but that also which exists in Substances, and in all the variety of Capacities and Energies; that, which having been implanted in Beings, has brought them together, and effected, that they should have the Relation here spoken of to each other. [Farther than this, by taking away Relation] there will be taken away, the Proportionate, the Equal, the Knowable, and Knowledge. If Geometry and Music are employed about Relations, and these last have no Existence; then will those Sciences be ridiculous, in being employed about Non-entities. How also can GOD himself be called AN OBJECT OF DESIRE TO ALL BEINGS, if there be no Relation between the Thing desired, and that which desires? *Simplic. in Præd. p. 43. B.*

WHAT ought we to think, should it appear the Basis of Morality?
 —“ MORAL DUTIES (says *Epictetus*) are in general measured by RE-
 “ LATIONS. Is he a Father?—The Relation ordains, that he must be
 “ taken care of; that thou yield to him in all things, bear with him,
 “ when he reproaches, when he strikes, &c.—But he is a bad Father
 “ —And wert thou then by nature connected with a good Father?—
 “ No, but with a Father—Thus therefore out of Neighbour, out of Ci-
 “ tizen, out of Magistrate wilt thou TRACE THE MORAL DUTY, if
 “ thou make it a Custom to CONTEMPLATE THE RELATIONS (m).”

THE Stoic Emperor *Antoninus* inculcates the same doctrine. *There are* (says he) *three RELATIONS; one to the proximate Cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine Cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live (n).* So important is the Knowledge of *Relations* (according to these Philosophers) in a subject, which so much concerns us, I mean an upright and a virtuous conduct.

’Tis to a subordinate end, that *Horace* applies this Knowledge, when he makes it an essential to *Dramatic Poets*, and as a Philosophical Critic, teaches them, that ’tis thro’ this Knowledge only they can truly delineate Characters. The verses are well known;

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

’Tis thus too that *Shakespeare*, either by Knowledge acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate superior Genius,

(m) *Epict. Ench. cap. xxx.*

(n) *M. Ant. viii. 27.*

Ch. X. *nius* (o), makes *Macbeth* shudder at the thoughts of murdering *Duncan*, when he reflects on the many *Duties* he owed him, arising from the many *Relations* he stood in, all of which *Duties* he was then basely going to violate.

——— *He's here in double trust ;*
First, as I am his KINSMAN, and his SUBJECT,
Strong both against the deed : then, as his Host,
Who should against his Murtherer shut the door,
Not bear the Knife myself——

AND here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent Tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a *Poem*, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most *moral* pieces existing. It teaches us the danger of venturing, tho' but for *once*, upon a capital offence, by shewing us that 'tis impossible *to be wicked by halves*; that we cannot stop; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, *be the success as it may*, we are sure in the event to become *wretched and unhappy* (p).

BUT to return to our Subject, I mean that of *Relation*.

IF

(o) The Author has in this place considered *Shakespeare*, as *Aristotle* did *Homer*, and has left it uncertain, to what Cause his transcendent merit should be ascribed. *Aristotle*, speaking of *Homer's* superiority, says in like manner, that it was *ἢτοι διὰ τέχνην, ἢ διὰ φύσιν*, either thro' *Art*, or thro' *Nature*. Vid. *Arist. Poet.* c. viii.

(p) See the Remarks on this Tragedy in that elegant Book, the *Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespeare*.

IF we quit Mankind, and view it's more general extent, we shall find, that, where *Continuity* fails, there *RELATION* *supplies it's office*, connecting as it were all things the most *remote* and *heterogeneous*. Were they indeed combined under an Union more intimate, were it the same with that *Continuity*, seen in a *living* Body and it's Limbs, *the whole Universe* would be no more than one immense Animal. But 'tis not so: and those, who have explained it's Nature, have rather called it *one City*, or *one Commonwealth* (q); a very different species of Monad from one Animal, or living Being. 'Tis here then (as we have said) *Relation* intervenes, and under a thousand different ties *connects all things together*.

THE ties indeed are many, tho' the Sources are few. Every *subordinate* Being, as it is by nature *subject to wants*, (indigence and imperfection being *essential* to it's constitution) has a connection with those *Beings*, thro' whom *such wants may be supplied*. Hence then one Source of *Relation*. Again, every Being whatever, *that has power to supply such wants*, has a Connection with those *Beings*, to whom it can *thus become subservient*. Hence then another Source of *Relation*. Now in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole it is so admirably contrived, that every Being in different degrees possesses this *double* character, and not only *needs assistance*, but is able in it's turn to *afford it*. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help; nothing so minute, as not at times to have it's use. Thus as *Connections reciprocate*, and are every where blended, the *Concatenation of Relations*

(q) See *Vol. First, Treatise the third*, p. 129, and *Note lxvii*.

Ch. X. *tions grows in fact universal, and the world becomes (as above described) one City or Commonwealth.*

INSTANCES of this *double Relation* occur (as we have said) in every particular Being. The Ewe is related to the Grass, as to the Being which *supplies* her wants; to her Lamb, as to the Being whose wants *she herself supplies*. The Grass again is *related* to the Earth, as to the Being, which affords it aliment; while it is *related* to the Ewe, by becoming itself aliment to her. The Earth is *related* to Vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse; while she is *related* to the Sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The *Relations* of the Sun are finely represented by *Epicætetus*, who makes THE SOVEREIGN OF THE UNIVERSE thus address that noble Luminary. “*Thou (saith he) art SUN: Thou art able by going round, to form the year and the Seasons; to enlarge and nourish the fruits; to raise and still the Winds; to warm in due degree the bodies of men; Arise, go round, and beginning from the greatest, extend after this manner thy influence to the most minute (r).*”

NOR when we mention *the Earth* ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her *Relations*, for which *Virgil* well distinguishes her by the character of *most Just*;

Fundit humo facilem victum JUSTISSIMA TELLUS (s).

THE

(r) *Arrian. Epicæ. l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 444. Edit. Upton. Σὺ ἡλίου εἶ δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ.*

(s) *Virg. Georg. ii. 460.*

THE *Attic Historian* and *Philosopher* will be found the best Commentator on this elegant passage of the *Roman Poet*. “THE EARTH too (says *Xenophon*) being a *Divinity*, teacheth those that can learn it of her, JUSTICE: for such as cultivate her best, she requiteth with most goods (t).”

WHEN we view the *Relation* of the Male to the Female, and of the Female to the Male, and add to this the *Common Relation* extending from both to their Offspring, we view the rise of *Families* thro’ the whole animal race. Among the more social, such as Sheep and Cattle, these Families by fresh *Relations* are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of *Flocks* and *Herd*s. Among those of higher order still (such as the Bee (u), the Ant, the Beaver, and above all the social and rational Being, Man) these herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into *civil Politics*, where there is a general Interest or *common Good*, a Good to which either willingly or unwillingly (x) every individual co-operates.

IF

(t) “Ετι δὲ ἡ Γῆ, θεὸς ἔσα, τὰς δυναμένας καταμανθάνειν, καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ διδάσκει· τὰς γὰρ ἀρίστα θεραπεύουσας αὐτήν, πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ἀντιποιεῖ· *Xenoph. Oeconom.* p. 35. *Edit. Oxon.*

(u) *Virgil* speaks of the Bee, as he would of Man;

Mores et studia et populos et praelia dicam. *Georg.* iv.

Aristotle, distinguishing these Animals from those, which do no more than barely herd together, elegantly calls them ζῶα πολιτικά, *Political* or *Civil* Animals, Animals formed for a Life of *Civil association*, where the *Business* is ONE, and that COMMON to the whole Tribe; ὧν ἓν τι, κ.τ.λ. *Histor. Anim.* p. 5. *Edit. Syllb.*

(x) ——— ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω,

Κακὸς γενόμενος, ἔδδεν ἥτιον εἶσομαι.

Epiet. Enchirid. c. lii.

See *Vol. I. Treatise the third*, p. 134, and Note lxxxvii.

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If we descend below Animals down to Vegetables, we shall discover in the Vine, the Ivy, the Woodbind, and all the Plants of slender Stalk, a manifest relation to those of a trunk more solid, such as the Oak, the Elm, and the several trees of the Forest. 'Tis with a Power, which appears *almost a conscious one*, that the former of these tribes, *recognizing their Relation*, apply to the latter for a support, and *spontaneously* twine their bodies, or at least their tendrils, around them (y).

WHEN

(y) Τὰ τέλη, ἐφ' ἃ τῶν φύσει γιγνομένων ΕΚΑΣΤΑ ἵεται, ἔκαστος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς φανομένης πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὕστατα δὴ πρὸς παραγίγνεται. Σκοπῶμεν δ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶνδε· τῇ ἀμπέλῳ ἑλικὴ τέλη ἐστὶν, τὸ ἑτέρον φυτὸν περισθῆναι περιελιχθεῖσαν, ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἀμπελον ἀναδῆσαι τῷ φυτῷ, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὴν φύσιν εἰληχυῖαν, ἐπαλλόκαυλον εἶναι. Οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἑτέρον φυτὸν περισθῆναι τὴν ἑλικὰ περιελιχθεῖσαν ἀναδῆσαι τὴν ἀμπελον, ἔτε τῇ ἀμπέλῳ φανομένη, ἔτε τῇ ἑλικῇ εὐθὺς πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὕστατον γε παραγίγνεται· ἐδὲν μέντοι ἥτιον τῷ φύεσθαι ὅλως ἑλικὰ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ αἴτιον τελικόν ἢ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεδαι αὐτῆς εἶναι. Ἀμύχανον δὲ τὸ μηδέπω ὄν, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἔστι τεταγμένον, ὄντι τῇ ἡδὴ αἴτιον γίνεσθαι· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τῷ γιγνομένῳ, ἔχει μὴ εἶναι. Προειληθῆναι ἄρα δεῖ ἐν τινὶ νῶ τὴν τῆς ἀμπέλῳ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεδαι, ὅς αὐτῇ ἐπιστατῶν, ὥσπερ δημιουργὸς ἀνὴρ σκευαστοῖς, καὶ τὴν ἑλικὰ αὐτῇ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕνεκα ἀναδέσεως φύσει· ἢ καὶ θαυμασίως, εἰ μὲν μηδὲν τι αὐτῇ τοῖστον παρακένεται οἷον περιελιχθῆναι, ἐπ' εὐθύ πως φαίνεται φερομένη· εἰ δὲ περισθῆναι τις παρῇ, εὐθὺς περιελιχθῇ. Οὐτ' ἐν τὴν ἑλικὰ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ μὴ ἔστι τῆς ἕνεκα φύεσθαι, ὅπως ἑτέρῳ αὐτὴν φυτῷ ἀναδῆσαι, νῦν ἔχει μὴ ἀξίαν· ἔτε τὸ μὴ νῦν τοῖς τοῖστοις ἐφιστάναι ἔχει αὖ καὶ ὀντινῶν λόγον.

The ENDS, to which the several vegetable Productions tend, are not instantly present to them, as soon as they begin to grow, but some way or other accrue to them subsequently. We may perceive this in a single instance. The End to the Vine's Tendril, is, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, to bind the Vine to that Vegetable; which Vine, among the vegetable Tribe, possesses this natural Character, that it should rest upon another for it's support. Now that the Tendril, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, should bind the Vine on, neither belongs to the Vine, when it first begins to grow, nor yet to it's Tendril; but is something which accrues subsequently: and yet nevertheless, the binding of it to another Vegetable is the FINAL CAUSE why the Tendril should grow at all, and belong to the Vine. But it is impossible that what AS YET IS NOT, and has no Arrangement in the order of things, (I mean the binding) SHOULD BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING WHICH NOW IS, (I mean the Tendril of the Vine, when it first appears.) The Cause of any thing produced must have an actual Existence, and not be a nonentity. This Binding therefore of the Vine to some other Vegetable must have been PRECONCEIVED IN SOME MIND OR INTELLECT, who presiding over it (as any Man, being an Artist, presides over his Works) makes the Tendril grow to it for the sake of such Binding: which Tendril also wonderfully, if there be nothing adjoining of
a nature

WHEN therefore we contemplate the various *Relations* already hinted, and mark in how *friendly* a manner they bring the most distant Beings together, we may be tempted to say with the Philosopher,

a nature for it to twine round, appears in some sort to shoot upwards; but if any Branch be near, instantly deviates and twines round it. It is therefore irrational to suppose that the Tendril did not grow to the Vine, that it might hereafter bind it to another Vegetable; nor can there be any degree of Reason for asserting, that some MIND or INTELLIGENCE did not preside over such Operations.

The force of this Argument is, as follows — THINGS exist before their ENDS; that is, before that the Ends of their Existence take place. The Tendril exists, before it binds the Vine; the Minute-hand exists, before it indicates the Minutes. And yet is this Binding, and this Indicating so necessary, that the Things themselves would never have existed, but for the sake of *these only*. Where then were these *Ends*, when the *Things* themselves first appeared? — In external and visible nature? — This from the Hypothesis is *impossible*, for the Hypothesis makes them *subsequent*. — No other place then remains, but either the SOVEREIGN MIND, or a *Mind subordinate*, according as the Work itself is a Work of Nature or of Art. See before, p. 63, 64.

I have taken the preceding Extract from a Manuscript of that able Scholar and Philosopher *George Gemistus*, otherwise called *Pletho*, who flourished in the fifteenth Century, both before and after the taking of *Constantinople*. If it apply not immediately to the Subject, it has at least the merit of being something rare and ingenious. It is a morsel of that Controversy among the learned *Greeks* of this Period, whether the Preference in Philosophy was due to *Plato* or to *Aristotle*. *Scholarius*, among others, was for *Aristotle*; *Pletho* for *Plato*; from whose Work on this Subject (which was an Answer to *Scholarius*) this Extract is taken. There is another small Work of *Pletho's* upon the same Subject, intitled, *Περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται*, printed at *Paris*, 1541; and *Bessarion* (a learned *Greek* of that age, who went over to the Latin Church, and became a Cardinal) wrote a large Tract to defend the *Platonic* Doctrine, intitled *Contra Calumniatorem Platonis*. The printed Edition is in Latin, but the whole Work is extant in *Greek* among the Manuscripts of *St. Marc's* Library at *Venice*, to which Library *Bessarion* bequeathed his own. There is too a fine Letter remaining of the same *Bessarion*, addressed to *Michael Apostolius*, who, tho' he took *Bessarion's* side, and defended *Plato*, yet appears to have done it, according to *Bessarion's* Letter, with a zeal and bitterness not becoming him; a zeal and bitterness too frequent in Controversy, and (unfortunately for the Cause of Letters) no where more, than among learned men, and those in particular, whom we call *Professors of Humanity*.

The Epistle above mentioned may be found in *Greek* and *Latin*, published by the learned *Boivinus*, in the second Tome of *L'Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Inscriptions*, &c. p. 455; and it is well worth perusal, for it's Temper and Elegance.

See also *Cicero de Senectute*, c. xv. *Fitis quidem*, &c.

Ch. X. *sopher, that "all things are full of FRIENDLY PRINCIPLES (z)." But we must not suffer this sentiment to carry us too far. Things are not only full of FRIENDLY PRINCIPLES, but of HOSTILE likewise.*

THE Fangs of the Lion are as much the work of Nature, as the tendrils of the Vine, or the nurturing Teats of the Ewe. To what then have these formidable weapons *Relation*; for *Nature*, we are assured, *makes nothing in vain (a)*? If to *Offence*, then is the Lion himself a source of *hostile* relation; if to *Defence*, then is he the object of injury from some other; so that *hostility* in either case is necessarily implied. Were it possible to doubt as to the *offensive* here, we could never doubt as to the Structure of the Spider's Web; a Structure clearly taught her by Nature for *offence alone*. These and the like Preparations, such as the Boar's Tusk, the Eagle's Talons, the Viper's Venom, &c. are all founded on such wants, as can never be satisfied *amicably*. The Wants therefore of this character naturally rouse up *similar* Instincts, and thus the World becomes filled as well with HOSTILE RELATIONS, as FRIENDLY.

Torva leæna lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam (b).

IT

(z) Πάντα δὲ φίλων μετὰ. *Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 486. Edit. Upt.*

(a) This was an axiom, inculcated every where by *Aristotle*; and more especially, when he is speaking of *Final Causes*, which, tho' now they make a small part of *Philosophy*, were never omitted by the *Stagirite*, as often as they could be introduced. His own words deserve attention—ἡ φύσις ἔθεν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ ἐστίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστον γένος ζῶν τὸ ἄριστον—NATURE MAKES NOTHING IN VAIN, but with respect to each animal Genus, out of the several ways practicable she always makes that which is best. *De Animal. Ingressu, p. 28. Edit. Sylb.*—And again, in the same Tract—ἡ φύσις ἔθεν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων—NATURE CREATES NOTHING IN VAIN, but (as has been said already) all things for the best, out of the several ways that are practicable. *Ibid. p. 141. Edit. Sylb.*

(b) *Virg. Ecl. ii.*

It appears to have been *these Relations of Hostility*, that first gave rise to the phænomena of NATURAL and MORAL EVIL. Now whether REAL EVIL exist at all, or whether we should confine it with the STOICS to *Evil purely moral*, are Questions beyond the Scope of this Treatise to examine. It will be sufficient to say, that *much Evil* is imaginary, and founded merely on *false opinion*: that of the EVILS MORE REAL, there are many, which have their END, and so may be said to partake *ultimately* the nature of GOOD. Many of the difficulties and distresses, which befall the human Species, conduce to save it from Sloth, and to rouse it up to action; to action, which is in fact the very life of the Universe.

————— *Pater ipse colendi*

Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem

Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,

Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.*

If there were no dangers, then could there be no Fortitude; if no Temptations, then no Temperance; if no adverse Accidents, nor Loss of what we love, then no submissive Resignation, no pious Acquiescence.

Οὐκ ἂν γενῶτο χάρις ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά·
Ἄλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥς' ἔχειν καλῶς.

Things GOOD and ILL can ne'er exist apart;

But such the MIXTURE, that they WELL accord (c).

AGAIN,

* *Virg. Georg. I.*

(c) The fine Distich here translated is from *Euripides*, quoted by *Plutarch de Isid. et Osirid.* p. 369. *Edit. Xyland.*

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AGAIN, the Jaws of the Lion, the Poison of the Rattle Snake, the Sword of the Conqueror, and every Instrument of destruction, may be said incidentally to prepare the way for Generation; and that not only by making room for new Comers, but by furnishing fresh Materials towards their respective Production. For tho' the Theatre of the World so far resembles other Theatres, that it is perpetually filled with Successions of new Spectators; yet has it this in peculiar, that the Spectators, which succeed here, are made out of those that went before. Every particular *Birth, or natural production*, appears an act, if not of *hostility*, at least of *Separation*; a *Secession* from the general Mass; a kind of revolt from the greater Bulk in favour of a *smaller*; which smaller would detach itself, and, were it able, be independent.

IN a word as FRIENDSHIP, by *cementing Multitude*, produces UNION; so STRIFE, by *dissolving Union*, produces MULTITUDE; and 'tis by MULTITUDE that the World becomes diversified and replenished.

AND hence we may perceive the meaning of what *Heraclitus* says in *Plutarch*, where he calls "WAR, the Father and King and Lord of all things; and asserts, that when HOMER prayed

" That Strife be banished both from Gods and Men,

" he

As to the *Speculations* here offered, and the *Solutions* suggested, we may well apply to them that just reflection of the *Stagirite*, tho' used by him on a different occasion.

"Ἰσως δὲ χαλεπὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι περὶ ἐκάστων αὐτῶν, ἐκ ἀχρηστὸν ἐστίν.—Perhaps 'tis difficult to prove any thing clearly upon Subjects such as these, without having often considered and examined them. And yet to have thrown out doubts concerning them, is a thing, not altogether without it's use. *Aristot. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Sylb.*

“ he was not aware that he was cursing the Generation of all things; Ch. X.
 “ as in fact they deduce their rise out of Contest and Antipathy.”
 The same Philosopher adds immediately, “ that THE SUN could not
 “ pass his appointed bounds; that otherwise, if he could,

“ Tongues he would find to patronize the Cause:”

meaning by this *mythological* way of talking, that the Sun could not desert his Course, because so much depended on it; or otherwise, if he could, that being himself *one of the primary Authors of Generation* upon this Earth, and well knowing how much Strife co-operated in the same work, he would surely look out for an advocate (were such any where existing) to defend the cause of STRIFE against the Calumnies of *Homer* (d).

FROM

(d) Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἄντικρυς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον, εὐχόμενον,

Ἐκ τε θεῶν ἔριν, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι,

λανθάνειν φησὶ τῇ πάντων γενέσει καταρώμενον, ἐκ μάχης καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τὴν γένεσιν ἔχόντων ἥλιον δὲ μὴ ὑπερβήσεσθαι τὰς προσήκοντας ὁρὰς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,

Γλώττας μιν δίκης ἐπικέρως ἐξευρήσειν.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 370. Edit. Xyland. Fol.

Dr. Squire, the late Bishop of St. David's, has given a fair Edition of this Tract in the original, to which he has subjoined an *English* Translation; but (according to a Practice too frequent with the best Critics) he has, in the Passage above quoted, attempted to mend, where no Emendation was wanting.

Chalcidius plainly alludes to the same Sentiment of *Heraclitus* in the following Extract from his Commentary on *Plato's Timæus*.—*Propterea Numenius laudat Heraclium (lege Heraclitum) reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum et vastitatem malis vitæ, quod non intelligeret mundum sibi deleri placere: si quidem Sylva, quæ malorum fons est, exterminaretur.* Chal. p. 396. Edit. Meurf. 1617.

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FROM all these Speculations one thing at least appears (whatever else may be doubtful) that *Relations of Hostility*, as well as *Friendship*, have their use in the Universe. Both also equally arise from *Want* on one side, and from *the Power of removing it* on the other (e). The difference is, that in *friendly Relations* the *Help* is communicated either *with pleasure*, as when the Mother suckles her Child; or at least *without pain*, as when we shew a traveller his way. In *hostile Relations*, the *Help*, without regard to the *Communicator*, is either taken by force, as when the Wolf devours the Lamb; or obtained by stratagem, as when the Spider ensnares the Fly.

AND thus by the reciprocal *Relations of Want and Help* (both of which under a variety of Forms exist in every *individual*) is there a kind of general Concatenation extended throughout the Universe; while each Being communicates what Help it can afford, and obtains in it's turn, that Help which it requires.

To all these *Relations* must be added that chief, tho' mentioned last, *that of the whole Universe, and every Being in it, to the First, Supreme, and Intelligent CAUSE, thro' which Relation THEY are*
called

In the *Greek* Quotation, *Homer* is supposed to wish inadvertently against the *Generation* of all things; in the *Latin*, he wishes in the same inadvertent manner against the existence of *Sylva*, that is, of *Matter*. The difference is easily reconciled, if we suppose *Matter* to be the *Basis of Generation*, and to be *essentially requisite* to the existence of things *Generable* and *Perishable*, out of which this lower and visible World is wholly composed.

(e) How far the WANT OF GOOD leads to *Arts* and *Action*, may be seen in *Vol. I. Treatise the first*, p. 18; and in the *Notes*, ix. x. xi. and xii. We here perceive it to extend not only to the whole *animal* World, but even to the *Vegetable*. More will be found on this Subject in the *Treatise upon Motion*, a part of the present Work.

called HIS OFFSPRING, and HE THEIR FATHER. Here indeed the *Relations* are not blended as before; they are all purely referable to *Want* on one side, and all purely arise from *spontaneous Help* on the other; the correspondence existing, as far as *Perfect* has respect to *Imperfect*, *Independent* to *Dependent*, the *Object desired* to the Beings which *desire* (f), the *Maker* to his *Works*, the *Parent* to his *Children* (g).

AND now to conclude with a Remark, which regards *Relation in general*. “As to every Continuous Being the Genus of *QUALITY* gives *Distinctions*, which help to mitigate it's Sameness, and render it as it were *discrete*; so to Beings *discrete*, however remote, the Genus of *Relation* gives a *Connection*, which serves to mitigate their *Diversity*, and to render them as it were *continuous*. Thus is the World maintained as well in it's *UNION*, as in it's *VARIETY*, while both *species of Quantity* run thro' the whole, and thro' every *Part*.”

AND so much for the ARRANGEMENT OF GENUS OF RELATION, it's nature, it's properties, it's utility, and extent (h).

(f) Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐπιμένῳ—*How is GOD called an Object desirable to all Beings, if there be no RELATION between the Object of Desire, and the Being which desires?* *Simplic. in Prædic. p. 43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.* See before, Note p. 126.

(g) St. Paul has given his Sanction to that Verse of *Aratus*—Τὴ γὰρ καὶ γένε' ἐσμ'—*For we are his Offspring.* *Arat. Phæn. v. 5. Acts xvii. 28.*

(h) Before we quit this Arrangement, we shall subjoin the following Note.

The old Logicians held that *Things Intelligible*, and *Intellection* were *Relatives*; so also *Things Sensible*, and *Sensation*. But then they started an objection—If *Relatives* co-exist, and always reciprocate in their existence, what would become of *Euclid's*

T 2

Theorems,

Ch. X.

Theorems, supposing there were no Geometricians? What would become of Sensible Objects, supposing there were no Beings sensitive?

One Solution of this Objection is derived from the *Percipient*—THE FIRST ORIGINAL AND SUPREME PERCIPIENT IS EVERY WHERE, AND ALWAYS IN THE FULL ENERGY OF UNIVERSAL PERCEPTION.

Another Solution is from the *Objects perceived*, be they sensible or intelligible. Every such Object has a *double* nature; an *absolute* nature, and a *relative* one. The Sound A is an Octave to the Sound B. B ceases, and A continues. A is no longer an Octave, but still it is a *Sound*: and even tho' we should call it no Sound, if there were to be no Hearers; it would still be an *Undulation* of Air, capable of producing Sound, if there were an Ear capable of perceiving it, that is, an *Organ adequate to the Sensation*.

The Instance given on this occasion by the Philosophers *Porphyry* and *Simplicius*, is curious, because it is taken from that difficult System of Music, the *Enharmonic*. The following are the words of *Simplicius*—Καὶν γὰρ διὰ ῥαθυμίας ἀποβάλλωμεν ποτὲ τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν, ἥδ' ἐν ἧτιον μένει τὰ ὄντα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπίσητά· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πρότερον μὲν κατηκόμεν διέσεως, νῦν δὲ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τέτα τῆ διαστήματ' ἐσμέν.—*For if ever thro' any Sloth or Indolence we reject Knowledge, those things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheless. 'Tis thus that in Music we used in former days to hear the QUARTER-TONE, but now we are unable to distinguish this interval. Simplic. in Præd. p. 48. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

Porphyry, having told us that tho' there were no Geometry, considered as a *Science*, there would still be Objects Geometrical, subjoins—ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ τὸ μὲν πάλαι τῆ διεστιάς διαστήματ' ἤκουον οἱ μουσικοὶ, ὕστερον δὲ ἀμεληθείσης τῆς ἐναρμονίης μελωδίας, καθ' ἣν τὸ διεστιάον διάστημα ἐμελωδεῖτο, ἐκέτι τῆ τοιαύτης αἰσθησις ἔσται (*lege ἐστὶ*) διαστήματ'· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τέτο διάστημα, εἰ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐκλείπειν.—*For thus too in Music, Musicians used FORMERLY to hear (and distinguish) the Interval of the QUARTER-TONE: but in latter days, THE ENHARMONIC MELODY having been neglected, by which this Interval used to be modulated, there is no longer now any Sensation of such an Interval: and yet 'tis evident that this sensible Interval has an Existence in nature, altho' for the present the Sensation of it be lost. Porphyry. in Prædic. p. 40. Ed. Paris, 1543.*

Porphyry flourished in the third Century; *Simplicius* in the sixth.

We may remark by the way from the above Quotations, how fast the *Arts* of Elegance were sinking even in the *more early* of those two Periods.


As for the state of Philosophy in the *latter* Period, we may form a Judgment of it by what we learn from *Simplicius* in the same Treatise, with regard to the *Stoics*. Having in his Commentary on the Predicaments of *Action* and *Passion* given many Quotations from the *Stoic* Logic, he concludes the Chapter with the following words—Πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν τοιαύτων ἐξεργασία παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς· ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν.—*There is much elaborate Discussion of these matters among the STOICS, of whom both the DOCTRINE and MOST OF THE WRITINGS are in our times lost, and at an end. Simpl. in Præd. p. 84. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

Mahomet soon followed, whose Successor *Omar* burnt the *Alexandrine* Library; nor did the succeeding *Caliphs* emerge from Barbarity, till the Race of the *Abbasidæ*, near two Centuries after.

The Barbarity of *Western Europe* continued much longer, and did not begin to lessen, till the *fifteenth* Century, that preceding the age of *Leo the tenth*.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning ACTION and PASSION—*Action, it's five Species—those of Passion reciprocate—Mind Divine, Human—latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Passivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Re-action, where they exist, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence and what—requisite both in Action and in Passion—Power, tho' like Non-entity, yet widely different—Double in the reasoning Faculty—Power, not first in existence, but Energy, which never has ceased, or will cease, or can cease.*

IN treating of *Relatives* we have considered principally those, Ch. XI.
 which possess the *Relative* Character in a degree *above* every other. 
 But there are things, which, as they possess it blended with Characters *more* eminent, have been formed for that reason into *separate* ARRANGEMENTS. Such for example is *the Relation* between a Being, and *the Place, which it occupies; that* between a Being, and *the Time, while it exists; the first of which Relations gives an answer to the Question, WHERE; the latter, to the Question, WHEN.*

THERE are also Relations of *Position*; Relations of *Habit*; and besides these there are Relations of ACTION and PASSION, all of which are distinguished by peculiar Attributes of their own, and have therefore merited distinct Examinations from the ancient Writers upon Logic.

Thus,

Ch. XI.

THUS, if we consider the two last, I mean ACTION and PASSION, we shall find them diffused thro' every part of the Universe; and that, either united in *one* Subject, or else separate, and in *different* Subjects.

By *Horace* they are united:

*Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam,
Multa TULIT, FECIT que puer—— (a).*

So are they by *Livy*, in that manly Speech of *Caius Mucius*—*Et FACERE et PATI fortia, Romanum est (b).*

So are they by *Shakespeare*:

*Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to SUFFER
The Stings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune,
Or—by OPPOSING end them (c).*

So are they by *Milton*:

*Fal'n Cherub, to be weak is miserable,
DOING, or SUFFERING—— (d)*

IN *Virgil* we see them separated, and PASSION given to *Man*, ACTION to the *Deity*:

O! PASSI graviora, dabit DEUS his quoque finem (e).

As

(a) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.

(b) *Liv.* ii. 11.

(c) *Hamlet.*

(d) *Par. Lost.* i. 157.

(e) *Æn.* i. 203.

As therefore ACTION and PASSION are of the most extensive influence; as they partake in some degree the nature of *Qualities* or *Attributes*, by being *intimately* and *essentially* connected with Substance; while the Relatives, *When*, *Where*, and *Position*, seem rather connected *accidentally*: we shall give ACTION and PASSION their just Precedence, and make them the Subject of the present Chapter.

THE SPECIES OF ACTION are as many, as are *the different Modes of acting* in the *different Species of Agents*.

THE FIRST SORT OF ACTION is that of *mere BODY ALONE*, considered either as void of Sensation *wholly*, like Fire, when it burns; or at least *as void of Sensation*, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and universal Power, the Power of *Attraction*, which all Body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to possess *in proportion to it's Quantity*; that *active* Power, (if it may for the present be so called) the Effects of which modern Philosophy has scrutinized with so much penetration. Such too are those Energies peculiar to *different Bodies*, and arising out of them from their *different Natures*; as when we say the Heavens emit Light; the Trees produce Leaves; the Fields give us Corn, &c.:

*Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere,
Segetes largiri fruges, &c. (f)*

Such too are those more secret Operations of Bodies, whether *magnetic* or *electric*; to which may be added the Virtues and Efficacies

(f) *Cicer. Tusc. Disp. i. 28.*

Ch. XI. *cies of Bodies Medicinal.* All these Energies in a comprehensive sense may be called the *Action* of Body, considered merely as *Body* (g).

A SECOND SORT OF ACTION is that which is the result of *Sensation*, *Instinct*, and *natural Appetite*, and which therefore, being complicated, must necessarily be confined to Bodies of a higher Genus, to Bodies *Sensitive*, that is, to ANIMALS.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus PETIT, &c. (h)

No where are *these Actions* exprest with more elegance and conciseness, than by our own *Epic Poet*, in his *Paradise Lost*:

————— *Air, Water, Earth,*

By Fowl, Fish, Beast, was FLOWN, was SWAM, was WALK'D (i).

THERE

(g) This is that Genus of Energies, which, as *Jamblichus* describes it, indicates no *Action* belonging to *Soul*, or to *Animal Nature*, or to *Reasonings*, or to *Life*, but which (on the contrary) exhibits the particular *Energy* of BODIES, CONSIDERED AS BODIES purely inanimate; and that as well with respect to all the *Peculiarities* which appear to surround *Body*, as to all those various inherent powers of *Bodies*, not only as they are solid and capable of resisting, but as they contain within them a multitude of Powers that are efficacious and active.—Γένος ἐνεργειῶν, ὅπερ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ λόγων καὶ ζωῆς ἐκέτι ἐπιδείκνυσσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ἢ σώματά ἐστιν ἄψυχα, φανεράν καθίστησι τὴν σωματοειδῆ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ πάσας μὲν τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰς φαινόμενας ιδιότητας, κατὰ πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, ἐχ' ἢ μόνον τερεὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀντίτυπα, ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει πολλὰς δραστηρίους δυνάμεις. *Simpl. in Prædic.* p. 81. *Edit. Basil.* 1551.

(h) *Hor. Sat. ii. 1.*

(i) *Par. Lost, vii. 502.* Καὶ δῆλον ὅσα ποτὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια εἶδη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορά ἐστιν εἶδη κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν, περὶ ᾧ ἐν ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἰστορίαις διαριθμεῖσθαι εἰώθαμεν.—'Tis evident that as are the *Species of Irrational Animals*

in

THERE IS A THIRD SPECIES OF ACTION more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from Sensation, Instinct, and natural Appetite, but from *Reason* also, *superadded* to these. This is a Mode of Action *peculiar to Man*, because of all the Animals we see around us, *Man* alone possesses the *Reasoning Faculty*.

WIDELY diversified is the Share assumed by the *subordinate* Faculties of the *Human Soul*, in Actions of *this* Character. Sometimes they submit to *Reason*, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed of themselves. And hence it is, that *Actions*, produced from Causes so peculiarly complicated derive to themselves the Colours of GOOD and EVIL, and are denominated, in distinction to every other deed of Man, ACTIONS MORAL.

WHEN VIRTUE and PLEASURE addressed the young HERCULES, VIRTUE supposed him to have a *Reason*, that could controul his *Appetites*; PLEASURE supposed him to have *Appetites*, that would bear down his *Reason*. Had he obeyed the last, he had been *vicious*; as he obeyed the first, he was *virtuous*. There was a Conflict in either case between his better part, and his worse; and in that Conflict *both Species* of Faculties were presumed, his *Rational Faculties*, and his *Irrational* (k).

THERE

in Number and in Quality, so many and such are the different Species in Acting agreeably to this [animal] mode of Energy; which several Species of Acting have been usually enumerated in the Histories of Animals. Simpl. in Præd. p. 81, ut suprà.

(h) See *Xenoph. Mem.* l. ii. c. i. S. 21.

Ch. XI.

THERE IS A FOURTH SORT OF ACTION, where the INTELLECT, operating *without* Passions or Affections, stays not *within itself*, but *passes out* (as it were) to some *external* Operation. 'Tis thus that NATURE, considered as an *Efficient Cause*, may be called *the Energy of God*, seen in the various Productions that replenish and adorn the World. 'Tis thus that ART, considered as an *Efficient Cause*, may be called *the Energy of Man*, which imitates in it's Operations the plastic Power of Nature (1).

THE LAST AND MOST EXCELLENT SORT OF ACTION is seen in *Contemplation*; in *the pure Energy* of SIMPLE INTELLECT, keeping *within itself*, and *making itself it's own Object*. 'This is *the highest Action* of which we are susceptible; and by it *we imitate* THE SUPREME BEING, as far as is consistent with our subordinate Nature. 'Tis to this that our great *Poet* alludes, when speaking of his Employment, during a state of Blindness, he says—

Then

The above Species of *Action* is thus described by *Simplicius*—Τρίτον δὲ τῶ ποιεῖν γένος, τὸ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν ἀπηρίθμηται, ὅπερ τῶ λόγῳ τὰς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ σύνθετα ποιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει, προαίρεσιν καὶ βέλῃν δόξαν τε καὶ σκέψιν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις παρεχόμενον. *Simpl. ut supra.* The Genus, comprehended under the Idea of ACTING MORALLY, is the third of this Order; that Genus, which presides over the Energies of Reason with respect to the concrete Objects of Sense (that is, which presides in the affairs of common life), and which furnishes upon occasion Deliberate Choice, Volition, Opinion, Inquiry, and other Energies of the same character. *Simp. in Præd. p. 80. B. Edit. Bas. 1551.*

We have in this place translated *πράσσειν* to *act morally*, the better to distinguish it from *ποιεῖν*, a word of meaning more extensive, signifying simply *to do*, or *to make*.

(1) Τῆς δὲ πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον—πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, μιμνήμεναι τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παραλειπόμενον ὑπ' αὐταῖς (*lege αὐτῆς*) ἀναπληρῆσαι. *Simplic. ut supra.* Of this Species of *Acting* THE DIVINITY has a large share—a large share also falls to ARTS, that imitate Nature, and supply what she has omitted.

*Then FEED ON THOUGHTS, which voluntary move
Harmonious Numbers—— (m).*

Ch. XI.

THE *Species of PASSION* may be understood by their reciprocating for the most part with those of ACTION.

THUS tho' the DIVINE MIND, by being *pure and intellectual Energy*, can have *nothing passive* in it's transcendent theory (n);
yet

(m) *Par. Lost*, iii. 37.

This highest Mode of ACTION (if it may be so called) is thus described by *Simplicius* in the same Comment, p. 80 :

Τὸ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμερίτων ἑσίων ἐπιστηνοπύμενον ἀπλαῖς νοήσεσιν—*That which, with simple intellections, inquires concerning Substances intelligible and indivisible—that is, Substances, which, having no Parts, cannot, like Body, be infinitely divided.*

Archytas has enumerated these *Species of Energy or Action*, but in a different manner, beginning with the last of them first, and so proceeding inversely, till he come to the first that is mentioned here, and this he omits. His words are worthy of perusal—Τὰς δὲ Ἐνεργείας διαφορὰς τρεῖς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶν αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν, οἷον ἀστρονομέειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν, τεκταίνειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν, οἷον στραταγὴν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι· γίνεται δὲ ἅ μὲν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. Γενικώτατα δὲ αὐτά. *Archyt. apud. Simpl. in Præd.* p. 80. There are three Distinctions of ACTION or ENERGY: One Sort of it consists in CONTEMPLATING, as when we study the Stars; another in MAKING, as when we heal a Disease, or exercise the Art of a Carpenter; another [not in making but] in ACTING, as when we lead an Army, or administer a Commonwealth. There is too a fourth Energy, WHERE THERE IS NO USE OF REASONING, as in Animals irrational. These are the Forms of Action the most general and comprehensive.

Simplicius tells us, that *Archytas* has omitted the other Species (that which we have mentioned first, and which respects Bodies inanimate) because he did not consider it as a Species purely active, nor as arising from any internal and sensitive Principle of Motion. And yet perhaps, in an introductory Treatise, it can hardly be considered as introduced improperly, tho' it must be allowed at the same time to want this Requisite.

We observe by the way that this distinction of Actions is called by Logicians *Actio transiens*, and *Actio immanens*, which corresponds in Grammar to Verbs Transitive on one side, and Verbs Neuter and Middle on the other. See *Hermes*, l. i. c. 9.

(n) See Chapter on Qualities, p. 91.

Ch. XI. yet THE MIND OF MAN, which has *intensions* and *remissions*, is, for that reason, *necessarily* PASSIVE in two important manners, either as *Truth*, real or apparent, demands it's *Affent*; or as *Falshood*, real or apparent, demands it's *Diffent*.

It is in consequence of *this Passivity* of the *Human Mind*, which I chuse to call *Passivity Intellectual*, that it becomes *susceptible of Discipline and Institution*, and thus finds itself adorned (according as it is cultivated) with the various tribe both of Arts and Sciences (o).

As the *Reason of Man* is acted upon by the appearances of *Truth* and *Falshood*, so are the *Appetites* of Man (and not only of Man, but of Brutes also) acted upon by the approach of *Pleasure* and *Pain* (p). This therefore may be called *SENSUAL PASSIVITY*, in opposition to the *rational* above described. 'Tis to this *Davus* alludes in *Horace*,

———— etenim fateor, me dixerit ille

DUCI VENTRE *levem*: NASUM NIDORE SUPINOR,

Imbecillus, iners, &c. (q)

The moulding this *Passivity* of the *human Mind* into as much of the fair and honest, as it is capable of receiving, when it is applied to

(o) *Vid. Arrian. Epiet. l. iii. c. 3.*

(p) Δεῖ δὲ τίθεναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ φαινόμενον γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. — We ought to suppose, that both GOOD APPARENT and PLEASURE supply the place of Good (real); for Pleasure is Good apparent. *Arist. de Animal. Motu. p. 154. Edit. Sylb.*

(q) *Hor. Sat. ii. 7. 37.*

to Nations, is called *Politics*; when to Families, *Oeconomics*; when to Individuals, *Ethics* (*r*); and is in general the Foundation of *Moral Principles and Conduct*. Ch. XI.

THE PASSIVITY PECULIAR TO BRUTES may be seen in the various purposes, to which we direct their several Powers; some to plow our lands, others to carry us; a third Species to hunt for us, &c. (*s*)

THE PASSIVITY OF INSENSITIVE BODIES, whether vegetable or not, is equally conspicuous in the various Ends, to which we apply them. The Earth we plow; over the Sea we sail; out of the Forest we build our Ships, &c. This insensitive *Passivity*, tho' it submit to the *Action* of other Bodies upon it, yet always follows the peculiar Nature

(*r*) Nicephorus Blemmides adopts this Division from the Peripatetic School—Τὸ δὲ Πρακτικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς ἠθικὸν, οἰκονομικὸν, καὶ πολιτικόν· καὶ ἠθικὸς μὲν ἐστὶ φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἤθη καὶ ἄλλα ρυθμίζειν δυνάμενος· οἰκονομικὸς δὲ, ὁ καὶ οἶκον ὅλον ἐκπαιδεύειν καλῶς ἐπιστάμενος· ὁ δὲ γε πᾶν ἢ καὶ πόλεις διεξάγων καὶ διακυβερνῶν ἀρίστως, πολιτικός—The PRACTICAL Part of Philosophy is divided into MORAL, OECONOMICAL, and POLITICAL. It is the MORAL Philosopher, who is able to adjust his own manners, and those of any other individual: the OECONOMICAL, who knows how to instruct well a whole Family; and he, who in the best manner conducts and governs a City, or Cities, this Philosopher is the POLITICAL one. Blem. Epitom. Logic. p. 37.

As we have been speaking just before of *Passivity*, it is proper to remark that the same Writer, from the same Philosophy, takes notice of two Species of it, a better Species and a worse; *Passivity Corruptive*, and *Passivity Compleitive*; *Corruptive*, as when any Being is consumed by Fire; *Compleitive*, as when a Being either learns, or is acted upon, either by it's Intellect, or it's Senses.—Τὸ πάσχειν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ φθαρτικόν, ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τελεωτικόν, ὡς τὸ μαρθάνειν, καὶ γινώσκειν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Nic. Blem. Ep. Log. 158.

(*s*) See Vol. I. Treatise I. p. 27, 28. See also as to the *Passivity* of Bodies inanimate, p. 26, 27, of the same Treatise.

Ch. XI. Nature of the Being, to which it belongs; so that the *Effects* often differ, where the *Active Power* is the same.

Limus ut hic DURESCIT, et hæc ut cera LIQUESCIT,
UNO EODEMQUE igni—— (t)

LASTLY, all *Bodies*, that act by *Attraction*, are themselves *RECIPROCALLY ACTED UPON*, as modern Philosophers have clearly demonstrated.

As to *ACTION* and *PASSION* in general, it may be observed, that the great and diversified Mixture of them, which runs thro' the World, and is conspicuous in every part of it, has a necessary reference (as all other Mixtures have) to *Principles more simple*, out of which it is compounded. *PURE ACTIVITY* we may suppose *MIND*; and *PURE PASSIVITY*, *MATTER*. As *Mind* is capable of acting whatever is possible, so is *Matter* of having, whatever is possible, acted upon it. The former is the *Source* of all Forms, Distinctions, and Beauty; the latter is the *Receptacle*. In the *SUPREME MIND* there is *nothing passive*; in the *LOWEST MATTER*, there is *nothing active* (u); while all between is a Mixture of both, where in different parts the different Principles are prevalent, and from this prevalence give the Being it's proper Character.

IF

(t) *Virg. Ecl. viii. 80.*

(u) See Chapter vi. p. 62.

Thus *Archytas* in *Simplicius*—Τὰ καθαῶς γένη τῆ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχησιμωτάτοις—τῆ μὲν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, τῆ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ—The pure and simple Genera of acting, and being acted upon, exist in the primary and most original of Beings; *ACTING*, in *GOD*; the being acted upon, in *MATTER*. *Simplic. in Præd. p. 84. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.*

IF we call *Man* a *Composite* of Soul and Body, as a *rational* Being, he has a Motion of *his own*; as a *sensitive* Being, he has a Motion in common with *Brutes*; as a Being merely *corporeal*, a Motion in common with *all Bodies* whatever. A Dog has only the *second* and *third* of these Motions, and a Stone only *the last*. Thus is the Stone *least* active, the Man *most* so, and the Brute *between both*.

THE Modes are different, under which Beings *act upon one another*.

SOME (as the whole tribe of *corporeal* Masses) only *act*, because they are *acted upon*, and that too by something *external*, and perfectly distinct from themselves. 'Tis thus the Nail acts upon the Timber, because the Hammer acts upon the Nail; and were not the Hammer to drive, the Nail would never penetrate.

Now such Motion as *this* is but a Species of *Passivity*, because tho' the Beings, which possess it, have an *original* Power to *receive* Motion, they by no means possess an *original* Power to *impart* it. And hence it follows, that if something did not exist *more intrinsically active* than themselves, they would *never act*, and there would be *no Motion at all*.

ACTION of this kind (if it deserve the name) is the ACTION of BEINGS, which, tho' MOVEABLE, are not *intrinsically* MOTIVE, that is, *Causes of Motion*.

ANOTHER

Ch. XI.

ANOTHER Mode of ACTION may be found in the following instances.—A Lamb acts upon *the Senses* of a Wolf—that Sensation acts upon his *Appetite*—that Appetite acts upon his *Corporeal Organs*—by *the Action of these Organs* he runs, he seizes, and he devours the Lamb.

A CHILD is seen by its Mother likely to fall from a precipice.—The *Sensation* acts upon her *parental Affections*—these Affections act upon her *Corporeal Organs*.—By *the Action of these Organs* she runs, she seizes, and she saves her Child.

THE Instances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with *deliberation* and *thought*. The Splendor of the *Roman Empire* acted upon the *Imagination* of *Cæsar*—that *Imagination* acted upon his *Desire of sovereign Power*—that Desire acted upon the *Faculties of his Mind and Body*.—By the *Energy of these Faculties* he passed the *Rubicon*, conquered *Pompey*, enslaved *Rome*, and obtained the wished-for Empire.

AGAIN.—The Domination of *Cæsar* acted upon the *Imagination* of *Brutus*—that *Imagination* acted upon his *Love for the Republic*—that Love for the Republic acted upon his *corporeal Organs*.—His *hand* in consequence plunged a *Dagger* into *Cæsar*, and, for, a time, the Republic, which he loved, was restored.

IN all these instances the *Corporeal Organs* act, like the *Corporeal Masses* before mentioned, because they are *first acted upon*. But when they are not acted upon, as those are, by *other external Bodies*,
but

but by *internal* Appetites, Affections, and Desires, *all* which, as well as the *Organs*, are PARTS of *one and the same* BEING. Such Being therefore is not, like Beings of the first Order, in a manner *passive* and *only moveable*; but, as it possesses *within itself* the power of *imparting* Motion, as well as of *receiving* it, the ACTION is that of a BEING, not only MOVEABLE, but *intrinsically* MOTIVE. Ch. XI.

WE may go farther, if we please, and suggest a *third* Mode of ACTION, the *Action* of the FIRST MOVER; THAT BEING, which, tho' *Motive*, is itself perfectly IMMOVEABLE.

IN a series of Agents, where each of them *imparts* Motion, which it has *previously received*, were *such* Agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no Motion could ever *begin*, were there not *something* at their head *totally different* from them all; something *purely impassive*; something, which can *move*, without *being moved*; in other words, which *can impart Motion* to every thing else, and remain *itself* IMMOVEABLE.

'Tis to this character that *Boethius* alludes, in his truly sublime address to the Author of the Universe:

——— *Qui tempus ab ævo*

Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS DAS CUNCTA MOVERI (v).

CONSIDERING

(v) Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, & κινεῖται — The DESIRABLE, and the INTELLIGIBLE MOVE, WITHOUT BEING MOVED. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 202. *Edit. Sytb.* See below, Chap. XVII. note (u).

Ch. XI.

CONSIDERING *Action* therefore and *the being acted upon* with a view to *Motion* and the *being moved*, we may say that the *Peripatetic* System (for 'tis hence we derive these Speculations) contemplated all Beings in *three* views; either as *MOVEABLE*, but not *MOTIVE*; or as both *MOVEABLE* and *MOTIVE*; or lastly as *MOTIVE* alone, but NOT *MOVEABLE* (*x*).

MORE is said upon this Subject in the subsequent Theory concerning Motion (*y*).

WE shall only add, that, in the above Modes of Acting, when *Bodies* act upon *Bodies*, the Action for the greater part is *reciprocal*. While the Oar impels the Wave, the Wave resists the Oar; while the Axe hews the Timber, the Timber blunts the Axe; while the Earth attracts the Moon, the Moon attracts the Earth. And hence the Theory of ACTION and RE-ACTION, so accurately scrutinized in modern Philosophy.

IF

The *Latin* Quotation is from the *Consolation* of *Boethius*, and is a part of those Hexameters, which for harmony of Numbers, and sublimity of Sentiment are perhaps not inferior to any in the *Latin* Language.

O! qui perpetuū mundum, &c.

(*x*) This Doctrine is expressed by the *Stagirite*, but in an inverted order. Τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον, ἢ κινούμενον, κινεῖ· ἢ δ' ὁρεξις καὶ τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν κινούμενον, κινεῖ· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων ἢ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν ἔδεν. *De Animal. Motu*, p. 154. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*y*) Concerning that MOTION, which does not arise from the Collision of one Body with another Body, but where the Power which moves, and the Organs, which are moved, appear to be both of them vitally UNITED in ONE and the same Subject, see below, Chap. XVII. Concerning the necessity of something, different from Body, to put Body in Motion, see below, Chap. XVII. paragraph 2. Concerning CAUSATIVE MOTION, see below, Chap. XVII. par. 26. Concerning IMMOBILITY, see below, Chap. XVII. near the end; and *Hermes*, Book III. Chap. IV. in the note.

IF we contemplate the World, as well the vegetable as the animal, we shall perceive ACTION and PASSION diffused thro' every part. Ch. XI.

AND yet it must be observed both of *Action* and of *Passion*, (such at least as those we see around us) that they are neither of them *perpetual* in any one particular instance. Corn *only* nourishes, and Hemlock *only* poisons, when they meet a *proper* Body, on which to operate: the Musician does not *always* perform, nor is the Ear *always* affected by Sounds: the Painter does not *always* paint, nor is the Eye *always* affected by Colours.

AND hence the rise of that notable thing called POWER; that dormant Capacity, into which both *Action* and *Passion*, when they cease, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their *Source* they *flow*.

THERE is nothing which appears so nearly to approach Non-entity, as this singular thing called POWER; yet is there nothing in fact so truly different from it.

OF Non-entity there are no Attributes, no Affections; but every POWER possesses a *specific* and a *limited* character, which not only distinguishes it from *Non-entity*, but from every *other* Power.

THUS among the ACTIVE POWERS, the Smith, *when asleep*, has *still* those Powers, which make him a Smith; the Shipwright, *when asleep*, has *still* those Powers, which make him a Shipwright. The Powers distinguish *both* from the *rest* of mankind, who purely *from not having them* are neither Smiths nor Shipwrights.

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THE *same Powers* help to distinguish the *same Artists* from one another: for the *Powers*, though invisible, are *incommutable*; nor can those of the Shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or those of the Smith enable him to construct a Ship.

IF we pass from *active* to PASSIVE POWERS, we shall find *these* after the same manner to be *limited* in every Subject, and *different* in every Species. Timber has the *Capacity* of becoming a Ship, but not an Axe; Iron on the contrary of becoming an Axe, but not a Ship (z). And tho' *different Agents*, by operating on the *same Patient*, may produce *different Effects* (as the Shipwright makes Timber into a Ship, while the Carpenter forms it into a House); yet still must each Effect correspond with the *passive Capacities*; or else, where these fail, there is nothing to be done.

WERE the case otherwise, were not the *Passive Powers* essentially requisite as well as the *Active*, there would be no reason, why any thing might not be made out of any thing.

FAR distant therefore from Non-entity are *Passive Powers*, however latent: so far indeed, that where they differ essentially from one another, they often lead to Effects perfectly *contrary*, tho' the *Agent*, which operates, be individually the same:

Limus ut hic DURESCIT, et hæc ut cera LIQUESCIT,
Uno eodemque igni, &c. (a.)

"Tis

(z) See Chapter the fourth concerning *Matter*, p. 38, 39; also p. 84, 85.

(a) *Virg. ut sup.* p. 270.

'Tis from this Theory we perceive the reason of that ancient Axiom, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis*; than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood.

Ch. XI.

As to the *Active Powers*, there is an important distinction between those called *Rational*, and the *Irrational*. The Subordinate are mostly confined to the producing *One Contrary* out of *Two*. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; Ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But the *rational Powers* imply *both Contraries at once*, and give to their possessor the *Alternative* of producing either. The Musician has *the Power* both of Melody and Dissonance; the Physician *the Power* both of healing, and making sick; the Magistrate *the Power* of deciding both justly and unjustly.

THE reason of this is, that *Rational Power alone* is founded in SCIENCE, and 'tis always *one and the same Science*, which recognizes *Contraries*; that, which teaches us Harmony, teaches us Discord; that which informs us what is Health, informs us what is Disease; that which discerns Truth, discerns also Falshood. Hence therefore it is, that as every *Science* may be called *double* in it's Powers of Knowledge; so all *Action founded on Science* may be called *double* in it's Powers of Acting (b). A noble Privilege this to Man, if well

(b) Καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν εἶναι ἀλογοί, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγον—καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγον πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἀλογοί, μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τῷ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσον καὶ ὑγείαν αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπισήμη, ὃ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν γένησιν—Of POWERS some will be found IRRATIONAL, others are attended with REASON—and as to those which are attended with Reason, THE SAME POWERS will EXTEND TO THINGS CONTRARY; but as to the irrational, ONE POWER will extend ONLY TO ONE CONTRARY; what is hot for example will only conduce to heating; but the Art of Medicine will

Ch. XI. well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abused; since by this *He alone*, of all sublunary Beings, is properly intitled either to *Praise* or *Dispraise*.

WITH respect to POWERS in general, there is this to be observed: so important are they to the constitution of many Beings, that often, tho' *latent*, they are more regarded than the strongest *apparent* Attributes. Thus 'tis from their *medicinal Powers only*, that we value the several Species of Drugs; and from their *generative Powers only* that we value the several Species of Seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is their *apparent* Qualities, farther than as they help to indicate those *invisible* Powers.

THE just Opposite to POWER is ENERGY, which, as it's etymology (c) shews, implies *the existing in Deed or Act*, as opposed to that existence, which only implies *Possibility*.

AND here 'tis worth observing, that *Every thing existing in Power* is necessarily roused into *Energy* by something, which itself existed PREVIOUSLY in *Energy* (d). Events and Incidents never stand still;

will become the Cause both of Disease and of Health. The Cause is, that this Medicinal Science is Reason, and THE SAME REASON DISCOVERS both THE THING, and it's PRIVATION. Arist. Metaph. p. 143. Edit. Sylb.

See also Vol. the first of these *Treatises*, p. 100, and Note xxii. to these add, p. 85 of the present Treatise, especially in the Note.

(c) *Ev *Eργῶν, IN ACT, IN DEED. See a sketch of the difference between *Act* and *Power*, Vol. I. p. 12, 13.

(d) 'Twas a Doctrine of the *Peripatetic School*, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμει ἐστὶ — THAT ENERGY is PRIOR TO POWER: *Arist. Metaph. p. 150, 152.* — αἰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ὄντι γίγνεται

still; some Agents or other are perpetually energizing, tho' all perhaps by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them at least as are of the *subordinate* Tribe. It happens indeed in the World, as in a Ship upon a Voyage. Every hand at a proper season has his hours of Rest, and yet the Duty never ceases, the Business of the Ship is never at a stand; those, that wake, rousing those, that sleep, and being in their turn roused again themselves.

BUT another way to shew that ENERGY is of necessity PREVIOUS TO POWER, consists in admitting the contrary Hypothesis.

LET us suppose for example a Man placed in a part of Space, where there was, and ever had been, *eternal Silence*; or otherwise in a part, where there was and ever had been, *eternal Darknes*: could such a one ever *actually* either have heard or seen, however exquisite his Powers both of hearing and seeing?—And why not?—Because to the evocation of one of these Powers, there is a necessity of *actual* Sound; to that of the other, of *actual* Light; so that had not these *Energies* existed *previously*, his Powers must have remained dormant thro' the period of their existence. Suppose therefore *all* *Energies* of *all* kinds to stop: how could they ever *revive*? Were they all once sunk into one *universal Sleep*, where

γίνεται τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ἐν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντι· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, αἰεὶ κινῶντός τινος· πρῶτον· τὸ δὲ κινῶν ἐνεργεῖα ἤδη ἐστίν. That which exists in Energy is always formed out of that which exists in Power, by SOMETHING WHICH EXISTS (already) IN ENERGY; for example Man is formed by Man, the Musical Artist by the Musical Artist, there being always some FIRST (or prior) BEING, which gives the Motion. Now THAT, WHICH GIVES THIS MOTION, IS ITSELF ALREADY IN ENERGY. *Aristot. Metaph. p. 151. Edit. Sylb.*

Ch. XI. where should we find a waking Cause, to rouse them from their Slumbers (e) ?

AND what then are the inferences from this Speculation, that *Power necessarily arises from previous Energy* ?—One is, that all those Doctrines about Order springing from Disorder, Beauty from Confusion; of Night and Chaos being the oldest of Beings; in general, of the Perfect and Actual arising from the Imperfect and Potential; however they may be true as to the *material* Cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their *real and essential Origin*. There is nothing in fact more certain, than that the ACTUAL and PERFECT are *previous to their Contraries*; else there could never have been in the Universe *any thing Actual or Perfect*.

ANOTHER inference is, that the *most minute* and contemptible *Energy*, now *actually* existing, necessarily proves the Existence of an *eternal Energy*, to which, as to its Cause, it is *ultimately* referable. And what can such ETERNAL ENERGY be, but something, *whose very ESSENCE is that ENERGY (f)*; something, which knows no *remissions*,

(e) 'Tis hence that *Aristotle*, speaking according to the Principles of his Philosophy, says of things *eternal, unalterable, and necessary*, that is, *things ever in Energy*—*εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν*, if THESE WERE NOT, THERE COULD BE NOTHING. *Metaph.* 153, *ut supra*. 'Tis a pertinent Question, stated by the same Author, in another part of the same Tract—*Πῶς γὰρ κινήσεται, εἰ μὴδὲν ἔσται ἐνέργεια αἴτιον; ἔ γὰρ ἢ γε ὅλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἐξυτὴν*—*How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no CAUSE (previously) EXISTING IN ENERGY? Mere Matter itself cannot move itself.*—*Ibid.* 201. And soon before in the same page—*ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ ἔσῃα ἐνέργεια*—*It may happen that the thing, which exists in POWER ONLY, may NOT EXIST AT ALL: there must therefore be (in the Universe) such a Sort of PRINCIPLE, AS THAT THE VERY ESSENCE OF IT SHOULD BE ENERGY.*

(f) See the Note preceding—The founder of the *Peripatetic* Sect, speaking of the *Deity*, uses the following Expressions—*ἡ γὰρ Νῆς Ἐνέργεια, ζωή. Ἐκεῖν δὲ, ἡ Ἐνέργεια*—*The Energy*

remissions, like subordinate *Energies*, no occasional retirings into *Power* and dead *Capacity*, but IS EVER THE SAME IMMUTABLE AND PERFECT? Without such a *Principle* the Universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this Principle? Shall we call it *BODY* or *MIND*?—The best way to answer this, will be to search *within* ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of *either* Being, together with the several Attributes appertaining to each.

AND so much for the two ARRANGEMENTS or PREDICAMENTS of ACTION and PASSION.

Energy of Mind or Intellect, is Life: and HE (the Supreme Being) is that ENERGY. Metaph. p. 203. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpretat. p. 198, B. & c. where the Arrangement of Beings is deeply and philosophically discussed, and exhibited.—Εξῆς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐπιδείξαι βεβόμεν, κ. τ. λ.

'Tis agreeably to this reasoning we are told—Τὸ χρόνος ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τῆς ἀεὶ κινῶντος πρῶτως—that one *Energy* in point of *Time* always precedes another, till we arrive at the *Energy* of that Being, which eternally gives *Motion* in the first instance. *Metaph. Θ. η. p. 152. Edit. Sylb.*

Which is as much as to affirm (in other words) that *there is a gradual ascent of active efficient Principles, one above another, up to that ONE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE, which is ORIGINAL and SUPREME.*

C H A P. XII.

Concerning WHEN and WHERE—Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how distinguished from Time and Place, how connected with them—Descriptions of When and Where—their Utility and Importance in human Life—Various Terms, denoting these two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extensive influence—plausible Topics—concurring Causes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Causes—Supreme Intelligence.

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WE have said already, that *Time* and *Place* agree, as they both belong to *Quantity Continuous* (a). So essential is this character, that could either of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be *Intervals without Time*, and *Distances without place*. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a *million of different things may exist in one instant of Time*, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one *Place*.

AND hence the Nature of *Place* may be called *distributive*, while that of *Time* may be called *accumulative*. Hence too as they agree in *some* respects, and *differ* in others, they are necessarily *not simple*, but *compound Ideas*, both belonging to one *Genus*, and each distinguished

(a) See before, p. 103 to 106.

guished by *specific* differences. Having a *Genus* and a *Difference*, they become capable of *Definition*, since 'tis on *these two requisites* that all *Definition* is founded (*b*). Ch. XII.

TIME therefore is *Continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of it's proper subjects*; PLACE is *Continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of it's proper subjects*.

WE have said thus much about these two Beings, because WHEN and WHERE, tho' distinct from both (*c*), are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this *Connection*.

MEN, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal Beings, as none of them are infinite either in *Duration* or *Extent*, must have something of course to *limit* and *circumscribe* them. Now PLACE circumscribes their *Extent*, and TIME, their *Duration*; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their *Motions*, of all their *Accidents*, in short of all they are able to *do*, and of all they are able to *suffer*.

FOR

(*b*) *Omnis DEFINITIO constat GENERE et DIFFERENTIA*—*Fell*, 218. *Termini verò essentielles* (Definitionis scil.) *GENUS et DIFFERENTIA*. *Sanderfon*, l. i. c. 17. See also *Wallisi Logic*. l. i. c. 23.—Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁρίσμοι ἐν γένει καὶ τῶν συστατικῶν εἰσι διαφορῶν, περὶ τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. *Amm.* in 5. voces, p. 67.

(*c*) How they are distinct, see below, particularly in Note (*f*), also p. 166.

Ch. XII. For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the *Time* and *Place*, or their *Meeting* would not be practicable. First then for the *Time*—

When shall we three meet again

In thunder, light'ning, and in rain (d)?

The Answer to this question connects their *Meeting* with a certain *Time*; and in the *Relation* between these two, we behold the rise of the Predicament, *WHEN*.

WHEN the battle's lost and won,

WHEN the hurly burly's done (e).

AGAIN—

Where's the Place?

The

(d) *Shakef. Macbeth.*

(e) Οὐ μέντοι ἔτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτὸν τὸ Ποτέ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον. Nor is *WHEN the same with TIME*; but if any thing, it consists in the *RELATION* which it BEARS TO *TIME*. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 87. B. *Ed. Bas.* 1551. And again—ὅταν δέ τι πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον ὃν τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ ἔχῃ ὡς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίνεται, ἢ τῷ Ποτέ, ἄλλη ἔσα παρὰ τὸ Ποσόν.—But when any particular *THING*, which is different from *TIME*, has a *RELATION* to *Time*, and for this reason is *IN Time*, as for example the *Sea-fight at Salamis*, which happened at such a particular *Time*: then there arises a different *PREDICAMENT*, that of *WHEN*, a *PREDICAMENT* different from that of *QUANTITY*. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 88. *Ejusd. Edit.*

The answer to this question connects their Meeting with a certain Place; and in the Relation between these two, we see the rise of the Predicament, WHERE. Ch. XII.

— upon the Heath,
There we go to meet Macbeth (f).

LET us take another example. *Virgil*, we are informed, wrote his *Georgics* at *Naples*. By *Naples*, in this instance, is the Place of *Virgil* circumscribed, which might else have been at *Rome*, at *Mantua*, &c. The connection therefore of *Virgil* with this City gives us an answer to the Question, WHERE.

AGAIN, he wrote them, we are told, while *Cæsar Augustus* was on his *Oriental Expedition*. Here the time of this Expedition circumscribes the time of Writing, which might else have been (for ought we know) during the Wars with *Brutus*, with *Antony*, &c. This relative Connection gives an answer to the Question, WHEN.

— Dum Cæsar ad altum
Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo :
Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis otii (g).

THESE

(f) Ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρόνος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνος τί· ἔγω; ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον, ἢ τόπος τί. — For as in TIME, Time itself is one thing, and that, which is according to Time, or something belonging to it, is another thing; so also is PLACE one thing, and that WHICH IS ACCORDING TO PLACE, or SOMETHING BELONGING TO IT, another Thing. *Simpl. in Præd. ut sup.*

UBI non est Locus, sed ESSE IN LOCO. QUANDO non est Tempus, sed ESSE IN TEMPORE. *Fell, p. 104, 107.*

(g) *Virg. Georg. iv. sub. fin.*

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THESE elegant lines, which we so justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the *common date of an epistle*; as if the Author, having finished his work, had subjoined *Naples, such a Month, such a Year*: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of Numbers, and sublime Ideas.

HENCE then we perceive the nature both of WHEN, and of WHERE. WHEN is not mere *Time*, nor is it *Beings and Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they stand related to Time*. Again, WHERE is not properly *Place*, nor is it *Beings and Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they stand related to Place*. If therefore the *When* only be given, and not the *Where*, then might the thing have happened either *here*, or at the *Antipodes*: and, by parity of reasoning, if the *Where* only be given, and not the *When*, then might the Event have happened, either *yesterday*, or *before the flood*. 'Tis then only comes *precision*, when we view the two united (h).

AND hence by the way the utility and praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for Sciences I cannot call them) *Geography* and *Chronology*. By acquainting us with the relations, borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of *Time* and of *Place*, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general Order and Concatenation of
Events,

(h) Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ Πᾶς καὶ τὸ Ποτέ ἀδελφὰ πῶς ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, κοινὴν ἐπίσης παρέχοντα τὴν συντέλειαν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τοῖς κινημένοις τὴν ἴσην χρεῖαν συμβαλλόμενα. And thus it is that WHEN and WHERE are a sort of Brothers one to another, affording equally a common Perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an Utility of equal Value to all things, that are in Motion. *Simplic. in Præd. p. 87. Ed. Basil. 1551.*

Events, and our own Connection with this Order, as Members of Ch. XII.
the same universe.

IN general it may be observed, that whatever is *an answer* to the Question, *WHERE*, belongs to the *Genus* or *Predicament* of *WHERE*; and whatever is *an answer* to the Question, *WHEN*, belongs in like manner to the *Predicament* of *WHEN*. *When* did such a thing happen?—*Now*; *this instant*; *to-day*; *yesterday*; *a century ago*; *in such a year of our Lord*; *such a year of the Hegira*; *such a year of Rome*; *such an Olympiad*, &c. To these may be added such terms in the *past*, as *Lately*, *Formerly*, *Long ago*, &c. and such also in the *future*, as *Immediately*, *Soon*, *Hereafter* (*i*), &c. Again, *WHERE* did such a thing happen?—*Here*; *There*; *in England*; *in Europe*; *in China*; *in the Moon*; *in the Sun*, &c. To these may be added such Terms as *Near*, *Far off*, *Above*, *Below*, &c.

ALL these Terms, by *thus answering these Questions*, serve to indicate the *Relation* of some *Being*, or *Event*, either to *Time*, or to *Place*; and, tho' some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it *in some degree*, they could not belong to these *two Predicaments*.

WE cannot assert the same of such terms, as *an Inch*, *a Foot*, or *a Cubit*; *a Day*, *a Month*, or *a Year*. The reason is, *they indicate no Relation of Time, or Place to particular things, but only measure out definite Portions in these two infinite Natures.*

WITH

(i) See many of these Terms elegantly and accurately explained in *Aristotle's Physics*, l. iv. c. 13. The Terms alluded to are *νῦν*, *πότε*, *ἤδη*, *ἄρτι*, *πάλαι*, *ἐξαιφνης*, &c. &c.

Ch. XII.

WITH regard to the *human* Body, not only the Whole fills its proper Place, but so too does every Limb. Hence, as its *particular Place* is a measure to each *Limb*, so is this *Limb* in its turn made a measure to that *Place*, in order to define *a like portion* of it, *existing elsewhere* (*k*). And hence the origin of such Measures, as an *Inch*, a *Foot*, a *Cubit*, and the like, which are all of them deduced from *certain Limbs* in the *Human* Body.

BUT tho' the *Limbs* of *Man* were tolerably adequate to measure *Place*, yet were *his* *Motions* by no means adequate to the mensuration of *Time*, derived (as they appear) from such a number of *Appetites*; from such a variety of *Fancies*, and contradictory *Opinions*. Here therefore were mankind obliged to *quit themselves*, and to recur to *Motions more orderly* than *their own*; to the *real* Motion of the *Moon*, to the *apparent* *Motions* of the *Sun*, in order to obtain such *orderly* Measures, as those of *Days*, and *Months*, and *Years*.

AND thus from the nature and origin of these *Terms*, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the Predicaments of *WHERE* and *WHEN*.

THERE is (if I may use the Expression) an *enlarged When*, such as *To-day*, *during this Month*, *this Year*; *this Century*; and a *precise When*,

(*k*) This is indeed a common Property to all Mensuration, that the *Measurer*, and the thing *measured*, should *reciprocate*, so that while the *Gallon* measures the *Wine*, the *Wine* should measure the *Gallon*; while the *Ell* measures the *filk*, the *filk* should measure the *Ell*.

See before, the Quotation given in the Note, p. 16. *Ξέρης* is there rendered a *Quart*, not as if this last represented that *Greek* measure, but as it was a measure, familiar to an *English* Reader.

When, the indivisible instant, in which the event happened. So also is there an enlarged *Where*, as in London, in England, in Europe, &c. and a precise *Where*, that is to say the exact Place, which each individual fills (l).

Now as every man exists in such a precise *Where*, and during such a precise *When*, so is it with reference to these two Relations of his own, that he recognizes the *When* and the *Where* of all other Beings. WHEN lived Charles the Great? Almost three hundred Years before the first Crusade. Tho' this Answer tells us the distance between Charles and that Expedition, yet are we still uninformed as to the Time, When he lived, unless we have something given us, to connect him with ourselves. And WHEN, we demand, happened the first Crusade? — About seven hundred Years ago. Here we have the temporal Relation between ourselves, and that Event; so that having previously learnt the like relation between that Event and Charles the Great, we of course recognize the Time, WHEN that Prince existed; that is to say, the temporal Relation between our own existence, and his. The same too happens in ascertaining the Place, WHERE.

AND hence it follows, that such Measures of Time and Place, as a Year, a Century, a Foot, a Furlong, tho' they belong not of themselves to the present Predicaments or Arrangements, may yet be made a Part of them, by being properly associated. Such they become, when we say a Furlong hence, a Century since, a Foot below, a Year after. The reason is, they are brought, by such association, to define

Relative

(l) See *Hermes*, Chap. VII. Note (g).

Ch. XII. *Relative Existence*, in doing which the very *Effence* of these *Predicaments* confists.

AND now a word, as to the force of *these two Predicaments*; their influence in the World; and more particularly in *human* affairs.

CÆSAR, when he was affaffinated, fell at the feet of *Pompey's* Statue. The celebrated *Hampden* received his death's wound upon that *Field*, *where** he had first executed the Ordinance for levying troops to serve the Parliament. From a royal Banqueting-house, built by himself in prosperity, was an unfortunate Prince led to an unjust Execution. In each of these instances the PLACE, WHERE, is a plausible Topic; a Topic equally suited either to raise compassion, or, if we would sophisticate more harshly †, to insinuate Judgments, divine Vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which in fact demonstrate nothing.

'Twas by an unfortunate fall so near the conclusion of the race, that the swift footed *Salus* lost the prize to young *Euryalus* (m). 'Twas by being attacked *when* asleep, and over-powered with liquor, that the gigantic *Polypheme* fell a sacrifice to *Ulysses* (n). 'Twas by living in an age, *when* a capricious audience ruled, that the elegant *Menander* so often yielded to *Philemon*, his inferior by the confession of all succeeding ages (o). *The Race is not to the Swift,*
nor

* *Clarendon's History*, Book VII.

† *St. Luke*, xiii. 4.

(m) *Æneid*. v. 286, &c.

(n) *Odyss.* ix. sub. fin.

(o) *Vid. Quintil.* l. x. c. 1.—*A. Gell.* l. xvii. c. 4. who says of him, *ambitu, gratiâque, et factionibus sæpenumerò vincebatur.*

nor the Battle to the Strong, nor yet Favour to men of Skill; but TIME and CHANCE happeneth to them all (p). Ch. XII.

THE same concurring Causes, which acted in these cases like adversaries, can become in others the most powerful allies. Δός μοι ὡς ὅ, Give me WHERE to stand, was a well known saying of the famous Archimedes. He wanted but a Place, WHERE to fix his Machine, and he thought himself able to move even the World (q). Shakespeare tells us,

*There IS A TIDE in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows—— (r)*

When Horace sent a Messenger with some of his Works to Augustus, his charge was to deliver them, if Augustus was in health; and not only so, but in good humour; and not only so, but in a humour to call for them:

Si validus, si lætus erit, si denique poscet (s).

Such

(p) Ecclesiastes, xi. 11.

(q) See the Life of Archimedes in Rivaltus's Edition of his Works, Paris, 1615. Fol.

(r) Julius Cæsar, Act iv. Sc. 5.

(s) Hor. Epist. l. ii. Ep. 13.

Ch. XII. Such a Stress did this polite author lay on the propriety of THE
 WHEN. *Virgil* mentions finely the

————— MOLLISSIMA *fandi*
 TEMPORA (t).

He makes too his *Fury* suspend her Powers of Mischief, till she could catch a LUCKY MOMENT to make her influence more extensive:

At sæva e speculis TEMPUS Dea NACTA nocendi,
Tartaream intendit vocem, &c. (u).

AND hence we may collect a just idea of the Term, OPPORTUNITY. It is not merely *Time*, concurring with *Events*, for *Time* attends them *all*, be they prosperous or adverse; but it is TIME, CONCURRING FAVOURABLY; 'tis TIME, CO-OPERATING as an auxiliary Cause (x).

TIME (it is said) and CHANCE happeneth to *all*.—And what is this CHANCE?—Is it the *Chance* mentioned by *Milton*, as residing at

(t) *Æneid.* iv. 293.

(u) *Æneid.* vii. 511.

(x) According to the *Stagirite*, GOOD passes thro' all the *Predicaments*, and, as it stops at each, assumes a different Denomination. In *Substance*, it is MIND and DEITY; in *Quality*, 'tis that which is *Just*; in *Quantity*, that which is *Exact*, and according to *Measure*; and in the *Predicament* WHEN, it is OPPORTUNITY, ἐν δὲ τῷ Πότε, ὁ Καρπός; that is to say, GOOD or FAVOURABLE, acceding to the *Time* WHEN, and characterising it, gives it by such accession the Name of OPPORTUNITY. *Aristot. Ethic. Eudem.* p. 86. *Edit. Sylb.* Locum autem Actionis, Opportunitatem Temporis esse dicunt; TEMPUS autem ACTIONIS OPPORTUNUM Græcè Εὐκαιρία, Latine appellatur OCCASIO. *Cic. de Offic.* i. 40.

at the Court of Chaos (*y*)? Or is it the same, which *some* Philosophers suppose to have framed the World, and to have maintained in it ever since no inconsiderable Sway?—If *such* Chance be the strict opposite to a *rational Principle*, 'tis hard to conceive, how it should have supplied it's place, and without the least ingenuity have produced a work so ingenious. 'Tis hard also to conceive, how *without* a Reason *that* should exist, which it requires *so much* Reason (even in part only) *to comprehend* (*z*). There is however another sort of CHANCE, which, under the name of FORTUNE, we find described as follows—a Cause not manifest to human reasoning (*a*); not a Cause devoid of Reason, but a Cause, which human Reason wants the means to investigate.

WE may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human Freedom, (and enough is there left both for *Merit* and *Demerit*) it is not so uncontrouled, as in the least to affect the Universe. It is not in our power to interrupt the course of Nature; nor can we, like the Giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreverfible Order of things, to which we neceffarily fubmit; an indiffoluble Concatenation of fucceffive Causes with their

(*y*) *Parad. Lost*, Book ii. 965.

(*z*) *Hanc igitur in Stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum, NON POSSUM INTELLIGERE SINE MENTE, RATIONE, CONSILIO. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 21.—Dubitant de Mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casusne ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliquâ, an ratione ac mente divinâ: et ARCHIMEDEM arbitrantur PLUS VALUISSE IN IMITANDIS Sphæræ conversionibus, quam NATURAM IN EFFICIENDIS. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.*

(*a*) —δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ἡ Τυχὴ, ἀδελφὴ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ. — *Arist. Phys. ii. 4. p. 33. Edit. Sylb.* Instead of διανοίᾳ, they used afterwards the Term λογισμῶ.

Ch. XII. their Effects, by which both the Being and the Well-being of this Whole are maintained.

THIS divine *Order* or *Concatenation* has *different* denominations: referred to the *Supreme Being* as to it's author, we call it FATE; referred to his Forefight for the Good of all, we call it PROVIDENCE (*b*).

'TIS *this* which mingles itself with all our Actions and Designs; which *co-operates* with the Pilot, the Husbandman, and the Merchant; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest Peasant, up to the mightiest Monarch. If it co-operate *favourably*, they succeed; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the *supposed efficacy* of *Time* and *Place*, so often of such importance in *this co-operation*. 'Tis hence, *the Race is not to the swift, nor the Battle to the strong, &c.*

A PILOT fails, with intention to reach a certain port. All, that the skill of a good Navigator can suggest, is done; yet he fails at a *Time*, when hurricanes arise, and, instead of gaining the destined port, is dashed upon the rocks. A Farmer with proper industry manures and sows his fields; yet the Seasons destroy his harvest, and
(according

(*b*) Three Terms are here employed, CHANCE, FATE, and PROVIDENCE; the *two first* of which have been often improperly asserted, *the last* has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the *Atheistic System*.

The Author of these Notes has endeavoured to give such Meanings to the Terms CHANCE and FATE, as may render them subservient to the Cause of PROVIDENCE, and by making them *wholly dependent on* THE SUPREME INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, to make them weaken the System of *Atheism*, rather than contribute to it's Support.

(according to his own Phrase) *the Times fight against him*. A Merchant travels for the sake of gain to a distant country, and *there* contracts a pestilential disease, which carries him off. Ch. XII.

THESE Incidents, thus connected with *Time* and *Place*, are referred in common language to *Chance*, as to their *Cause*; and so indeed they may, as far as CHANCE implies a CAUSE, *which human reasoning was not able either to foresee or obviate*. But if we go farther, and suppose it a *Cause*, where there is in fact no Reason at all; in such case we do nothing less than *deify* CHANCE, committing the affairs of the World to the *blindest* of Guides, instead of that ONE, ALL-GOOD, ALL-POWERFUL, DIVINE INTELLIGENCE, *which in the same undivided instant both sees, and hears all things (c)*.

AND so much for the two GENERA or ARRANGEMENTS of WHEN and WHERE.

(c) See *Epicharmus*, quoted in the Note, p. 65.

C H A P. XIII.

Concerning POSITION or SITUATION—What it is, and how deduced—how it exists in Beings inanimate—in Vegetables—in Man—animal Progression—Works of Art—Attitudes—illustrations of Attitude—from Poets—from Actors—from Orators—It's Efficacy, whence—Position, among the Elements of Democritus—it's Influence and Importance in the natural World—in the intellectual.

Ch. XIII.

THE Arrangement or Predicament of POSITION or SITUATION has a near affinity with that of *Place*. They are both of the *relative* order, and are both *conversant*, when taken *strictly*, about *corporeal* Substances only. They differ however, in as much as the *simple Possession* of Space constitutes *PLACE*; the *manner* (a) of *possessing* it, *POSITION*, or *SITUATION*.

Now

(a) *Differt SITUS ab UBI in hoc, quod UBI est LOCATIO TOTIUS, SITUS est ORDINATIO PARTIUM IN LOCO. UBI est simpliciter ESSE IN LOCO; SITUS, secundum PARTIUM ORDINATIONEM. Fell, p. 104.*

Ad SITUM omnem requiritur TRIPLEX HABITUDO, quæ conjuncta constituit Situm; Habitudo Partium alicujus Totius inter se; Partium alicujus Totius ad ipsum Totum; Partium et Totius ad Locum. Sanderson, p. 49, l. i. c. 14.

Prædicamentum SITUS (Κεῖσθαι) respicit Positionem rei, tum respectu partium suarum inter se, tum respectu Loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis, l. i. c. 13.

—ἔτε ἔν τὸ κείμενον σῶμα, ἔτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κεῖται, τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχαστάν πως θέσιν ἐν τῷ γένει τῆ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ὅσα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ἢ ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις· ἡ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκὴ τῶν ἐνιδρυμένων καὶ τῶν τὴν ἑδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη καὶ πρωτίστη ἐστὶ τῆ κεῖσθαι ὑπογραφή—*We are not to understand the Genus of LYING or POSITION, by taking into our Discussion either the Body lying,*
or

Now the *manner*, in which a Body possesses Space, has respect to certain *Relations*, which exist, some *within*, and some *without* it; Relations, which arise from it's *Parts*, it's *Whole*, it's *immediate Place*, and *the Place surrounding it*. Ch.XIII.

WE shall explain what we assert (which perhaps may appear obscure) by beginning from Bodies *the most simple*, and passing from these to others, more *complex* and diversified.

THE simplest and most perfectly similar of all Bodies is the Sphere (*b*). If therefore we take a Sphere, and place it upon the ground, the Part *farthest from the Earth's centre* we call it's *Top*; that *the nearest*, it's *Bottom*; and all lying between we call it's *Middle*. These Distinctions in the *Sphere* regard *external Objects only*, because the Sphere being *every where similar* contributes nothing to them *itself*. If we roll it therefore along, the Distinctions are not lost; only, while the Motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to *local Distinctions, existing without*.

AND

or the Place, in which it lies, but singly and solely by taking into our account the peculiar Mode of SITE in the Genus of lying, as it runs thro' all those ranks of Beings, which are formed by nature to be supported some of them by others, or to be seated some of them upon others; for 'tis THIS CONNECTION BETWEEN THINGS, THAT ARE SEATED, and THINGS THAT AFFORD THE SEAT, which makes the primary and the strictest Description of LYING or POSITION. Simpl. in Præd. p. 85. Ed. Basil. 1551.

(*b*) The Sphere, and other solid Figures, soon after mentioned in this Chapter, are for the greater part well known. He however, who wishes for ocular inspection, may find them all (the Sphere alone excepted) among the Diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth Books of *Euclid*, to which Books we refer him, as they are easy to be had, under various Editions.

Ch. XIII.

AND hence it follows, that the Sphere, tho' it have *Place*, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no *Position*, because it has no *peculiar Parts* deducible from it's own Figure, which Parts can be called *Top* or *Bottom*, as *contradistinguished* one to another.

WHAT is true of the Sphere, may be asserted *almost* as truly of the five *Platonic Bodies*, the *equilateral Pyramid*, the *Cube*, the *Octaedron*, &c. and that, because they are not only *regular*, but because their several *Faces* are *every way similar*.

WHAT is true of *these Bodies*, is true also of their *Opposites*, the Bodies I mean, which are not only *dissimilar*, but *universally irregular*. Fragments of Rock, and Hillocks of Sand, have neither *Top* nor *Bottom*, but what is merely *casual*; and therefore, tho' of necessity they exist in *Place* by being *Bodies*, yet, as they have no *internal local Distinctions* under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows *they cannot properly have Position*.

BUT if we pass to those Bodies, which are neither *irregular*, like the broken Rock, because they have *Order* and *Proportion*; nor yet *every way similar*, like the Sphere, because they have *Extensions that are unequal* (such for example as the *Cylinder*, or the *Parallelepipedon*); here we shall find the very Bodies, from *their own Attributes*, to concur with the World around, both in *acquiring* to themselves *POSITION*, as well as in *diversifying* it.

THE Cylinder for example extends *farther* one way than another, and therefore possesses *within* itself three such parts, as *two Extremes*,

and

and one Mean. If we so place it therefore, that one of these Extremes (no matter which) shall be *most remote from the Earth's Centre*, and the other *most near*; in such case, by this manner of blending *external* and *internal* Relations, the Cylinder is said to STAND. If we remove in part the *higher* Extreme from it's Perpendicular, and thus *differently* blend Relations, the Cylinder is said to INCLINE. And if we pursue this *Inclination*, till the two Extremes of Top and Bottom become *horizontal*, then is it said to LIE. The Motion, which leads from *Standing* to *Lying*, we call FALLING; that from *Lying* to *Standing*, we call RISING. Every one of these Affections may well happen to the Cylinder, because it's peculiar *Figure*, taken with it's peculiar *Place*, co-operates to the production of the POSITIONS here described.

'Tis not so with those Bodies already mentioned, where these *internal Characters* are not distinguished. The *Sphere* and the *Cube* neither FALL nor RISE, because *they* neither STAND nor LIE more at one time than another.

BUT suppose we go farther; suppose to *one* Extreme of this Cylinder we add *a new Part*, that is a *Capital*; to *the other* Extreme *another Part*, that is a *Base*: the *two Extremes* of the Cylinder would no longer in such case remain *indiscriminate*, but the Characters of *Top* and *Bottom* would become distinguished and ascertained, *even in the Figure itself*, without looking to things *external*.

THE consequences of these new Characters are *new Modes of POSITION*. A *Pillar* (for such we must now suppose it) is not only

A a 2

capable,

Ch. XIII. capable, like the *simple* Cylinder, of *Standing* and of *Lying*, but in as much as two of it's Parts, that is to say it's Extremes, are *essentially* distinguished, if it rest on it's *Base*, it STANDS UPRIGHT; if on it's *Capital*, it STANDS INVERTED.

LET us carry our suppositions farther, and by a Metamorphosis, like one of *Ovid's*, transform this *Pillar* into a *Tree*. Let the *Capital* sprout into Branches, the *Shaft* become a Trunk, and the *Base* strike into Roots. Here then in a *vegetable* Subject we behold the same Distinctions; a *Top*, a *Bottom*, and a *Middle* of it's own, leading as before to the same *Diversities* of *Position*.

IF we still pursue the Metamorphosis, and transform the *Tree* into a *Man*, making it's Branches into a *Head*, it's Trunk into a *Body*, and it's Roots into *Feet*, we shall discover also in an *animal* Subject the same *Distinctions* as before; and the Subject will in consequence be capable of LYING, as well as of STANDING; of *Standing* UPRIGHT, as well as INVERTED.

BUT this is not all. *Man* is not only an *extended* substance, like the Column, or the Tree, but over and above, as an *Animal*, he is by nature *locomotive*. Now the *Part* of him in progression, which leads the way, we denominate his *Forepart* or *Front*; the *Opposite*, his *Hinder-part* or *Rear*; and the two Parts upon each Side, his *Right* and his *Left*.

AND thus has *Man*, in consequence of his animal Frame, over and above the former Distinctions of *Top* and *Bottom* (both of them common

common to the *other* Subjects already described) *four additional* Ch.XIII.
Distinctions peculiar to him as an Animal, the Distinctions of *Front*
 and *Rear*, of *Right* and *Left*, which four are *wholly unknown* both
 to the Column, and to the Tree.

WHILE he is under the POSITION OF STANDING, these four *Distinctions* have little force, but when he happens to LIE, then is their Efficacy seen, and *each* of them leads to a *new*, and *different Position*. If his *Front*, while he is *lying*, be *nearest* to the Earth, then is he said to lie PRONE; if his *hinder-part* or *Rear*, then to lie SUPINE; if *neither* of these, then 'tis either on his *Right*, or on his *Left*; which *Positions* are unknown either to the Pillar, or the Tree.

THUS, besides the *Standing* POSITIONS of UPRIGHT and INVERTED, has MAN, in consequence of his Frame, FOUR OTHER POSITIONS, which appertain to him, *as he lies*; so that his Frame taken together, as *one perfect Whole*, is susceptible of SIX DIFFERENT AND SPECIFIC POSITIONS, which have reference to the SIX DIFFERENT AND SPECIFIC EXTENSIONS OF HIS BODY (c).

FABLES tell us, that the triangular Island *Sicily* was thrown upon the Giant *Typhoeus*. Under one Promontory lay his *Right Arm*; under another, his *Left*; under a third, his *Legs*; under mount *Ætna*, his *Head*; under the whole island, his *Body*, having his *Breast*
upwards,

(c) See these different *Extensions*, which *Aristotle* calls *Distances*, διαστάσεις, fully discussed in his Treatise *de Animalium ingressu*, p. 129. Edit. Sylb. In his History of Animals, we read—ἔχει δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθια, καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά. Hist. Animal. p. 17. Edit. Sylb.

Ch. XIII. *upwards, his Back downwards. These Positions refer to the several Extensions above described.*

*Vasta giganteis ingesta est insula membris
Trinacris, et magnis subiectum molibus urget
Æthereas ausum sperare Typhoëa sedes.
Nititur ille quidem, pugnatque resurgere sæpè;
DEXTRA sed Ausonio manus est subiecta Peloro;
LÆVA, Pachyne, tibi: Lilybæo CRURA premuntur;
Degravat Ætna CAPUT: sub quâ RESUPINUS arenas
Ejeëtat, flammamque fero vomit ore Typhoeus (d).*

BUT not to anticipate with regard to Poets, of whom we shall say more hereafter.—In a *Cube* there are *six* Faces, capable of denoting as many *Positions*; and yet there is this important Difference between the *Cube* and the *Man*: the Faces of the *Cube* being all of them *Similar*, it's *Positions*, being only *nominal*, can only refer to *things without*, and every Face can alike concur to the forming of the *same Position*. But the Parts *analogous* to these in *Man* being all of them *dissimilar*, his *Positions*, being *real*, are by no means thus *commutable*; but if the *Head* be *uppermost*, then, and then only, is he, by *Position*, *Upright*; if his *Back* be *uppermost*, then, and then only, is he, by *Position*, *Prone*; nor can he possibly be called either *Prone* or *Upright*, were any other Part to exist in the same Place, excepting the two here mentioned.

FROM

(d) Ovid. *Metam.* v. 346.

FROM what has been alleged, we see the true Origin of POSITION OR SITUATION. “ *It arises from the Relation, which the Distinctions of PARTS WITHIN bear to the Distinctions of PLACE WITHOUT; and it varies of course, as this Relation is found to vary.*” The fewer of these internal Distinctions any Being possesses, the less always the number of it’s possible Positions. As it possesses more, it’s Positions increase with them.

As to the *Progression of Animals*, peculiar to them as Animals, that Progression, (I mean) by which they move *not* as mere Bodies, but as Bodies possessed of *Instinct* and *Sensation*; it is to be observed, that this Progression is formed by the help of Joints and Muscles, and that these, during their operation, form *within the Animal Body* a variety of *Angles* and *Flexures*. Now hence arises a *fresh multitude of characteristic Positions*. There is one Position, under which a Bird *flies*; another, under which a Horse *gallops*; a third, under which a Man *walks*, &c.

THESE latter Positions differ from those already described, because they depend not on a simple Relation of the *whole Body* to *things without*, but on a diversified Relation of it’s different Parts, one to another. The Painter well knows the force of these Positions, since ’tis by these he superinduces Motion upon *immoveable Canvas*; so that from the Position, which we see, we infer the Progression, which we see not (e).

AND

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise 2. chap. ii. p. 37.

Ch. XIII.

AND this naturally leads us to consider the POWER OF POSITION or SITUATION in Works of ART. Among the common Utensils of life, such as Chairs, Beds, Tables, &c. there is a *Position* which is *proper*, and another which is *absurd*; a *Position*, by which they *attain their End*, and another, which *renders them useless*. Some derive their very *Essence* (if I may use the Phrase) from their *Situation*; for example, the *Lintel*, from being *over* the Door; the *Threshold*, from being *under* it (*f*). We may pass from these to Productions more elegant.

'Tis the Knowledge of these various POSITIONS peculiar to *Animal* Bodies, and to the *human above the rest* (commonly known by the name of ATTITUDES) which constitutes so eminent a part in the character of a perfect *Painter*. To the *Statuary*, if possible, it is a more important Science still, because he has no helps, like the *Painter*, from Colour, Light, and Shade.

INSTANCES in support of this assertion (if it need supporting by instances) may be alleged innumerable both from Pictures and from Statues.

PAINTING gives us the ATTITUDES of *St. Paul*, and the Sorcerer *Elymas*, in the Cartoon of *Raphael*—of *Apollo*, and the dancing *Hours*,

(f) Τὰ δὲ θέσει [λέγεται,] ὡς ἔδωκε καὶ ὑπὲρθυρον· ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κεῖσθαι πῶς διαφέρει—Other Substances are DENOMINATED FROM THEIR POSITION, as the THRESHOLD, and the LINTEL; for these differ by the peculiar manner of their being SITUATED.—And soon after—Οὐδὲς γὰρ ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔτως κεῖται· καὶ τὸ εἶναι, τὸ ἔτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει—For it is a THRESHOLD, because it is so SITUATED; and it's EXISTENCE indicates IT'S BEING SITUATED AFTER THIS MANNER. *Metaph. H. c. 6. p. 135. Edit. Sylb.*

Hours, in the *Aurora* of *Guido*—of the *sleeping Christ*, his *Mother*, Ch. XIII.
and *St. John*, in the *Silence* of *Caracci*—of many and diversified
Holy Families, in the works of *Carlo Maratti*, &c.

FROM ATTITUDES in *Painting* we pass to those in *Sculpture*; to that of the *Medicean Venus*, the *Farnesian Hercules*, the *Niobe*, the *Laocoon*, the *Wrestlers*, the *dying Gladiator*, &c.

'Tis easy, when we are describing these Beauties, to be diffuse in our expressions, and to exclaim, as we describe, *how charming, how exquisite*, &c. But the observation is just, as well as obvious—


*Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
Quàm quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus (g).*

HE, therefore, who would comprehend ATTITUDE in Works such as these, must either visit the Originals, or else contemplate them (as he may easily do) in Models, Drawings, and Books of Sculpture and Painting (*h*).

WE shall find less difficulty in the works of *Poets*, because *these* address us in *Words*, and convey to us their Ideas not thro' our language

(g) *Hor. Art. Poet.* 180.

(h) Those, who dwell in the neighbourhood where these Notes were written, may find excellent examples of ATTITUDE at *Wilton House* (*Lord Pembroke's*) among the Statues and Basso-Relievos there preserved; in particular the *Cupid bending his Bow*; the *Faun*, who, as he stands, turns his Body, and looks backward; the *Figures in the Marriage-Vase*; the *Amazon fighting*, the Basso-Relievos of *Meleager*, of *Niobe*, of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*, &c.

Ch. XIII.  guage but their own. 'Tis thus *Virgil* gives us an ATTITUDE OF SITTING IN DESPERATION:

—— SEDET, æternumque SEDEBIT

Infelix Theseus—— (i)

SHAKESPEARE, OF SITTING IN DESPONDENCE:

She SATE, like Patience on a monument,

SMILING AT GRIEF—— (k)

MILTON, OF CONJUGAL AFFECTION:

—— He, on his side

LEANING HALF RAISED, *with looks of cordial Love*

HUNG OVER HER, *enamour'd*—— (m)

OVID makes *Theseus*, as he elevated a javelin, to be miraculously petrified in the VERY ATTITUDE OF AIMING:

—— *Utque manu jaculum fatale parabat*

Mittere, in hoc hæsit signum de marmore GESTU (n).

MORE

(i) *Æn.* vi. 517.

(k) *Shakespeare's Twelfth Night*, Act. ii. Sc. 6.

(m) *Par. Lost*, v. 11.

(n) *Ovid. Metam.* v. 182.

MORE formidable is a *similar* ATTITUDE at Milton's Lazar-house: Ch.XIII.

— OVER *them* triumphant DEATH his dart
SHOOK—but delay'd to strike— (o).

THERE are ATTITUDES less tremendous, that mark *Reverence* and
Humiliation.

THUS Shakespeare,

These CROUCHINGS, and *these* LOWLY COURTESIES
Might fire the blood of ordinary men (p).

THE LYING, OR BEING EXTENDED ON SOME SURFACE, is an AT-
TITUDE in *most* instances so connected with *Death*, that DEATH is
often denoted by *that* Attitude alone.

THUS Nestor in *Homer*, speaking of the *Greek* Commanders, slain
before *Troy*—

—ἐνθα δ' ἐπεῖτα κατέκταθεν ὅσσοι ἄριστοι,
Ἐνθα μὲν Αἴας ΚΕΙΤΑΙ ἀρήϊός, ἐνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεύς,
Ἐνθα δὲ Πάτροκλος, θεόφιν μῆσ' ἄτάλαντος,
Ἐνθα δ' ἐμὸς φίλος υἱός— (q)

There

(o) *Par. Lost*, xi. 491.

(p) *Shakespeare's Jul. Cæsar*, Act iii. Sc. 1.

(q) *Hom. Odyss.* Γ. 108.

Ch. XIII.

*There fell the bravest of the Grecian Chiefs;
 There LIES great Ajax; there Achilles LIES;
 There too Patroclus, knowing as a God;
 There my own much-lov'd Son — *.*

THUS SHAKESPEARE,

*O! mighty Cæsar, dost thou LIE so LOW?
 Are all thy triumphs, glories, conquests, spoils,
 Shrunk to this little measure — (r) ?*

SLEEP, whom the Poets deify, appears under a SIMILAR POSITION :

— CUBAT ipse Deus, membris languore solutis (s).

'Twas perhaps from this *Resemblance* in POSITION, joined to that other, the *Cessation of the Sensitive Powers*, that SLEEP and DEATH were by the Poets called BROTHERS (t), and that the former (u) upon many occasions served to represent the latter.

IF

* See also *Hom. Il. Σ. v. 20*, and Mr. Clarke's Note, where he quotes *Quintilian*.

(r) *Shakes. Jul. Cæs. Act iii. Sc. 3.*

(s) *Ovid. Metam. xi. 612.*

(t) See *Hermes, l. i. c. 4.*

(u) When Sleep represents Death, it is commonly marked with some strong Epithet: by *Homer* it is called a *brazen Sleep*; by *Virgil*, an *iron Sleep*; by *Horace*, simply a *long Sleep*; which Idea the Poet *Moschus* heightens, by calling it not only a *long Sleep*, but a *Sleep, without an end; a sleep, out of which we cannot be awak'd.*

Εὐδομος εἰν μάλα μακρὸν, ἀτέρμονα, νήγρετον ὕπνον.

See *Hom. Iliad. Α. 241. Virg. Æn. x. 745. Horat. Od. l. iii. 11. v. 36. Mosch. Idylb. iii. 105.*

Even

IF we pass from *Poets* to *Actors* (by *Actors*, I mean those of *Dramatic* Compositions) we shall find that *ATTITUDES* and *POSITIONS* make at least a moiety of their merit; so that tho' they are *to speak* 'tis certain, as well as *to act*, yet 'tis from *acting*, not from *speaking*, that they take their *denomination*.

NOR are JUST *POSITIONS* without their Use to that *real Actor* upon the Stage of life, I mean the *Orator*. *Demosthenes*, in whom Rhetoric attained it's last Perfection, was at first so unsuccessful, that he was in a state of despair, 'till *Satyrus*, a celebrated Tragedian, shewed him the amazing force of *Action*, by the different *manners* of repeating certain Passages out of *Euripides* and *Sophocles* (x).

AND whence is it that *POSITIONS* derive this wonderful Efficacy? — 'Tis in fact because the *Body* is an *Organ* to the *Soul*; an instrument, whose *Gestures* correspond to every *Affection*, and are diversified by *Nature herself*, as those *Affections* are found to vary. *Words* move only those, who understand the language; and even, where the Language is understood, acute Sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute Hearers. But *Action*, spontaneously indicating the Motions of the *Soul*, is a Language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external

Gestures

Even in Prose-writers, when we read of persons being *dead*, we sometimes read that they are *FAL'N ASLEEP*, or that they *SLEPT with their fathers*. *Corinthians* i. c. xv. v. 6. *2 Chronicles* c. ix. v. 31.

It seems indeed to have been a custom with all nations, in instances of this sort, to mitigate the *Harshness* of the *Thing* signified, by the *Mildness* of the *Terms* that signify it: a well known Figure, called in books of Rhetoric *Euphemismus*.

(x) *Plutarch. Demosth.* p. 849. *Edit. Xyland.*

Ch. XIII. Gestures and Signs, by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several *Affections*; so that seeing *the same Signs* recur, he readily knows their *Meaning*, in as much as *Nature herself* supplies the Place of an Interpreter. But to pass from these Speculations to others more general.

THE primary Elements of *Democritus* were *Atoms* and a *Void*. As for the *Variety* and the *Specific Differences*, which he found to exist in things, he deduced them out of his *Atoms*, first by *Figure*, as A for example differs from N; next by *Order*, as AN for example differs from NA; and lastly by *POSITION*, as Z for example differs from N, these Letters in *Figure* being in a manner the same (*y*).

THUS *POSITION*, according to this Philosopher, stands *among the Principles of the Universe*.

A HIGH rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate it's extensive influence. For not to mention the force of *POSITION* in the different parts of every *animal*; not to mention the admirable *SITUATION* even of *subordinate Subjects*; the grateful variety of *Lands and Waters*, of *Mountains and Plains*; what shall we say to the *POSITION* of the *Heavens above*, and of the *Earth beneath*; of the *Sun himself* in the centre, and the several *Planets* moving round him? If we carry our hypothesis

(*y*) What others called σχῆμα, *FIGURE*, *Democritus* called Πυμῶς; Τάξις, *ORDER*, he called Διάθεσις; and Θέσις, *SITUATION*, or *POSITION*, he called Τροπή. See *Aristot. Metaph.* p. 11. 134. *Edit. Sylb.* See also *Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt.* l. i. c. 2. where *Philoponus* in his Comment informs us, that these strange words were λέξεις Ἀβδερναί, *Abderic Words*; Words used in *Abdera*, the city to which *Democritus* belonged.

thesis farther, and suppose (as has been well conjectured) that the Solar System itself has a proper *Position* respecting the *fixed* Stars; and that they, presiding in other Systems, maintain a certain *Position* respecting the System of the Sun; we shall have reason so to esteem the importance of this GENUS, that perhaps upon it's Permanence depends the Permanence of the World.

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NOR need we be surpris'd, tho' it be properly an Attribute of things *corporeal*, if we discover the traces of it even in Beings *incorporeal*. If the sensible World be an *Effect*, of which the *Cause* is a *sovereign Mind*, all that we discover in *Effects* we may fairly look for in their *Causes*, since *here* it's *prior* Existence (z) is in a manner *necessary*.

THUS *our own* Minds are not only the Place and *Region* of our *Ideas* (a), but with respect to these *Ideas*, such is the influence of POSITION, that upon this in a manner depends our *whole Perception* of *Truth*. Let us for example *invert* the Terms of a simple Proposition, and instead of saying, that *Every Man is an Animal*, say that *Every Animal is a Man*; and what becomes of the *Truth* which such Proposition contained? Let us *derange* in any Theorem the Propositions themselves, confounding them in their order, blending them promiscuously, putting the *first last*, and the *last first*; and what becomes of the

(z) See *Hermes*, Chap. IV.

(a) — Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν — Well therefore do they conceive, who say that the SOUL is THE REGION OF FORMS, or IDEAS. *Arist. de An.* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* See before, p. 56, in the Note, and p. 63, 64.

Ch.XIII. the Truth which such *Theorem* was to *demonstrate*? 'Tis lost, till the Propositions recover their natural *situation*.

— *tantum series, juncturaque pollet**.

DEMOCRITUS, whom we have just mentioned, in order to shew the importance of ARRANGEMENT in *natural* Subjects, and the amazing *Differences* that arise, where the Change is most *minute*, ingeniously remarks, that *out of the same Letters are formed Tragedy and Comedy (b)*. We may affirm as confidently, that out of the *same* Terms are formed *Truth* and *Falshood (c)*.

THE Efficacy indeed of this INTELLECTUAL POSITION is so great, that thro' it not only the wise *know*, but the unwise become *informed*. 'Tis by the strength of this alone that all *Teaching* is performed; all *Learning* acquired; that the simple and uninstructed are led from

* *Hor.*

(b) — ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία γίνεται, καὶ κωμῳδία γραμμάτων. *De Gen. et Corrupt.* l. i. c. 2. p. 4. *Edit. Sylb.*

(c) SIMPLE TERMS are to be found in the several PREDICAMENTS or ARRANGEMENTS here treated, being THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC.

From different *Arrangements* of these *Terms* arise PROPOSITIONS; and from different *Arrangements* of *Propositions* arise SYLLOGISMS.

PROPOSITIONS are the Object of THE SECOND PART OF LOGIC; SYLLOGISMS, of THE THIRD.

There is no going *farther*, for the most enlarged Speculations are but Syllogisms repeated. Such then, in a *Logical* and *Intellectual* View, is the FORCE and EXTENT of the PREDICAMENT of POSITION or SITUATION, here treated.

from Truths *acknowledged* (d) to Truths *unknown*, and thus ascend by due degrees to the sublimest parts of Science. What then shall we say to that STUPENDOUS POSITION, to that MARVELLOUS ARRANGEMENT, EXISTING WITHIN THE DIVINE MIND; where the *whole* of Being is *ever* present in *perfect* Order; and to which no single Truth is ever latent or unrevealed (e)?

IF we would comprehend the Dignity of POSITION in this it's ARCHETYPAL FORM, let us view it at the same instant with something, it's *perfect* contrary: let us compare it for example to the sick Man's Dream, or to that Chaos of Ideas, which fills the Mind of one delirious. As we can find few *Situations* more *unfortunate*, than these *latter*; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or *divine*, than the *former*.

AND so much for the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of POSITION, which arises from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of WHERE, as this from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of RELATION, both *Position* and *Where* being in their nature *Relatives*.

(d) There is an Order or Arrangement peculiar to Learners; and of course, *with respect to them*, the *Principle* or *Beginning* of Knowledge is different from what it is, according to the order of Nature. Hence the following observation.—Ἡ δὲ (Ἀρχὴ) ὅθεν ἂν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο· οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως, ἐκ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ τῆς τῆς πράγματι ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ῥᾶς ἂν μάθοι.—There is another Species of BEGINNING, and that is the Point, from which any thing may be done after the best manner; for example in the affair of Learning any thing, we are sometimes not to begin from what is first, and which is the Principle or Beginning of the Thing itself, but we are to begin from that Point, whence any one may learn the most easily. *Metaph.* l. iv. c. 1.

In the *Meno* of *Plato* there is a striking example of an *Arrangement* of Truths, which lead an *uninstructed* Youth to the Knowledge of a fine and important Theorem in Geometry. See the Dialogue of that name in *Plato*, and Mr. *Sydenham's* elegant and accurate Translation, enriched with Diagrams.

(e) See before, p. 62, 63, 91, 115, 116, 147, 150, 151, 159, 160.

CHAP. XIV.

Concerning HABIT, or rather the BEING HABITED—It's Description—its principal Species deduced and illustrated—its Privation—Conclusion of the second or middle part of the Treatise.

Ch.XIV. **T**HE GENUS OF HABIT, or rather OF BEING HABITED, is of so little importance, when compared to the other *Predicaments*, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to *antient* authority (a).

Tho' it have respect both to *Habits*, which are *worn*, and to *Persons* who *wear* them; yet is it not recognized either in the one or the other, but is a *RELATION*, which arises from the two taken together (b).

Now as every such *Habit*, as well as every such *Wearer*, are both of them *Substances*, the Relation must necessarily be a *Relation*, existing between *Substances*. It cannot therefore be the *Relation* existing between *Mind* and its *Habits* (such as *Virtue* or *Science*) nor that between

(a) The Authority alluded to is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*.

(b) *Quod non ita intelligendum est, ac si res ipsæ, quæ sic habentur, sint hujus Prædicamenti (puta Vestitus, ipsi, &c.) quæ ad alia Prædicamenta spectant, sed HABITIO harum, seu IPSUM HABERE, τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα. Wallis. Logic. l. i. c. 14.*—Soon after he explains *HABITIO*, and informs us it means, *Vestitum esse, Tunicatum esse, Togatum esse, Coronâ cingi, Calceo indui, &c.*

Sanderfon in his *Logic* explains the *Predicament* as follows—*Corpus habens est Substantia; Res habita ferè est Forma artificialis de quartâ Specie Qualitatis; applicatio hujus ad illud est habitus hujus Prædicamenti. Lib. i. c. 14.*

between *Body* and it's *Habits* (such as Agility or Health), for these *Habits* are not Substances, but *inherent Attributes* (c). Ch. XIV.

AGAIN, it cannot be the *Relation* existing between a *Man* and his *Possessions*; for, tho' these are both of them *Substances*, and tho' a Possessor may be said to *have* an Estate, he cannot be said to have it *upon* him; he does not wear it (d).

THE being Habited therefore is in it's *strictest* Sense something *less* than the *first* Relation, that between a Substance, and it's Attributes; something *more*, than the *second* Relation, that (I mean) between a Possessor, and his Possessions (e).

'TIS

(c) *Simplicius*, when he gives the reason, why *Habit* and the *Body-Habited* cannot co-exist, as *Substance* and it's *Attributes* co-exist, says—συμφυῖ γὰρ ταῦτά ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο—For these *Attributes* are con-natural [that is, grow with the Being] and are the BEING ITSELF. *Simplic. in Præd. p. 93.*

(d) Διὸ ἔδδ' τὰ κτήματα, ἢ ἀνδράποδα, ἢ φίλους, ἢ πατέρας, ἢ υἱεῖς κατὰ τὸ γένος ἔχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι ἐκ ἐν περιθέσει ταῦτά ἐστι, καίτοι κτήματα ὄντα.—For which reason we are not said, in the sense of this Genus, TO HAVE Possessions, or Slaves, or Friends, or Fathers, or Children; for these none of them are said to exist in their being THROWN ROUND US, or SUPERINDUCED, altho' they are all [in some sense or other] our Possessions. *Simplic. ut suprà.*

(e) — καὶ εἴκει μέσον πῶς εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν, τὸ κεντῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑξὶν διακεῖσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειται, ὡς ἡ λευκότης. χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν κτημάτων, ἃ ἐ περικεῖμεθα· ἡ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστι καὶ ἔξωθεν, χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν, αἱ συμβεβήκασιν ἡμῖν, συμφυεῖς ἔσται, καὶ ἐκ ἐπὶκτῆτοι.—THE HAVING ANY THING ON appears to be a sort of Medium between POSSESSING, and the being HABITUALLY DISPOSED. As far as it is had, after the same manner as *Whiteness* is had, [or any inherent Attribute,] it is distinguished from Possessions WITHOUT, with which we are not said to be enveloped or cloathed. As far as it is corporeal, and FROM WITHOUT, it is distinguished from [inherent Attributes or] *Habits*, which belong to us, as things CON-NATURAL, and not as things adventitious. *Simplic. ut suprà.*

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'Tis to be hoped that these Reasonings on a subject so trite, will be pardoned for their Brevity. They are to shew, not what the Relation *is*, but what it is *not*.

IF it be demanded — *And what then is it?* — the Answer must be, *It is a RELATION existing after a peculiar manner; when an ARTIFICIAL SUBSTANCE is SUPERINDUCED (f) upon a NATURAL ONE, and becomes contiguous to it, tho' it be not united in vital Continuity.*

*Such was THE VERY ARMOUR HE HAD ON,
When he th' ambitious Norway combated (g).*

THE primary End of being habited seems to have been PROTECTION; and that, either by way of defence against the inclemencies of *Nature*, as in the case of common Apparel; or by way of defence, against *Insults*, as in the case of Helmets, Breast-plates, Coats of Mail, &c.

FARTHER than this, as Habits were various both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their *Dignity and Office*: hence it was found expedient, that many of these *superior Ranks* should be marked by THE DISTINCTIONS OF PECULIAR HABITS; so that this established *another End* of being Habited, over and above *Protection*, an *End*, which gave Robes to Peers, Uniforms to Admirals, &c.

FARTHER

(f) See the preceding Notes in this Chapter, particularly the second.

(g) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. 1.

FARTHER still, some Regard, when either of the sexes *habited* themselves, was had to DECENCY; some to BEAUTY and ADVENTITIOUS ORNAMENT; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the *Grecian* Statues, or those in the capital Pictures of the great *Italian* Masters, and compare these truly graceful and simple Forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves, and our neighbours (*h*).

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As there are many sorts of Habit, which have respect to this last End, I mean to *Beauty* or *adventitious Ornament*; so when a man is found to cultivate this End to an *excess*, it constitutes the character, which we call a *Fop* (*i*). Nay, even the *Conveniences* of Dress, when *too minutely* studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries

(*h*) The same Simplicity, which contributes to the Decoration of our *Persons*, contributes also to the Decoration of *Nature*.

The following Anecdote, communicated to me by the late Lord *Lyttelton*, appears to be worth preserving. When Sir *John Vanbrugh* had finished *Blenheim-house*, the then Duchess of *Marlborough* asked him for the Plan of a *Garden*. Sir *John* told her, he could give no Plan himself, and he feared she might apply to others, as incapable as he was, naming certain Gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. *But*, continued he, *if your Grace would have a Garden truly elegant, you must apply for a PLAN to THE BEST PAINTERS OF LANDSCAPE.*

So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a Taste, which, taking its rise not many years after from *Kent*, has been since completed by *Brown*, and no where with greater beauty and magnificence, than on the very Spot, of which we are now writing, I mean *Blenheim*.

(*i*) *Horace*, in the first satire of his first book, calls the wild and extravagant *Nævius*, by the name of *VAPPA*; which *Baxter* ingeniously explains, *quod insano sumptu stolidas sequeretur delicias. Nos hujuscemodi homunciones FOPPS dicimus; an et hoc a VAPPA, quærant alii.*

VAPPA meant originally the Juice of the Grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when 'twas neither *Wine*, nor *Vinegar*. *VAPPA propriè dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. l. i. S. 2. v. 13.*

Ch.XIV. ries with it a reproach. 'Twas hence that *Turnus* upbraided the *Trojans* for wearing a Covering over their hands, and for tying their Caps on with Strings, that is to say in *modern language*, for using *Gloves and Chinstraps*.

Et tunicae manicas, et habent redimicula mitrae (k).

WE have already mentioned the Use of *Habit* as to *Distinction*. In almost all Countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the *Noble* from the *Ignoble*; the *Scholar* from the *Mechanic*; to mark the *Sacerdotal*, the *Military*, the *Juridical*, &c. 'Tis to the *Fallibility*, which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial Sayings, THE CLOAK makes not the *Philosopher*; THE COWL makes not the *Monk* (l).

'Tis in a Sense less strict and precise, that we take the word *HABIT*, when we say of the *Plains*, they are *cloathed* with *Grass*; of the *Mountains*, they are *cloathed* with *Wood*; and more remotely still, when we apply the Notion of *Habit* to the *MIND*—Having on the *BREAST-PLATE* of *Righteousness*—taking the *SHIELD* of *Faith* (m), &c.

IN the Language of Poetry there is sometimes much elegance derived from this Arrangement; as for example, when *the Morn*, at day-break,

(k) *Æn.* ix. 616.

(l) *Pallium non facit Philosophum—Cucullus non facit Monachum.*

(m) *Ephesians*, ch. vi. v. 14, 16.

day-break, is said to be clad with **RUSSET MANTLE**; or when *the Moon*, in diffusing her pallid light, is said *to throw o'er the dusk* **HER SILVER MANTLE** (n); or when the *Psalmist* says, on a greater subject, *Thou DECKEST thyself with LIGHT, as it were with a GARMENT* (o).

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THO' from all these instances we may perceive the force of this *Genus*, yet another still remains, I mean the force of it's **PRIVATION**. *Nakedness* is found to heighten *other* circumstances of Distress:

NUDUS in *ignotâ, Palinure, jacebis arenâ* (p).

THO' the Sense be *metaphorical*, yet *Shakespeare* avails himself of the *same Privation* in the pathetic Speech, which he gives to *Wolfey*:

—— O! *Cromwell, Cromwell!*
Had I but serv'd my God with half the zeal
I serv'd my King, he would not in mine age
Have left me NAKED to my enemies (q).

THE *same Privation* has it's effect also in a way more *Comic*, and contemptuous. 'Tis thus *Aristophanes* talks about *Philosophers*:

Tæç

(n) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. 1. — *Par. Lost*, iv. 608.

(o) *Psalm* civ. v. 2.

(p) *Æn.* v. 871.

(q) *Shakesf.* Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 6.

Τὰς ὠχρῶντας, τὰς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις (r).

You mean those pallid, those BAREFOOTED fellows.

'Tis thus the Author of the *Dunciad* describes *Friars*——

——— *Linsley-woolfsey brothers,*

Grave mummers, SLEEVELESS some, and SHIRTLESS others (s).

IN some instances, *such partial Privations of Habit* become an indication of REVERENCE. Thus *Moses*, when on *holy* ground, was ordered to stand *barefooted (t)*; and among *Europeans* 'tis a mark of Respect, to appear *bareheaded*.

AND so much for THE GENUS OR PREDICAMENT OF HABIT, which we divide into Species from it's different Ends of PROTECTION, DISTINCTION, DECENCY, and ORNAMENT, to all of which is alike opposed their Contrary, PRIVATION. So much also for the TEN UNIVERSAL ARRANGEMENTS, GENERA, or PREDICAMENTS, with the discussion of which we conclude the *Second, or middle Part* of this Treatise.

(r) 'Αριστοφ. Νεφ. 103.

(s) *Dunciad*. iii. 113.

(t) *Exod.* iii. 5.

C H A P. XV.

Concerning the APPENDAGES to the Universal Genera or Arrangements; that is to say concerning OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER or AT ONCE, and MOTION, usually called Post-Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all these (Motion excepted) deduced, and illustrated—Preparation for the Theory of MOTION.

HAVING now gone thro' each of the PREDICAMENTS or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, and considered it's Character, and distinguishing Attributes; there remains nothing farther to complete the Theory, but an *Explication of certain Terms*, which have occasionally occurred, and which, from their subsequent place, and subsequent Contemplation, have been called by the Latin Logicians POST-PREDICAMENTS (*a*), and form the *third, or last* Part of this Treatise.

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Thus for example, things have been sometimes mentioned in the former part of this Work, as *opposed* to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to consider the Doctrine of OPPOSITES (*b*).

At

(*a*) See before, p. 23, 24.

(*b*) See before ch. vii. and ch. viii. p. 97, 98. See also *Arist. Præd. περὶ τῶν ANTI-IKEMENON*, p. 47. *Edit. Syll.*

Ch. XV. At other times things have been treated as being some PRIOR, some SUBSEQUENT, and others existing TOGETHER or AT ONCE (c); and hence it becomes expedient to examine these several Terms, and to investigate the *different* meanings, of which each of them is susceptible.

LASTLY, MOTION in it's various Species is so widely *diffused* thro' some of the most important *Genera* already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a speculation, where the professed *End* is to *scrutinize Universals*.

It appears therefore that there still remain, as Subjects of our Inquiry, OPPOSITES, PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT, CO-EXISTENT or AT ONCE, and last of all MOTION.

Now in the first place, as to OPPOSITES, the Reader must be reminded, that, having already spoken of them in a former Treatise (d), we omit them here, and refer to that.

THE

(c) See before, p. 102, 103, 125. See *Arist. Prædic.* περὶ τῶν AMA. p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(d) See *Hermes*, l. ii. c. 2, Note (i) p. 351, 2, in which Note are enumerated RELATIVES, τὰ πρὸς τι; CONTRARIES, τὰ ἐναντία; CONTRADICTIONARIES, τὰ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατὰ φασιν. There is one Species omitted, τὰ καθ' ἑξῆς καὶ ἐξ ἑξῆς, things opposed in the way of HABIT and PRIVATION; such as *Sight* and *Blindness*.

This *Privation* differs from that mentioned already in the third Chapter of this Treatise, because the Privation there is the *road to natural Productions*; the Privation here admits no *Progress*, nor any *Return* to the original *Habit*, at least in a *natural way*. See *Ammon.* p. 146, and of this Work, p. 34, &c.

THE DOCTRINE (e) of PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT follows: and these perhaps may appear to be sufficiently discussed, if we enumerate, and explain the following Modes. Ch. XV.

THE MOST OBVIOUS MODE of PRIORITY is the TEMPORAL (f), according to which we say, that the Trojan Wars were *prior* to the Punic, and the Battle of Marathon to that of Blenheim.

A SECOND MODE of PRIORITY is, when a thing is *prior* to some other, because IT DOES NOT RECIPROCATE IN THE CONSEQUENCE OF EXISTENCE (g).

A FEW examples will illustrate the apparent difficulty of this character. The number One according to this doctrine is *prior* to the number

(e) See *Arist. Præd.* Περὶ τῆς ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ. p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

(f) This Mode *Aristotle* calls PRIOR κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ACCORDING TO TIME; the Priority, depending on the Quantity of Time being larger with respect to the Subject, which is called older, or more antient—τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι, καὶ παλαιότερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον λέγεται. *Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ammonius, in commenting this Passage, observes an elegance in the Greek tongue, peculiar to itself—Παλαιότερον, he tells us, is applied indiscriminately to Beings animal and inanimate; Πρεσβύτερον is applied only to the animal Genus. *Simplicius* on the same occasion makes the same Observation, in *Præd.* p. 106.

The last Author has also the following remark concerning the different Modes of Temporal Priority—Τὰ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον πρότερα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενομένων τὰ πορώτερον ὄντα τῆς Νῦν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ ἐγγύτερον. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 106. B. Things PRIOR IN TIME among the PAST are those the FARTHEST from the PRESENT NOW; among the FUTURE, are those the NEAREST to it. *Simpl. in Loc.*

(g) The Words in *Aristotle* are—τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἶναι ἀκολουθίαν. *Prædic.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

He alleges the same Instance from Numbers, which is given here.

Ch. XV. number *Two*, because if there exist *Two*, 'tis a *necessary consequence* that there should be *One*; but if there exist *One*, it does not *reciprocate*, that there should be *Two*. Thus every *Genus* is *prior* to any one of it's various *Species*, because if there be *such a Species* as Man, or Lion, there is necessarily *such a Genus* as Animal; but if there be *such a Genus* as Animal, there is not necessarily *such a Species* as Man, or Lion.

THIS *Mode of Priority*, which we call *PRIORITY ESSENTIAL*, will be found of great importance in all *logical Disquisitions*, and may therefore perhaps merit some farther attention.

ACCORDING to this, *that thing* of any two or many things is *PRIOR*, which, *by being taken away*, annihilates the rest; or *which, if the rest ARE*, must necessarily BE (*h*).

For example—If there were *no Theorems* of Science, to guide the *Operations* of Art, there could be no Art; but if there were *no Operations* of Art, there might still be *Theorems of Science*. Therefore is *Science PRIOR to Art*. Again, if there were *no such Things* as *Syllogized Truths*, there could be no such *Sciences* as Optics or Astronomy. But, *tho' neither of these*, there might notwithstanding be such things, as *Truths Syllogized*. Therefore is *Logic PRIOR to these*, and, by parity

(*h*) What is here said, is explained in what immediately follows. *Simplicius* says, agreeably to the explanation here given, καλεῖν δὲ ἐνόησαν οἱ νεώτεροι τὸ τοῖστων Πρότερον, συνεπιφερόμενον μὲν, μὴ συνεπιφέρον δὲ, καὶ συναναιρεῖν μὲν, μὴ συναναιρεῖμενον δὲ. — The latter Logicians are accustomed to call this *Mode of Priority*, that which is CO-INFER'D, but does NOT CO-INFER; that which CO-ANNIHILATES, but is not CO-ANNIHILATED. *Simpl. in Pred.* p. 106.

parity of reasoning, to every other particular Science. Again, if there were no such Principles as Self-evident Truths, there could be no such things as Truths Syllogized. But, tho' no Truths Syllogized, there might still be Truths self-evident. Therefore the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which treats of these primary and original Truths, being PRIOR to Logic, is PRIOR also to the tribe of Sciences, as are these to the tribe of Arts; so that of course the whole structure of Logic, of Sciences, and of Arts, may be said to rest upon this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as upon that only firm and solid Base, against which the Powers of Ignorance and Sophistry can never totally prevail.

THERE is a THIRD MODE of PRIORITY, seen in ORDER and ARRANGEMENT. Thus in the demonstrative Sciences, Definitions and Postulates are PRIOR to Theorems and Problems; in Grammar, Syllables are PRIOR to Words, and Letters to Syllables. 'Tis thus in a well composed Oration, the Proëme is PRIOR to the State and Argument; and these last, to the Peroration (i).

A FOURTH MODE of PRIORITY is that of HONOUR and AFFECTION, when we prefer Objects, that we revere or love, to others that less merit, or at least that we esteem less to merit our Regard and Attention (k).

Ἀθανάτης

(i) Τρίτον δὲ κατὰ τινὰ τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων· ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις, κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.* This is not translated, being expressed in the Text.

(k) Ἐπὶ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον πρότερον τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώθασι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τὰς ἐντιμότερας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προτέρας παρ' αὐτοῖς φάσκιν εἶναι—*Arist. Præd. Ibid.*—not translated for the reason before given.

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Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεῶς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,

τίμα· — ἔπειθ' Ἡρώας ἀγαυέας·

Τέες τε καταχθονίης σέβει δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων·

Τέες τε γονεῖς τίμα, τέες τ' ἀγχίς' ἐκγεγαῶτας (l), κ. τ. λ.

The Gods immortal, as by Law divine

They stand arrang'd, FIRST honour: NEXT revere

Th' illustrious Heroes, and terrestrial Race

Of Genii, paying each the legal Rites:

Honour thy Parents. NEXT, and those of kin

The nearest, &c.

HIEROCLES, in his comment on these verses, commonly called for their excellence the *Golden Verses of Pythagoras*, has largely expatiated on this divine *Precedence and Subordination*.

THUS *Horace*, with respect to that *Priority of Beings*, founded on the Religion of his Country—

Quid PRIUS dicam solitis Parentis

Laudibus—— &c.

PROXIMOS illi tamen occupavit

Pallas honores (m).

He

(l) *Pythag. aurea carmina.*

(m) *Horat. Od. l. i. 12.*

He adopts PRIORITY, derived from *the same* principle, when he speaks of the favourite topics, which his Genius led him to cultivate: Ch. XV.

Quid PRIUS illustrem satiris, musâque pedestri (n) ?

THE Stagirite, who records these various Modes of PRIORITY, observes on this *fourth* Mode (and apparently with reason) that it was in a manner the most *alien* and *foreign* of them all (o).

HE mentions also a FIFTH MODE, but he introduces it with a sort of doubt. *It should seem (p)*, says he, besides the Modes here mentioned, there was another Mode of PRIORITY even in things reciprocating; altho' so far as they reciprocate, they may be said to co-exist.

THE fact is, if either of them in any sense can be called CAUSE to the other, it may for that reason be called PRIOR, if not in Time, at least in Efficacy and Power.

FOR example, the *actual Existence of a Man* reciprocates with the *Proposition*, which affirms him *actually to exist*. For if the Man *actually* exist, then is the Proposition *true*; and *reciprocally*, if the Proposition be *true*, then does the Man *actually exist*. And yet, tho' these things in this manner *reciprocate*, is not the Proposition Cause

(n) Horat. Sat. l. ii. 6. v. 17.

(o) His Words are—ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατ' τῶν τρόπων ἐστ'—Arist. Præd. Ibid. p. 54.

(p) Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένους ἑτερ' εἶναι τὴν προτέραν τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρέφοντων ΤΟ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 54.

Ch. XV. Cause to the Man's Existence, but *the Man's Existence* to that of the Proposition; since according as the Man *either is or is not*, in like manner we call the Proposition either *true or false* (q).

THIS last Mode of *Priority* we call CAUSAL PRIORITY, or the BEING PRIOR BY CAUSALITY.

WE must not however quit this Speculation, without observing that Cause and Effect do not always thus reciprocate, but that for the greater part *the Cause is naturally* PRIOR. For example: Hunger and Thirst are the *natural Causes* of Eating and Drinking; and thus, by being their Causes, are *naturally prior* to them. Crimes too are *the natural Cause*, why Punishments are inflicted; and therefore Crimes, by parity of reason, are *prior* to Punishments. The Sentiment, tho' obvious, is well expressed by *Pætus Thrasea*. *Nam Culpa quàm Pæna TEMPORE PRIOR EST; emendari, quàm peccare, posterius est* (r).

NOR are Crimes only prior to Punishment, but so is Judicial Process; since to punish *first*, and then to hear, is what Sir Edward Coke chuses to call (in a language somewhat strong) *the damnable and damned Proceedings of the Judge of Hell* (s):

Castigatque, auditque dolos—— (t).

AND

(q) The Words of *Aristotle* are—τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ, ἀληθὲς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὲς λέγεται.—*Ibid.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(r) *Tacit. Annal.* xv. 20.

(s) *Coke's Institutes*, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

(t) *Æneid.* vi. 567.

AND thus it appears there are FIVE PRINCIPAL MODES OF PRIORITY; that is to say, the TEMPORAL, the ESSENTIAL, that of ORDER, that of PRECEDENCE, and that of CAUSALITY; which five being known, THE MODES OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT (it's natural *opposite*) are easily known also (*u*). Ch. XV.

WE are now to examine *the Modes of Co-existence*, or *that of being AT ONCE and TOGETHER (x)*; and *these Modes* have evidently great connection with the preceding.

THE most SIMPLE MODE among these, as well as among *the Modes of Priority*, is the TEMPORAL, perceived in things or events, which exist *during the same time (y)*.

UNA *Eurusque Notusque ruunt*—— (*z*).

—ΟΜΟΥ πόλεμος τε δαμᾶ καὶ λοιμός Ἀχαιῆς (*a*).

War and the Plague AT ONCE destroy the Greeks.

Persons, in this manner co-existing, are called CONTEMPORARIES: such as *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*; *Virgil* and *Horace*; *Shakespeare* and *Johnson*.

A SECOND

(*u*) — δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁσαυχὼς τὸ πρῶτον, τοσαυταυχὼς ἂν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λέγοιτο. *Simplic. ut supra*, p. 106. B.

(*x*) *Aristot. Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*y*) — ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ — *Prædic.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*z*) *Æn.* i. 89.

(*a*) *Iliad.* A. v. 61.

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A SECOND MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE is founded in NATURE and ESSENCE, where two things necessarily reciprocate in consequence of their existing, while neither of them at the same time is the *Cause* of existence to the other (b).

'Tis in this sense that *Double* and *Half* are TOGETHER OR AT ONCE, for they *reciprocate*; if there be *Double*, there must be *Half*; and if *Half*, there must be *Double*. They are also *neither* of them the *Cause*, why the other exists. *Double* is no more the *Cause* of *Half*, than *Half* is of *Double*. This last condition is requisite, because if either of the *Two* were *essentially* and truly a *Cause* to the other, it would pass, by virtue of its *Causality*, from Co-existence to *Priority* (c).

THERE IS A THIRD MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE, seen in *different* Species of the *same* Genus, when, upon dividing the Genus, we view them *arranged together*, *contra-distinguished* one to another (d).

'Tis thus the Genus, *Triangle*, being divided into *equilateral*, *equicrural*, and *scalene*, *no one of these Species* appears to be by nature *prior*, but all of them TO EXIST AT ONCE in a state of *Contradistinction*.

(b) Thus expressed by *Aristotle* — φύσει δὲ ΑΜΑ, ὅσα ἀντιτρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τῷ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον ἑατέρου πατέρω τῷ εἶναι. *Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

By referring to the Chapter on *Relatives*, it is easy to perceive, whence this Speculation arises; for in that Chapter the same Example is alleged as here, by way of illustration of the same Doctrine. See before, p. 125.

(c) See before, p. 207, 8.

(d) Thus expressed by *Aristotle* — καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῷ αὐτῷ γένους ἀντιδιωρημένα ἀλλήλοις ΑΜΑ τῇ φύσει λέγεται — *Ibid.* 55.

tion. The same may be said of the *three animal Species*, the aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial, when we divide, after the same manner, the *Genus Animal* (e). Ch. XV.

AND thus are the *Modes of Co-existence or Together* either the TEMPORAL, the ESSENTIAL, or the SPECIFIC.

AND here, should any one object to these distinctions, as either too *trivial* or too *scholastic* for the purposes of a *polite* writer; we answer, that we no more wish an author to mention them, when not professedly his subject, than we would have him dissert, without a cause, upon nouns, pronouns, and the principles of Grammar. All we hope from these elementary Doctrines, is to see them in their *Effects*; to see them in the accuracy of the composition, both as to reasoning and language. 'Tis thus a grazier, when he turns his oxen into some rich and fertile pasture, never wishes to inspect what food they have devoured, but to see a fair and ample Bulk, the effect of food well digested. Besides, when *Sophists* assail us, and either exhibit *one thing for another*, or *two things for one and the same*; to what surer weapon can we recur for defence, than to that of *precise and well-established Distinction* (f) ?

THERE

(e) — ἀντιδιηρησθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν· οἷον τὸ πῖπνον τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ — Ibid. 55.

(f) *Learning and Science*, or rather learned and scientific *Terms*, when introduced out of *Season*, become what we call PEDANTRY. The *Subject* may have merit, the *Terms* be precise, and yet, notwithstanding, the *Speaker* be a PEDANT, if he talk without regard either to *Place*, or *Time*.

The following story may perhaps illustrate this Assertion. “ A learned Doctor at *Paris* “ was once purchasing a pair of stockings, but unfortunately could find none, that were “ either strong enough, or thick enough. Give me, says he to the Hosiery, stockings of “ *Matter CONTINUOUS, not of Matter DISCRETE.*” *Menagiana*, tome ii. p. 64.

Ch. XV.

THERE remains to be treated the Theory of MOTION; in which, without attempting to impeach or contradict any modern Speculations, we shall inquire, what was the opinion of the Ancients concerning it; in what manner they attempted to catch it's *fugitive* nature; and how they divided it by it's *Effects* into it's *subordinate Species*.

BUT this is a Theory demanding a *separate* Chapter, where those, who question the doctrines, may perhaps amuse their curiosity, while they peruse an attempt to exhibit the sentiments of Antiquity upon so singular a subject; a subject, in it's *existence* so obvious, in it's *real character* so abstruse.

C H A P. XVI.

Concerning MOTION PHYSICAL—*It's various Species deduced and illustrated—blend themselves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Opposition, Rest—Motion Physical—an Object of all the Senses—Common Objects of Sensation, how many—Motion, a thing not simple, but complicated with many other Things—it's Definition or Description taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Aristotle, and why.*

ALL MOTION is either PHYSICAL, or NOT PHYSICAL. As by MOTION PHYSICAL I mean that, which is obvious to the Senses, so by MOTION NOT PHYSICAL, I mean that, which, by being the object of no sense, (as for example the Succession of our Thoughts and Volitions) is the Subject of *after* contemplation, and knowable not to the Sensitive, but to the rational Faculty.

Ch.XVI.

THIS therefore will be the Plan of our following Inquiry.

IN the present Chapter we shall consider MOTION MERELY PHYSICAL, both in it's several *distinct* Species, and in it's *general* or *common* Character.

IN the next Chapter we shall inquire whether there be OTHER MOTION BESIDES; and if such may be found, we shall then examine,

Ch.XVI. mine, how far it is *distinguished* from the *Physical*, and how far it is *connected*.

FIRST therefore for the first (a).

As the most obvious of all *Motions* is the *Motion of Body*, so the most obvious *Motion* of Body is that, by which it *changes from Place to Place (b)*, itself remaining, or at least supposed to remain, both in one Place and the other, precisely *the same*. 'Tis thus a Bowl moves over a Plane; a Bird thro' the Air; a Planet round the Sun. This Motion is properly MOTION LOCAL; or, if we chuse a single Name, we may call it PASSAGE or TRANSITION. It's peculiar character, as opposed to any other Motion, is to *affect no Attribute of Body*, but merely *that of Local Site*.

*Caruleo per summa levis volat æquora curru,
Subdunt undæ, tumidumque sub axe tonanti
Sternitur æquor aquis; fugiunt vasto æthere nimbi (c).*

Here the Chariot flies, the Waves subside, the Clouds disperse, all is in LOCAL MOTION.

THERE

(a) In the Order of *Nature* the *Genus* precedes it's several *Species*; but in the order of *Human Perception* the several *Species* precede their *Genus*, which last is the order adopted here. See *Hermes*, p. 220.

(b) Called therefore in *Greek* ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, and sometimes by a single word, πορεία. See *Arist. Prædic.* p. 55. *Edit. Sylb. and Ammon. in Loc.* p. 171. B.

(c) *Æn.* v. 819.

THERE are *other Motions*, which affect the more *inherent* Attributes. Thus when a lump of Clay is moulded from a Cube into a Sphere, there is *Motion more than local*; for there is the acquisition of a *new Figure*. The same happens, when a man from hot becomes cold, from ruddy becomes pale. MOTION OF THIS SPECIES has respect to the Genus of *Quality*, and (if I may be permitted to coin a word) may be called ALIATION (d).

*If thou be'st He! but O! how fal'n, how CHANG'D
From Him, who in the happy realms of light,
Cloath'd with transcendent brightness, didst outshine
Myriads, tho' bright — (e).*

Here we behold *Qualities that are changed*, a Scene of ALIATION.

ANOTHER SPECIES OF MOTION, is seen in *Addition and Detraction*; as when we either add, or take away a Gnomon from a Square. Here is no *Aliation*, or Change of *Quality*, (for the Figure, as a Square, remains the same in either case) but the Effect of *such Motion* is a *Change only in the Quantity*, as the Square becomes either *smaller or larger*. When *Quantity is enlarged*, we call the *Motion* AUGMENTATION; when 'tis lessened, we call it DIMINUTION (f).

*Behold a wonder: They, but now who seem'd
In BIGNESS to surpass Earth's Giant Sons,*

Now

(d) Ἀλλοίωσις, in barbarous Latin, *Alteratio*. Vid. *Arist. ut suprâ*.

(e) *Par. Lost*, i. 84. See p. 98.

(f) *Augmentation*, Αὐξήσις — *Diminution*, Μείωσις. Vid. *Arist. ut sup.*

Ch. XVI.

Now LESS than smallest Dwarfs, in narrow room

Throng numberless—— (g).

Here we behold DIMINUTION.

PARVA metu primo; mox sese ATTOLLIT IN AURAS,

Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila condit (h).

Here we behold AUGMENTATION.

ALL these *Motions* have this *in common*, that they are *Changes* or *Roads* from one *Attribute* to another (i), while the *Substance* remains the same, both in *Essence* and in *Name*. Thus the Planet *Jupiter*, which was a year ago in such a part of the heavens, and is at present in another, tho' his *Attributes of Place* are changed, is yet both in *Essence* and in *Name* still the same Planet. By parity of Reason, 'tis the same individual Man, who, by change in *Quantity*, from fleshy becomes emaciated (k).

BUT

(g) *Par. Lost*, i. 777.

(h) *Æn.* iv. 176. See chap. ix. where the Species of *Quantity* are enumerated.

(i) Οὐ κατηγορίαι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὁδὸς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας—They (that is, these several Species of Motion) are not *Predicaments*, but a ROAD to the *Predicaments*. *Ammon. in Præd.* 171.

(k) Speaking of these Species of Motion, *Ammonius* says—κινεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ Ποσὸν, ἢ κατὰ Ποιόν, ἢ κατὰ Τόπον, φυλάττοντα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐσιώδες Εἶδος—That things are moved and changed either in QUANTITY, or in QUALITY, or in PLACE, still preserving [during these Motions] their ORIGINAL ESSENTIAL FORM. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 172.

Here we find the Phrase Εἶδος ἐσιώδες, commonly called *Substantial Form*, but which we chuse (as thinking it more accurate) to translate *Essential*. To explain—Let us for example

BUT there are *other Motions*, which in their *Effects* go farther. Ch.XVI.
 Thus when the *Substance* of a Man becomes not only pallid and emaciated, but it's *living Principle* is detached from that which it enlivens, Putrefaction and Diffolution of the Body ensue, and 'tis no longer a Change *within the Substance*, but the *very Substance is lost* both in *Effence* and in *Name* (l). SUCH MOTION is called CORRUPTION, DISSOLUTION, or DYING. On the contrary, when the Seed of any Species, whether Animal or Vegetable, by Evolution, Accretion, or other latent Process of Nature, produces a certain *Being*, which had no existence before; 'tis a Change, like the former, that goes not merely to *Attributes*, but by a more efficacious Operation to the very *Substance* itself. SUCH MOTION is called GENERATION or BIRTH.

THE following difference subsists between these two latter Species and the former; the *former* are no more than *Roads to different Modes* of Being; the *latter* lead to *Being itself*, and to it's opposite *Non-being* (m).

HOWEVER

example call *Sphericity* (if we may employ such a word) the *Essential Form* to a Bowl. Every one will admit that the Bowl may undergo *many* Changes; may become White from Black, Hot from Cold; and (by a more easy Change than these) it may roll from one Place to another; and yet notwithstanding it may *still continue* to be a Bowl. But when it's *Sphericity*, that is to say it's *Εἶδος ἐσιώδες*, it's *essential Form* departs, when (supposing it's *Matter* to be Clay) it is moulded *from a Sphere into a Cube*, from that instant the Bowl is no more, it has no longer an existence either in *Effence*, or in *Name*. See before, p. 52.

(l) See the Note immediately preceding.

(m) Hence GENERATION is called—Ὅδος ἀπὸ τῆς οὐκ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν, τὰ τέσσαρα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν—THE ROAD *from NON-BEING to BEING*; that is, from BEING IN POWER to BEING IN ACT—CORRUPTION or DISSOLUTION, on the contrary,

Ch.XVI. *HOWEVER* separate and distinct these Species of *Motion* may be found, yet being all of the same Genus, they naturally blend themselves together.

Thus tho' *Local Motion* may possibly exist without the rest, yet 'tis impossible for the rest to exist without *Local Motion*. Generation is the Affemblage of parts; Corruption, the Separation; so that here *Local Motion* is evident in either case. 'Tis the same in *Aliation*; the same in *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. When Fear renders a person pale, such *Change* could not be, did not his Blood retreat locally from the surface to within: and as for *Augmentation* and it's Opposite, they are no more than the bringing to, and the carrying off; both which in their very Idea imply *Local Motion*.

THE other Species of *Motion* are incidentally blended also. He that increaseth in bulk, commonly increaseth with ruddiness; and he that lessens in bulk, commonly lessens with Paleness. There are both in the Qualities and the Quantities of the particles to be affembled, many Changes necessarily previous to Generation or Birth; and many others, as necessarily previous to Corruption or Death (n).

AND

trary, is called 'Οδὸς ἀπὸ τῆς ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν—THE ROAD from BEING to NON-BEING. Ammon. in Præd. p. 172.

The Particle Πῃ, prefixed in the Quotations to μὴ ὄντος, and τὸ ὄν, is to distinguish the Non-being and Being here mentioned from Being and Non-being absolute. Πῃ means in a manner, as it were, after a sort. See below, 221, 2.

(n) See *Aristot. Phys.* l. viii. c. 8.—where he shews at large that *Local Motion* is necessarily the primary Motion, as running thro' the rest, and essential to them all; and where he likewise explains in what manner the other Species of Motion necessarily blend

AND thus have we established SIX SPECIES OF MOTION, which we denominate PHYSICAL, because they respect *Physical Subjects*. Ch. XVI.
They are to be found in four of the UNIVERSAL GENERA, or ARRANGEMENTS; one in the Genus, *Where*, TRANSITION; one in *Quality*, ALIATION; two in *Quantity*, AUGMENTATION and DIMINUTION; two in *Substance*, GENERATION and CORRUPTION.

IN all these *Motions* there is OPPOSITION or CONTRARIETY (o). Where two Species are coupled in one Genus, the two Species themselves are, in such case, *Contraries*; as *Generation* and *Corruption*, *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. Where the Species stands *single*, as *Local Motion*, or *Aliation*, the Contrarieties are more *numerous*, and therefore perhaps not mentioned. In *Local Motion* we behold Backward and Forward, Rectilinear and Curvilinear, Centripetal and Centrifugal, &c. In *Aliation*, or *Change of Quality*, we behold Blackening and Whitening; Straightening and Bending; Strengthening and Weakening; with many others, to which names are wanting. Lastly, all MOTION whatever is contrary to REST (p).

AND now perhaps it may not be amiss to inquire, WHAT PHYSICAL MOTION IS. Some Philosophers have found a short method here,

blend themselves with each other. The Chapter is too long to be here transcribed. In his Tract *de Animâ*, l. i. c. 3. having spoken of the several Species of Motion, he adds, that MOTION infers PLACE—*πάσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ*—For that ALL THE MOTIONS here enumerated are in PLACE.

(o) See the Chapter preceding, p. 201.

(p) Ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς τῇ μὲν κινήσει ἡρεμία ἐνάντιον—In strictness the CONTRARY to MOTION is REST. *Arist. Prædic. c. xi. p. 56. Edit. Sylb.*

The other Modes of *Contrariety* are explained in the subsequent part of the Chapter here quoted, which in some Editions is the fourteenth.

Ch. XVI. here, by telling us, 'tis a *simple Idea*, and therefore *cannot be defined*. Others, with more reason, have called it *hard* to be defined (*q*), a circumstance not unusual with other Subjects *equally obvious*, there being nothing more different both in accuracy and truth, than that Apprehension, which is adequate to the purposes of the Vulgar, and that, which ought to satisfy the investigation of a Philosopher.

IN the first place, if we consider MOTION as an Object of *Sensation*, we shall discover it to be the Object not of *one* Sense, but of *all*. In a ring of Bells we *hear* it; in a succession of Savours we *taste* it; of Odours, we *smell* it; and that we *feel* or *see* it, there needs no example. Thus is it distinguished from those Objects, that are *peculiar to one Sense alone*; as from Colours, which we *only see*, or from Sounds, which we *only hear*. *Simple* therefore as it is, it is not only an Object of Sensation, but stands *distinguished*, as a COMMON OBJECT, from other objects that are PECULIAR.

AND are there then (it may be demanded) no *other* Objects of the *same* Character?—'Tis answered, there are; as Bulk and Figure, *common* Objects to the Sight and Feeling; Rest and Number, *common* Objects, like Motion, to *every* Sense (*r*).

AND

(*q*) —χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν αὐτὴν (*scil.* κίνησιν) τί ἐστίν· 'Tis hard to comprehend what it is—So says the *Stagirite*, and gives his Reasons, which we postpone for the present, that we may not anticipate. *Phys.* l. iii. c. 2. p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*r*) Κοινὰ δὲ, κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἕδεμιας ἐστὶν ἴδια (*scil.* αἰσθήσεως). The common Objects of Sensation are MOTION, REST, NUMBER, FIGURE, BULK; for these are peculiar to no one Sense. *Arist. de Animâ*, l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. These common Objects are well worthy of Attention in explaining the Doctrine of the Senses and Sensation.

AND how (it is asked again) is *Motion* distinguished from these?— Ch.XVI.
 We reply, from Rest, by *Contrariety*; from Number, by *Continuity*;
 from Bulk and Figure, as the Parts of Motion are *never permanent*,
never co-exist. What Speculations does this Idea, *Simple* as it is
 called, open, even while we consider it no farther than as an Object
 of *Sensation*?

BUT we must not stop *here*, even while we consider it as *Physical*.
 As such we shall find it connected with a *Body*, which moves; and
 as such, necessarily performed *thro' Space*, and *in Time*; so that
these also, and their *Attributes* of *Infinite* and *Continuous*, must be
 added to it's Theory, as so many necessary Speculations.

WE cannot therefore but observe, that if it be a *simple* Idea, 'tis
 strangely *complicated* with a multitude of others (s); such as *Space*,
Time, *Infinity*, *Continuity*, together with *Body*, and it's *visible Attri-*
butes both of *Quantity* and of *Quality*. But to proceed in our Spe-

THAT

(s) See the Beginning of the third Book of *Aristotle's Physics*, ch. i. where being about to treat of *Motion*, he shews with what other Subjects it is necessarily connected, such as CONTINUOUS, INFINITE, PLACE, TIME, &c. and where accordingly, after he has given us the Opinions of his Predecessors in Philosophy concerning these Subjects, he proceeds in due order to explain what he thinks himself. — His words are, as they here follow. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν Συνεχῶν· τὸ δ' Ἀπειρον ἐμφαίνεται εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ Συνεχεῖ διὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀριζομένοις τὸ Συνεχὲς, συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τῷ Ἀπείρῳ, ὡς εἰς Ἀπειρον διακετὸν τὸ Συνεχὲς ὄν. Πρὸς δὲ ταῖς ἀνευ Τόπου, καὶ Κενῆ, καὶ Χρόνου ἀδύνατον κίνησιν εἶναι. MOTION appears to be in the Number of things CONTINUOUS: now INFINITE immediately shews itself in that which is CONTINUOUS; for which reason, when they define CONTINUOUS, they have often occasion to employ withal the character of Infinite, in as much as CONTINUITY is that, which is DIVISIBLE TO INFINITE. Add to this, without PLACE, and VACUUM, and TIME, 'tis impossible that MOTION should have existence. *Physic.* l. iii. c. 1.

CH. XVI. — THAT there are things existing *in act, in reality, in actuality* (call it as you please) we have the evidence both of our Senses, and of our internal Consciousness; so that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there also are things which *actually* and *really* are *not*, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx for example *actually* is *not*; a Centaur *actually* is *not*; for these we may call Phantoms in the language of *Lucretius*,

Quæ neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profectò.

Lastly, every *Substance* that *actually* is, by *actually* being *that* thing, *actually* is *not* any other (*t*). A piece of Brass for example *actually* is *not* an Oak; an Acorn, *not* a Vine; a Grape-stone, *not* a Statue.

THERE is a difference however here; I mean a difference in the last mode of *actually not being*; for tho' the Brass is no more a Statue, than it is an Oak, yet has it a *Capacity* to become the one, and *none* to become the other. The same may be said of the Acorn, with respect to the Oak; of the Grape-stone, with respect to the Vine. Were it not for this *definite nature of Capacity*, which as much distinguishes the *invisible Powers*, as *Actuality* distinguishes the *visible Attributes*, there would be no reason why an Acorn should not produce a Statue, as well as it produces an Oak; or why

(*t*) This LAST SPECIES of NON-ENTITY should be carefully attended to, as the *Doctrine of Motion wholly depends upon it*, and as it is so *essentially* distinguished both from the PHANTASTIC Non-entities (the Sphinx, the Centaur, &c) immediately preceding, and from that *strongest* of all Non-entities, the Non-entity of IMPOSSIBILITY, such as that *the Diameter of the Square should be commensurable with it's Sides*, or that *the same Number should be both Even and Odd*. See before, p. 217.

any thing (to speak more generally) *should not be able to produce any thing* (u). Ch. XVI.

WHAT then, if there were *no Capacity* existing in the Universe?—Could there be *Generations, Corruptions, Growths, Diminutions, Aliations, or Change of Place*?—Impossible.—But if these are all the *Species of Physical Motion*, it follows, that *WITHOUT CAPACITY there can be no such Motions*.

AND is *MOTION* then for this reason *pure CAPACITY*, and that *only*?—Let us examine.—A Man, being in *Salisbury*, has a *Capacity* of travelling to *London*. Is he therefore, for merely *possessing such Capacity*, upon the road thither?—He is not.—*Motion* therefore, tho' *Capacity*, is not *Capacity alone*: there must be some degree of *ACTUALITY*, or else *MOTION* can never exist. Shall we then call it *pure ACTUALITY*?—We cannot assert that, when we have made *Capacity* one of it's requisites. Besides, how should *Motion* be seen in *pure Actuality*; an *Actuality*, which *never exists*, till *Motion* is at an end? A Man surely can no more be called *moving towards London*, who is *actually* arrived there, than he who, possessing the *Capacity* of going thither, *forbears* to exert any of his *motive powers*.

IF *Motion* therefore be neither *Capacity alone*, nor *Actuality alone*, and yet *both* (as it appears) are *essential* to it; 'tis IN BOTH we must look after it, AS DERIVING IT'S EXISTENCE FROM BOTH.

SUCH

(u) This Distinction of τὸ Ἐντελεχία and τὸ Δυνάμει, of that which is in *ACTUALITY*, and that which is in *POWER*, is the Basis of all the *Peripatetic* Reasoning upon this Subject. See p. 153, 4, &c. also p. 84, 5.

Ch. XVI.

SUCH in fact it will appear; something MORE *than dead Capacity*, something LESS *than perfect Actuality*: CAPACITY ROUZED, and *striving to quit it's latent Character*: not the CAPABLE *Brass*, nor yet the ACTUAL *Statue*, but the CAPACITY IN ENERGY, that is to say, the Brass in Fusion, while *it is becoming the Statue*, and is *not yet become*. Thus too, when a Complexion is *actually Red*, we say not that it *reddens*; much less do we assert so, while it remains *perfectly Pale*; but as every *pale* Complexion implies a *Capacity to become red*, 'tis in THE ENERGY OF THIS CAPACITY exists the *Reddening*, that is the MOTION.

IN the account of MOTION here given we see the Doctrine of the *Peripatetics*. The more ancient Sects of *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, tho' they give *different Descriptions*, seem to have deduced them all from *the same Principles*. Thus because, whenever any thing is *moved*, it is some way or other *diversified* either in *Quantity*, or in *Quality*, or at least in *Place*, for this reason they called MOTION, DIVERSITY. Again, because, while opposite forces are *equal*, then is *Motion suspended*, and revives not till *Inequality destroys the Equilibrium*; for this reason they called MOTION, INEQUALITY. Again, because every thing, which is *moving*, is *not* in some certain Attributes, either what it *was*, or what it *will be*; for this reason they called MOTION, NON-ENTITY (*x*), not *Non-entity absolute*, but with a *peculiar reference*.

ALL

(*x*) — ἔλεγον δὲ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι Ἑτερότητα, καὶ Ἀμισότητα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. *Philop. in Physic.* p. 144. For *Non-Entity*, see before, p. 221, 2.

ALL these Descriptions of MOTION naturally flow from *one* Source, C. XVI. and that is, from it's *indefinite* (y) and *unascertainable* appearance. Now the reason why it *so* appears, is, as we have said, because we cannot place it either in *the simple* CAPACITY of things, or in *the simple* ACTUALITY. The Bow for example *moves not*, because it *may be bent*; nor because it *is bent*; but *the Motion lies between*; lies in an *imperfect* and *obscure union* of the two *together*; is THE ACTUALITY (if I may so say) EVEN OF CAPACITY ITSELF (z); *imperfect*

(y) —αἴτιον δὲ τῶν εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι αὐτὰς, ὅτι ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις. *Physic.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*—The Cause of their placing MOTION among these things, is, that it appears to be something INDEFINITE.

(z) We have just before stiled it the ENERGY OF CAPACITY; here, the ACTUALITY OF CAPACITY. These expressions are difficult, unless we attend to the manner, in which they are used. The original Greek expresses the Sentiment thus—ἡ τῆς δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἢ τοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν—THE ENERGY of what exists IN POWER, considered as so existing, is MOTION. *Arist. Physic.* 43. *Edit. Sylb.*—And soon after, p. 45—τῶν δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι ἢ εἰς δυνάμιν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐστὶ δεῖναι αὐτὴν ἀπλῶς· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι ποσὸν κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ τὸ ἐνέργεια ποσόν· ἢ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελής δὲ αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις· καὶ διὰ τῆτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς γένεσιν ἀναγκαῖον δεῖναι, ἢ εἰς δυνάμιν, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀπλήν· τῶν δ' ἑθὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον· λείπεται τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μὲν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν, οἷαν εἴπομεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχόμενὴν δ' εἶναι. *Arist. Phys.* l. iii. c. 2.—The Reason why MOTION appears to be INDEFINITE, is, that there is no placing it simply either in the CAPACITY of things, or in their ENERGY: for neither is that necessarily moved, which is CAPABLE OF BECOMING a certain Quantity; nor that, which is a certain Quantity in ENERGY and ACT. Indeed the MOTION itself appears to be a certain Sort of Energy, but then 'tis an IMPERFECT one; and the reason of this is, the CAPACITY ITSELF is IMPERFECT, OF WHICH it is the ENERGY. Hence therefore it becomes hard to comprehend it's Nature: for 'tis necessary to place it either in Privation, or in Capacity, or else in simple Energy, and yet no one of these appears to be possible. The Manner therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining, which is, that it should be a peculiar Sort of Energy, and that, such a one as we have described; HARD TO DISCERN, AND YET POSSIBLE TO EXIST. P. 45, ut *suprà*. *Edit. Sylb.*

C. XVI. *imperfect* and *obscure*, because such is CAPACITY to which it belongs.

AND so much for MOTION PHYSICAL, it's different Species, and it's general Character. We are now to inquire concerning *Motion of another kind*.

C H A P. XVII.

Concerning MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL.—This means METAPHYSICAL, and why so called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Consciousness, Anticipation, Preconception—Appetite, Resentment, Reason—Motion Physical and Metaphysical how united—Discord and Harmony of the internal Principles—Powers vegetative, animal, rational—Immortality—REST, it's several Species—MOTION, to what perceptive Beings it appertains; to what, not—and whence the Difference.

OUR Contemplation hitherto may be called *Physical*, because 'tis C. XVII.
about *Physical Motions*, that the whole has been employed, and 'tis from *Physical Observations*, that the whole has been deduced. But he, who stops here, has but half finished his Work, if it be true that *Corporeal Masses* only move, because they are moved (*a*); and therefore cannot be considered as *the original Source of Motion*.

WHEN a Boy carries about with him an Insect in a Box, we call not this Motion the *Insect's Motion* as an *Animal*, because a Nut or a Pebble would have moved in like manner. (*b*) When the same Boy,

(*a*) Τὸ κινῆν φυσικῶς, κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιῶτον κινεῖ, κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.—That which GIVES Motion PHYSICALLY, is itself MOVEABLE: for every thing, which gives Motion in this manner, is moved also itself.—And soon after—Τὸτο δὲ ποιεῖ διζέει· ὥςτε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει—This, (namely the giving Motion) it does by CONTACT; so that at the same time (while it acts) it is acted upon. *Aristot. Physic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 44, 45. Edit. Sylb.*

(*b*) —εἴκει δὲ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι, ἧ ἐξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένη τῷ βιασθέντι.—That seems to be FORCED or COMPELLED, of which the Principle or Moving Cause is FROM WITHOUT, while

C. XVII. Boy, piercing a Wing of this Insect, makes it describe a *circular Motion* round a Pin or Needle, even *this* cannot well be called the Insect's Motion; for *it's Motion*, as an *Animal*, is not, like a Planet, round a Center. So far however *the Motion* differs from that in the Box, that by being a *mixt Motion*, the *centrifugal Part* is the *Animal's own*, the *centripetal* is *extraneous*. But if ever the Wing detach itself, and the fortunate Insect flie off; at that instant the *Mixture of extraneous* is no more, and the *Motion* thence forward becomes properly and purely *animal*.

AND what is it, which gives *the Motion* this *proper* and *pure* character?—It is SPONTANEITY (*c*), that pure and *innate Impulse* arising from the Animal *itself*, by which *alone* it's Flight is then produced and conducted.

AND thus, while we pass from Flying to *Innate and Spontaneous Impulse*, that is to say in other words, from Flying to its *Cause*, we pass also insensibly from *Motion Physical* to *Metaphysical*; for METAPHYSICS are properly conversant about *primary and internal Causes*. We call not such Impulse *Metaphysical*, as if it were μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν, *something subsequent to natural Motion*, that is, to Flying (for this would set Effect before Cause, a preposterous order indeed!); but we call it *Metaphysical*, because tho' truly prior in itself, it is
subsequent

while the Being compelled contributes nothing from itself. *Ethic. Nic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 37. Edit. Sylb.*

(*c*) Τὸ ἐκείσιν δοξείεν ἂν εἶναι, ἧ ἄρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς—That should seem to be SPONTANEOUS, of which the Principle or Moving Cause is IN THE BEING ITSELF. *Eth. Nic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 38. Edit. Sylb.*

subsequent in *Man's Contemplation*, whose Road of Science is naturally C. XVII.
upward, that is, from Effect to Cause, from Sensible to Intelli-
 gible (*d*).

SPONTANEOUS *Impulse* (*e*) is to the Insect the Cause of Flying; so it is to the Dolphin, of Swimming; to the Man, of Walking. But *what* is the Cause of this Impulse itself? And why do *Animals* possess it, more than Stocks or Stones?

To solve this question, we must first remark, that every *Animal*, however exquisite in it's frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the Part of a greater and more perfect Whole (*f*), to which it is *connected* by many necessary *Wants*.


ONE of these for example is common to all Animals, that of Food or Aliment. Suppose then *this Want* were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence?—The Animal would perish.—And how
 has

(*d*) See Vol. I. p. 197, 220. and of the present Treatise, p. 192, Note (*d*).

(*e*) Ὁρμή. Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una pars in APPETITU posita est. Cic. de Offic. i. 28.—APPETITIONESQUE, quas illi ὁρμὰς vocant, obedientes efficere Rationi—De Offic. ii. 5.—Animalia, quæ habent suos IMPETUS et rerum APPETITUS—Ejusd. ii. 3.—NATURALEM enim APPETITIONEM, quam vocant ὁρμὴν, itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14.—Seneca uses the words, SPONTANEUS MOTUS. Epist. cxxi.

(*f*) Ipse autem Homo—nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam PARTICULA PERFECTI. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 14. See of this Vol. p. 131, &c. and the end of the present Chapter.

What is applied by Cicero in the above Passage to *Man*, may with equal propriety be applied to all other Animals, and needs no proving. 'Twas a fundamental Doctrine of the Stoics.

C. XVII.  has Providence obviated this danger?—It has given to every *Animal*, however base, however young, not only a *Consciousness* of this *Want*, but an *obscure Sensation* of some distinction in things *without*; and a *Preconception* or *Anticipation* in favour of that Aliment which it is to *prefer*, from an *inward feeling* of *it's proper Constitution* (g). 'Tis thus *without* either *Teaching* or *Experience*, but merely from an *innate Feeling* of *what is conducive to their proper Being*, that Infants are able to distinguish Milk from Vinegar; and Silk-worms the Leaf of a Mulberry from that of a Laurel or an Ash (h). Now the Con-
sequence

(g) —Πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι παντὶ ζῳῷ τὴν αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν—The thing PRIMARILY INTIMATE to every *Animal*, is *it's own CONSTITUTION*, and a *CONSCIOUSNESS* of it. Diog. Laert. vii. 85.

(h) —Simul atque natum fit animal—ipsum sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum et suum Statum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus Status, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur adferre. Cic. de Fin. iii. 5.

Thus Seneca—OMNIBUS (sc. Animalibus) CONSTITUTIONIS SUE SENSUS EST, et inde Membrorum tam expedita tractatio. Epist. cxxi.—Soon after—Constitutionem suam [Animal] crasse intelligit, summatim, et obscure—and again—ante omnia est Mei cura: hoc animalibus inest cunctis: nec inferitur, sed INNASCITUR.—And soon after, speaking of the terror, which some Animals feel in their earliest state, when they first behold a Hawk, or a Cat, he adds—apparet illis inesse Scientiam nocituri, non EXPERIMENTO COLLECTAM; nam, antequam possint experiri, cavent.

Even the *ferocious* tribes of Animals, when their Powers become mature, are *shewn*, how to employ them, by an *innate, internal Instinct*.

Dente lupo, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi INTUS
Monstratum—

As to *INNATE IDEAS*, there is certainly nothing so true, (and it requires no great Logic to prove) that, if by *INNATE IDEAS* be meant *INNATE PROPOSITIONS*, there never were, nor ever can be any such things existing. But this no ways tends to subvert that *innate Distinction* of things into *Eligible* and *Ineligible*, according as they are suitable to every Nature, or not suitable; a Distinction, which every Being appears to recognize from *it's very birth*.

Hence

sequence of this *Consciousness*, of these *Preconceptions* or *Anticipations*, C. XVII.
is a *spontaneous Impulse*; for 'tis in these that such Impulse finds an
adequate

Hence the Author above quoted in the same Epistle—*tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoquo modo effusa, quid sit infestum ipsis PROTINUS norunt, et mortifera devitant.*

And 'tis upon this reasoning we may venture to affirm, that every *such Being* in it's earliest moments *perceives itself to be an Animal*, tho' it may not be philosophically informed, what an *Animal really is*—QUID SIT ANIMAL, nescit; ANIMAL ESSE se sentit. *Ibid.*

Whatever others in ancient, or even in modern days, may have thought concerning this Subject, that *Philosopher* surely can be hardly suspected of favouring *Innate Ideas*, who held THE HUMAN SOUL, or rather it's INTELLECTIVE PART, from it's comprehending all things, to be for that very reason something pure and unmixed—ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμικτὴ εἶναι—and this, because [in any compound] that which is alien, by shewing itself along with other Objects, impedes and obstructs—παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ἀντιφράττει—That therefore the HUMAN INTELLECT in it's Nature was nothing else than mere CAPACITY, or THE BEING CAPABLE—ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτῇ εἶναι φύσιν τίνα μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἡ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν—That in consequence it WAS NOT any single one of the whole tribe of Beings, before it comprehended and understood it—ὁ ἄρα καλέμεν τῆς ψυχῆς Νῆς—ἔδεν εἶναι ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων, πρὶν νοεῖν—That 'twas not therefore probable it should be blended with the Body, for that then it would become vested with some corporeal Quality, and be either hot or cold, and have some corporeal Organ, as the sensitive faculty has; whereas now it has none—διὸ ἔδεν μεμίχθαι εὐλόγον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποῖος γὰρ ἂν τις γίγνοιτο, θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρὸς, καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δὲ ἔδεν εἶναι—He concludes at last his Reasonings with telling us—that the Intellect, as he had said before, was in CAPACITY, after a certain manner, the several Objects intelligible; but was in ACTUALITY no one of them, until it first comprehended it—and that it was the same with the Mind or HUMAN UNDERSTANDING [in it's original State] as with a RASA TABULA or WRITING TABLET, in which nothing as yet had been ACTUALLY written—διὸ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ Νῆς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία ἔδεν, πρὶν ἂν μὴ νοῇ· δεῖ δ' ἔτι, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείᾳ, ἥ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένων, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῇ Νῇ. *Aristot. de Animâ, l. iii. iv.*

As to the Simile of a RASA TABULA, or (to speak in a language more modern and familiar) that of a SHEET OF FAIR WRITING PAPER, tho' it be sufficiently evident of itself, it may be illustrated in the following manner.

The *Human Intellect* is pure unmixed, untainted CAPACITY, as a *Sheet of fair Writing Paper* is pure unmixed, untainted WHITENESS. The pure unmixed Character of this intellectual Capacity renders it fit for every Object of Comprehension, as the pure unmixed Character of the Paper makes it adequate to every Species of Writing. The Paper would not be adequate to this purpose, were it previously scrawled over with Syllables or Letters.

As

C. XVII. *adequate efficient Cause.* But if we include all these under the common name of *Perception*, we shall then find, that PERCEPTION is the proper Cause of SPONTANEOUS IMPULSE; that 'tis so the Animal impels itself, because 'tis so that it perceives; it does not so perceive, because it is so impelled (i).

THE Impulse hitherto spoken of is of *earliest* date, commencing in a manner with the Animal itself; and, as it merely respects the Body and bodily Pleasure, is distinguished from other Impulses by the name of APPETITE (k).

As Animals advance, the Scene of Perception enlarges, and the number of Spontaneous Impulses increase of course with it. Yet while

As far only as it is *clear*, it is *capable*; and if we suppose it *perfectly* clear, then is it *perfectly* capable. The same Sort of Reasoning is applicable to the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Such we take to be the Sentiments of this ancient Sage on this important Subject.

The Sentiments and Subject, being both of them curious, will ('tis hoped) be an Apology for this Digression.

By it we think it appears, that it was a received Opinion among the Ancients, that *Instincts* both in Man and Beast were *original*, and *founded in Nature*. That *Aristotle* held the same, appears not only from his History of Animals, but from the following remarkable Passage in his *Politics*, relative to Man. There speaking of the *Social State*, or State of Society, he says—*φύσει μὲν ἔν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν*—that the TENDENCY to such a Society was BY NATURE in all men. *Pol. p. 4. Edit. Sylb.*

We think also it farther appears, that whatever *Aristotle* thought of *Instincts* residing in the lower faculties of Man, *Instincts* respecting the purposes of common Life and Society, yet, as to the SUPREME and INTELLECTIVE PART, this he held in it's original State to be WHOLLY PURE and UNMIXED, and only fitted, by that Purity, for general and universal Comprehension. He seems (like the rest) to have justly distinguished between INNATE INSTINCTS, and INNATE PROPOSITIONS.

(i) —ὁρεγόμεθα ὅτι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ, διότι ὁρεγόμεθα. *Arist. Metaph. Λ. ζ. p. 203. Edit. Sylb.*

(k) ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ.

while *Pleasure corporeal* continues the *sole* Object, and there appears no Danger either in *acquiring* or *preserving it*, the Impulse is still an *Appetite*, varying only in it's name, as the Pleasure, to which it is referred, varies in the Species. C. XVII.

YET, besides these *Preconceptions*, the Sources of simple *Appetite*, there are also *Preconceptions* of *offering Violence*, and others of *resisting Danger*, and these naturally call forth *another* Power, I mean the Power of ANGER (*l*). Few Animals, when young, feel any such *Preconceptions*; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the *irascible* Impulses soon *spontaneously* attend, prompting the Lion to employ his Fangs; the Vultur his Talons; the Boar his Tusk; and every other Animal of prey his proper and natural Preparations.

ALL these *Spontaneous Impulses*, as well of *Anger* as of *Appetite*, are equally included under the common name of *Irrational* (*m*), being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with *Reason*.

BUT when REASON becomes strong enough to view it's proper Objects; that Sight, to which no Being here but *Man alone* is equal; when the Moral and the Intelligible rise before his *mental* Eye, and he beholds the fair Forms of *Good* and of *Truth*; then too arise *Impulses*

(*l*) ΘΥΜΟΣ.

(*m*) ΑΛΟΓΟΣ, as well as ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ and ΛΟΓΟΣ, are Terms too well known, to need more than to be mentioned.

C. XVII. *pulses of a far more noble kind, those to Friendship, to Society, to Virtue, and to Science (n).*

AND

(n) This Progression from the lower to the superior Faculties is well described by Cicero.

Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ sunt secundum naturam: simul autem cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius (quam adpellant ἔννοια illi) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam; multo eam pluris æstimavit, quàm omnia illa, quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut statueret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis PER SE LAUDANDUM ET EXPETENDUM BONUM. Cic. de Fin. iii. 6.

Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni: omnes enim constitutioni conciliantur, in quâ sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni suæ conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic, &c. Sen. Epist. cxxi. The whole Epistle is worth perusal, in particular what follows—Ergo infans ei constitutioni suæ conciliatur, quæ TUNC infanti est, non quæ futura juveni est. Neque enim, SI ALIQUID ILLI MAJUS IN QUO TRANSEAT, restat; non HOC quoque, in quo nascitur, SECUNDUM NATURAM EST.

See also his elegant Application of this Doctrine to the different Stages of that well-known Vegetable, Corn, from it's first appearance above the ground, to it's State of maturity. *Nam et illa herba, quæ in Segetem, &c. Epist. p. 603. Edit. Varior.*

See also how elegantly Cicero applies the same Doctrine to the Vine, where to the vegetative Powers he first supposes Sense superadded; and then to Sense, Reason; each Superaddition still increasing in value, tho' not robbing the former Powers of their due regard and attention—*Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuctur, ut de Viti potissimum loquar, est id, &c. De Fin. v. 14.*

See Vol. the First, Dialogue concerning Happiness, part the second, and the Notes, p. 167, &c.

The Number and Subordination of the animating Powers are well distinguished in the following Extracts.

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι (καθάπερ εἵπομεν) τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη δυνάμεις δὲ εἵπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὀρεεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βέλγησις· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα μίαν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφῆν· ᾧ δὲ αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τέτρω ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τῇ γὰρ ἡδὲ ὀρεεῖς ἐστὶν αὕτη—With regard to the Powers of the Soul that have been enumerated, to some Beings they appertain ALL of them; to others, only SOME of them; and to others, only ONE of them. The Powers we have mentioned, are the Nutritive, the Sensitive, the Power of Desire, of local Motion, of Ratiocination. Now to Plants there appertains only the Nutritive Power; to other Beings both this, and the Sensitive: but if the Sensitive, then the

AND thus is Man not only a Microcosm in the Structure of his Body, but in the System too of his Impulses, including all of them within him from the basest to the most sublime (o). He includes them

the Power of Desire; for Appetite, and Resentment, and Volition (the three great leading Powers) are each of them a Species of Desire, and all Animals have at least one of the Senses, I mean the Sense of Touch. Now to the Being, which possesses Sensation, to this appertain also Pleasure and Pain, and that which is Pleasurable and Painful. But if these, then Appetite; for Appetite is the Desire of that, which is Pleasurable. Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3.

And soon after—"Ανευ μὲν γὰρ τῆ θρεπτικῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ ἑστὶ· τῆ δὲ αἰσθητικῆς χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Πάλιν δὲ, ἀνευ μὲν τῆ ἀπλικῆς τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφ' ἧς ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων ἔτε ὅψιν ἔτε ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν, ἔτε ὀσμῆς ὅλως αἰσθῆσιν· καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινήτικόν, τὰ δ' ἐκ ἑχει· τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τέτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα· οἷς δὲ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, ἔπειτα λογισμὸς, —ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἔδδ' φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνον ζῶσι—Without the Nutritive Power there is no Sensitive; but then the Nutritive is separated from the Sensitive in Plants. Again, without Touch there can be none of the other Sensations, but there may be Touch without any of the rest; for thus are there many Animals, which have neither Sight, nor Hearing, nor even a Sensation of Smells. Farther still, of the Sensitive Beings some possess the Loco-motive Power, and others possess it not: the last Order of Beings, and those the fewest in number, are those, which possess the Powers of REASONING and DISCUSSION: and among the mortal and perishable Beings those, who possess these Powers, possess ALL the remaining Species; but those, who possess any one of these Powers in particular, do not all of them therefore possess the Reasoning Power, but some of them want even the Power of Phansy or Imagination; others of them conduct themselves and live by that [inferior Power] alone. *Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3. p. 28. Edit. Sylb. See before, p. 61, Note (g).*

It must be here observed, that PLANTS are said TO LIVE (ζῆν) tho' not to be ANIMALS (ζῶα); the Character of ANIMAL being derived from the Power of SENSATION, of which Plants are supposed destitute; while that of LIFE appertains to them, because they GROW, and PRODUCE each of them SEED after their kind.

These different Powers, as they stand united in one subject, may be better comprehended, by marking their clear and distinct character, when they exist apart, in different Subjects.

(o) The preceding Speculations have respect to the threefold Division of the SOUL, adopted by the Pythagoreans and Platonics, by which they made it to be Rational, Irascible, and Concupiscible, and called it's three Faculties Λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία, REASON, ANGER, and CONCUISCENCE or APPETITE. See *Diog. Laert. iii. 90*, *Plato's Republic* is founded on this Division.

C. XVII.  them all, as being possessed of *all* Perception; and *Perception* we have now found to be the *Cause* of all *Spontaneous Impulse*.

WE must remember however that 'tis not Perception *simply*, which causes such *Impulse*; but 'tis Perception of Want *within*, and of adequate Good *without*; and that as this Good is sometimes an object of *Sense*, sometimes of *Intellect*, sometimes a *mistaken* Good, at other times a *real* one, (in as much as Sensation is fallible, and Reason may be deceived) so the whole amounts to this; *the Cause of Spontaneous Impulse is the Perception of absent Good, and that either sensible or intelligible, either real or apparent (p).*

AFTER this manner we perceive one of the most important Unions; the *Union* of those two capital Motions, the *Physical* and the *Metaphysical*. THE SOUL perceives those Goods, which it is conscious that the Animal *wants*. Hence an *Impulse to obtain them* by employing the Organs of the *Body*; and this, as far as *the Soul only* is concerned, we call Motion *Metaphysical*. Hence the *bodily* Organs actually *are* employed, and this we call Motion *Physical*. *Perception leads the way; Spontaneous Impulse follows; and the Body supplies the place of an Instrument or Tool (q).*

As

(p) See *Vol. the First, Treatise on Happiness*, and Notes on the same, pages 121, 140, 141, 132, 192.

(q) —ἔτις μὲν ἐν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὁρέξεως ἕως, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως—And thus it is, that ANIMALS proceed to move themselves and act, a DESIRE being the last and immediate Cause of their moving, and this Desire being occasioned either by SENSATION, or else by IMAGINATION and INTELLECTION. *Arist. de Animal. Motu. c. vii. p. 155. Edit. Sylb.*

Tα

As every *animal Motion* has a view to Good, so, if it miss that Good, *the Motion ceases*, and the Animal is left discontented: if it obtain it, the Animal is happy, but then too *the Motion ceases*; for the End is obtained, to which the Motion tended. And thus is all *Animal Motion* in it's Nature *finite*, as it has a Beginning and an End; as it begins from the *Want of Good*, and ends in it's *Acquisition*. Hence too as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to *Motion circular*, where we run a complete round, by returning to the point whence we began. C.XVII.

'Tis no-unentertaining Speculation to attend to these *internal Motions*, as they arise from the different prevalence of their different *internal Causes*. Within the Soul of *Man* there are *Passions*, and a Principle of *Reason*: sometimes the *internal Motion* arises from *many Passions at once*, and the Soul is like a Sea when agitated by contrary Winds.

————— *æstuat ingens*

Imo in corde PUDOR, mixtoque INSANIA LUCTU (r).

Here the Motion is tempestuous, and *Reason* during the Storm appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but without

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικά μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδεύς τὰ πάθη, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὐτὴ δὲ γίγνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως, ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.—The CORPOREAL FEELINGS prepare in a proper manner the ORGANIC PARTS of the Body; DESIRE prepares those Feelings; that Desire is prepared by some FANCY or APPEARANCE; and this last arises either thro' INTELLECTION or SENSATION. *Ejusd. l. c. 8. p. 157. Edit. Sylb.*

If it be asked why nothing has been said concerning *Aversion* and *Evil*, as well as concerning *Volition* and *Good*; the Answer is, that *to fly Evil* is *to seek Good*; and *to escape Evil* is *to obtain Good*; so that in the present inquiry they are both included.

(r) *Æn. x. 870.*

C. XVII. *out success; and in such case the Motion is equally turbid and irregular. Thus Medea, when she is about to murder her children:*

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά·

Θυμὸς δὲ κρείττωι τῶν ἐμῶν βελευμάτων (s).

I know the mischiefs, that I soon shall act,

But Passion over-rules my better thoughts.

There are times too, when *Reason* acts with greater success, and when *the Motion* becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have *the Passions* obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that *orderly*, that *fair and equal Motion*, by which the *Stoics* represented even HAPPINESS itself, and elegantly called it *the Well-flowing of life* (t).

BESIDES the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely *moral*, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely *intellectual*. It is under *this Motion*, that the Man of Speculation passes, thro' the road of Syllogism, from the *simplest* Truths to the *most complicated* Theorems.

AND here it may be remarked, that as pure and original *Truth* is the Object of our *most excellent* VOLITION (it being all that we seek, considered

(s) *Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 28. p. 144. Edit. Upton. Euripid. Med. v. 1078, 9.*

(t) *Ἐρροια βίη*.—See *Diog. Laert. vii. 88.*—*Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu. Senec. Epist. 120. See also of this Treatise, p. 145.*

considered as *Beings intelligent*), so is it as strictly and properly the Object of our *most excellent* PERCEPTION; there being no perceptive Power, but our *Intellect alone*, that can reach it. 'Tis here then we behold the meaning of an ancient and important Doctrine, that THE PRIMARY OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION AND OF VOLITION ARE THE SAME (*u*). 'Tis hence also we may learn, that not only ALL GOOD IS TRUTH (as there can be none such *without a reason*, from which it is so denominated), but also that ALL TRUTH IS GOOD, as it is the *sole pursuit* of the contemplative, the *natural Object* of their Wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious (*x*).

HAVING said thus much concerning *Perception*, and that highest Species of *animal Impulse*, I mean *Volition*, it must not be forgot, that there are *other internal Motions* of a very different character, where
both

(*u*) Τὸ ΟΡΕΚΤΟΝ καὶ τὸ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ κινεῖ, ἢ κινούμενον τῶν δὲ ΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΑ, ΤΑ ΑΤΤΑ—
The DESIRABLE and the INTELLIGIBLE move, without being moved; and of these two Genera those Objects, that are HIGHEST and FIRST, are THE SAME. *Arist. Metaph.* A. ζ. p. 202. *Edit. Sylb.*

When a Theorem of *Archimedes* moves within us a *Desire* to understand it; or when, being understood, it raises within us our necessary *Assent*: we do not conceive the Theorem itself to be moved, either by the Desire, or by the Assent, as the Horses are moved, that give Motion to the Waggon, or the Waggon moved, that gives motion to it's Load.

(*x*) Tho' we seldom hear of *Goods* in our common intercourse with Mankind, but what have reference to the Body, or at best to the *lower Affections*; yet HAS THE HIGHEST FACULTY OF THE SOUL A PECULIAR GOOD, as much as the other faculties have, from the *intellectual Possession* of which Good it seeks FELICITY and PEACE.

I loved her (says the wise Man, speaking of Wisdom; and what is *Wisdom*, but the most exalted Truth?) *I loved her above Health and Beauty, and chose to have her instead of Light: for the Light, that cometh from her, never goeth out.* *Wisd.* vii. 10.

C.XVII. both *Perception* and *Spontaneous Impulse* are in a manner *unconcerned*.

WITHIN every Animal there is an INNATE and ACTIVE POWER, which ceases not it's work, when Sense and Appetite are asleep; which, *without any conscious co-operation of the Animal itself*, carries it from an Embryo or Seed to the maturity of it's proper *Form*. Now so far this Power may be called a *Principle of Motion*. At *Maturity* it stops (for were the progress infinite, there could be no Maturity at all); and so far it may be called a *Principle of Cessation* or *Rest* (y). From this point of Rest it deserts the Being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the Being gradually decays.

— *fubeunt morbi, tristisque senectus;*

Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mortis (z).

As the *Local Motion* of Animals is derived from *Sense*, and *spontaneous Impulse*; so from the *Principle*, just described, are derived the *other*

(y) Speaking of the difference between the Operation of the *Elements* and mere MATTER, and that of NATURE, and an *internal Principle*, the *Stagirite* observes—Τῶν δὲ φύσει συνεστώτων πέρας ἐστὶ καὶ λόγῳ μέγεθος καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἢ πυρὸς, καὶ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης—As to things, which derive their Constitution from NATURE, there is a BOUND and Proportion in their Magnitude and Growth; and these proceed from their SOUL, not from the Element of Fire; and are caused rather by Reason, than by Matter. *De An.* ii. 4. p. 30. *Edit. Sylb.*—And, not long before, describing a *Physical* or *natural Substance*, he makes it to be something ἔχοντι ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῷ, which possesses within itself a *Principle of MOTION* and of REST. *De An.* ii. 1. p. 23. *Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis by this Principle that the Magnitude of the Thistle, the Oak, the Bee, the Elephant, and every other *natural Production*, whether animal or vegetable, is to a certain degree circumscribed and limited; and when that *Limit* either fails or exceeds in a conspicuous manner, the Being becomes a *Monster*. See Vol. I. p. 164, Note xviii.

(z) *Georg.* iii. 67, 68.

other Motions: from it's ACTIVITY, their *Generation*, their *Augmentation*, and *Change to better*; from it's CESSATION, their *Change to worse*, their *Diminution*, and lastly *Death**. 'Tis this is that *internal Principle*, which descends from Animals even to Vegetables; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called VEGETATIVE LIFE, tho' sometimes it is denoted by the more obvious Name of NATURE (a). C. XVII. 

WE must remember however, that while we speak of *Motion* here, we mean the *invisible Cause*, not the *visible Effects*; for these are *purely physical*, and belong to another Speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other *motive Powers*, the Powers of Magnetism and Electricity; the *visible Motions*, which they produce, being of a Species *merely Physical*, but the *Cause* of these Motions
lying

* See before, p. 214 to p. 217.

(a) See the Definition of NATURE in *Volume the First*, among the Notes on the first Treatise, p. 145, 146, and more fully in the addition to Note 3, p. 157.

The VEGETATIVE LIFE here mentioned is sometimes called ψυχὴ φυτικὴ, sometimes θρεπτικὴ, and at other times τὸ θρεπτικόν, the NUTRITIVE PRINCIPLE; that Principle, which, passing thro' *Plants*, as well as *Animals*, never ceases to *nourish* and support them, thro' the period of their existence—ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ—καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἢ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεισι ἡρεμῶσι· τότε γὰρ μάλιστα αἱ πέψεις—THE VEGETATIVE SOUL energizes at all times, and more during Sleep, when the OTHER POWERS ARE AT REST; and therefore 'tis then mostly are performed the Digestions. *Philop. in Arist. de An. l. ii.*—Τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐρησθέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον ὥς ἔδεν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως—THE NUTRITIVE part of the Soul performs it's Work in SLEEPING, more than in Waking; for then, more than at any other time, are Animals nourished and enlarged in bulk, as they have NO NEED OF SENSATION FOR THESE PURPOSES. *Aristot. de Somno, cap. 1. sub. fin.* See before, p. 59, 60.

C. XVII. lying itself totally concealed. Whether then we suppose it a Species of inferior *Life*, and say with *Thales*, that the Magnet and the Amber are *animated* (*b*); or whether we content ourselves with calling it an *internal active Quality* (*occult* we must not call it, for that is now forbidden) we may safely pronounce it a *Quality*, which, tho' we are sure of it's existence, is not otherwise comprehensible, than *by reference to it's Effects*; as we know *Homer*, who is out of Sight, by his *Iliad*, which lies before us.

THERE is yet *another motive Principle*, far greater in *local extent* than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every Atom of this our Earth has it's proper tendency, but by which even Planets, Satellites, and Comets, describe their Orbits.

ASTRONOMERS will inform us as to the force of MOTION *here*, and how much on it's due Order depends this immense Universe.

THE best of ancient Philosophers, when they saw so many *inferior Motions* not to be performed *without Counsel or Design*, could not think of imputing such *superior* ones to the efficacy of blind *Chance*; and therefore, whatever they might conceive of the *immediate Cause*
(call

(*b*) This Opinion of *Thales* concerning the Magnet's *having a Soul*, because it moved Iron (*ψυχὴν ἔχει, ὅτι τὸν σιδηρὸν κινεῖ*) may be found in *Arist. de An.* l. i. c. 2. p. 7.

Philoponus, in his Comment on this Passage, gives us from *Thales* the following Sentiment, which, tho' not immediately to our purpose, we have transcribed for it's importance—*ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἡ Πρόνοια μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει, καὶ ἔδεν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, ἐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον*—He used to say, that PROVIDENCE extends to the lowest of all Beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is most minute. See before, p. 73.

(call it *Gravitation* or *Attraction*, or by any other name) they justly supposed the primary Cause to be A PRINCIPLE OF INTELECTION: C. XVII.

——— *totam infusa per artus*

MENS agitat molem —— (c).

THEY indeed so far considered MIND to be the Source of ALL MOTION, that 'twas thro' its Motive Powers, that they distinguished it from Body; which last was no more than a passive Subject, possessing nothing motive within itself, but deriving all its Motions from something else.

'Twas hence too that they inferred THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.—They reasoned thus.—“Vital Motion may forsake the Body, “because to the Body 'tis not an Essential; and in such case the Body “is said to die. But Vital Motion cannot forsake the Soul, because to “the Soul 'tis an Essential, and 'tis not possible that any thing should be “forsaken by itself (d).” But this by way of digression.

As

(c) *Æn.* vi. 727.

(d) —Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque ipsum agitur alicunde, quando finem habet motus, VIVENDI FINEM HABEAT necesse est. SOLUM igitur, QUOD SEIPSUM MOVET, quia NUNQUAM DESERITUR A SE, NUNQUAM ne moveri quidem desinit. *Quintilian*, &c. *Cic. Tuscul. Disp.* i. 23.

The whole Passage, which is rather too long to transcribe, is the Translation of an Argument, taken from *Plato's Phædrus*.—Τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινῆν, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄλλος κινέμενον, κ. τ. λ. *Plat. Edit. Ficini.* p. 1221. B.

See *Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis*, c. 13.

Cicero has used the same Argument in his *Tract de Senectute*.—Cumque SEMPER AGITETUR ANIMUS, nec principium motus habeat, quia SE IPSE MOVEAT, NE FINEM QUIDEM habiturum esse MOTUS, quia NUNQUAM SE IPSE SIT RELICTURUS—C. 21.

C. XVII.

As to the *rise* and *duration* of MOTION, the founder of the *Peripatetic* Sect thus states the Question. “*Was MOTION* (says he) *ever generated without existing before; and is it ever again so destroyed, that there is nothing moved; or was it neither generated, nor is destroyed, but ever was, and will be; something appertaining to Beings, which is immortal and unceasing; a kind of Life, as it were, to all things that exist by the power of Nature (e)?*”

THOSE, who meditate an answer to these Queries, will remember that MOTION is *co-eval with the Universe*, since we learn that, in its *first and earliest æra*, the *Spirit of God* MOVED upon the face of the waters*. They will remember too that MOTION is as old as TIME, and their *Coexistence* so necessary, it is not possible to suppose *the one*, without supposing *the other*.

AND thus, having before considered PHYSICAL MOTION, have we now considered what may be called METAPHYSICAL, or (if I may use the expression) CAUSATIVE MOTION; including under this name every ANIMATING POWER, whether *rational* or *irrational*, which, though different from *Body*, *acts upon Body*, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other *Bodies*. These *animating Powers* are only known

Quintilian has brought the Argument into the Form of a Syllogism.—*Quicquid ex seipso movetur, immortale est: Anima autem ex seipsâ movetur: immortalis igitur est Anima. Inst. Orat. V. 14.*

(e) Πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, ἢ ἔσα πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν ἔτι, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἢ ἔτε ἐγένετο, ἢ τε φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ἦν, καὶ ἔσαι, καὶ τὸτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔσιν, οἷον ζωὴ τις ἔσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν; *Arist. Phys. l. viii. c. 1. p. 144. Edit. Sylb.*

* Genesis chap. 1.

known from their *Effects*, as the Painter's *Art* is known from his *Pictures*. And hence, as 'tis the Effect, which leads us to recognise the Cause, hence *these animating Powers*, tho' prior in existence to *Physical Effects*, are necessarily subsequent in human Contemplation, and are thence, and thence only called METAPHYSICAL (*f*). C. XVII.

AND now, having done with MOTION, we must take some notice of REST.

THE most obvious Species of REST is that opposed to the most obvious Species of MOTION; such for example as the *Cessation of Gales*, after they have been fresh and blowing:

*Ingrato celeres obruit OTIO
Ventos——— (g).*

—the *Cessation of Billows*, after they have been loud and tempestuous—

SILENCE, *ye troubled Waves, and thou Deep*, PEACE (*h*).

BUT

(*f*) See 228, 251, 268. As to the character and subordination of the several *Animating Powers*, see before p. 235. and so on to p. 243. as well in the Text, as in the Notes. See also Chapter the Sixth.

(*g*) *Horat. Od. l. i. 16.*

(*h*) *Par. Lost, vii. 216.*

Both these Species of *Rest* are denoted in *English* by the common name of CALM. The *Greeks*, with their usual precision, have given a different Name to each: the first, that

C. XVII. BUT 'tis expedient to be more particular.—The two instances of REST, that we have alleged, are of MOTION *purely* LOCAL. So is it, when the *flight* of an Arrow is *spent*; when a Bowl, that has been *running*, stops. But REST is also connected with the *other* Species of Motion. The *Cessation* of Growth is *Maturity*; of the *Vital Energies*, is *Death*.

So too with respect to the *higher* faculties of the Soul, *Sense* and *Reason*. The *Rest* of the *sensitive Powers*, after the labours of the day, is SLEEP;

Dulcis et alta QUIES, placidaque simillima Morti (i).

The *Rest* of the *Passions*, after having been agitated, is COMPOSURE and EQUANIMITY; the *Rest* of the *deliberative* and *reasoning Powers*, after sedulous Investigation, is the *Discovery* of the thing fought, or rather the ACQUIESCENCE IN TRUTH discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative.

AND

that is the *Wind-Calm*, they call *Νηνεμία*, and define it *Ἡρεμία ἐν πλῆθει αἰέρος*, TRANQUILITY in a quantity of AIR; the second, that is the *Sea-Calm*, they call *Γαλήνη*, and define it *Ὁμαλότης θαλάττης*, EVENESS in the SEA'S SURFACE. These definitions are of *Archytas*, and may be found in *Aristotle's Metaph.* p. 136. *Edit. Sylb.*

PLATO has brought the two terms together, in those harmonious Lines, delivered by *Agatho* in the *Banquet*—

*Εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ ΓΑΛΗΝΗΝ,
ΝΗΝΕΜΙΑΝ ἀνέμων, κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.*

See *Platon. Symp.* p. 1190, *Edit. Fic.* See also the learned and ingenious Translation of *Mr. Sydenham*, p. 118.

(i) *Æn.* vi. 522.—See Vol. I. p. 245, and of this Volume, p. 188.

AND hence, in the last mode of *Rest*, or *Acquiescence*, the rise of C. XVII.
our *English* Phrase, *I am fixt*; and of the *Latin* Phrase, *Stat*:

STAT conferre manum——(k).

Hence *Science* in *Greek* is called ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, every Theorem being as it were a *Resting Place*, at which the man of Science stops (l).

LASTLY, there is a *Rest* of all the most interesting to mankind, I mean PEACE, that *happy Rest*, which follows the Trepidations and Ravages of *War*.

AND now having done with REST, let us bring the whole to a conclusion.

WE have said already, that the Cause of all *Animal Motion* is GOOD, either real or apparent. It is a farther Requisite, that it should be GOOD, *which is wanting*; GOOD *at a distance*: for were it *present*, the *Motion* would then be superfluous. Thus we see the meaning

(k) *Æn.* xii. 678.

The incomparable *Sanctius* in his *Minerva* gives the following excellent explanation of this Passage. *Quamdiu enim deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia fluctuat; ubi certum ac statutum est, quod quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et STAT SENTENTIA.* *Sanct. Minerv.* l. iv. c. 4. p. 637. *Edit. Amst.* 1733.

In *Perizonius's* Note upon this part of *Sanctius*, it appears that SEDET is used in the same signification, and for the same reasons. See the Note following.

(l) —ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἡ νόησις ἔσμεν ἡρεμήσει τινί, καὶ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΕΙ μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει—INTELLECTION appears to resemble a certain *Resting* and *STANDING STILL*, rather than a *Motion*. *De An.* l. i. c. 3. See Vol. I. p. 413, where this Etymology is treated of more at large.

C. XVII. meaning of the Philosophical Critic, *Scaliger*: MOTIONIS ENIM APPETENTIA CAUSA EST; APPETENTIÆ, PRIVATIO (m): *The Cause of MOTION is APPETITION; of Appetition, is PRIVATION.* 'Tis to this PRIVATION or WANT, that the Wisdom of all Ages has imputed Industry, Perseverance, and the Invention of Arts and Sciences.

THIS, in *Virgil*, is the —

—*duris urgens in rebus* EGESTAS (n).

To this alludes *Epicharmus*, the Poet and Philosopher:

————— τῶν πόνων
Πωλῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα γὰρ τ' ἀλᾶθ' οἱ θεοί (o).

————— *The Gods*
Sell us all Goods at Labour's painful price.

To this alludes *the Scripture*, at Man's earliest period,—*In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread* (p).

BUT tho' *Want* be thus essential to set Man, and not only Man, but all animal Nature, in *Motion*, yet is WANT itself an IMPERFECTION; and *to be in want* is *to be imperfect*. And hence it follows,
that

(m) *Scalig. de Causis Ling. Lat. c. 114.*

(n) *Geor. i. 146.* See Vol. first, p. 142, 3, p. 150, 1, 2.

(o) *Xenoph. Mem. l. ii. c. 1.*

(p) *Gen. iii. 19.*

that true Greatness, or Superiority of Nature, consists not in having *many* Wants, even tho' we can find means to get them gratified; but in having *as few as possible*, and those within the compass of *our own* abilities. C. XVII.

'Tis to this Doctrine that *Virgil* nobly alludes, when he makes *Evander* with an heroic dignity receive *Eneas*, not at the gates of a proud Palace, but at the Door of an humble Cottage:

Ut ventum ad sedes, hæc, inquit, limina victor

Alcides subiit; hæc illum regia cepit:

AUDE, hospes, CONTEMNERE OPES, et te QUOQUE DIGNUM

FINGE DEO; rebusque veni non asper egenis (q).

Conformable to the *same* way of thinking is what *Socrates* says to *Antipho* in *Xenophon*: "You SEEM (says he) O *Antipho*, to be one of
 " those, who imagine Happiness to be Luxury and Expence. But I for
 " my part esteem THE WANTING OF NOTHING, to be DIVINE; and
 " THE WANTING OF AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, to come NEAREST TO
 " THE DIVINITY; and, as THE DIVINITY IS MOST EXCELLENT, so
 " the being NEAREST TO THE DIVINITY is the being NEAREST TO
 " THE MOST EXCELLENT (r)."

ARISTOTLE

(q) *Æn.* viii. 362.

(r) "Εοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῇν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτῳ τῷ θεῷ· καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον, κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτῳ τῷ θεῷ, ἐγγυτάτῳ τῷ κράτιστῳ. *Xenoph. Mem.* l. i. c. 6. Sect. 10.

C. XVII. ARISTOTLE seems to have followed his old Master (for such was Socrates), with respect to this Sentiment. “*To that Being, (says he) which is IN THE MOST EXCELLENT STATE, HAPPINESS appears to appertain WITHOUT ACTION AT ALL; to the BEING NEAREST to the most perfect, thro’ a SMALL and SINGLE ACTION; to those THE MOST REMOTE, thro’ ACTIONS MANY AND VARIOUS (s).*” He soon after subjoins the reason, why *the most excellent Being has no need of Action.* “*It has (says he) WITHIN ITSELF THE FINAL CAUSE,*” that is to say, *perfect Happiness: but ACTION ALWAYS EXISTS IN TWO, when there is both a FINAL CAUSE, and a POWER TO OBTAIN IT, each of them separate, and detached from one another (t).*

AND

(s) “Εοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως· τῷ δὲ ἐγγύτατα, διὰ ὀλίγης καὶ μιᾶς τοῖς δὲ πορρωτάτῳ, διὰ πλειόνων. *Arist. de Caelo. l. ii. c. 12. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.*

(t) Τῷ δ’ ὡς ἄριστα ἔχοντι ἔσθ’ οὐδὲν δεῖ πράξεως, ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἔνεκα· ἡ δὲ πράξις ἐστὶν αἰεὶ ἐν δυσίν, ὅταν καὶ ἔνεκα ᾗ, καὶ τὸ τέτε ἔνεκα. *Ibid.*

The following Remark may perhaps explain this Sentiment, if it should appear obscure.

When a Being finds it's Good fully and wholly within itself, then, *itself* and it's Good being ONE, it finds no Cause of Motion, to seek that, which it possesses already. Such Being therefore, from it's very nature, is IMMOVEABLE,

But when a Being and it's Good are separate, here, as they necessarily are Two, the distant Good, by being perceived, becomes a FINAL CAUSE OF MOTION, and thus awakens within the Being a certain DESIRE, of which Desire MOTION is the natural Consequence. SUCH BEING therefore by its nature is MOVEABLE.

Ammonius, in the following Quotation, appears to have had this Doctrine and these Passages of Aristotle in his view.

“Ὅσα γὰρ πλειόνων τινῶν δεέται, πλείονας κινήσεις κινεῖται· τὰ δὲ ὀλιγοδεᾶ, ὀλιγοκίνητα· ἀμέλει τὸ Θεῖον, ἀνευδεές ὄν, καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκίνητον—All such Beings, as are in want of many things, are moved in many Motions; those, who have few Wants, have few Motions; but THE DIVINITY, being WITHOUT WANTS, is therefore PERFECTLY IMMOVEABLE. *Ammon. in Præd. 144. B. 145.*

AND hence perhaps we may be able to discern, why IMMOBILITY C. XVII.
 should be a peculiar Attribute to the SUPREME and DIVINE NA-
 TURE, in contradistinction to ALL OTHER Beings, endued with Pow-
 ers of PERCEPTION. To Him there are *no Wants, nothing absent*
which is Good, being himself the very Effence of pure Perfection and
 Goodness (*u*).

AND so much for that MOTION which, tho' *subsequent in contempla-*
tion to the Physical (x), and thence called METAPHYSICAL, is yet
 truly *prior* to it in the *real order* of Beings, because it appertains to
 the *First Philosophy*. So much also for the Theory of MOTION.

(*u*) See before, p. 91.

(*x*) See before, p. 228.

C H A P. XVIII.

*Conclusion—Utilities deducible from the Theory of these Arrangements
—Recapitulation.*

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AND thus having finished the Doctrine of *these* PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, or, in other words, of CATEGORIES, PREDICAMENTS, COMPREHENSIVE or UNIVERSAL GENERA; (for we have called them indifferently by every one of these names) together with such Speculations both *previous* and *subsequent* (a), as were either requisite to explain the Subject, or else naturally arose out of it; we imagine *the Utilities* of this knowledge will be obvious to every one, who has studied it with impartiality, and has aimed to know, what it *really* is,

IN the first place, as we have usually begun the consideration of each ARRANGEMENT from Speculations respecting BODY, and have thence made a Transition to others respecting MIND; we may hence mark *the Connection between these* TWO GREAT PRINCIPLES, which stand related to each other, as the SUBJECT and its EFFICIENT CAUSE, and in virtue of that Relation may be said *to run thro' all things* (b).

AGAIN,

(a) See before, p. 23, 24, 201. and below, p. 258.

(b) See before, p. 23.

AGAIN, our Mind, by this *orderly* and *comprehensive* Theory, becoming furnished, like a good Library, with proper Cells or Apartments, we know where to place our Ideas both of *Being* and it's *Attributes*, and where to look for them again, when we have occasion to call them forth. Without some ARRANGEMENT of this sort, the Mind is so far from *increasing* in Knowledge by the Acquisition of *new* Ideas, that, while it increases the *Number* of these, it does but increase it's own *Perplexity*. It is no longer a Library well regulated, but a Library crowded and confused,

——— *ubi multa supersunt,*
Et dominum fallunt——— (c).

AGAIN, as these ARRANGEMENTS have a necessary Connection *with the whole of Existence*; with all BEING or SUBSTANCE on one hand, with every possible ACCIDENT or ATTRIBUTE on the other: it follows of course that *so general* a Speculation must have naturally introduced many others; Speculations, not merely *Logical*, but extending to *Physics*, to *Ethics*, and even to *the First Philosophy* (d). The Reader from these incidental Theorems (if the Author has succeeded in his endeavours to represent them) will have a taste how *the Ancients* wrote, when they reasoned upon these Subjects, and may gratify his curiosity (if he please) by comparing them with *the Moderns*.

It was not from an ostentatious wish to fill his page with Quotations, that the Author has made such frequent and copious extracts
from

(c) *Horat. Epist. l. i. 6.*

(d) See before, p. 13.

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from other Authors. He flatters himself, that by this he has not only given authority to the Sentiments, but relieved also a Subject, in itself rather severe. From the Writers alleged, both ancient and modern, the Reader will perceive, how important and respectable these Authorities are. He will perceive too, that, in the wide regions of *Being*, some Sages having cultivated one part, and some another, the Labours of Ancients and Moderns have been often different, when not hostile; often various, when not contradictory; and that, among the valuable discoveries of *later* periods, there are many so far from clashing with the *ancient* doctrines here advanced, that they coincide as amicably, as a CHILLINGWORTH and an ADDISON in the same Library; a RAPHAEL and a CLAUDE in the same Gallery.

It is not without precedents, that he has adopted this manner of *Citation*. It was adopted by *Aristotle* long ago in his *Rhetoric* and his *Poetics*. *Aristotle* was followed by those able Critics, *Demetrius*, *Quintilian*, and *Longinus*. *Chrysippus*, the Philosopher, so much approved the method, that in a single Tract he inserted nearly the whole of that celebrated Tragedy, the *Medea* of *Euripides*: so that a person, who was perusing the Tract, being asked what he was reading, replied pleasantly, 'Twas the *Medea* of *Chrysippus* (e). *Cicero* has enriched his philosophic Treatises with many choice morsels both from *Greek* and *Roman* Writers; and this he does, not only approving the practice himself, but justifying it by the practice of the Philosophers then at *Athens*, among whom he names *Dionysius* the *Stoic*, and *Philo* the *Academic* (f). *Seneca* and *Plutarch* both pursued the same plan,

the

(e) *Diog. Laert.* l. vii. § 180.

(f) *Tusc. Disput.* l. ii. § 10.

the latter more particularly in his *moral* Compositions. To these may be added, tho' of a baser age, my own learned Countryman *John* of *Salisbury* (g), who, having perused and studied most of the *Latin* Classics, appears to have decorated every part of his Works with splendid fragments, extracted out of them. Two later Writers of Genius have done the same in the narrative of their Travels; *Sandys* at the beginning of the last Century, and *Addison* at the beginning of the present.

AND so much by way of Apology for the Author himself. But he has a farther Wish in this exhibition of capital Writers; a Wish to persuade his Readers, of what he has been long persuaded himself, that every thing really *elegant*, or *sublime* in composition, is ultimately referable to the Principles of a *sound Logic*; that those Principles, when Readers little think of them, have still a *latent* force, and may be traced, if sought after, even in the politest of Writers*.

By reasoning of this kind he would establish an important *Union*; the Union he means between TASTE and TRUTH. 'Tis this is that splendid Union, which produced the *Classics* of pure *Antiquity*; which produced, in times less remote, the *Classics* of *modern* days; and

(g) This extraordinary Man flourished in the reign of *Henry the second*, and was therefore of *Old Salisbury*, not of *New Salisbury*, which was not founded till the reign of *Henry the Third*. *John* (of whom we write) having had the best Education of the time, and being not only a Genius, but intimate with the most eminent Men, in particular with Pope *Adrian* (who was himself an *Englishman*) became at length a Bishop, and died in the year 1182. See *Fabricius* in his *Biblioth. Lat.* v. ii. p. 368, and in his *Biblioth. Med. et Infim. ætat.* See also *Cave's Histor. Literar.* v. ii. p. 243.

* See the numerous Quotations thro' every part of this Treatise.

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and which those, who *now* write, ought to cultivate with attention, if they have a wish to survive in the estimation of posterity.

TASTE is, in fact, but a Species of inferior *Truth*. 'Tis the *Truth of Elegance, of Decoration, and of Grace*; which, as *all Truth* is *similar and congenial, coincides* as it were *spontaneously* with the more *severe and logical*; but which, whenever *destitute* of that more solid support, resembles some fair but languid Body; a Body, specious in feature, but deficient as to nerve; a Body, where we seek in vain for that natural and just perfection, which arises from the pleasing harmony of Strength and Beauty associated.

RECOMMENDING an earnest Attention to *this Union*, we resume our Subject by observing, that 'tis in contemplating these *orderly, these comprehensive ARRANGEMENTS (h)*, we may see whence the *subordinate*

(h) There are few Theories so great, so comprehensive, and so *various*, as the Theory of these PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The Ancients had many methods of representing Works of such a *diversified and miscellaneous* character.

Fruits of various kinds, promiscuously blended, used to be presented in a *Dish*, as an offering to *Ceres*. THIS DISH, so FILLED, they called LANX SATURA; and hence LANX SATURA, or rather *Satura*, or *Satira alone* (*Lanx* being understood) came to signify by metaphor a *miscellaneous* writing; such as were the Compositions of *Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal*, and others.

A *Satire* in this sense did not mean *Sarcasm, Calumny, or personal Abuse*; it meant no more than a Writing, where the *Subject* was *various and diversified*, such as *Juvenal* well describes it, when he speaks of his own works:

Quicquid agunt homines, nostri est FARRAGO libelli.

Again, we all know that GROVES and FORESTS are *diversified* with Trees; with Trees of various Figures, Magnitudes, and Species; and hence it was that *Statius* called his *miscellany Collections* of Poems by the name of SILVÆ.

Now

subordinate Sciences and Arts all arise: *History*, natural and civil, out of SUBSTANCE; *Mathematics*, out of QUANTITY; *Optics*, out of QUALITY and QUANTITY; *Medicine*, out of *the same*; *Astronomy*, out of QUANTITY and MOTION; *Musick* and *Mechanics*, out of *the same*; *Painting*, out of QUALITY and SITE; *Ethics*, out of RELATION; *Chronology*, out of WHEN; *Geography*, out of WHERE; *Electricity*, *Magnetism*, and *Attraction*, out of ACTION and PASSION; and so in other instances.

EVERY Art and every Science being thus referred to its *proper Principle*, we shall be enabled with sufficient accuracy *to adjust their comparative value (k)*, by comparing the several Principles, from which they severally flow. Thus shall we be saved from absurdly *overprizing a single Art, or a single Science*, and from treating all the rest with a sort of insolent contempt; advantages so little to be expected from any Knowledge *less extensive*, that, on the contrary, the more deeply knowing Men may be in *a single Subject alone*, the more

Now it was from these ideas that Mr. *Stuart*, with his usual Taste and Classical Elegance, has designed the Frontispiece, which adorns this Work.

We there behold a Temple of the *Tuscan Order*, dedicated to *Ceres*; to which Goddess a *Roman* of distinction, with proper attendants about him, is making an offering of the LANX SATURA, or *Dish of promiscuous Fruits*. Behind we see a GROVE, which, besides the propriety of being an usual place for Temples, has a fine effect in forming the background of the Piece.

The LANX SATURA and the GROVE equally contribute to denote the *Miscellaneous Character of these PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS*.

This Account of the *Lanx Satura* is taken from *Diomedes* the Grammarian, and may be found in the Preface of *Dacier* to his Translation of *Horace's Satires*; and in the same Preface, prefixed also to the *Satires* of the *Delphin Horace*.

(k) See before, p. 23.

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more likely are they to fall into such narrow and illiberal Sentiments.

It is indeed no wonder in such case, that mistakes should arise, since those, who reason thus, be they as accurate as may be in *their own* particular Science, will be found to reason about *one* thing, which they know, and about *many*, of which they are ignorant; and how from Reasoners such as these, so inadequately prepared, can we expect either an exact, or an impartial Estimate?

AND thus much at present for the Speculation concerning PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS; in the treating of which, we have considered *in the Beginning (l)* such matters as were necessarily *previous*; in the *Middle (m)* we have considered the ARRANGEMENTS *themselves*; and, *in the End (n)*, various matters, naturally *arising out of them*, or which have *incidentally occurred* during the time of their being discussed.

AND thus *this Part of Logical Speculation* appears to be finished.

(l) See Chapter the *first* and *second*.

(m) See from Chapter the *third* to Chapter the *fourteenth* inclusive.

(n) See from Chapter the *fifteenth* to the *Conclusion*.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAGE 6.—SO EAGER WAS CATO FOR KNOWLEDGE, &c.] Thus Cicero describes him—*quippe qui, ne reprehensionem quidem vulgi inanem reformidans, in ipsâ curiâ solet legere sæpè, dum Senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ Reipublicæ detrahens.*—*De Fin.* III. 2.—Where 'tis worth remarking, that CATO considered his Application to Literature as no way obstructing his Duty to the Commonwealth. The Studious character and the Political in Him were united.

Ibid.—THE PATRIOT BRUTUS FOUND TIME NOT ONLY TO STUDY, BUT TO COMPOSE A TREATISE UPON VIRTUE.] Thus the same Cicero—*Placere enim tibi (Bruto scilicet) admodum sensi et ex eo libro quem ad me accuratissimè scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis, Virtutem ad beatè vivendum se ipsâ esse contentam.* *Tuscul. Disput.* v. 1. And again, —*provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem de VIRTUTE scripsisti.* *De Fin.* I. 3.

One or two short fragments of this Treatise of Brutus are preserved in Seneca, *De Consolat. ad Helv.* C. ix.

As to PERICLES, EPAMINONDAS, and the other great names mentioned in the same page with CATO and BRUTUS, see the note immediately following.

P. 7.—FOR THE SPLENDOUR OF THEIR ACTIVE CHARACTER.] The following authorities may serve to confirm the truth of this assertion.

IN PLUTARCH'S life of PERICLES we read as follows—*Ὁ δὲ πλεῖστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἥθει, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομέσιος, ὃν αἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι ΝΟΤΗ προσηγόρευον.* But he, who was most conversant with PERICLES, and most contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high spirit for governing the popular Assemblies more weighty and authoritative; in a word, who exalted his ideas, and raised at the same time the dignity of his behaviour: the person, who did this, was ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age used to call NOTH or MIND. *Plut. in Vit. Periclis*, p. 154. B. Edit. Xyland.

PLUTARCH soon after gives good reasons for this appellation of ANAXAGORAS, viz. his great abilities, and his being the first who made MIND or INTELLECT (in opposition to CHANCE) a Principle in the Formation and Government of the Universe.

The Words of ANAXAGORAS on this subject, though well known, are well worth citing—*Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμῶς· εἴτα ΝΟΥΣ ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.* *All things were BLENDED TOGETHER: then came MIND (or an Intelligent Principle) and gave them ARRANGEMENT.* *Diog. Laert.* 11. 6.

EPAMINONDAS, in his *political* capacity, was so great a man, that he raised his Country, the Commonwealth of THEBES, from a contemptible state to take the lead in Greece; a dignity which *the Thebans* had never known before, and which fell, upon *his* loss, never to rise again. The same man was a pattern in private life of every thing virtuous and amiable; so that *Justin* well remarks—*fuit autem incertum, vir melior, an dux, esset.*

CORNELIUS NEPOS, having recorded the other parts of his Education, adds—at PHILOSOPHIÆ PRÆCEPTOREM habuit LYSIM, Tarentinum, PYTHAGOREUM; cui quidem sic fuit deditus, ut adolescens tristem et severum senem omnibus æqualibus suis in familiaritate anteposuerit, neque prius eum a se dimiserit, quam doctrinis tanto antecessit condiscipulos, ut faciliè intelligi posset pari modo superaturum omnes in cæteris artibus. *Corn. Nep. in Vit. Epaminon.* c. 2. *Justin. Hist.* VI. 8. *Cicer. de Oratore*, III. 34.

As for ALEXANDER the Great, we may form a judgment, what sort of Education his Father PHILIP wished him to have, from that curious Epistle which he wrote to ARISTOTLE, upon ALEXANDER'S birth. It is in its character so simple and elegant, that we have given it intire, as preserved by *Aulus Gellius*:

Φίλιππος Ἀριστοτέλει χαίρειν.

Ἴσθι μοι γεγονότα υἱόν· πολλὴν ἔν τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχω, ἔχ' ἔτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τῆ παιδός, ὥς ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν σὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι· ἐλπίζω γὰρ αὐτὸν, ὑπὸ σὲ τραφέντα καὶ παιδευθέντα, ἄξιον ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων διαδοχῆς.

PHILIP to ARISTOTLE greeting.

Know that I have a Son born. On this account I am greatly thankful to the Gods, not so much for the birth of the child, as for his being born DURING YOUR TIMES: for I hope that by his being bred, and educated UNDER YOU, he will become worthy of us, and WORTHY TO SUCCEED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AFFAIRS. *A. Gell.* IX. 3.

What in fact this education was, we may learn not only from ALEXANDER'S History, but from an observation of *Plutarch*, in answer to an objection, how *Alexander* could venture to attack such an immense power as the PERSIAN with such contemptible forces of his own. *Plutarch* says, that no forces could be greater or fairer than the several accomplishments of ALEXANDER'S Mind—and concludes, that he marched against the Persians with better supplies from his Preceptor ARISTOTLE, than from his Father PHILIP.—*πλείονας παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τῆ καθήκοντος, ἢ παρὰ Φιλίππου τῆ πατρὸς ἀφορμὰς ἔχων, διέβαινεν ἐπὶ Πέρσας.* *Plut. de Alex. Fort.* p. 327. *Edit. Xyland.*

As for SCIPIO, the illustrious Conqueror of Carthage, we have this account of him and his Companion POLYBIUS (to whom we may add also PANÆTIUS) from VELLEIUS PATERCULUS

PATERCULUS—*SCIPIO tam elegans liberalium studiorum, omnisque doctrinæ et auctor et admirator fuit, ut POLYBIUM PANÆTIUMQUE, præcellentes ingenio viros, domi militiæque secum habuerit. Neque enim quisquam hoc Scipione elegantius intervalla negotiorum otio dispunxit, semperque aut belli, aut pacis servit artibus; semperque inter arma et studia versatus, aut CORPUS PERICULIS, aut ANIMUM DISCIPLINIS exercuit. Vell. Paterc. Hist. L. I. p. 19. Edit. Lipsii.*

During the campaigns of SCIPIO, POLYBIUS attended him even in the time of Action or Engagement; as, for example, in that bold attempt, when SCIPIO, with POLYBIUS and thirty Soldiers only, undermined one of the Gates of Carthage. See *Ammian. Marcel. L. XXIV. 2.*

During more quiet intervals *Polybius* did not forget the duties of a Friend, or the dignity of a Philosopher, but gave advice, and that suitable to the character which SCIPIO wished to support in the Commonwealth. Among other things he advised him (as *PLUTARCH* informs us) never to quit the *Forum*, or place of public resort, before he had made himself some Friend, who was intimately conversant in the conduct of his fellow-citizens—*μὴ πρότερον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ φίλον τινα ποιήσασθαι, σύνεργος ὄντα τῶν πράξεων τῶν πολιτῶν. Plut. Sympotiac. L. III. p. 659. Edit. Xyl.*

To these instances we may add the peculiar regard which CÆSAR had for the Philosopher ARISTO, and POMPEY for the Philosopher CRATIPPUS. *Ælian* well remarks on these two great Romans, that, *they did not, because their power was great, despise those who had the power of doing them the greatest Services: ἔ γάρ, ἐπεὶ μέγα ἐδύναντο, ὑπερεφρόνεν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοῖς ὀνήσαι δυναμένων. Ælian. Var. Hist. VII. 21.*

In the same author, L. III. C. 17. there is an express dissertation on this subject, worthy of perusal, as being filled with examples both from the Grecian and Roman History.

To these citations I shall add only one or two more.—*Et certè non tulit ullos hæc Civitas aut gloriâ clariores, aut auctoritate graviore, aut humanitate politiores, P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Græciâ palam semper habuerunt. Cic. de Orat. 11. 37.*

In the same work, to prove the Union of the PHILOSOPHICAL character and the POLITICAL, we have the following testimony, taken from the history of those Sages, so much celebrated in antiquity, PITTACUS, BIAS, SOLON, &c. *Hi omnes, præter Milesium THALEM, CIVITATIBUS SUIS PRÆFUERUNT. De Orator. III. 34.*

See also *Cicero's* tract filed *Orator*, Sect. 15. p. 137. *Edit. Oxon.* and the *Phædrus* of *Plato*, p. 1237, *Edit. Ficini*, in both which places the intimacy above-mentioned between PERICLES and ANAXAGORAS is recorded, and the importance also of this intimacy, as to the weight it gave PERICLES in the Commonwealth of *Athens*.

P. 34.—TO THE BETTER CO-ARRANGEMENT OF, &c.] To the Quotations here given may be added the following one from VARRO.

PYTHAGORAS

PYTHAGORAS Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse Bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem; quare item duo, status et motus. Quod stat aut agitur, Corpus: ubi agitur, Locus: dum agitur, Tempus: quod est in agitu, Actio. Quadripartitio magis sic elucebit: Corpus est, ut cursor: Locus, stadium quâ currit: Tempus, hora quâ currit: Actio, cursio. Quare fit, ut omnia ferè sint quadripartita, et ea æterna; quod neque unquam Tempus, quin fuerit Motus, (ejus enim intervallum Tempus;) neque Motus, ubi non Locus et Corpus; (quod alterum est, quod movetur; alterum, ubi;) neque, ubi sit agitatus, non Actio ibi. Igitur Initiorum quadrigæ, LOCUS et CORPUS, TEMPUS et ACTIO.

PYTHAGORAS the Samian says that the Principles of all things are two and two, or double: as for example, Finite and Infinite, Good and Evil, Life and Death, Day and Night; and by the same rule, Rest and Motion. [In these last] that which rests or is agitated, is BODY; the Where it is agitated, is PLACE; the Whilst it is agitated, is TIME; and in the agitation itself we view the ACTION.

This fourfold Division will better appear as follows. Call BODY, the Person who runs; call PLACE, the Course, over which he runs; call TIME, the hour during which he runs; and let the Race or Running, be called the ACTION.

Now it happens, that almost all things are in this manner fourfold, and this fourfold Division is as it were eternal. The reason is, there never was Time, but there must have been Motion, (of which Time indeed is but the Interval;) nor Motion, but where there must have been Place and Body; (one of which is the thing moved; the other, that where it is moved;) nor Agitation, but where there must have been Action.

And hence it follows, that PLACE and BODY, TIME and ACTION, form, as it were, a joint Quaternio of Principles. Varr. de Ling. Lat. L. 4. p. 7. Edit. Amstel.

We have given this Passage at length, not only as it explains Co-arrangement, but as it exhibits to us four of those Predicaments or Arrangements, which make Parts of this Treatise, viz. SUBSTANCE, WHEN, WHERE, ACTION.

P. 49.—OF PURE AND ORIGINAL BODY]—Συνεχές μὲν ἐν εἰς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετὸν· μέγεθος δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἑν, γραμμὴ· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕκ ἐστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρεῖς πάντῃ.—CONTINUOUS is that, which is divisible into Parts infinitely divisible; BODY is that, which is every way divisible. Of Extensions, that which is divisible one way, is a LINE; that which is divisible two ways, is a SUPERFICIES; that which is divisible three ways is BODY; and besides these, there is no other Extension, because THREE are ALL, and THRICE [Divisible] is EVERY WAY [Divisible]. Aristot. de Cælo, L. I. c. 1.

In Support of this last Idea (that the Term THREE implies ALL) Aristotle refers to the common practice of his own Language—τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ΑΜΦΩ λέγονται, καὶ τὰς δύο ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΥΣ, ΠΑΝΤΑ δ' εἰς λέγονται· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσήγορίαν φημὶν πρῶτον. We call

call (says he) TWO THINGS, or TWO PERSONS, BOTH; but we do not call them ALL: it is with regard to THREE, that we first apply THIS APPELLATION (viz. the Appellation of ALL.) *Arist. in loc.*

This is true likewise in *Latin*; and is true also in *English*. Even the vulgar with us would be surpris'd were they to hear any one say, Give me ALL TWO, instead of Give me BOTH.

For the Grammatical Idea of BOTH see Vol. I. p. 339.

The *French*, by a strange solecism, say TOUS DEUX, a fault which we should not expect in an elegant language, corrected and refined by so many able writers.

P. 52.—CAN NEVER SUBSIST WITHOUT IT.] MATTER and ATTRIBUTE are essentially distinct, yet like Convex and Concave, they are by nature inseparable.

We have already spoken as to the *Inseparability of Attributes*: we now speak as to that of Matter.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ φημὲν ὕλην τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀλλὰ ταύτην ἔχωριστον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως—
We say there is a certain MATTER belonging to all Bodies, the Objects of Sense; a Matter, NOT SEPARABLE, but ever existing with some Contrariety.

Soon after—Ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην ὑποθεμένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις—First, and for a Principle, we lay down MATTER, which is INSEPARABLE from the Contraries, and is their SUBJECT or SUBSTRATUM. *Arist. de Gen. et. Corr. Lib. 2. p. 34, 35. Edit. Sylb.*

By Contraries in this place he means the several Attributes of Matter, such as Hot and Cold, Black and White; Moist and Dry, &c. which are all of them Contrary one to the other, from some or other of which Matter is always INSEPARABLE.

P. 65.—ANIMATING FORMS, WHICH THOUGH THEMSELVES NOT BODY, ARE YET]—ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν· οἷον βαδίξειν ἄνευ ποδῶν. ὥστε καὶ δύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον—λείπεται δὲ τὸν ΝΟΥΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ δύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ ΘΕΙΟΝ εἶναι μόνον· ἐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια—As many Faculties or Principles of the Soul as require bodily or corporeal Energy, [that is, which require a Body or an Organ to enable them to act] these, 'tis evident, cannot exist without a Body; as for example, the locomotive Faculty of walking cannot exist without Feet: so that for such Faculties to pass into the Body from without [originally separate and detached from it] is a thing impossible.—It remains therefore that MIND or INTELLECT ALONE should pass into us FROM WITHOUT [that is, be separate and wholly detached] and should ALONE be something DIVINE; because with the Energy of this Faculty Bodily Energy has no communication—that is, there is no want of corporeal Organs for reasoning and thinking, as there is want of Eyes, for Seeing, or of Ears for Hearing. *Arist. de Animal. Gen. L. II. c. 3. p. 208, 209, Edit. Sylb.*

In

In another Place, speaking of those Parts of the Soul, which are inseparable from Body, because *they cannot energize* without it, he adds—*There is however no objection why some Parts should not be separable; and that, because they are the Energies of no one Body whatever.* Besides (he goes on and says) *it is not yet evident, whether the Soul may be not the Life and Energy of the Body, in the same manner as the Pilot is the Life and Energy of the Ship.*—Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνὶά γε ἔθεν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. Ἐτι δὲ ἄδηλον, εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τῷ σώματος ἢ ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοῖα. *Arist. de Animá, II. c. 1.*

In this last instance he gives a fine illustration of the *Supreme and divine Part* of the Soul, that is, the MIND or INTELLECT. It belongs (it seems) to the Body, as a Pilot does to the Ship; *within* which Ship, though the Pilot exist, and which said ship though the Pilot govern, yet is the Pilot notwithstanding *no part* of the Ship: he may leave it *without change* either in the Ship or in himself; and *may still* (we know) *exist when the Ship is no more.*

P. 73.—*EA CURA QUIETOS SOLICITAT?*] 'Twas the advice of the EPICUREANS with regard to *themselves, not to marry, not to have children, not to engage in public affairs*—ἐ γὰρ γαμητέον, ἀλλ' ἐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ' ἐδὲ πολιτευτέον. *Arrian. Epict. III. 7. p. 384. Edit. Upt.* The political Life, according to them, was like that of *Sisyphus*, a Life of labour which knew no end.

*Hoc est adverso nixantem tundere monte
Saxum, quod tamen a summo jam vertice rursùm
Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora campi.* *Lucret. III. 1013, &c.*

Hence, with regard to *their Gods*, they provided them a similar Felicity; a Felicity, like their own, detached from all attention. Thus HORACE, when an *Epicurean*—

—*Deos didici SECURUM AGERE ÆVUM,
Nec, si quid miri faciat natura, DEOS id
TRISTES ex alto cæli demittere tectis.* *Hor. Lib. I. Sat. V.*

Thus EPICURUS himself—τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, ἔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει—*That which is BLESSED and IMMORTAL* (meaning the Divine Nature) *HAS NEITHER ITSELF ANY BUSINESS, nor does it find business for any other.* *Diog. Laert. x. 139.*

AUSONIUS has translated the sentiment in two Iambics, *Ep. cxvi:*

*Quod est beatum, morte et æternùm carens,
Nec sibi parit negotium, nec alteri.*

See also LUCRETIVS, I. 57. VI. 83, whom *Horace* seems to have copied in the verses above quoted.

'Tis true *this* Idea destroyed that of a *Providence*; but to them, who derived the World from a *fortuitous* Concourse of Atoms, such a consequence was of small importance.

P. 73.

P. 73.—AND SCAPE THY NOTICE.]

To the Citations in the note p. 85, may be added the following fine sentiment of THALES—Ἡρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν, εἰ λήθοι Θεὸς ἀνθρώπος ἀδικῶν· ἀλλ' ἐδὲ διανοόμενος, ἔφη—One asked him, if a man might escape the knowledge of the Gods, when he was COMMITTING Injustice: No, says he, not even when he is MEDITATING it. Diog. Laert. i. 36.

P. 78.—WHO IS IT, THAT COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE ?]

This Reasoning and that in *Hermes*, p. 410, abundantly shew the SUPREMACY of THE MIND among the Faculties of the *Human Soul*. 'Tis MIND that sees the Difference not only between Black and White, Bitter and Sweet, but (which no sense is equal to) the difference between Black and Bitter, White and Sweet, and the various tribes of heterogeneous Attributes. Nor does it shew this Supremacy in these Recognitions only, but likewise, when under one and the same view it recognises Objects of Sense and of Intellect united, as in case of Syllogisms made of Propositions particular and universal, such as, (if I may be permitted to speak after so scholastic a manner) such as the Syllogisms *Darii* and *Ferio* in the First Figure.

To this may be added, that this joint Recognition of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by THE SAME FACULTY, and in THE SAME UNDIVIDED INSTANT, seems to prove in the strongest manner that such FACULTY, (by this Faculty I mean the MIND or INTELLECT) must be INCORPOREAL; for Body, being infinitely divisible, is by no means susceptible of such a simple and perfect Unity, as this Recognition must necessarily be.

P. 109.—THE MOUNTAIN, WHICH BY ITS RELATION TO THE MOLEHILL WAS GREAT, BY, &c.]

This may be true with regard to Mountains, and Molehills, and the other more indefinite parts of Nature; but with regard to the more definite parts, such as Vegetables, and Animals, here the Quantities are not left thus vague, but are, if not ascertained precisely, at least ascertained in some degree.

Thus ARISTOTLE—Ἐστὶ γὰρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρας τῆ μεγέθους διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστέων ἀυξήσεως. Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶχεν ἀυξήσιν αἰεὶ, καὶ τῶν ζώων ὅσα ἔχει ὁσοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἤυξάνετ' ἂν ἕως ἔξῃ. All Animals have a certain Bound or Limit to their Bulk; for which reason the Bones have a certain Bound or Limit to their growth.—Were the Bones indeed to grow for ever, then of course, as many Animals as have Bone, or something analogous to it, would continue to grow as long as they lived. Arist. de Anim. Gener. ii. 6. p. 227. Edit. Sylb.

What follows from Simplicius is to the same purpose; only where he mentions FORM, we must understand that efficient animating Principle, described in the sixth chapter of this work.

Ἐκαστον Εἶδος συνυπάγει, μετὰ τῆς οἰκείας ιδιότητος, καὶ ποσὲ τι μέτρον σύμμετρον τῇ ιδιότητι· ἡ γὰρ σχῆμα μόνον ἐπιφέρει μεθ' ἑαυτῆς τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος, ὃ μετὰ διαστάσεως εἰς τὴν ὕλην παραγίγνεται. Πλάτος δὲ ἔχει καὶ τῆτο ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον πῶς τῆς ἐνύλης φύσεως. Ἐάν δὲ πολὺ τὸν ὅρον παραλλάξῃ, ἢ πρὸς τὸ μείζον, ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐλαττόν, τέρας νομίζεται. *Every FORM introduces, along with its own original Peculiarity, a certain measure of Quantity, bearing proportion to that Peculiarity; for it brings with itself not a FIGURE only, but a MAGNITUDE also, which passes into the Matter, by giving it extent. Now even here this Magnitude has a sort of latitude, from the indefinite nature of the material Principle [with which it is united.] But yet, notwithstanding if it change the Bound or Limit, either as to greater or to less, in a remarkable degree, the Being [by such deviation] is esteemed a Monster. Simplic. in Præd. p. 37. A. Edit. Basil.*

SIMPLICIUS gives examples of this Deviation in the case of *Giants* and of *Dwarfs*.

P. 136.—SPECTATORS—MADE OUT OF THOSE THAT WENT BEFORE.] The *Subject Matter* is the same in many succeeding Beings; as the *River* is the same; which, as it flows along, reflects many different Objects. 'Tis in this sense we are to understand the following Assertion, and not with the least view to *equivocal Production*:

Ὅμοιόν διὰ τὸ τὴν τῆδε φθορὰν ἄλλῃ εἶναι γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν τῆδε γένεσιν ἄλλῃ εἶναι φθορὰν, ἀπαυγον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν. *Wherefore, from the Dissolution of one thing being the Generation of another, and the Generation of one thing being the Dissolution of another, it necessarily follows that the Change must be perpetual and never cease. Arist. de Gen. et Corr. L. I. c. 3. p. 10. Edit. Sylb.*

The Change here alluded to is the common course of Nature in the Production of Beings, which, were it not for the Process *above-mentioned*, would either soon be at a stand, or would require a perpetual Miracle for the supply of *new Materials*.

P. 154.—THE THEORY OF ACTION AND REACTION.]

Of this Doctrine we have the following account.—Αἴτιον δὲ τῆ μὲν λύεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις, ὅτι τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆ πάσχοντος· οἷον τὸ τέμνον ἀμβλύνεται ὑπὸ τῆ τεμνομένης, καὶ τὸ θερμαῖνον ψύχεται ὑπὸ τῆ θερμαινομένης, καὶ ὁμοίως τὸ κινῶν (ἐξω τῆ Πρώτης) ἀντικινεῖται τινὰ κίνησιν· οἷον ὡδὲν ἀντρωθεῖται πῶς, καὶ ἀντιθλίβεται τὸ θλίβον. *The Cause why Motions are stopt, is, that THE ACTING POWER IS ALSO ACTED UPON BY THAT, UPON WHICH IT ACTS; for example the cutting Power is blunted by that which is cut; and the warming Power is cooled by that which is warmed; and in general the moving Principle (excepting the SUPREME and FIRST) is reciprocally moved itself under some motion or other; the impelling Power, for instance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compressing Power, after a manner re-compressed. Aristot. de Animal. Gener. L. 4. p. 280. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 157.—DOUBLE IN ITS POWERS, &c.] Ἰκανὸν γὰρ δεύτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἑαυτὸ τε κρίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κάμπυλον γινώσκοντες, κριτῆς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν

καὶ τὸ δὲ κάμπυλον, ἅθ' ἑαυτῶν ἅτε τῶ εὐθέος — One of the two Parts in the Contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. 'Tis thus that by the Strait we come to know both the strait and the crooked, for the strait Rule of the Artist is a judge of both. But the crooked on the other side is no judge either of itself, or of the Strait. *Arist. de An.* i. 5.

P. 158.—EXISTED PREVIOUSLY IN ENERGIE.] Ὅσα φύσει γίνεταί ἢ τέχνῃ, ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος γίνεταί ἐκ τῶ δυνάμει τοιούτου. — Whatever things are made either by Nature or by Art, are made out of something, having a capacity to become the thing produced, and that THROUGH the operation of something, which already exists in Energy. *De Animal. Gener.* p. 204. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 166.—AS THEY STAND RELATED TO PLACE.] The Force of this Arrangement or Predicament WHERE, is finely contrasted with the Predicament of QUANTITY, in that Laconic Apophthegm of AGIS. The Lacedaemonians (said he) do not ask HOW MANY the Enemies are, but WHERE they are: Οὐκ ἔφη δὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐρωτᾶν ΠΟΣΟΙ εἰσὶν οἱ πολέμοι, ἀλλὰ ΠΟΤ εἰσὼν. *Plut. Lacon. Apophth.* p. 215. D. *Edit. Xyland.*

P. 185.—THE DYING GLADIATOR, &c.] To these Attitudes may be added that, given by LYSIPPUS to the Statue of ALEXANDER the Great. That Prince had a certain Extension of Neck, which made him gently recline it upon his left Shoulder. When his Figure was cast in brass by *Lyfippus*, the Artist ingeniously contrived to convert this natural defect into an Attitude of Magnificence. His Head, being reclined, was made, with a sort of insolent look, to contemplate the Heavens, as if things below were already at his command. And hence the meaning of that celebrated Epigram, in which this Work of Brass is supposed to address *Jupiter* in the following words;

Αὐδάσονται δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος, εἰς Διὰ λείσσω,
Γᾶν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλύμπου ἔχει.

The Brass looks up to Jove, and seems to cry,
This Earth is MINE; do THOU possess the Sky.

Plutarch. de Vitâ et For. Alex. p. 335. *Edit. Xyland.* See also *Brodæi Epigram.* Gr. L. IV. p. 454. *Edit. Franc.* 1600, where the Lines here cited are introduced by two others.

P. 189.—FROM POETS TO ACTORS, &c.] See *Cic. de Orat.* iii. 56, 57, 58, 59. *Edit. Pearce*, where 'tis worth remarking, (c. 59.) so much stress is laid on the management of the Countenance, and of the Eyes in particular, that we are informed the old men of that age did not greatly praise even ROSCIUS himself, when he appeared in his Mask—*quo melius nostri illi senes, qui PERSONATUM ne ROSCIUM quidem magnopere laudabant; ANIMI est enim omnis ACTIO; et imago animi VULTUS est, indices OCULI.*

P. 198.—MOUNTAINS CLOATHED WITH WOOD.] Thus CICERO—*Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, &c.* *De Nat.*

Deor. ii. 64. p. 253. *Edit. Davis.*—And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the Earth, as *vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus*, &c. ii. 39. p. 195.—Yet all this we must remember is but *metaphorical*.

P. 204.—IS SCIENCE PRIOR TO ART? *Nihil est enim, quod ad ARTEM redigi possit, nisi ille PRIUS, qui illa tenet, quorum Artem instituere vult, habeat illam SCIENTIAM, ut ex iis rebus, quarum Ars NONDUM sit, Artem efficere possit. Cic. de Orat. i. 41. Edit. Pearce, &c. p. 63. Edit. Oxon.*

This Citation well proves a part of what is here asserted, viz. the necessary Priority of some Science to every Art.

P. 217.—AND TO IT'S OPPOSITE NON-BEING.] These MOTIONS under the name of Changes (*μεταβολαί*) are well explained, as follows.

Ὅταν μὲν ἔν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά. ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ τὸ ποῖον, ἀλλοίωσις· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ, ἢ ἄτερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ, φθορά.—When therefore the Change of the contrary Attribute is according to the QUANTITY, 'tis AUGMENTATION or DIMINUTION; when according to the PLACE, 'tis LOCAL MOTION; when according to any Affection, or QUALITY, 'tis ALIATION. When NOTHING REMAINS, of which the new production can be at all considered as an Affection, or an Attribute, 'tis then GENERATION; and the contrary, DISSOLUTION. *Arist. de Gen. et Corr. L. I. c. 4. p. 14. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 228.—BUT WE CALL IT METAPHYSICAL.]

Philoponus in a very few words well explains the term, METAPHYSICAL. Speaking of the First and Supreme Cause of all things, he adds—περὶ μὲν ἔν ἐκείνῃς εἰπεῖν, τῆς πρώτης ἔστι φιλοσοφίας· θεολογία γὰρ οἰκεῖον, καὶ τῇ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ πραγμαλείᾳ· μᾶλλον δὲ ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ, πρὸς ἡμᾶς γὰρ ὑπερὰ τὰ τῇ φύσει πρότερα.—To speak concerning this Principle, is the business of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, for it is a Subject belonging to Theology, and to that Speculation, which is METAPHYSICAL, that is to say, SUBSEQUENT TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, or rather indeed 'tis a Subject PRIOR TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, in as much as those things with regard TO US are SUBSEQUENT, which are BY NATURE PRIOR. *Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p. 12. Edit. Ald. Venet. 1527.*

P. 232.—THE COMMON NAME OF PERCEPTION.]

This word, PERCEPTION, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes Intellection but Sensation also, and that of the lowest degree. What is here called Perception, is by *Aristotle* called KNOWLEDGE—Γνώσεώς τινος πάντῃ (scil. ζῷᾳ) μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος, τὰ δ' ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ πάνπαν μικρᾷ, αἰσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν· ἢ δ' αἰσθήσις, γῶσις τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοπεῖσι πρὸς φρόνησιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὥσπερ ἔδεν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως μόνον· πρὸς δὲ ἀναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. Ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξῃ τὸ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴ κείσθαι τεθνεὺς καὶ μὴ ὄν.

All

All Animals share a degree of KNOWLEDGE; some of them, a greater; others of them, a less; and some of them, an exceedingly small degree; for they have all of them SENSATION, and SENSATION IS A SORT OF KNOWLEDGE. But the Value and the No-value of Sensation is widely different, when we compare it with RATIONAL COMPREHENSION on the one side, and with the race of BEINGS INANIMATE on the other. With regard to RATIONAL COMPREHENSION, the mere partaking of TASTE and TOUCH alone, appears to be as nothing; but with regard to pure INSENSIBILITY it is something most excellent. For [when compared to Beings Insensible] it may surely appear a blessed Event, to be possessor of THIS Knowledge, and not [resembling them] to lie as dead and a Non-entity. Aristot. de Animal. Gener. Lib. I. sub. fin. p. 197. Edit. Sylb.

P. 337.—ENDS IN IT'S ACQUISITION.]

Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος ὥστε τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάσης κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ ἔνεκα. *All Animals both move, and are moved for the sake of something; so that this something, that is to say, THE FINAL CAUSE, is the BOUND or LIMIT of all their Motion. Arist. de Animal. Mot. C. 6. p. 153. Edit. Sylb.*

P. 258.—CONCERNING PREDICAMENTS OR PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.] Many learned and ingenious Observations on this Subject, as well as on several other parts of ancient Philosophy (*the Peripatetic* in particular) have been given to the World in a Tract lately published, styled, ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE, IN TWO VOLUMES, 8vo.

There may be found too in the second Volume many judicious and curious remarks on *Style, Composition, Language*, particularly *the English*; observations of the last consequence to those, who wish either to write or to judge with accuracy and elegance.

The Author of these Arrangements might have availed himself of many Citations from this Work, highly tending to illustrate and to confirm his Opinions, but unfortunately for him, the greater part of his own Treatise was printed off, before the second Volume of this Work appeared.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

All these things are to be done in the most perfect manner possible, and the result of the whole is to be a complete and perfect system of education, which shall be the basis of all other knowledge and wisdom.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

There are two principles which are the basis of all knowledge and wisdom, and which are the foundation of all other knowledge and wisdom.

The first principle is that all knowledge and wisdom is derived from the mind, and the second principle is that all knowledge and wisdom is derived from the senses.

There may be found in the second volume many instances of the application of these principles to the study of the human mind.

The object of this volume is to show the application of these principles to the study of the human mind, and to show the results of the application of these principles to the study of the human mind.

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J. Stuart del.

W. Sharp sculp.

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES .

PHILOLOGICAL
INQUIRIES,
IN
THREE PARTS.

First published in the Year 1780.

PHILOLOGICAL

I. Q. U. I. E. S.

IN

THE TARTAR

THE TARTAR

PHILOLOGICAL
INQUIRIES:

PART THE FIRST.

PHILOGONIA
I N O F F I C E
PHILOGONIA
I N O F F I C E
I N O F F I C E

THE FIRST

PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES

ADDRESS TO MY MUCH ESTEEMED RELATION AND FRIEND,

EDWARD HOOPER, Esq.

OF HURN-COURT, IN THE COUNTY OF HANTS.

DEAR SIR,

BEING yourself advanced in years, you will the more easily forgive me, if I claim *a Privilege of Age*, and pass from PHILOSOPHY to PHILOLOGY.

You may compare me, if you please, to some weary Traveller, who, having long wandered over craggy heights, descends at length to the Plains below, and hopes, *at his Journey's End*, to find a smooth and easy Road.

FOR MY WRITINGS (such as they are) they have answered *a Purpose* I always wished, if they have led men to inspect *Authors, far superior to myself*, many of whose Works (like hidden Treasures) have lain *for years* out of sight.

BE that however as it may, I shall at least enjoy the pleasure of thus *recording* OUR MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP; a *Friendship*, which has lasted for *more than fifty* years, and which I think so much for my honour, *to have merited so long*.

BUT I proceed to my Subject.

As the *great Events* of NATURE* led Mankind to *Admiration*: so Curiosity *to learn the Cause*, whence such Events should arise, was that, which by due degrees formed NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

WHAT happened in the *Natural* World, happened also in the *Literary*. *Exquisite Productions* both in PROSE and VERSE induced men *here* likewise *to seek the Cause*; and *such Inquiries*, often repeated, gave birth to PHILOLOGY.

PHILOLOGY should hence appear to be of a most *comprehensive* character, and to include not only all Accounts both of *Criticism* and *Critics*, but of every thing connected with *Letters*, be it *Speculative* or *Historical*.

THE TREATISE, which follows, is of this PHILOLOGICAL KIND, and will consist of THREE PARTS, properly distinct from each other.

THE

* Some of these *great Events* are enumerated by VIRGIL—the *Course of the Heavens*—*Eclipses of the Sun and Moon*—*Earthquakes*—the *Flux and Reflux of the Sea*—the *quick Return of Night in Winter*, and the *slow Return of it in Summer*. Virg. Geor. II. 475, &c.

THE FIRST will be an *Investigation of the Rise and different Species of CRITICISM and CRITICS.*

THE SECOND will be AN ILLUSTRATION OF CRITICAL DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES, *as they appear in DISTINGUISHED AUTHORS, as well Ancient as Modern.*

THE THIRD AND LAST PART will be rather HISTORICAL than *Critical*, being AN ESSAY ON THE TASTE AND LITERATURE OF THE MIDDLE AGE.

THESE subjects of Speculation being dispatched, we shall here *conclude* THESE PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.

First therefore for the *First*, THE RISE AND DIFFERENT SPECIES OF CRITICISM AND CRITICS.

CHAPTER I.

Concerning the Rise of CRITICISM in its FIRST SPECIES, the PHILOSOPHICAL — eminent persons, GREEKS and ROMANS, by whom this Species was cultivated.

Part I.

THOSE, who can imagine that the Rules of Writing were first established, and that men then wrote in conformity to them, as they make preserves and comfits by referring to receipt-books, know nothing of *Criticism*, either as to its origin or progress. The truth is, they were Authors, who made the first good Critics, and not Critics, who made the first good Authors, however writers of later date may have profited by critical Precepts.

If this appear strange, we may refer to other subjects. Can we doubt that men had Music, such indeed as it was, before the principles of Harmony were established into a Science? that Diseases were healed, and Buildings erected, before Medicine and Architecture were systematized into Arts? that men reasoned and harangued upon matters of speculation and practice, long before there were profest teachers either of Logic or of Rhetoric? To return therefore to our subject, the rise and progress of Criticism.

ANCIENT GREECE in its happy days was the seat of Liberty, of Sciences, and of Arts. In this fair region, fertile of wit, the *Epic* Writers came first; then the *Lyric*; then the *Tragic*; and lastly the
Historians,

Historians, the *Comic Writers*, and the *Orators*, each in their turns delighting whole multitudes, and commanding the attention and admiration of all. Now, when wise and thinking men, the subtle investigators of principles and causes, observed the wonderful effect of these works upon the human mind, they were prompted to inquire *whence this should proceed*; for that it should happen *merely from Chance*, they could not well believe.

HERE therefore we have the RISE and ORIGIN of CRITICISM, which in its beginning was “a deep and philosophical Search into “the primary Laws and Elements of good Writing, as far as they “could be collected from the most approved Performances.”

IN this contemplation of Authors, the first Critics not only attended to the Powers, and different Species of WORDS; the Force of *numerous Composition* whether in prose or verse; the Aptitude of *its various kinds to different subjects*; but they farther considered that, which is the basis of all, that is to say in other words, the MEANING or the SENSE. This led them at once into the most curious of subjects; the nature of *Man* in general; *the different characters of men*, as they differ in rank or age; their *Reason* and their *Passions*; how the one was to be persuaded, the others to be raised or calmed; the *Places* or *Repositories*, to which we may recur, when we want proper matter for any of these purposes. Besides all this they studied *Sentiments* and *Manners*; what constitutes a Work, *One*; what, a *Whole* and *Parts*; what the Essence of probable, and even of natural *Fiction*, as contributing to constitute a *just Dramatic Fable*.

MUCH

Part I.

MUCH of this kind may be found in different parts of PLATO. But ARISTOTLE his Disciple, who may be called *the Systematizer* of his Master's Doctrines, has in his two Treatises of *Poetry* and *Rhetoric**, with such wonderful penetration, developed every part of the subject, that he may be justly called THE FATHER OF CRITICISM, both from the age when he lived, and from his truly transcendent genius. The *Criticism*, which this capital writer taught, has so intimate a correspondence and alliance with *Philosophy*, that we can call it by no other name, than that of PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM.

To *Aristotle* succeeded his Disciple *Theophrastus*, who followed his master's example in the study of *Criticism*, as may be seen in the catalogue of his writings, preserved by † *Diogenes Laertius*. But all the *critical* works of *Theophrastus*, as well as of many others, are now lost. The principal authors of the kind now remaining in *Greek*, are *Demetrius* of *Phalera*, *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus*, *Dionysius Longinus*, together with *Hermogenes*, *Aphthonius*, and a few others.

Of these the most masterly seems to be *Demetrius*, who was the earliest, and who appears to follow the Precepts, and even the Text of *Aristotle*, with far greater attention, than any of the rest. His Examples, it must be confessed, are sometimes obscure, but this we rather

* To such as read not this Author in the Original, we recommend the French Translation of his *Rhetoric* by *Cassandre*, and that of his *Art of Poetry* by *Dacier*; both of them elaborate and laudable performances.

† Vid. *Diog. Laert.* L. V. f. 46, 47, &c.

rather impute to the destructive hand of time, which has prevented us from seeing many of the original authors.

Ch. I.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the next in order, may be said to have written with judgment upon the force of *Numerous Composition*, not to mention other tracts on the subject of *Oratory*, and those also *critical*, as well as *historical*. *Longinus*, who was in time far later than these, seems principally to have had in view the *Passions*, and the *Imagination*, in the treating of which he has acquired a just applause, and expressed himself with a dignity suitable to the subject. The rest of the *Greek Critics*, tho' they have said many useful things, have yet so minutely multiplied the rules of Art, and so much confined themselves to the Oratory of the Tribunal, that they appear of no great service, as to good writing in general.

AMONG the ROMANS, the first Critic of note was CICERO, who, tho' far below *Aristotle* in depth of philosophy, may be said, like him, to have exceeded all his countrymen. As his celebrated Treatise concerning the Orator* is written in dialogue, where the Speakers introduced are the greatest men of his nation, we have incidentally an elegant sample of those manners, and that politeness, which were peculiar to the leading characters during the *Roman Commonwealth*. There we may see the behaviour of free and accomplished men, before

* This Treatise, being the Work of a capital Orator on the subject of his own Art, may fairly be pronounced a capital Performance.

The Proem to the third Book, both for language and sentiment, is perhaps as *pathetic*, and in that view as *sublime*, as any thing remaining among the Writings of the Antients.

Part I. before a baser address had set that standard, which has been too often taken for good-breeding ever since.

NEXT to *Cicero* came *Horace*, who often in *other* parts of his writings acts the *Critic* and *Scholar*, but whose *Art of Poetry* is a standard of its kind, and too well known to need any encomium. After *Horace* arose *Quintilian*, *Cicero*'s admirer, and follower, who appears by his works not only learned and ingenious, but (what is still more) an honest and a worthy man. He likewise dwells too much upon the Oratory of the Tribunal, a fact no way surprising, when we consider the age in which he lived; an age, when tyrannic Government being the fashion of the times, that nobler *Species of Eloquence*, I mean the *popular and deliberative*, was, with all things truly liberal, degenerated and sunk. The latter *Latin* Rhetoricians there is no need to mention, as they little help to illustrate the subject in hand. I would only repeat that the species of Criticism here mentioned, as far at least as handled by the more able Masters, is that which we have denominated CRITICISM PHILOSOPHICAL. We are now to proceed to another species.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the Progress of CRITICISM in its SECOND SPECIES, the HISTORICAL—GREEK and ROMAN CRITICS, by whom this Species of Criticism was cultivated.

AS to the *Criticism* already treated, we find it *not confined* to any one particular Author, but containing general Rules of Art, either for judging or writing, confirmed by the example not of one Author, but of many. But we know from experience that, in process of time, Languages, Customs, Manners, Laws, Governments, and Religions insensibly change. The *Macedonian* Tyranny, after the fatal battle of *Charonea*, wrought much of this kind in *Greece*; and the *Roman* Tyranny, after the fatal battles of *Pharsalia* and *Philippi*, carried it throughout the known world*. Hence therefore of *Things* obsolete, the *Names* became obsolete also; and authors, who in their own age were intelligible and easy, in after days grew difficult and obscure. Here then we behold the rise of a second race of *Critics*, the tribe of *Scholiasts*, *Commentators*, and *Explainers*.

Ch. II.

THESE naturally attached themselves to particular authors. *Aristarchus*, *Didymus*, *Eustathius*, and many others bestowed their labours upon *Homer*; *Proclus*, and *Tzetzes* upon *Hesiod*; the same *Proclus* and *Olympiodorus* upon *Plato*; *Simplicius*, *Ammonius*, and *Philoponus* upon

* See Vol. I. p. 439.

Part I.

upon *Aristotle*; *Ulpian* upon *Demosthenes*; *Macrobius* and *Asconius* upon *Cicero*; *Calliergus* upon *Theocritus*; *Donatus* upon *Terence*; *Servius* upon *Virgil*; *Acro* and *Porphyrion* upon *Horace*; and so with respect to others, as well Philosophers, as Poets and Orators. To these Scholiasts may be added the several Composers of Lexicons; such as *Hesychius*, *Philoxenus*, *Suidas*, &c. also the Writers upon Grammar, such as *Apollonius*, *Priscian*, *Sofipater*, *Charisius*, &c. Now all these pains-taking men, considered together, may be said to have completed another species of Criticism, a species which, in distinction to the former, we call CRITICISM HISTORICAL.

AND thus things continued, tho' in a declining way, till, after many a severe and unsuccessful plunge, the *Roman Empire* sunk through the *West of Europe*. *Latin* then soon lost its purity; *Greek* they hardly knew; *Classics*, and their *Scholiasts* were no longer studied; and an Age succeeded of Legends and Crusades.

C H A P. III.

MODERNS, *eminent in the two species of Criticism before mentioned, the PHILOSOPHICAL and the HISTORICAL—the last Sort of Critics more numerous—those, mentioned in this Chapter, confined to the Greek and Latin Languages.*

AT length, after a long and barbarous period, when the shades of Monkery began to retire, and the light of Humanity once again to dawn, the Arts also of CRITICISM insensibly revived. 'Tis true indeed, the Authors of THE PHILOSOPHICAL SORT (I mean that which respects the Causes and Principles of good writing *in general*) were not many in number. However of this rank among the *Italians* were *Vida*, and the elder *Scaliger*; among the *French* were *Rapin*, *Bouhours*, *Boileau*, together with *Bossu*, the most methodic and accurate of them all. In our own Country our *Nobility* may be said to have distinguished themselves; *Lord Roscommon*, in his *Essay upon translated Verse*; the *Duke of Buckingham*, in his *Essay on Poetry*; and *Lord Shaftesbury*, in his Treatise called *Advice to an Author*: to whom may be added our late admired Genius, *Pope*, in his truly elegant poem, *the Essay upon Criticism*.

THE Discourses of *Sir Joshua Reynolds* upon *Painting* have, after a philosophical manner, investigated the Principles of an Art, which no one in *Practice* has better verified than himself.

Ch. III.

Part I.

WE have mentioned these Discourses, not only from their merit, but as they incidentally teach us, that to write *well upon a liberal Art*, we must write *philosophically*—that all the *liberal Arts* in their Principles are *congenial*—and that these *Principles*, when traced to their *common Source*, are found all to terminate in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY*.

BUT to pursue our subject—However small among *Moderns* may be the number of these *Philosophical Critics*, the Writers of HISTORICAL OR EXPLANATORY CRITICISM have been in a manner innumerable. To name, out of many, only a few—of *Italy* were *Be-roaldus*, *Ficinus*, *Victorius*, and *Robertellus*; of the Higher and Lower *Germany* were *Erasmus*, *Sylburgius*, *Le Clerc*, and *Fabricius*; of *France* were *Lambin*, *Du Vall*, *Harduin*, *Capperonierius*; of *England* were *Stanley* (editor of *Æschylus*) *Gataker*, *Davis*, *Clarke* (editor of *Homer*) together with multitudes more from every region and quarter,

Thick as autumnal leaves, that strow the brooks

In Vallombrosa—

BUT I fear I have given a strange catalogue, where we seek in vain for such illustrious personages, as *Sesostris*, *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*, *Attila*, *Tottila*, *Tamerlane*, &c. *The Heroes of my Work* (if I may be pardoned for calling them so) have only aimed in retirement to present us with *Knowledge*. *Knowledge only* was their Object, not Havock, nor Devastation.

AFTER

* See Vol. I. p. 285, and *Philosoph. Arrang.* p. 205; also the words, *First Philosophy*, in the Index to those *Arrangements*.

AFTER Commentators and Editors, we must not forget the Compilers of *Lexicons* and *Dictionaries*, such as *Charles* and *Henry Stevens*, *Favorinus*, *Constantine*, *Budæus*, *Cooper*, *Faber*, *Vossius*, and others. To these also we may add the Authors upon *Grammar*; in which subject the learned *Greeks*, when they quitted the East, led the way, *Moschopulus*, *Chrysoloras*, *Lascharis*, *Theodore Gaza*; then in *Italy*, *Laurentius Valla*; in *England*, *Grocin* and *Linacer*; in *Spain*, *Sanctius**; in the Low Countries *Vossius*; in *France*, *Cæsar Scaliger* by his residence, tho' by birth an *Italian*, together with those able Writers *Mess. de Port Royal*. Nor ought we to omit the Writers of *Philological Epistles*, such as *Emanuel Martin*†; nor the Writers of Literary Catalogues (in French called *Catalogues Raisonnées*) such as the account of the Manuscripts in the Imperial Library at *Vienna*,
by

* SANCTIUS, towards the end of the Sixteenth Century, was Professor of Rhetoric, and of the Greek Tongue, in the University of *Salamanca*. He wrote many works, but his most celebrated is that, which bears the name of *Sanctii Minerva, seu de Causis Linguae Latinae*. This invaluable Book (to which the Author of these Treatises readily owns himself indebted for his first rational Ideas of *Grammar* and *Language*) was published by *Sanctius* at *Salamanca* in the Year 1587. Its superior merit soon made it known thro' *Europe*, and caused it to pass thro' many Editions in different places. The most common Edition is a large octavo printed at *Amsterdam* in the year 1733, and illustrated with Notes by the learned *Perizonius*.

† EMANUEL MARTIN was Dean of *Alicant* in the beginning of the present Century. He appears from his writings, as well as from his history, to have been a person of pleasing and amiable manners; to have been an able antiquarian, and as such, a friend to the celebrated *Montfaucon*; to have cultivated with eagerness the various studies of Humanity, and to have written Latin with facility and elegance. His Works, containing twelve Books of Epistles, and a few other pieces, were printed in *Spain* about the year 1735, at the private expence of that respectable statesman and scholar, Sir *Benjamin Keene*, the *British* Ambassador, to whom they were inscribed in a Classical Dedication by the learned Dean himself, then living at *Alicant*. As Copies of this Edition soon became scarce, the Book was reprinted by *Wesselingius*, in a fair Quarto (the two Tomes being usually bound together) at *Amsterdam* in the year 1738.

Part I. by *Lambecius*; or of the *Arabic* Manuscripts in the *Escurial* Library,
by *Michael Casiri**.

* MICHAEL CASIRI, the learned Librarian of the *Escurial*, has been enabled by the Munificence of the last and the present Kings of *Spain*, to publish an accurate and erudite Catalogue of the *Arabic* Manuscripts in that curious Library, a Work well becoming its Royal Patrons, as it gives an ample Exhibition of *Arabic* Literature in all its various Branches of Poetry, Philosophy, Divinity, History, &c. But of these Manuscripts we shall say more in the *Appendix*, subjoined to the *End of these Inquiries*.

CHAP. IV.

MODERN Critics of the Explanatory kind, commenting MODERN Writers — Lexicographers — Grammarians — Translators.

THO' much HISTORICAL EXPLANATION has been bestowed on the *antient* Classics, yet have the Authors of our own Country by no means been forgotten, having exercised many Critics of *Learning* and *Ingenuity*. Ch. IV.

Mr. Thomas Warton (besides his fine Edition of *Theocritus*) has given a curious History of *English* Poetry during the *middle* Centuries; Mr. Tyrwhit, much accurate and diversified Erudition upon *Chaucer*; Mr. Upton, a learned Comment on the *Fairy Queen* of *Spencer*; Mr. Addison, many polite and elegant *Speēctators* on the Conduct and Beauties of the *Paradise Lost*; Dr. Warton, an *Essay* on the *Genius and Writings of Pope*, a work filled with Speculations, in a taste perfectly pure. The Lovers of Literature would not forgive me, were I to omit that ornament of her Sex and Country, the *Critic* and *Patroness* of our illustrious *Shakspeare*, Mrs. Montagu. For the honour of CRITICISM not only the *Divines* already mentioned, but others also, of rank still superior, have bestowed their labours upon our *capital* Poets*, suspending for a while their severer studies, to relax in these Regions of Genius and Imagination.

THE

* *Shakspeare, Milton, Cowley, Pope.*

Part I.

THE *Dictionaries* of *Minshew*, *Skinner*, *Spelman*, *Sumner*, *Junius*, and *Johnson*, are all well known, and justly esteemed. Such is the Merit of *the last*, that *our Language* does not possess a more copious, learned, and valuable Work. For *Grammatical Knowledge* we ought to mention with distinction the learned prelate, *Dr. Lowth*, Bishop of *London*; whose admirable tract on the *Grammar* of the *English Language*, every Lover of that Language ought to study and understand, if he would write, or even speak it, with purity and precision.

LET my Countrymen too reflect, that in studying a Work upon this subject, they are not only studying a *Language*, in which it becomes them to be knowing, but a *Language*, which can boast of as many good Books, as any among the living, or modern Languages of *Europe*. The Writers, born and educated in a *free Country*, have been left for years to their *native Freedom*. Their Pages have been never defiled with an *Index expurgatorius*, nor their Genius ever shackled with the terrors of an Inquisition.

MAY this invaluable Privilege never be impaired either by the hand of Power, or by licentious Abuse.

PERHAPS with the Critics *just described* I ought to arrange TRANSLATORS, if it be true that *Translation* is a Species of *Explanation*, which differs no otherwise from *explanatory Comments*, than that these attend to *Parts*, while *Translation* goes to the *Whole*.

Now

Now as *Translators* are infinite, and many of them (to borrow a phrase from Sportsmen) *unqualified Persons*, I shall enumerate only a few, and those, such as for their merits have been deservedly esteemed.

Of this number I may very truly reckon MERIC CASAUBON, the Translator of *Marcus Antoninus*; MRS. CARTER, the Translator of *Epicletus*; and MR. SYDENHAM, the Translator of many of *Plato's* Dialogues. All these seem to have *accurately understood* the original Language, from which they translated. But that is not all. The Authors translated being Philosophers, the Translators appear to have studied *the Style* of their Philosophy, well knowing that in antient Greece every Sect of Philosophy, like every Science and Art, had a *Language of its own* *.

To these may be added the respectable names of *Melmoth* and of *Hampton*, of *Franklyn* and of *Potter*; nor should I omit a few others, whose labours have been similar, did I not recollect the trite, tho' elegant admonition,

— *fugit irreparabile tempus,*

Singula dum capti circumvectamur amore.

VIRG.

YET one Translation I can by no means forget, I mean that of *Xenophon's Cyropædia*, or the *Institution of Cyrus*, by the Honourable

MAURICE

* See Vol. I. p. 361, 362.

Part I.

MAURICE ASHLEY COWPER, son to the second Earl of *Shaftesbury*, and brother to the third, who was Author of the *Characteristicks*. This Translation is made in all the *Purity* and *Simplicity* of the Original, and to it the Translator has prefixed a truly philosophical Dedication, addressed to my Mother, who was one of his Sisters.

I ESTEEM it an honour to call this Author my Uncle, and that not only from his Rank, but much more from his *Learning*, and unblemished *Virtue*; Qualities, which the Love of *Retirement* (where he thought they could be best cultivated) induced him to *conceal*, rather than to produce in public.

THE first Edition of this Translation, consisting of two octavo Volumes, was published soon after his decease, in the year 1728. Between this time and the year 1770, the Book has past thro' a second and a third Edition, not with the eclat of popular Applause, but with the silent approbation of the studious Few.

C H A P. V.

Rise of the THIRD SPECIES of CRITICISM, the CORRECTIVE—practised by the Antients, but much more by the Moderns, and WHY.

BUT we are now to inquire after ANOTHER SPECIES OF CRITICISM. All antient books, having been preserved by *Transcription*, were liable thro' *Ignorance*, *Negligence*, or *Fraud*, to be corrupted in three different ways, that is to say, by *Retrenchings*, by *Additions*, and by *Alterations*.

Ch. V.

To remedy these evils, a *third* Sort of *Criticism* arose, and that was CRITICISM CORRECTIVE. The Business of this *at first* was painfully to *collate* all the various Copies of authority, and then, from amidst the variety of Readings thus *collected*, to establish by good reasons either *the true*, or *the most probable*. In this sense we may call such CRITICISM not only CORRECTIVE, but AUTHORITATIVE.

As the number of these Corruptions must needs have increased by length of time, hence it has happened that *Corrective Criticism* has become much more necessary in these *latter* ages, than it was in others more antient. Not but that even in *antient* days various *Readings* have been noted. Of this kind there are a multitude in the Text of *Homer*; a fact not singular, when we consider his great antiquity. In the Comments of *Ammonius* and *Philoponus* upon *Aristotle*, there

Part I.

there is mention made of several in the text of that Philosopher, which these his Commentators compare and examine.

WE find the same in *Aulus Gellius*, as to the Roman Authors; where it is withal remarkable, that, even in that *early* period, much stress is laid upon the authority of *antient* Manuscripts*, a Reading in *Cicero* being justified from a Copy made by his learned freedman, *Tiro*; and a Reading in *Virgil's Georgics*, from a Book, which had once belonged to *Virgil's* Family.

BUT since the revival of Literature, TO CORRECT has been a business of much more latitude, having continually employed, for two centuries and a half, both the Pains of the most laborious, and the Wits of the most acute. Many of the learned men before enumerated were not only famous as *historical* Critics, but as *corrective* also. Such were the two *Scaligers* (of whom one has been † already mentioned) the two *Casaubons*, *Salmasius*, the *Heinsii*, *Grævius*, the *Gronovii*, *Burman*, *Kuster*, *Wasse*, *Bentley*, *Pearce*, and *Markland*. In the same Class, and in a rank highly eminent, I place Mr. *TOUPE* of *Cornwall*, who, in his *Emendations upon Suidas*, and his Edition of *Longinus*, has shewn a *critical* acumen, and a compass of learning, that may justly arrange him with the most distinguished scholars. Nor must I forget Dr. *TAYLOR*, Residentiary of St. Paul's, nor Mr. *UPTON*, Prebendary of Rochester. The former, by his Edition of *Demosthenes* (as

* See *Aulus Gellius*, Lib. I. c. 7. and 21. *Macrob. Saturn.* Lib. I. c. 5.

† Pag. 285.

(as far as he lived to carry it), by his *Lyfias*, by his comment on the *Marmor Sandvicense*, and other critical pieces; the latter, by his correct and elegant Edition, in Greek and Latin, of *Arrian's Epictetus* (the first of the kind that had any pretensions to be called complete), have rendered themselves, as Scholars, lasting ornaments of their Country. These two valuable men were the Friends of my youth; the companions of my social, as well as my literary hours. I admired them for their Erudition; I loved them for their Virtue; they are now no more—

Ch. V.

His saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
Munere — VIRG.

CHAP. VI.

CRITICISM *may have been* ABUSED—Yet DEFENDED, *as of the last*
Importance to the Cause of Literature.

Part I.

BUT here was the misfortune of this last species of *Criticism*.
 The best of things may pass into abuse. There were numerous
 Corruptions in many of the finest authors, which neither antient Edi-
 tions, nor Manuscripts could heal. What then was to be done?—
 Were Forms so fair to remain disfigured, and be seen for ever under
 such apparent blemishes?—"No (says a Critic), CONJECTURE can
 "cure all—*Conjecture*, whose performances are for the most part
 "more certain than any thing, that we can exhibit from the autho-
 "rity of Manuscripts*."—We will not ask, upon this wonderful
 assertion, *how, if so certain, can it be called Conjecture?*—'Tis enough
 to observe (be it called as it may) that this spirit of *Conjecture* has
 too often past into an intemperate excess; and then, whatever it
 may have boasted, has done more mischief by far than good. Au-
 thors have been taken in hand, like anatomical subjects, only to dis-
 play the skill and abilities of the Artist; so that the end of many an
 Edition seems often to have been no more, than to exhibit the great
 sagacity and erudition of an Editor. The Joy of the task was the
 Honour of mending, while Corruptions were sought with a more
 than

* *Plura igitur in Horatianis his curis ex Conjecturâ exhibemus, quàm ex Codicum sub-
 sidio; et, nisi me omnia fallunt, plerumque certiora. Bentleyi Præfat. ad Horat.*

than common attention, as each of them afforded a testimony to the Editor and his Art. Ch. VI.

AND here I beg leave, by way of digression, to relate a short story concerning a noted Empiric. “ Being once in a ball-room crowded with company, he was asked by a gentleman, *what he thought of such a lady? was it not pity that she squinted?*—Squint! Sir! replied the doctor, *I wish every lady in the room squinted; there’s not a man in Europe can cure squinting but myself.*”

BUT to return to our subject—Well indeed would it be for the cause of letters, were this bold *conjectural* spirit confined to works of *second* rate, where let it change, expunge, or add, as happens, it may be tolerably sure to leave matters as they were; or if not much better, at least not much worse. But when the divine Geniuses of *higher* rank, whom we not only applaud, but in a manner revere, when these come to be attempted by petulant Correctors, and to be made the subject of their wanton caprice, how can we but exclaim with a kind of religious abhorrence,

—*procul! O! procul este profani!*

THESE sentiments may be applied even to the celebrated *Bentley*. It would have become that able writer, tho’ in literature and natural abilities among *the first* of his age, had he been more temperate in his Criticism upon *the Paradise lost*; had he not so repeatedly and injuriously offered violence to its Author, from an affected superiority, to which he had no pretence. But the rage of *Conjecture* seems to

Part I. have seized him, as that of *Jealousy* did *Medea**; a rage, which she
 confesseth herself unable to resist, altho' she knew the mischiefs, it would
 prompt her to perpetrate.

AND now to obviate an unmerited Censure, (as if I were an enemy
 to the thing, from being an enemy to its abuse) I would have it re-
 member'd, 'tis not either with *Criticism* or *Critics*, that I presume to
 find fault. The Art, and its Professors, while they practise it with
 temper, I truly honour; and think, that, were it not for their
 acute and learned labours, we should be in danger of degenerating
 into an age of dunces.

INDEED CRITICS (if I may be allowed the metaphor) are a sort
 of *Masters of the ceremony* in the Court of letters, thro' whose assist-
 ance we are introduced into some of the first and best company.
 Should we ever, therefore, by idle prejudices against pedantry, verbal
 accuracies, and we know not what, come to slight their art, and re-
 ject them from our favour, 'tis well we do not slight also those *Classics*,
 with whom Criticism converses, becoming content to read them in
 translations, or (what is still worse) in translations of translations, or
 (what is worse even than that) not to read them at all. And I will
 be bold to assert, if that should ever happen, we shall speedily return
 into those days of darkness, out of which we happily emerged upon
 the revival of *antient* Literature.

* See the *Medea* of Euripides, v. 1078. See also *Philosoph. Arrangements*, p. 238.

CHAP. VII.

Conclusion—Recapitulation—Preparation for the Second Part.

AND so much at present for *Critics*, and learned Editors. So much also for the *Origin* and *Progress* of CRITICISM; which has been divided into three *species*, the PHILOSOPHICAL, the HISTORICAL, and the CORRECTIVE; the PHILOSOPHICAL, *treating of the principles, and primary causes of good writing in general*; the HISTORICAL, *being conversant in particular facts, customs, phrases, &c.* and the CORRECTIVE being divided into the AUTHORITATIVE and the CONJECTURAL; the AUTHORITATIVE, *depending on the Collation of Manuscripts and the best Editions*; the CONJECTURAL, *on the Sagacity and Erudition of Editors**.

Ch. VII.

As the *First Part* of these *Inquiries* ends here, we are now to proceed to the *Second Part*, a SPECIMEN OF THE DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES OF CRITICISM, as they are illustrated in the *Writings of the most distinguished Authors*.

* For the FIRST SPECIES OF CRITICISM, see p. 278. For the SECOND SPECIES, see p. 283. For the THIRD SPECIES, see p. 293, to the end of the Chapter following, p. 298.

There are a few other Notes besides the preceding; but as some of them were long, and it was apprehended for that reason that they might too much interrupt the *Continuity* of the Text, they have been joined with other pieces, in the forming of an APPENDIX.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion—Repetition—Preparation for the Second Part

AND to reach at present for Christ and to reach Liberty, so Cl. VII. must offer for the Origin and History of Christianity; which has been divided into three parts, the historical, the critical, and the doctrinal; the historical, which is the origin and history of the Christian religion, the critical, which is the origin and history of the Christian religion, and the doctrinal, which is the origin and history of the Christian religion. The historical part is divided into the origin and history of the Christian religion, the critical part is divided into the origin and history of the Christian religion, and the doctrinal part is divided into the origin and history of the Christian religion.

As the First Part of this Inquiry ends here, we are now to begin the Second Part, a Second Part of the Inquiry, and the most distinguished Inquiry.

For the First Part of the Inquiry, we have seen the origin and history of the Christian religion, and the critical part is divided into the origin and history of the Christian religion, and the doctrinal part is divided into the origin and history of the Christian religion.

End of the First Part.

PHILOLOGICAL
INQUIRIES:

PART THE SECOND.

PHILOGICAL
INQUIRIES:
PART THE SECOND.

PHILOLOGICAL

INQUIRIES.

PART THE SECOND.

INTRODUCTION.

WE are, in the following Part of this Work, to give a Specimen Part II.
of those Doctrines, which, having been *slightly* touched in the
First Part, we are now to illustrate more amply, by referring to Ex-
amples, as well antient as modern.

It has been already hinted, that among Writers THE EPIC CAME
FIRST*; it has been hinted likewise, that NOTHING EXCELLENT IN
A LITERARY WAY HAPPENS MERELY BY CHANCE†.

MENTION also has been made of NUMEROUS COMPOSITION‡,
and the force of it suggested, tho' little said farther.

To

* p. 278.

† p. 279.

‡ Ibid.

Part II. To this we may add the THEORY OF WHOLE AND PARTS *, so essential to the very being of a *legitimate* Composition; and THE THEORY also of SENTIMENT and MANNERS †, both of which naturally belong to *every Whole*, called *Dramatic*.

NOR can we on this occasion omit a few Speculations on THE FABLE OR ACTION; Speculations necessarily connected with every Drama, and which we shall illustrate from Tragedy, its most striking Species.

AND here, if it should be objected that we refer to *English* Authors, the Connection should be remembered between *good* Authors of *every* Country, as far as they all draw from *the same* Sources, the Sources I mean of *Nature* and of *Truth*. A like Apology may be made for Inquiries concerning the ENGLISH TONGUE, and how far it may be made susceptible of *Classic Decoration*. All Languages are in some degree *congenial*, and, both in their *Matter* and their *Form*, are founded upon *the same Principles* ‡.

WHAT is here said, will, we hope, sufficiently justify the following DETAIL; a *Detail* naturally arising from the *former* part of the Plan, by being founded upon expressions, *not sufficiently there developed*.

FIRST, therefore, for the First; that THE EPIC POETS LED THE WAY, and that NOTHING EXCELLENT IN A LITERARY VIEW HAPPENS MERELY BY CHANCE.

* p. 279.

† Ibid.

‡ See Vol. I. p. 404.

C H A P T E R I.

THAT THE EPIC WRITERS CAME FIRST, *and that* NOTHING EXCEL-
 LENT IN LITERARY Performances happens merely from CHANCE
 —the CAUSES, or REASONS of such Excellence, illustrated by Ex-
 amples.

IT appears, that not only in GREECE, but in *other* Countries, more
 barbarous, the *first* Writings were in *Metre**, and of an *Epic*
 Cast, recording Wars, Battles, Heroes, Ghosts; the Marvellous
 always, and often the Incredible. Men seemed to have thought,
 that the higher they soared, the more important they should appear;
 and that the common Life, which they *then* lived, was a thing too
 contemptible to merit Imitation.

Ch. I.

HENCE it followed, that it was not till *this Common Life* was ren-
 dered respectable by more *refined* and *polished Manners*, that Men
 thought it might be copied, so as to gain them applause.

EVEN in GREECE itself, *Tragedy* had attained its maturity† many
 years before *Comedy*, as may be seen by comparing the age of *So-
 phocles* and *Euripides* with that of *Philemon* and *Menander*.

FOR

* Temple's Works, Vol. I. p. 239. Fol. Edit.

† Aristot. Poet. c. 4. p. 227. Edit. Sylb. Also Characteristics, Vol. I. p. 244.

Part II.

For *ourselves*, we shall find most of our *first Poets* prone to a *turgid Bombast*, and most of our *first Prosaic Writers* to a *pedantic Stiffness*, which rude Styles gradually improved, but reached not a *Classical Purity* sooner than *Tillotson, Dryden, Addison, Shaftesbury, Prior, Pope, Atterbury, &c. &c.*

As to what is asserted soon after upon the Efficacy of Causes in *Works of Ingenuity and Art*, we think in general, that the *Effect* must always be proportioned to its *Cause*. 'Tis hard for him, who reasons attentively, to refer to CHANCE any *superlative Production**.

EFFECTS indeed strike us, when *we are not thinking about the CAUSE*; yet may we be assured, if we reflect, *that a CAUSE THERE IS*, and that too a CAUSE INTELLIGENT, and RATIONAL. Nothing would perhaps more contribute to give us a *Taste truly critical*, than on every occasion *to investigate* this Cause; and to ask ourselves, upon feeling any uncommon Effect, *why* we are thus delighted; *why* thus affected; *why* melted into Pity; *why* made to shudder with Horror?

TILL this WHY is well answered, all is Darkness, and our *Admiration*, like that of the *Vulgar*, founded upon *Ignorance*.

To explain by a few Examples, that are *known* to all, and for that reason here alleged, *because they are known*.

I AM

* Vol. I. (Philosoph. Arrang.) p. 172. 242.

I AM struck with the NIGHT-SCENE in Virgil's *fourth Eneid*—
 “the *universal* Silence throughout the Globe—the *sweet Rest* of its
 “various Inhabitants, soothing their Cares and forgetting their La-
 “bours—the unhappy Dido alone *restless*; restless and agitated
 “with impetuous Passions*.”

I AM affected with the Story of REGULUS, as painted by WEST.
 —“The crowd of *anxious* Friends, persuading him not to return—
 “his Wife, *fainting* thro’ sensibility and fear—Persons, the least con-
 “nected, appearing to feel for him—yet himself *unmoved*, inexor-
 “able and stern†.”

WITHOUT referring to these deeply tragic Scenes, what Charms
 has Music, when a masterly Band pass unexpectedly from *loud* to
soft, or from *soft* to *loud*?—When the System changes from the
greater Third to the *less*; or reciprocally, when it changes from this
 last to the former?

ALL these Effects have a similar, and well-known Cause, *the*
amazing Force which CONTRARIES acquire, either by JUXTA-POSITION,
or by QUICK SUCCESSION ‡.

BUT

* Æn. IV. 522, &c.

† Horat. Carm. L. III. Od. 5.

‡ This Truth is not only obvious, but antient. Aristotle says,—Παράλληλα τὰ Ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι—that CONTRARIES, when set beside each other, make the strongest appearance. Παράλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ Ἐναντία γνωρίζεται—that CONTRARIES are better known, when set beside each other. Arist. Rhetor. Lib. III. p. 120, & p. 152. Edit. Sylb. The same author often makes use of this Truth in other places; which Truth, *simple as it seems*, is the source of many capital Beauties in all the Fine Arts.

Part II.

BUT we ask still farther, *why have CONTRARIES this Force?*—We answer, because, *of all things which differ, none differ so widely.* Sound differs from Darknefs, but *not so much* as from Silence; Darknefs differs from Sound, but *not so much* as from Light. In the same intense manner differ Repose and Restlessness; Felicity and Misery; dubious Solitude and firm Resolution; the Epic and the Comic; the Sublime and the Ludicrous*.

And, *why differ CONTRARIES thus widely?*—Because while *Attributes, simply different*, may co-exist in the same subject, CONTRARIES cannot co-exist, but always destroy one another†. Thus the same Marble may be both *white* and *hard*; but the same Marble cannot be both *white* and *black*. And hence it follows, that as their *Difference* is more intense, so is our *Recognition* of them more vivid, and our *Impressions* more permanent.

THIS

* From these instances we perceive the meaning of those descriptions of CONTRARIES, that they are τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει—ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ—τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν—things which differ most widely, among things existing in the same Genus—in the same Recipient—comprehended under the same Power or Faculty. *Arist. Metaph. Δ. 1. p. 82. Edit. Sylb.* Cicero, in his Topics, translates the first description—quæ in eodem genere plurimum differunt. S. 70.

Aristotle reasons as follows. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἑλάττω, ἐστὶ τις καὶ μεγίστη διαφορὰ, καὶ ταύτην λέγω ENANTIΩΣΙΝ. It being admitted that things differing from one another, differ MORE and LESS, there must be also a certain DIFFERENCE, which is MOST, and this I call CONTRARIETY. *Metaph. p. 162. Edit. Sylb.*

† *Ammonius*, commenting the doctrine of CONTRARIES, (as set forth in *Aristotle's Categories*) informs us, that they not only do not imply one another (as a Son necessarily implies a Father) but that they even DESTROY ONE ANOTHER, so that, where one is present, the other cannot remain—ὃ μόνον οὐ συνεισφέρει ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φθείρει· τὸ γὰρ ἐνὸς πάροντος, ἔχ' ὑπομένει τὸ ἕτερον. *Ammon. in Categ. p. 147. Edit. Venet.* The *Stagirite* himself describes them in the same manner, τὰ μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρῆναι, things that cannot be present at once in the same subject. *Metaph. Δ. p. 82. Edit. Sylb.*

THIS Effect of CONTRARIES is evident even in objects of *Sense*, where Imagination and Intellect are not in the least concerned. When we pass (for example) from a Hot-house, we feel the common Air *more intensely* cool; when we pass from a dark Cavern, we feel the common light of the Day *more intensely* glaring.

BUT to proceed to Instances of ANOTHER and a very DIFFERENT KIND.

FEW Scenes are *more affecting* than THE TAKING OF TROY, as described in the *second Eneid* — “ the Apparition of *Heclor* to *Eneas*,
 “ when asleep, announcing to him the Commencement of that dire-
 “ ful Event—the distant Lamentations, heard by *Eneas*, as he
 “ awakes—his ascending the House-top, and viewing the City in
 “ flames—his Friend *Pentheus*, escaped from destruction, and relat-
 “ ing to him their wretched and deplorable condition—*Eneas*, with
 “ a few Friends, rushing into the thickest danger—their various
 “ success, till they all perish, but himself and two more—the affect-
 “ ing Scenes of Horror and Pity at *Priam's* Palace—a Son, slain at
 “ his Father's feet; and the immediate Massacre of the old Monarch
 “ himself—*Eneas*, on seeing this, inspired with the memory of *his*
 “ own Father—his resolving to return home, having now lost *all* his
 “ Companions—his seeing *Helen* in the way, and his Design to dis-
 “ patch so wicked a woman—*Venus* interposing, and shewing him
 “ (by removing the film from his Eyes) the *most sublime*, tho' *most*
 “ *direful*, of all sights; the Gods themselves busied in *Troy's* Destruc-
 “ tion; *Neptune* at one employ, *Juno* at another, *Pallas* at a third —
 “ 'Tis

Part II. “ ’Tis not *Helen* (says *Venus*) but the Gods, that are the Authors of
 “ your Country’s Ruin—’tis their Inclemency, &c.”

Not less solemn and awful, tho’ less leading to *Pity*, is the Commencement of the sixth *Eneid*—“ the Sibyl’s Cavern—her frantic
 “ Gestures, and Prophecy—the Request of *Eneas* to descend to the
 “ Shades—her Answer, and Information about the Loss of one of
 “ his Friends—the Fate of poor *Misenus*—his Funeral—the Gold-
 “ en Bough discovered, a preparatory Circumstance for the Descent
 “ —the Sacrifice—the Ground bellowing under their Feet—the
 “ Woods in motion—the Dogs of *Hecate* howling—the actual De-
 “ scent in all its particulars of *the marvellous*, and *the terrible*.”

If we pass from an antient Author to a modern, what Scene more striking, than *the first Scene in HAMLET*?—“ The Solemnity of the
 “ Time, a severe and pinching Night—the Solemnity of the Place, a
 “ Platform for a Guard—the Guards themselves; and their ap-
 “ posite Discourse—yonder Star in such a Position; the Bell then beat-
 “ ing one—when Description is exhausted, the thing *itself* appears,
 “ the Ghost enters.”

FROM SHAKESPEAR the Transition to MILTON is natural. What Pieces have ever met a more just, as well as universal applause, than his *L’Allegro* and *Il Penseroso*?—The first, a Combination of every incident that is *lively* and *cheerful*; the second, of every incident that is *melancholy* and *serious*; the Materials of each collected, according to their character, from Rural Life, from City Life, from
 Music,

Musick, from Poetry ; in a word, from every part of *Nature*, and every part of *Art*.

Ch. I.

To pass from POETRY to PAINTING—the *Crucifixion of Polycrates* by SALVATOR ROSA * is “ a most affecting Representation of various human Figures, seen under different modes of Horror and Pity, as they contemplate a dreadful Spectacle, the Crucifixion above mentioned.” *The Aurora of GUIDO* on the other side is “ one of those joyous Exhibitions, where nothing is seen but Youth and Beauty, in every attitude of Elegance and Grace.” *The former* Picture in Poetry would have been a deep *Penferoso*; *the latter*, a most pleasing and animated *Allegro*.

AND to what Cause are we to refer these *last* Enumerations of striking Effects?

To a very different one from the former—not to an OPPOSITION of contrary Incidents, but to a CONCATENATION or ACCUMULATION of many, that are similar and congenial.

AND why have CONCATENATION and ACCUMULATION such a Force?—From these most simple and obvious Truths, that many things similar, when added together, will be more in Quantity, than any one of them taken singly;—consequently, that the more things are thus added, the greater will be their Effect †.

WE

* See Vol. I. (Treatises,) p. 38.

† QUINCTILIAN observes, that the man who tells us, *a City was stormed*, includes, in what he says, *all things which such a disaster implies*; and yet for all, that such a brief Information

Part II.

WE have mentioned at the same time both *Accumulation* and *Concatenation*, because in *Painting*, the Objects, by *existing at once*, are *accumulated*; in *Poetry*, as they *exist by succession*, they are not accumulated but *concatenated*. Yet, thro' *Memory* and *Imagination* *, even these also derive an *accumulative Force*, being *preserved* from passing away by those admirable Faculties, till, like many Pieces of Metal melted together, they collectively form one common Magnitude.

It must be farther remembered, there is an *Accumulation* of things *analogous*, even when those things are the objects of *different Faculties*.

Information less affects us than a Detail, because 'tis less striking, to deliver *the whole at once*, than it is to *enumerate the several particulars*. His words are—*minus est TOTUM dicere, quam OMNIA*. *Quinct. Institut. VIII. 3.*

The whole is well worth reading, particularly his Detail of the various and horrid Events, which befal the storming of a City. *Sine dubio enim, qui dicit expugnatam esse Civitatem, &c.*

ARISTOTLE reasons much after the same manner.—καὶ διαιρέμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη, τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται· πλείονων γὰρ ὑπεροχὴ φαίνεται—the *same things, divided into Parts, appear GREATER, for then there appears an Excess or an Abundance of MANY things*.

By way of proof, he quotes HOMER on the same subject, I mean the taking of a City by fiorm.

"Οσσα καὶ ἀνθρώποισι πέλει, τῶν ἄστυ ἀλώη"

"Ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνεσι, πόλιν δὲ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,

Τέκνα δὲ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγεσι, βαθυζώνας τε γυναῖκας. *Iliad. IX. v. 588.*

The dire disasters of a City stormed;

The Men they massacre; the Town they fire;

And others lead the Children and the Wives

Into Captivity—

See *Arist. Rhetor. Lib. I. p. 29. Edit. Sylb.* where the above Lines of *Homer* are quoted; and tho' with some variation from the common Reading, yet with none, which affects the Sense.

* See Vol. I. p. 407, &c.

Faculties. For example—As are passionate *Gestures* to the Eye, so are passionate *Tones* to the Ear; so are passionate *Ideas* to the Imagination. To feel the amazing force of an Accumulation *like this*, we must see some capital *Actor*, acting the *Drama* of some capital *Poet*, where all the Powers of *Both* are *assembled at the same instant*.

AND thus have we endeavoured, by a few obvious and easy examples, to explain what we mean by the words, *seeking the Cause or Reason, as often as we feel works of Art and Ingenuity to affect us**.

IF I might advise a *Beginner* in this elegant pursuit, it should be, as far as possible, to recur *for Principles* to the *most plain and simple Truths*, and to *extend* every Theorem, as he advances, to its *utmost latitude*, so as to make it *suit*, and *include*, the greatest number of possible Cases.

I WOULD advise him farther, to *avoid subtle and far-fetched Refinement*, which, as it is for the most part adverse to *Perspicuity* and *Truth*, may serve to make an able *Sophist*, but never an able *Critic*.

A WORD more—I would advise a young Critic, in his Contemplations, to turn his Eye rather to *the Praise-worthy* than *the Blameable*; that is, to *investigate the Causes of Praise*, rather than the Causes of *Blame*. For tho' an uninformed *Beginner* may in a single instance
happen

* See p. 275. 278. 279. 305. 306.

Part II. happen to *blame properly*, 'tis more than probable, that in the next he may fail, and incur the Censure past upon the criticizing Cobler, *Ne futor ultra crepidam* *.

— We are now to inquire concerning NUMEROUS COMPOSITION.

* Those, who wish to see the origin of this ingenious Proverb, may find it in *Pliny*, L. XXV. f. 12, and in *Valerius Maximus*, L. VIII. c. 12.

CHAP. II.

NUMEROUS COMPOSITION—*derived from QUANTITY SYLLABIC—*
antiently essential both to Verse and Prose—Rhythm—Peans and
Cretics, the Feet for Prose—QUANTITY ACCENTUAL—a Dege-
neracy from the SYLLABIC—Instances of it—first in Latin—then
in Greek—Versus Politici—Traces of Accentual Quantity in Terence
—essential to Modern Languages, and among others to English, from
which last Examples are taken.

AS NUMEROUS COMPOSITION arises from a *just* Arrangement of Ch. II.
 Words; so is that *Arrangement just*, when formed upon their
 VERBAL QUANTITY.

Now if we seek for this VERBAL QUANTITY in *Greek* and *Latin*,
 we shall find that, while *those two Languages* were in Purity, their
Verbal Quantity was in Purity also. *Every Syllable* had a measure of
Time, either long or short, defined with precision either by its *consti-*
tuent Vowel, or by the *Relation* of that Vowel to other Letters adjoin-
 ing. SYLLABLES thus characterized, when combined, made A
 FOOT; and FEET thus characterized, when combined, made A
 VERSE; so that, while a *particular* Harmony existed in every *Part*, a
general Harmony was diffused thro' the *Whole*.

PRONUNTIATION at this period being, like other things, perfect,
 ACCENT and QUANTITY were accurately *distinguished*; of which dis-
 tinction, familiar *then*, tho' *now* obscure, we venture to suggest the
 following

Part II. following Explanation. We compare QUANTITY to *Musical Tones differing* IN LONG AND SHORT, as, upon whatever Line they stand, a *Semibreif* differs from a *Minim*. We compare ACCENT to *Musical Tones differing* IN HIGH AND LOW, as D upon the *third* line differs from G upon the *first*, be its length the same, or be it longer or shorter.

AND thus things continued for a succession of Centuries, from *Homer* and *Hesiod* to *Virgil* and *Horace*, during which interval, if we add a trifle to its end, all the truly classical POETS, both *Greek* and *Latin*, flourished.

NOR was PROSE at the same time neglected. Penetrating Wits discovered THIS ALSO to be capable of NUMEROUS COMPOSITION, and founded their Ideas upon the following Reasonings.

THO' they allowed, that PROSE should *not* be *strictly* metrical (for then it would be no longer *Prose*, but *Poetry*); yet at the same time they asserted, *if it had* no *Rhythm at all*, such a vague Effusion would of course fatigue, and the Reader would seek in vain for those returning Pauses, so helpful to his reading, and so grateful to his Ear*.

NOW as FEET were found an Essential to that *Rhythm*, they were obliged, as well as Poets, to consider FEET under their several characters.

IN

* See *Aristot. Rhetor.* L. III. p. 129. *Edit. Syll.* Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μῆτε ἑμμετρον εἶναι, μῆτε ἄρρυθμον, κ. τ. λ. So *Cicero*—*numeris astrictam Orationem esse debere, carere versibus.* *Ad. Brut. Orator.* f. 187.

IN this Contemplation they found THE HEROIC FOOT, (which includes *the Spondee, the Dactyl, and the Anapaest*) to be majestic and grave, but yet *improper for Prose*, because, if employed too frequently, the Composition would appear *Epic*.

ON the contrary, in THE IAMBIC they found *Levity*; it often made, tho' undesignedly, *a part of common discourse*, and could not, for that reason, but *want a suitable dignity* *.

WHAT Expedient then remained? — They recommended A FOOT, where *the former two were blended*; where *the Pomp of the Heroic*, and *the levity of the Iambic* were *mutually to correct*, and *temper* one another.

BUT as this appears to require explanation, we shall endeavour, if we can, to render it intelligible, saying something previously upon the nature of *Rhythm*.

RHYTHM differs from METRE, in as much as RHYTHM is *Proportion applied to any Motion whatever*; METRE is *Proportion, applied to the Motion of Words Spoken*. Thus, in the drumming of a March, or the dancing of a Hornpipe, there is *Rhythm*, tho' *no Metre*; in *Dryden's* celebrated Ode there is METRE as well as RHYTHM, because the Poet with the *Rhythm* has associated certain *Words*. And
hence

* See in the same Treatise of *Aristotle* what is said about these Feet, just after the Passage above cited. Τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν, ὁ μὲν ἡρώδης σεμνὸς, κ. τ. λ. All that follows is well worth reading.

Part II. hence it follows, that, tho' ALL METRE is RHYTHM, yet ALL RHYTHM is NOT METRE*.

THIS being admitted, we proceed and say, that the RHYTHM of the Heroic Foot is one to one, which constitutes in Music what we call COMMON TIME; and in musical Vibration, what we call THE UNISON.

The

* Διαφέρει δὲ μέτρον ῥυθμῶς, ὅλη μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μέτροις ἡ συλλαβὴ, καὶ χωρὶς συλλαβῆς ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο μέτρον· ὁ δὲ ῥυθμὸς γίνεται μὲν καὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς, γίνεται δὲ καὶ χωρὶς συλλαβῆς, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρότῳ. Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὰς χαλκίας ἴδωμεν τὰς σφύρας καταφερόντας, αἶμα τινὰ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκούομεν—μέτρον δὲ ἐκ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο χωρὶς λέξεως ποιᾶς καὶ ποσῆς. METRE differs from RHYTHM, because with regard to Metres the subject matter is a syllable, and without a syllable (that is a Sound articulate) no Metre can exist. But RHYTHM exists both IN and WITHOUT syllables; for it may be perceived in mere PULSATION or STRIKING. 'Tis thus, when we see Smiths hammering with their sledges, we hear at the same time (in their strokes) a CERTAIN RHYTHM,—but as to METRE, there can be none, unless there be AN ARTICULATE SOUND, or WORD, having a peculiar Quality and Quantity, (to distinguish it.) Longini Fragm. III. f. 5. p. 162. Edit. Pearce, qto.

METRUM in verbis modo; RHYTHMUS etiam in corporis motu est. Quintil. Inst. IX. 4. p. 598. Edit. Capper.

What these authors call RHYTHMUS, Virgil calls NUMERUS, or its plural NUMERI.

—NUMEROS memini, si verba tenerem. Bucol. IX. 45.

And, before that, speaking of the Fauns and wild Beasts dancing, he informs us—

Tum vero IN NUMERUM Faunosq; ferasq; videres
Ludere— Bucol. VI. 27.

So too, speaking of the Cyclopes at their Forge, he tells us,

Illi inter sese magnâ vi brachia tollunt
IN NUMERUM— Geor. IV. 174, 175.

Which same verses are repeated in the eight *Encid.* So Cicero—NUMERUS Latine, Græcè Ρυθμός—Ad. Brut. Orat. f. 170.

No English Term seems to express RHYTHMUS better than the word, TIME; by which we denote every Species of measured Motion. Thus we say, there is TIME in beating a Drum, tho' but a single Sound; Time in Dancing, and in Rowing, tho' no Sound at all, but what is quite incidental.

The RHYTHM of the *Iambic* is *One to Two*, which constitutes in Music what we call *TRIPLE TIME*; and in *musical Vibration*, what we call *THE OCTAVE*. The RHYTHM next to these is that of *Two to Three*, or else its equivalent, *Three to Two*; a *Rhythm* compounded of the *two former Times united*; and which constitutes in *musical Vibration*, what we call *THE FIFTH*.

'Twas here then they discovered *THE FOOT* they wanted; that *Foot*, which, being neither the *Heroic*, nor the *Iambic*, was yet so far connected with them, as to contain *virtually* within itself the RHYTHMS of them both.

THAT this is fact, is evident, from the following reasoning. The *Proportion of Two to Three* contains in *Two* the RHYTHM of the *Heroic Foot*; in *Three*, that of the *Iambic*; therefore, in *two and three united*, a *Foot compounded out of the two*.

NOW THE FOOT thus described is no other than the *PÆAN*; a *Foot* constituted either by *one long Syllable and three short*, and called the *Pæan a majori*; or else by *three short Syllables and one long*, and called the *Pæan a minori*. In either case, if we resolve the *long Syllable* into *two short*, we shall find the *Sum of the Syllables* to be *Five*; that is, *Two to Three*, for the *first Pæan*, *Three to Two* for the *second*, each being in what we call *THE SESQUIALTER PROPORTION* *.

THOSE

* The sum of this speculation is thus shortly expressed by Cicero. *Pæs enim, qui adhibetur ad numeros, partitur in tria: ut necesse sit partem pedis aut æqualem esse alteri parti; aut altero tanto, aut sesqui esse majorem. Ita fit æqualis, Dactylus; duplex, Iambus; sesqui, Pæon.* *Ad. Brut. Orat. f. 188.*

Aristotle

Part II.

THOSE, who ask for examples, may find *the first Pæan* in the words ἡφάνισέ, *Dēsñitě*; the second, in the words μετὰ δὲ γῆν *Dömüerānt*.

To the *Pæan* may be added THE CRETIC, a Foot of *one short Syllable between two Long*, as in the words, εἰψόμεναι, quōvē nūnc; a Foot in power evidently equal to the *Pæan*, because resolvable, like that, into five equal times.

WE dwell no longer here; perhaps we have already dwelt too long. 'Tis enough to observe, that, by a discreet use of these PÆANS, the antients obtained what they desired, that is, they *enriched their Prose*, without making it into *Verse*; and, while vague and vulgar *Prose* flowed *indefinitely* like a stream, theirs, like descending Drops, became capable of *being numbered* *.

IT may give Credit to these Speculations, trivial as they may appear, when 'tis known they have merited the attention of the ablest Critics,

Aristotle reasons upon the same Principles. Ἐστὶ δὲ τρίτος ὁ Παιάν, καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύο εἰν· ἐκείνων δὲ, ὁ μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἐν· ὁ δὲ, δύο· ἔχεται δὲ τῶν λόγων τέτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος, οὗτος δ' εἰν ὁ Παιάν· κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Rhet. L. III. c. 8. p. 129, 130. Edit. Sylb.*

Again, *Cicero*, after having held much the same doctrine, adds—*Probatum autem ab eodem illo (scil. Aristotele) maximè Pæan, qui est duplex; nam aut a longâ oritur, quam tres breves consequuntur, ut hæc verba, dēsñitě, ĩncĭpĭtě, cōmprĭmĭtě; aut a brevibus deinceps tribus, extremâ productâ atque longâ, sicut illa sunt, dömüerānt, fōñpēdēs. De Orator. III. 57, (183.) and in his Orator. ad M. Brutum—f. 205. and before, f. 191 to 197.*

* NUMERUS autem in Continuatione nullus est: Distinctio, et æqualium et sæpe variorum intervallorum Percussio, NUMERUM conficit: quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intercallis distinguuntur, notare possumus; in omni præcipitante non possumus. *Cic. de Oratore, Lib. III. f. 186.*

Critics, of *Aristotle* and *Demetrius Phalereus*, of *Cicero* and *Quintilian**. Ch. II.

THE Productions still remaining of this Golden Period seem (if I may so say) to have been providentially preserved, to humiliate modern Vanity, and check the growth of bad Taste.

BUT this Classical Æra, tho' it lasted long, at length terminated. Many Causes, and chiefly the irruption and mixture of *Barbarians*, contributed to the debasing both of *Latin* and *Greek*. As *Diction* was corrupted, so also was *Pronunciation*. *Accent* and *Quantity*, which had been once *accurately* distinguished, began now to be *blended*. Nay more, *Accent* so far usurped *Quantity's* place, as by a sort of Tyranny, to make short syllables, long; and long syllables, short. Thus, in Poetry, as the accent fell upon DE in *Dēus*, and upon i in *ībi*, the first syllables of these two words were considered as *long*. Again, where the Accent did *not* fall; as in the ultima's of *Regnō*, or *Saturnō*, and even in such ablatives as *Insulā* or *Cretā*, there the Poet assumed a Licence, if he pleased, to make them *short*. In a word, the whole doctrine of PROSODY came to this—that, as anciently the *Quantity of the Syllables* established the *Rhythm of the Verse*,

* See *Aristotle* and *Cicero*, as quoted before, particularly the last in his *Orator*, f. 189 to the end; *Quintilian*, L. IX. c. 4. *Demetrius Phalereus*, at the beginning of his Tract *De Elocut*.

Cicero, in his *De Oratore*, introduces *Crassus* using the same Arguments; those, I mean, which are grounded upon authority.

Atque hæc quidem ab iis Philosophis, quos tu maxime diligis, Catule, dicta sunt: quod eo sæpius testificor, ut auctoribus laudandis ineptiarum crimen effugiam. *De Oratore*, Lib. III. f. 187.

Part II. *Verse, so now the Rhythm of the Verse established the Quantity of the Syllables.*

THERE was an ancient Poet, his name COMMODIANUS, who dealt much in this illicit Quantity, and is said to have written (if that be possible) in the fifth, nay some assert, in the third Century. Take a sample of his Versification.

Saturnusque senex, si Dēus, quando senescit ?

And again,

Nec Divinus erat, sed Dēum sese dicebat.

And again,

Jupiter hic natūs in insulā Cretā Sātumo,

Ut fuit adultus, patrem de regnō privavit.

And again,

Ille autem in Cretā regnavit, et ibi defecit.

I SHALL crown the whole with an admirable distich, where (as I observed not long ago) *the Rhythm of the Verse gives alone the Quantity, while the Quantity of the Syllables is wholly disregarded.*

Tōt rēum crīmīnībūs, pārrīcīdām quōquē fūtūrū,

Ex auctōritātē vēstrā cōtūlīstīs in āltū.

Dr. Davies, at the end of his *Minutius Felix*, has thought it worth giving us an Edition of this wretched author, who, if he lived so early as supposed, must have been from among the dregs of the people, since *Ausonius*, *Claudian*, *Sulpicius Severus*, and *Boethius*, who were all authors of the same or a later period, wrote both in *Prose* and *Verse* with Classical Elegance.

WE

WE have mentioned the Debasement of *Latin*, previously to that of *Greek*, because it was an Event, which happened much sooner. As early as the sixth Century, or the seventh at farthest, *Latin* ceased to be the common Language of *Rome*, whereas *Greek* was spoken with competent purity in *Constantinople*, even to the fifteenth Century, when that City was taken by the *Turks*.

Not but that Corruption found its way also into *Greek* Poetry, when *Greek* began to degenerate, and *Accent*, as in *Latin*, to usurp dominion over *Quantity*.

'Twas then began the use of the *Versus Politici**, a species of Verses so called, because adapted to the *Vulgar*, and only fit for *Vulgar* Ears. 'Twas then the sublime *Hexameters* of *Homer* were debased into miserable *Trochaïcs*, not even legible as *Verses*, but by a suppression of *real* Quantity.

TAKE a Sample of these Productions, which, such as it is, will be easily understood, as it contains the Beginning of the First *Iliad* —

Τὴν ὀργὴν ἄδε, κ' λέγε,
ὦ θεά με Καλλιόπη,
Τῷ Πηλείδῃ Ἀχιλλέως,
Πῶς ἐγένετ' ὀλεθρία,
καὶ πολλὰς λύπας ἐποίησε
εἰς τὰς Ἀχαιοὺς δὴ πάντας,

καὶ

* See Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. Vol. X. p. 253, 318, 319.

Part II.

Καὶ πολλὰς ψυχὰς ἀνδρείας

Πῶς ἀπέσειλεν εἰς Ἄδην.

In reading the above Verses, we must carefully regard ACCENT, to which, and to which alone we must strictly adhere, and follow the same *Trochaic Rhythm*, as in those well known Verses of *Dryden*—

Wár he súnġ is tóil and tróuble,

Hónour bút an émpty búbble, &c.

The *Accentual* Quantity in the Greek, as well as in the English, totally destroys the *Syllabic*—δε in ἄδε is made long; so also is λε in λέγε; α, in θεὰ; ο, in Καλλιόπη. Again μ is short; so also is π in Πηλείδης. In Αχιλλέως every Syllable is corrupted; the first and third, being short, are made long; the second and fourth, being long, are made short. We quote no farther, as all that follows is similar, and the whole exactly applicable to our *present* versification.

THIS disgraceful Form of *Homer* was printed by *Pinelli*, at *Venice*, in the year 1540, but the Work itself was probably some centuries older*.

BESIDES this anonymous Perverter of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (for he has gone thro' both) there are *Political Verses* of the same barbarous character by *Constantinus Manassēs*, *John Tzetzes*, and others of that period.

AND

* A sort of Glossary is subjoined, whence, for curiosity, we select some very singular explanations, Πύλη, a Gate, is explained by Πορτα—θυρωροὶ, those, who keep Gates, are called Πορτάραι, that is, PORTERS—κλίσιαι, TENTS, are called by the name of Τένται—πύργος, a TOWER, by that of Τέρη—and of κήρυξ we are informed, σημαίνει ὅλον Τρυμπετάρην, that it signifies in general A TRUMPETER.

AND so much for the *Verse* of these times. Of their *Prose* (tho' next in order) we say nothing, it being loss of time to dwell upon authors, who being unable to imitate the Eloquence of their Predecessors, could discover no new Roads to Fame, but thro' Obscurity and Affectation. In this Class we range the *Historiæ Augustæ Scriptores*, *Marcianus Capella*, *Apuleius*, together with many others, whom we may call *Authors of African Latinity*. Perhaps too we may add some of the *Byzantine Historians*.

BEFORE we quit ACCENTUAL QUANTITY, there is one thing we must not omit. Strange as it appears, there are traces of it extant, even in *Classical Writers*.

As *Dactyls* and *Anapæsts* were frequently intermixed with Iambics, we find no less a writer, than the accurate *TERENCE*, make Syllables *short*, which *by Position* were *long*, in order to form the Feet above-mentioned. Take the following instances among many others.

Et id grātum fuisse advorsum te habeo gratiam.

Andr. A. I. f. 1. v. 15.

Prōptēr hōspitai hujusce consuetudinem.

Andr. A. II. f. vi. v. 8.

Ego exclūdor: ille recipitur, quā gratiā?

Eunuch. Act. I. f. ii. v. 79.

AMONG these Verses, all beginning with Anapæsts, the second syllable *id* in the first Verse is made *short*, tho' followed by *three Consonants*: the first Syllable *PRŌPTER* in the second Verse is made *short*, tho' followed by *two Consonants*: and the third syllable, *EX* in *excludor*,

Part II. *cludor*, in the third Verse is made *short*, tho' followed by a *double Consonant*, and *two others* after it.

WE are to observe however that, while Licences were assumed by the *Dramatic Writers of the Comic Iambic*, and by *TERENCE* more than the rest; 'twas a practice unknown to the *Writers of Hexameter*. 'Tis to be observed likewise, that these Licences were taken *at the beginning* of Verses, and never *at the End*, where a *pure Iambic* was held indispensable. They were also *Licences usually taken* with *Monosyllables, Dissyllables, or Prepositions*; in general with *Words in common and daily use*, which in all Countries are pronounced with *rapidity*, and made short *in the very Speaking*. It has been suggested therefore with great probability, that *TERENCE* adopted such a Mode of Verifying, because it *more resembled* the common Dialogue of the *middle Life*, which no one ever imitated more happily than himself*.

WE are now to proceed to the *modern Languages*, and to *our own* in particular, which, like the rest, has little of Harmony but what it derives from *ACCENTUAL QUANTITY*. And yet as this *ACCENTUAL QUANTITY* is wholly governed by *Ancient Rhythm*, to which, as far as possible, *we accommodate Modern Words*, the Speculations are by no means detached from *Ancient Criticism*, being wholly derived from *Principles*, which that Criticism had *first* established.

* See the *valuable Tract* of the celebrated BENTLEY, prefixed to his *Terence*, under the title of *De Metris Terentianis ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΜΑ*.

C H A P. III.

QUANTITY VERBAL in English — a few Feet pure, and agreeable to SYLLABIC QUANTITY — instances — yet ACCENTUAL QUANTITY prevalent — instances — transition to PROSE — English Pœans, instances of — RHYTHM governs Quantity, where this last is Accentual.

I N the scrutiny which follows we shall confine ourselves to ENGLISH, as no Language, to us at least, is equally familiar. And here, if we begin with quoting Poets, it must be remembered it is not purely for the sake of Poetry, but with a view to that Harmony, of which our Prose is susceptible.

Ch. III.

A few pure Iambics of the Syllabic sort we have, tho' commonly blended with the spurious and accentual. Thus Milton,

Fountaîns, and ye, that warble, as YE FLŌW— P. L. V. 195.

And again, more completely in that fine Line of his—

Fŏr Elŏquēnce, thē Soŭl; Sŏng chārms THE SENSE— P. L. II. 556.

I N the first of these Verses the last Foot is (as it *always should be**) a pure SYLLABIC Iambic; in the second Verse every Foot is such, but the Fourth.

BESIDES

* Sup. p. 326.

Part II. BESIDES *Iambics*, our Language knows also *the Heroic Foot*. In the Verse just quoted,

FOUNTAINS, and ye, that warble as ye flow,

the first Foot is a SPONDEE: so is the *fourth Foot* in that other Verse,

For Eloquence, the Soul; SONG CHARMS the Sense.

This Foot seems to have been admitted among the *English Iambics* precisely for the same reason as among the *Greek and Latin*; to infuse a certain *Stability*, which *Iambics* wanted, when alone—

TARDIOR ut paullo, GRAVIORQUE veniret ad aures,
SPONDEOS STABILES in jura paterna recepit. Hor. Art. Poet.

NOR do we want *that other Heroic Foot*, THE DACTYL, and that too accompanied (as usual) with THE SPONDEE. Thus in the second Psalm we read—

Whŷ dō theŷ pēoplē ĩmāĠĪNE A VĀIN THĪNG?

And soon after—

—against the Lōrd ānd āĠĀĪNST HĪS AĠNOĪNTĒD.

Where in both instances we have the *Hexameter Cadence*, tho' perhaps it was casual, and what the Translators never intended.

It must indeed be confessed *this Metre* appears *not natural* to our Language, nor have its *Feet* a proper effect, but when mixt with

with *Iambics*, to infuse that *Stability*, which we have lately mentioned*. Ch. III.

'Tis proper also to observe that, tho' metrical Feet in *English* have a few *long* and *short* Syllables, even in their *genuine* character (that I mean, which they derive from TRUE SYLLABIC QUANTITY) yet is *their Quantity more often determined* BY ACCENT ALONE †, it being enough to make a Syllable *long*, if it be ACCENTED; and *short*, if it be UNACCENTED; whatever may be the *Position* of ANY subsequent Consonants.

THUS in MILTON, we read,

— on the *ſēcrēt tōp*
Of *ˈOrēb dīdſt* ĩNSPĪRE—

P. L. I. 6. 7.

And again,

Hūrl'd hēadLŌNG, flāmĭNG, frōm th' ēthēriāl ſkȳ. P. L. I. 45.

IN these examples, the first Syllable of *ĩnſpire* is *short* by *Accental Quantity*, tho' the *Position* of its Vowel is before *three Consonants*; the last Syllable of *headlōng*, and the last Syllable of *flāmĭng*, are *short*, even tho' the *consecutive Consonants* are in both cases *Four*.

SUCH

* Sup. p. 328.

The use of the *Heroic* and the *Iambic* is well explained by *Cicero* from *Aristotle*.

Quod longe Aristoteli videtur secus, qui judicat Heroum Numerum grandiore quam desideret soluta oratio; Iambum autem nimis e vulgari sermone. Ita neque humilem, nec abjectam orationem, nec nimis altam et exaggeratam probat; plenam tamen eam vult esse gravitatis, ut eos, qui audiunt, ad majorem admirationem possit traducere. Ad Brut. Orat. f. 192.

† Sup. p. 321. 326.

Part II.

SUCH then in *English* being the force of ACCENTUAL QUANTITY, we are now to consider those Feet, thro' which not *our Verse*, but OUR PROSE may be harmonized.

Now *these Feet* are no other than THE TWO PÆANS, already described *, and their equivalent, THE CRETIC, which three may more particularly be called the FEET FOR PROSE †.

IN *Prose-composition* they may be called those Ingredients, which, like Salt in a Banquet, serve to give it a relish. Like Salt too, we should so employ them, that we may not seem to have mistaken the Seasoning for the Food.—But more of this hereafter ‡.

As to *the Place of these PÆANS*, tho' they have their effect in every part of a Sentence, yet have they a peculiar energy at its Beginning, and its End. The difference is, we are advised *to begin with the first Pæan*, and to conclude with the second, that the Sentence in each Extreme may be audibly markt §. If the Sentence be emphatical, and call for such attention, nothing can answer the purpose more effectually, than that CHARACTERISTIC LONG SYLLABLE,

* Sup. p. 319, 320.

† *Sit igitur [oratio] (ut supra dixi) permixta et temperata numeris, nec dissoluta, nec tota numerosa, PÆONE maxime, &c. Ad Brut. Orat. f. 196—and soon before, f. 194. PÆON autem minime est aptus ad Versum; quo libentius eum recepit ORATIO.*

‡ *Infr. p. 341.*

§ Vid. *Aristot. Rhetor. L. III. c. 8. p. 30. Edit. Sylb. "Ἐστὶ δὲ Παιάνος δύο εἶδη, ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις" ὧν τὸ μὲν, κ. τ. λ.*

TABLE, which in the *first Pæan* is always *inceptive*, in the *second* is Ch. III.
always *conclusive*.

For want of better examples we venture to illustrate by the following, where we have markt the *Two PÆANS*, together with their Equivalent *THE CRETIC*, and where we have not only markt the *Time* over each Syllable, but *separated each Foot* by a disjunctive stroke.

*Beautŷ mǎy bĕ—lōst, mǎy bĕ fōr—yĕars ōutlīv'd: but Virtue remains
the same, till Līfe ītsĕlf—īs āt ān ēnd.*

Again—

*Stēep īs thĕ A-scĕnt bŷ whĭch wĕ—moūnt tō Fāme;—nōr īs thĕ Sūm—
mīt tō bĕ gāīn'd—būt bŷ Sāgā—cītŷ ānd toīl. Fōols āre sūre tō lōse
thĕir wāy, ānd Cōwārd sīnk bĕnĕath the difficulty: thĕ wīse ānd brāve
ālōne sūccĕed; pĕrsīst—īn thĕir āttĕmpt—ānd nĕvĕr yīeld—tō thĕ
fātīgūe.*

THE Reader in these examples will regard two things; one, that the *Strokes of Separation* mark *only the Feet*, and are not to be regarded *in the Reading*; another, that tho' he may meet perhaps a few instances agreeable to *ancient Profody*, yet in *modern Rhythm* like this, be it *Prosaic* or *Poetic*, he must expect to find it governed for the greater part BY ACCENT*.

AND

* Sup. p. 321. 326. 329.

Part II.

AND so much for *Prosaic Feet*, and *Numerous Prose*, which, upon the Principles established by *ancient Critics*, we have aimed to accommodate to *our own Language*.

BUT we stop not here, having a few more Speculations to suggest, which, appearing to arise from the Principles of the old *Critics*, are amply verified in our best *English* authors. But more of this in the following Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

*Other Decorations of Prose besides Prosaic Feet—ALLITERATION—
SENTENCES—PERIODS—Caution to avoid excess in consecutive
Monosyllables—Objections, made and answered—Authorities alledged
—Advice about Reading.*

BESIDES the Decoration of *Prosaic Feet*, there are other Deco-
rations, admissible into *English Composition*, such as ALLITERA-
TION, and SENTENCES, especially THE PERIOD. Ch. IV.

FIRST therefore for the first; I mean ALLITERATION.

AMONG the Classics of old there is no finer illustration of this
Figure, than LUCRETIVS'S Description of those blest abodes, where
his Gods, detached from *Providential Cares*, ever lived in the frui-
tion of *divine Serenity*.

*Apparet Divum numen, sedesque QUIETÆ,
QUAS neque concutiunt venti, neque NUBILA NIMBIS
Aspergunt, NEQUE NIX acri concreta pruina
CANA CADENS violat, semperque INNUBILUS æther
Integit, et LARGE diffuso LUMINE ridet.* Lucret. III. 18.

THE sublime and accurate VIRGIL did not condemn *this Decora-
tion*, tho' he used it with such pure, unaffected *Simplicity*, that we
often

Part II. often feel its Force, without contemplating the Cause. Take one Instance out of infinite, with which his Works abound.

Aurora interea MISERIS MORTALIBUS ALMAM

Extulerat LUCEM, referens opera atque LABORES.* Æn. XI. v. 183.

To

* The following Account of this Figure is taken from *Pontanus*, one of these ingenious *Italians*, who flourished upon the revival of a purer Literature in *Europe*.

Ea igitur sive figura, sive ornatus, condimentum quasi quoddam numeris affert, placet autem nominare ALLITERATIONEM, quod è Literarum allusione constet. Fit itaque in versu, quoties dictiones continuatæ, vel binæ, vel ternæ ab iisdem primis consonantibus, mutatis aliquando vocalibus, aut ab iisdem incipiunt SYLLABIS, aut ab IISDEM primis vocalibus. Delectat autem ALLITERATIO hæc mirificè in primis et ultimis locis facta, in mediis quoque, licet ibidem aures minùs sint intentæ. Ut,

“ *Sæva sedens super arma —* Virg.

“ *—tales casus Cassandra canebat.* ejusd.

“ *Infonem infando indicio. —* ejusd.

“ *—longè sale Saxa sonabant.* ejusd.

“ *—magno misceri murmure pontum.* ejusd.

“ *Quæque lacus latè liquidos —* ejusd.

Fit interdum per continuationem insequentis versus, ut in his Lucretianis.

“ *—adverso flabra feruntur*

“ *Flumine. —*

Atqui ALLITERATIO hæc ne Ciceroni quidem displicuit in Oratione solutâ, ut cum dixit in Bruto, “ Nulla Res magis penetrat in animos, eosque FINGIT, FORMAT, FLECTIT.” Et in secundo de Oratore; “ Quodque me SOLlicitare SUMME solet.” Quid quod ne in jocos quidem illis tam lepidis neglecta est à Plauto; ut cum garrientem apud herum induxit Pænulum; “ Ne tu oratorem hunc PUGNIS PLECTAS postea.” Atque hæc quidem ALLITERATIO quemadmodum tribus in iis fit vocibus, fit alibi etiam in duabus simili modo. Ut,

“ *—taciti ventura videbant.* Virg.

“ *Tamo tempus erit. —* ejusd.

JOHANNIS JOVIANI PONTANI *Ælius—Dialogus.* Tom. II. p. 104. Edit. Venetis, ap. Ald. 1519.

TO VIRGIL we may add the superior authority of HOMER.

Ch. IV.

Ἦτοι δ' καππεδίον τὸ Ἀλγῖον οἶος Ἀλᾶτο,

Ὅν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον Ἀνθρώπων Ἀλεείνων. Ιλ. ζ. 201.

HERMOGENES, the Rhetorician, when he quotes these Lines, quotes them as an example of the Figure here mentioned, but calls it by a Greek name, ΠΑΡΗΧΗΣΙΣ*.

Cicero has translated the above Verses elegantly, and given us too ALLITERATION, tho' not under the same letters.

Qui miser in campis errabat solus Alæis,

Ipse suum Cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans. Cic.

Aristotle knew this Figure, and called it ΠΑΡΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ, a name perhaps not so precise as the other, because it rather expresses *Resemblance in general*, than that, which arises from *Sound in particular*. His example is—ΑΓΡΟΝ γὰρ ἔλαβεν, ΑΡΓΟΝ παρ' αὐτῷ †.

THE Latin Rhetoricians stiled it ANNOMINATIO, and give us examples of similar character ‡.

BUT

* The Explanation of it, given by *Hermogenes*, exactly suits his Instance. Παρήχησις δὲ ἐστὶ κάλλος ὁμοίων ὀνομάτων, ἐν διαφορᾷ γνώσει ταυτὸν ἡχόντων. PARECHESIS is *Beauty in similar Words, which under a different Signification SOUND the same*. Ἑρμογ. περὶ Ἑυρεσ. Τομ. δ. p. 193. Edit. Porti, 1570.

† Aristot. Rhet. III. 9. p. 132. Edit. Syll.

‡ Scrip. ad Herenn. L. IV. f. 29.

Part II.

BUT the most singular Fact is, that so *early* in our own History, as the reign of *Henry the Second*, this Decoration was esteemed and cultivated both by the *English* and the *Welch*. So we are informed by *Giraldus Cambrensis*, a contemporary Writer, who, having first given the *Welch* instance, subjoins the *English* in the following verse—

GOD is together GAMMEN and Wisedóme.

—that is, *God is at once both Joy and Wisdom.*

HE calls the Figure by the *Latin* Name ANNOMINATIO, and adds,
 “ that the two Nations were so attached to this verbal Ornament in
 “ every high finished Composition, that nothing was by them esteemed
 “ elegantly delivered, no Diction considered but as rude and rustic,
 “ if it were not first amply refined with the polishing Art of this
 “ Figure*.”

’Tis perhaps from this National Taste of ours that we derive many *Proverbial* Similes, which, if we except the Sound, seem to have no other merit—*Fine, as Five pence—Round, as a Robin—&c.*

EVEN SPENSER and SHAKSPEARE adopted the practice, but then it was in a manner suitable to such Geniuses.

SPENSER

* *Præ cunctis cutem Rhetoricis exornationibus ANNOMINATIONE magis utuntur, eâque precipue specie, quæ primas dictionum litteras vel syllabas convenientiâ jungit. Adeo igitur hoc verborum ornatu duæ nationes (Angli scil. et Cambri) in omni sermone exquisito utuntur, ut nihil ab his eleganter dictum, nullum nisi rude et agreste censeatur eloquium, si non schematis hujus limâ plene fuerit expolitur.* *Girald. Cambrensis Cambria Descriptio*, p. 889. *Edit. Fol. Camdeni*, 1603.

SPENSER says—

*For not to have been dipt in LETHE LAKE
Could save THE SON of THETIS from to die;
But that BLIND BARD did him immortal make
With Verses, DIPT in DEW of Castalie.*

SHAKSPEARE says—

*HAD my sweet HARRY HAD but HALF their numbers,
This day might I, HANGING on HOTSPUR'S neck,
Have talked, &c. Hen. IVth, Part 2d, Act 2d.*

MILTON followed them.

For Eloquence, the SOUL; SONG charms the SENSE.
P. L. II. 556.

And again,

*BEHEMOTH, BIGGEST BORN of Earth, upheav'd
His vastness— P. L. VII. 471.*

FROM DRYDEN we select one example out of many, for no one appears to have employed this Figure more frequently, or (like *Virgil*) with greater Simplicity and Strength.

*Better to HUNT in fields for HEALTH unbought,
Than fee the DOCTOR for a nauseous DRAUGHT.
The Wise for cure on exercise DEPEND;
God never MADE his Work for MAN to MEND.*

Dryd. Fables.

Part II. POPE sings in his *Dunciad*—

'Twas *chatt'ring, grinning, mouthing, jabb'ring all;*
And NOISE, and NORTON; BRANGLING, and BREVAL;
DENNIS, and DISSONANCE.—

Which Lines, tho' truly poetical and humorous, may be suspected by some to shew their Art *too conspicuously*, and too nearly to resemble that Verse of old *Ennius*—

O! Tite, Tute, Tati, Tibi Tanta, Tyranne, Tulisti.

Script. ad Herenn. L. IV. f. 18.

GRAY begins a sublime Ode,

RUIN seize thee, RUTHLESS King, &c.

WE might quote also ALLITERATIONS from *Prose Writers*, but those, we have alledged, we think sufficient.

NOR is Elegance only to be found in *single Words*, or in *single Feet*; it may be found, when we *put them together*, in our *peculiar mode* of putting them. 'Tis out of *Words and Feet thus compounded* that we form SENTENCES, and among Sentences none so striking, none so pleasing, as THE PERIOD. The reason is, that, while other Sentences are *indefinite*, and (like a Geometrical Right-line) may be *produced indefinitely*, THE PERIOD (like a Circular Line) is always *circumscribed*, returns, and terminates at a given point. In other words, while other Sentences, by the help of common Copulatives, have a sort of *boundless effusion*; the *constituent parts* of a PERIOD* have

* Vid. Arift. Rhet. III. c. 9. Demetr. Phal. de Elocut. f. 10, &c.

have a sort of *reflex* union, in which union the Sentence is so far complete, as neither to require, nor even to admit a *farther* extension. Readers find a pleasure in this *grateful Circuit*, which leads them so agreeably to an acquisition of knowledge.

THE Author, if he may be permitted, would refer by way of illustration to the Beginnings of his HERMES, and his PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, where some Attempts have been made in this *Periodical Stile*. He would refer also for much more illustrious examples, to the Opening of CICERO'S OFFICES; to that of the capital Oration of DEMOSTHENES CONCERNING THE CROWN; and to that of the celebrated PANEGYRIC, made (if he may be so called) by *the father of Periods*, ISOCRATES.

AGAIN—every *Compound Sentence* is compounded of *other Sentences more simple*, which, compared to one another, have a *certain proportion of Length*. Now 'tis in general a good Rule, that among these *constituent Sentences* THE LAST (if possible) should be *equal* to THE FIRST; or *if not equal*, then *rather longer* than shorter*. The reason is, that without a special Cause, *abrupt Conclusions* are *offensive*, and the Reader, like a Traveller quietly pursuing his Journey, finds an unexpected precipice, where he is disagreeably stopt.

To

The compact combining character of the PERIOD is well illustrated by Demetrius in the following Simile. Ἐοικε γὰρ τὰ μὲν περιδικὰ κῶλα τοῖς λίθοις, τοῖς ἀντερείδασιν τὰς περιφερεῖς τέγας, καὶ συνέχουσιν—the constitutive Members of THE PERIOD resemble those Stones, which mutually support, and keep vaulted Roofs together. f. 13.

* —aut PARIÀ esse debent POSTERIORA superioribus, EXTREMA primis; aut, quod est etiam melius et jucundius, LONGIORA. Cic. de Orat. III. f. 136.

Part II.

To these Speculations concerning *Sentences*, we subjoin a few others.

It has been called a fault in our Language, that it abounds in MONOSYLLABLES. As these, in too lengthened a suite, disgrace a Composition; *Lord Shaftesbury*, (who studied purity of Style with great attention) limited their number to *nine*, and was careful, in his *Characteristics*, to conform to his own Law. Even in *Latin* too many of them were condemned by *Quintilian**.

ABOVE all, care should be had, that a Sentence END not with a crowd of them, those especially of the vulgar, untunable sort, such as, *to set it up, to get by and by at it, &c.* for these disgrace a Sentence that may be otherwise laudable, and are like the Rabble at the close of some pompous Cavalcade.

'Twas by these, and other arts of similar sort, that Authors in distant ages have cultivated their STYLE. Looking upon *Knowledge* (if I may be allowed the allusion) *to pass into the Mansions of the Mind* THRO' LANGUAGE, they were careful (if I may pursue the metaphor) not to offend in THE VESTIBULE. They did not esteem it pardonable to despise the *Public Ear*, when they saw the Love of Numbers so universally diffused †.

NOR

* *Etiam MONOSYLLABA, si plura sunt, male continuabuntur: quia necesse est, COMPOSITIO, multis clausulis concisa, SUBSULTET.* Inst. Orat. IX. 4.

† *Nihil est autem tam COGNATUM MENTIBUS NOSTRIS, quam NUMERI atque VOCES; quibus et excitamur, et incendimur, et lenimur, et languescimus, et ad hilaritatem et ad tristitiam sæpe deducimur; quorum illa summa vis, &c.* Cic. de Orat. III. f. 197.

NOR were they discouraged, as if they thought their labour would be lost. In these *more refined*, but yet *popular* Arts, they knew the amazing difference between *the Power to execute*, and *the Power to judge*;—that to EXECUTE was the *joint* Effort of *Genius* and of *Habit*; a painful Acquisition, only attainable by the Few;—to JUDGE, the simple Effort of that *plain but common Sense*, imparted by Providence in some degree to every one*.

BUT here methinks an Objector demands—“*And are Authors then to compose, and form their Treatises by Rule?—Are they to balance Periods?—To scan Pæans and Cretics?—To affect Alliterations?—To enumerate Monosyllables, &c.*”

IF, in answer to this Objector, it should be said, THEY OUGHT, the Permission should at least be *tempered* with much caution. These Arts are to be so *blended* with a pure but *common* Stile, that the Reader, as he proceeds, may *only feel* their *latent* force. If ever they become *glaring*, they degenerate into *Affectation*; an Extreme more disgusting, because less natural, than even the vulgar language of an unpolished Clown. 'Tis in Writing, as in Acting——The best Writers are like our late admired *Garrick*.—And how did that able Genius employ his Art?—Not by a vain *ostentation* of any *one* of its powers, but by a *latent use* of them *all* in such an exhibition of Nature, that, while we were present in a Theatre, and only beholding an Actor, we could not help thinking ourselves in *Denmark* with HAMLET, or in *Bosworth Field* with RICHARD †.

THERE

* *Mirabile est, cum plurimum in Faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in Judicando. Ibid. III. f. 197.*

† *Ubiunque Ars ostentatur, Veritas abesse videtur. Quintil. Institut. X. 3. p. 587. Edit. Capp.—Quæ sunt ARTES ALTIORES, plurumque OCCULTANTUR, ut Artes sint.*

Part II.

THERE is another Objection still—These Speculations may be called MINUTIÆ; things partaking at best more of *the elegant*, than of *the solid*; and attended with difficulties, beyond the value of the labour.

To answer this, it may be observed, that, when *Habit* is once gained, nothing so easy as *Practice*. When the Ear is once habituated to these *Verbal Rhythms*, it forms them *spontaneously*, without attention or labour. If we call for instances, what more easy to every Smith, to every Carpenter, to every common mechanic, than *the several Energies of their proper Arts**? How little do even *the rigid Laws of Verse* obstruct a Genius truly Poetic? How little did they cramp a *Milton*, a *Dryden*, or a *Pope*? *Cicero* writes that *Antipater the Sidonian* could pour forth Hexameters *extempore*†; and that, whenever he chose to verify, Words followed him of course. We may add to *Antipater* the ancient *Rhapsodists* of the *Greeks*, and the modern *Improvvisatori* of the *Italians*. If this then be practicable in *Verse*, how much more so in *Prose*? In *Prose*, the Laws of which so far differ from those of Poetry, that we can at any time relax them

Ant. Ejusd. VIII. c. 3. p. 478. *Edit. Capper.*—DESINIT Ars esse, si APPAREAT. *Ejusd.* IV. 2. p. 249.

* See *Dionys. Halicarn. de Struct. Orat.* f. 25. where this Argument is well enforced by the common well-known HABIT OF READING, so difficult at first, yet gradually growing so familiar, that we perform it at last without deliberation, just as we see, or hear.

† *Cic. de Oratore*, L. III. 194. The same great writer in another place, speaking of the power of Habit, subjoins—*Id autem bonâ disciplinâ exercitatis, qui et multa scripserint, et quæcunque etiam sine scripto dicerent similia scriptorum effecerint, non erit difficilimum. Ante enim circumscribitur mente SENTENTIA, confestimque VERBA concurrunt, &c.* *Orator. ad. Brut.* f. 200.

them as we find expedient? Nay more, where to relax them is not only expedient, but even *necessary*, because tho' *Numerous Composition* may be a *Requisite*, yet *regularly returning Rhythm* is a thing we should avoid*?

IN every *whole*, whether natural or artificial, *the constituent Parts* well merit our regard, and in nothing more, than *in the facility of their co-incidence*. If we view a *Landskip*, how pleasing the *Harmony* between Hills and Woods, between Rivers and Lawns? If we select from this *Landskip* a *Tree*, how well does the *Trunk* correspond with its *Branches*, and the whole of its *Form* with its beautiful *Verdure*? If we take an *Animal*, for example, a fine *Horse*, what a *Union* in his *Colour*, his *Figure*, and his *Motions*? If one of human race, what *more pleasingly congenial*, than when *Virtue* and *Genius* appear to animate a *graceful Figure*?

—*pulchro veniens e corpore virtus?*

The charm increaseth, if to a *graceful Figure* we add a *graceful Elocution*. *Elocution* too is heightened still, if it convey elegant *Sentiments*; and these again are heightened, if cloathed with *graceful Diction*, that is, with *Words*, which are pure, precise, and well arranged.

BUT this brings us *home* to the very *spot*, whence we departed. We are insensibly returned to *Numerous Composition*, and view in *SPEECH* however

* *Multum interest, utrum NUMEROSA sit (id est, similis Numerorum) an planè e NUMERIS, constet Oratio. Alterum si sit, intolerabile vitium est: alterum nisi sit, dissipata, et inculta, et fluens est Oratio. Ejusd. ad Brut. f. 220.*

Part II. however referred, whether to the Body or the Mind, whether to the Organs of Pronunciation, or the Purity of Diction; whether to the Purity of Diction, or the Truth of Sentiment, how *perfectly natural the Co-incidence of every part.*

WE must not then call these *verbal Decorations*, MINUTIÆ. They are essential to the *Beauty*, nay to the *Completion* of the *Whole*. Without them the *Composition*, tho' its *Sentiments* may be just, is like a *Picture*, with good *Drawing*, but with bad and defective *Colouring*.

THESE we are assured were the *Sentiments* of CICERO, whom we must allow to have been a Master in his Art, and who has amply and accurately treated *verbal Decoration* and *numerous Composition* in no less than *two Capital Treatises* *, strengthening withal his own Authority with that of ARISTOTLE and THEOPHRASTUS; to whom, if more were wanting, we might add the names of DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, DIONYSIUS of HALICARNASSUS, DIONYSIUS LONGINUS, and QUINCTILIAN.

HAVING presumed thus far to advise AUTHORS, I hope I may be pardoned for saying a word to READERS, and the more so, as the Subject has not often been touched.

WHOEVER reads a *perfect* or *finished Composition*, whatever be the Language, whatever the Subject, should read it, even if *alone*, both *audibly*, and *distinctly*. IN

* His *Orator*, and his *De Oratore*.

IN a Composition of *this* Character not only *precise Words* are admitted, but Words *metaphorical* and *ornamental*. And farther—as every Sentence contains a latent Harmony, so is that Harmony derived from the *Rhythm* of its constituent Parts*.

A COMPOSITION then *like this*, should (as I said before) be read both *distinctly* and *audibly*; with due regard to Stops and Pauses; with occasional Elevations and Depressions of the Voice, and whatever else constitutes *just* and *accurate*† PRONUNCIATION. He, who despising, or neglecting, or knowing nothing of all this, reads a Work of such character, as he would read a Sessions-paper, will not only miss many beauties of *the Stile*, but will probably miss (which is worse) a large proportion of *the Sense*.

SOMETHING still remains concerning the Doctrine of WHOLE and PARTS, and those Essentials of *Dramatic* Imitation, MANNERS, SENTIMENT, and THE FABLE. But these Inquiries properly form other Chapters.

* See before, from p. 327 to p. 340.

† *Vid. Scriptor. ad Herenn. L. I. f. 3. L. III. f. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. p. 4. 73. 74. 75. Edit. Oxon. 1718.*

CHAP. V.

Concerning WHOLE and PARTS, as essential to the constituting of a legitimate Work—the Theory illustrated from THE GEORGICS OF VIRGIL, and THE MENECHENUS OF PLATO—same Theory applied to smaller pieces—TOTALITY, essential to small Works, as well as great—Examples to illustrate—ACCURACY, another Essential—more so to smaller pieces, and why—Transition to DRAMATIC SPECULATIONS.

Part II.

EVERY legitimate Work should be ONE, as much as a Vegetable, or an Animal; and, to be ONE like them, it should be a WHOLE, consisting of PARTS, and be in nothing redundant, in nothing deficient. The difference is, THE WHOLE of an Animal, or a Vegetable consists of PARTS, which exist at once: THE WHOLE of an Oration, or a Poem, as it must be either heard or perused, consists of Parts not taken at once, but in a due and orderly Succession.

The Description of SUCH A WHOLE is perfectly simple, but not, for that Simplicity, the less to be approved.

A WHOLE, we are informed, *should have a Beginning, Middle, and End**. If we doubt this, let us suppose a Composition to want them:—would not the very vulgar say, *it had neither head nor tail?*

NOR

* Ὅλον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. Arist. Poet. cap. 7. p. 231. Edit. Sylb.

NOR are the *Constitutive Parts*, tho' equally simple in their description, for that reason less founded in truth. A BEGINNING is *that, which nothing necessarily precedes, but which something naturally follows*. AN END is *that, which nothing naturally follows, but which something necessarily precedes*. A MIDDLE is *that, which something precedes, to distinguish it from a Beginning; and which something follows, to distinguish it from an End**.

I might illustrate this from a PROPOSITION in *Euclid*. The stating of the thing to be proved, makes the BEGINNING; the proving of it, makes the MIDDLE; and the asserting of it to have been proved, makes the CONCLUSION, or END: and thus is every such Proposition a complete and perfect Whole.

THE same holds in Writings of a character totally different. Let us take for an Example the most highly finished Performance among the Romans, and that in their most polished period, I mean THE GEORGICS OF VIRGIL.

Quid faciat lætas segetes, quo fidere terram

Vertere, Mæcnas, (II) ulmisque adjungere vites

Conveniat; (III) quæ cura boum, qui cultus habendo

Sit pecori; (IV) apibus quantâ experientia parcis,

Hinc canere incipiam, &c.

Virg. Georg. I.

In

* Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστιν, ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ μετ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πεφικνέν εἶναι ἢ γινέσθαι. Τελευτὴ δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετ' ἄλλο πεφικνέν εἶναι, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπιτοπολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τῷτο ἄλλο ἔδεν. Μέσον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο, καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. Arist. Poet. cap. 7. p. 231, 232. Edit. Sylb.

Part II. In these Lines, and so on (if we consult the Original) for forty-two Lines inclusive, we have THE BEGINNING; which *Beginning* includes two things, THE PLAN, and THE INVOCATION.

IN the four first Verses we have THE PLAN, *which Plan gradually opens* and becomes the WHOLE WORK, as an Acorn, when developed, becomes a perfect Oak. After this comes THE INVOCATION, which extends to the last of the *forty-two Verses* above-mentioned. The two together give us the *true character of a BEGINNING*, which, as above described, *nothing can precede*, and which, 'tis necessary that *something should follow*.

THE remaining Part of the first Book, together with the three Books following, to Verse the 458th of Book the Fourth, make the MIDDLE, which also has its *true character*, that of *succeeding the Beginning*, where we expect *something farther*; and that of *preceding the End*, where we expect *nothing more*.

THE eight last Verses of the Poem make THE END, which, like *the Beginning*, is *short*, and which preserves its real character, by satisfying the Reader, that *all is complete*, and that *nothing is to follow*. The Performance is even *dated*. It finishes like an Epistle, giving us the *Place* and *Time* of writing; but then giving them in such a manner, as they ought to come from VIRGIL*.

BUT to open our thoughts into a farther Detail.

As

* See Vol. I. p. 165.

As *the Poem* from its very *Name* respects various MATTERS RELATIVE TO LAND, (GEORGICA) and which are either immediately or mediately connected with it: among the variety of these matters the Poem *begins* from the *lowest*, and thence *advances gradually* from *higher to higher*, till having reached the *highest*, it there properly *stops*.

The first Book begins from the *simple Culture of the EARTH*, and from its HUMBLEST PROGENY, Corn, Legumes, Flowers, &c. *

'Tis a NOBLER SPECIES OF VEGETABLES, which employs *the second Book*, where we are taught *the Culture of Trees*, and, among others, of that important pair, THE OLIVE and THE VINE †. Yet it must be remembered, that all this is nothing more than the culture of mere *Vegetable and Inanimate Nature*.

'Tis in *the third Book* that the Poet rises to Nature SENSITIVE and ANIMATED, when he gives us precepts about *Cattle, Horses, Sheep, &c.* ‡

At length, in *the fourth Book*, when matters draw to a Conclusion, then 'tis he treats his Subject in a MORAL and POLITICAL WAY. He

* These are implied by *Virgil* in the *first Line* of his *first Book*, and in every other part of it, the *Episodes* and *Epilogue* excepted.

† This too is asserted at the *Beginning of his first Book*—*Ulmisque adjungere Vites*—and is the *intire subject* of the *second*, the same exceptions made as before.

‡ This is *the third subject* mentioned in *the Praeme*, and fills (according to just order) the *intire third Book*, making the same exceptions, as before.

Part II. He no longer pursues the Culture of the *mere brute Nature*; he then describes, as he tells us,

— *Mores, et studia, et populos, et prælia, &c.*

for such is the character of his BEES, those truly SOCIAL and POLITICAL ANIMALS. 'Tis here he first mentions *Arts*, and *Memory*, and *Laws*, and *Families*. 'Tis here (their great sagacity considered) he supposes a portion imparted of a SUBLIMER PRINCIPLE. 'Tis here that every thing *Vegetable* or merely *Brutal* seems forgotten, while all appears at least HUMAN, and sometimes even DIVINE.

His quidam signis, atque hæc exempla secuti,

Esse apibus PARTEM DIVINÆ MENTIS, et haustus

Ætherios dixere: DEUM namque ire per omnes

Terrasque tractusque maris, &c.

Georg. IV. 219.

WHEN the subject will not permit him to proceed farther, he suddenly conveys his Reader, by the Fable of ARISTÆUS, among *Nymphs*, *Heroes*, *Demi-gods* and *Gods*, and thus leaves him in company, supposed more than mortal.

THIS is not only a sublime CONCLUSION to the *fourth Book*, but naturally leads to THE CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE WORK; for he does no more after this than *shortly recapitulate*, and elegantly blend his recapitulating with a Compliment to *Augustus*.

BUT even this is not all.

THE dry, *didactic* character of the GEORGICS made it necessary, they should be enlivened by EPISODES and DIGRESSIONS. It
has

has been the Art of the Poet, that these *Episodes* and *Digressions* should be *homogeneous*; that is, should so connect with the Subject, as to become (as it were) *Parts* of it. On these Principles every Book has for its END, what I call an *Epilogue*; for its BEGINNING, an *Invocation*; and, for its MIDDLE, the several *Precepts*, relative to its Subject, I mean *Husbandry*. Having a *Beginning*, a *Middle*, and an *End*, EVERY PART ITSELF becomes A SMALLER WHOLE, tho' with respect to the *general* Plan it is nothing more than A PART. Thus the *Human Arm* with a view to its Elbow, its Hand, its Fingers, &c. is as clearly A WHOLE, as it is simply *but* A PART with a view to the *intire Body*.

THE SMALLER WHOLES of this divine Poem may merit some attention; by these I mean *each particular Book*.

EACH Book has an INVOCATION. *The first* invokes the Sun, the Moon, the various rural Deities, and lastly *Augustus*; *the second* invokes *Bacchus*; *the third* *Pales* and *Apollo*; *the fourth*, his Patron *Mæcenas*. I do not dwell on these *Invocations*, much less on the Parts which follow, for this in fact would be writing a Comment upon the Poem. But the EPILOGUES, besides their own intrinsic beauty, are too much to our purpose, to be past in silence.

IN the arrangement of them the Poet seems to have pursued *such an Order*, as that *alternate Affections* should be *alternately excited*; and this he has done, well knowing the importance of that generally acknowledged Truth, *the Force derived to Contraries by their*
juxta-

Part II. *juxta-position or succession* *. *The first Book* ends with *those* PORTENTS AND PRODIGIES, both upon Earth and in the Heavens, which preceded the Death of the Dictator *Cæsar*. To these direful scenes the Epilogue of *the second Book* opposes the TRANQUILITY AND FELICITY OF THE RURAL LIFE, which (as he informs us) Faction and civil Discord do not usually impair—

Non res Romanæ, perituraque regna —

In the Ending of *the third Book* we read of a PESTILENCE, and of *Nature in devastation*; in *the fourth*, of NATURE RESTORED, and, by help of the Gods, replenished.

As this CONCLUDING EPILOGUE (I mean the Fable of *Aristæus*) occupies the most important place, so is it decorated accordingly with *Language, Events, Places, and Personages*.

No LANGUAGE was ever more polished and harmonious. The descent of *Aristæus* to his mother, and of *Orpheus* to the shades, are EVENTS; the watery Palace of the *Nereids*, the Cavern of *Proteus*, and the Scene of the *infernal Regions*, are PLACES; *Aristæus*, old *Proteus*, *Orpheus*, *Eurydice*, *Cyllene* and her *Nymphs*, are PERSONAGES; all great, all striking, all sublime.

LET us view these Epilogues in the Poet's Order,

I. CIVIL HORRORS.

II. RURAL TRANQUILITY.

III. NATURE LAID WASTE.

IV. NATURE RESTORED.

Here,

* See before, p. 307, 308, &c.

Here, as we have said already, *different* Passions are, by the *Subjects* being *alternate* *, *alternately* excited; and yet withal excited so judiciously, that, when the Poem concludes, and all is at an end, *the Reader leaves off with tranquility and joy.*

FROM the GEORGICS of *Virgil* we proceed to the MENEXENUS of *Plato*; the first being the most finished Form of a *didactic Poem*, the latter, the most consummate Model of a *Panegyrical Oration*.


THE MENEXENUS is a *funeral Oration* in praise of those brave *Athenians*, who had fallen in battle by generously asserting the Cause of their Country. Like the *Georgics*, and every other just Composition, THIS ORATION has A BEGINNING, A MIDDLE, and AN END.

THE BEGINNING is a solemn account of the deceased having received *all the legitimate Rights of Burial*, and of the propriety of doing them honour not only by DEEDS, but by WORDS; that is, not only by *funeral Ceremonies*, but by a SPEECH, to perpetuate the memory of their magnanimity, and to recommend it to their posterity, as an object of imitation.

As the deceased were brave and gallant men, we are shewn *by what means* they came to possess their character, and *what noble exploits* they performed in consequence.

HENCE

* See before, p. 351.

Part II.  HENCE the MIDDLE of the Oration contains first their *Origin*; next their *Education* and Form of Government; and last of all, the consequence of such an Origin and Education; their Heroic *Atchievements* from the earliest days to the time then present*.

THE middle Part being thus complete, we come to the CONCLUSION, which is perhaps the most sublime piece of Oratory both for the Plan and Execution, which is extant of any age, or in any language.

By an awful *Protopopeia*, the *Deceased* are called up to address the *Living*; the *Fathers*, slain in battle, to exhort their living Children; the *Children*, slain in battle, to console their living Fathers; and this with every Idea of *manly* Consolation, and with every generous incentive to a contempt of Death, and a love of their Country, that the powers of Nature, or of Art could suggest†.

'Tis here this Oration concludes, being (as we have shewn) A PERFECT WHOLE, executed with all the strength of a sublime Language, under the management of a great and a sublime Genius.

If these Speculations appear too dry, they may be rendered more pleasing, if the Reader would peruse the two Pieces criticized. His labour, he might be assured, would not be lost, as he would peruse two

* See Dr. *Bentham's* elegant Edition of this Oration, in his *Λόγοι Ἐπιταφίοι*, printed at Oxford, 1746, from p. 21 to p. 40.

† See the same Edition from the words *ὦ Παιδες, ὅτι μὲν ἔτε πατέρων ἀγαθῶν*, p. 41, to the Conclusion of the Oration, p. 48.

two of the *finest pieces*, which the two *finest ages* of Antiquity produced.

WE cannot however quit *this Theory* concerning WHOLE and PARTS, without observing that it regards alike both *small Works* and *great*; and that it descends even to an *Essay*, to a *Sonnet*, to an *Ode*. These *minuter* efforts of Genius, unless they possess (if I may be pardoned the expression) a certain character of TOTALITY, lose a capital pleasure derived from their UNION; from a *Union*, which, collected in a few pertinent Ideas, combines them all happily, under *One amicable Form*. Without this *Union*, the Production is no better than a sort of *vague Effusion*, where Sentences follow Sentences, and Stanzas follow Stanzas, with *no apparent reason* why they should be two rather than twenty, or twenty rather than two.

IF we want another argument for this MINUTER TOTALITY, we may refer to *Nature*, which *Art* is said to imitate. Not only *this Universe* is one stupendous Whole, but such also is a *Tree*, a *Shrub*, a *Flower*; such those Beings, which, without the aid of glasses, even *escape* our perception. And so much for TOTALITY (I venture to familiarize the term) that *common* and *essential Character* to every *legitimate Composition*.

THERE is *another* character left, which, tho' foreign to the present purpose, I venture to mention, and that is the character of ACCURACY. Every Work ought to be as *accurate as possible*. And yet, tho' this apply to Works of *every* kind, there is a difference whether

Part II. the Work be *great* or *small*. In *greater* Works (such as Histories, Epic Poems, and the like) their *very Magnitude* excuses *incidental* defects, and their Authors, according to *Horace*, may be allowed to *slumber*. 'Tis otherwise in *smaller* Works, for the very reason, *that they are smaller*. Such, *thro' every part*, both in Sentiment and Diction, should be perspicuous, pure, simple and precise.

As Examples often illustrate better than Theory, the following short Piece is subjoined for perusal. The Reader may be assured, it comes not from the Author; and yet, tho' not his own, he cannot help feeling a *paternal* Solitude for it; a wish for indulgence to a juvenile Genius, that never meant a private Essay for public Inspection.

PERDITA TO FLORIZEL.

Argument.

Several Ladies in the Country having acted a Dramatic Pastoral, in which one of them under the name of FLORIZEL, a Shepherd, makes love to another under the name of PERDITA, a Shepherdess; their acting being finished, and they returned to their proper characters, one of them addresses the other in the following lines. —

“ No more shall we with trembling hear that Bell*,

“ Which shew'd Me, Perdita; Thee, Florizel.

“ No more thy brilliant eyes, with looks of love,

“ Shall in my bosom gentle pity move.

“ The

* The Play-bell.

“ The curtain drops, and now we both remain,
 “ You free from mimic love, and I from pain.
 “ Yet grant one favour—tho’ our Drama ends,
 “ Let the *feign’d* Lovers still be *real* Friends.”

THE Author, in *his own* Works, as far as his Genius would assist, has endeavoured to give them a just TOTALITY: He has endeavoured that each of them should exhibit a real *Beginning, Middle, and End*, and these *properly adapted* to the places, which they possess, and *incapable of Transposition*, without Detriment or Confusion. He does not however venture upon a *Detail*, because he does not think it worthy to follow *the Detail* of Productions, like *the Georgics*, or *the Menexenus*.

So much therefore for the Speculation concerning WHOLE and PARTS, and such matters relative to it, as have incidentally arisen.

WE are now to say something upon the Theory of SENTIMENT; and as SENTIMENT and MANNERS are intimately connected, and in a DRAMA both of them naturally rise out of the FABLE, it seems also proper to say something upon DRAMATIC SPECULATION IN GENERAL, beginning, according to Order, first from the first.

CHAP. VI.

DRAMATIC SPECULATIONS,—*the constitutive Parts of every Drama*
—*Six in number—*which of these belong to other Artists—*which,*
to the Poet—transition to those, which appertain to the Poet.

Part II.

THE Laws and Principles of Dramatic Poetry among THE
GREEKS, whether it was from the excellence of their Pieces,
or of their Language, or of both, were treated with attention even by
their ablest Philosophers.

WE shall endeavour to give a sketch of their Ideas; and, if it shall
appear that we illustrate by instances chiefly Modern, we have so done,
because we believe that it demonstrates the Universality of the Precepts.

A DRAMATIC PIECE, or (in more common Language) A PLAY,
is, *the Detail or Exhibition of a certain Action*—not however an Action,
like one in History, which is supposed actually to have happened,
but, tho' taken from History, a FICTION or IMITATION, in various
particulars derived from Invention. 'Tis by this that Sophocles and
Shakspeare differ from Thucydides and Clarendon. 'Tis INVENTION
makes them Poets, and NOT METRE, for had Coke or Newton written
in Verse, they could not for that reason have been called Poets*.

AGAIN,

* Δῆλον ἔν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν, ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσω ποιητὴς
κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ἐστὶ μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. 'Tis therefore evident hence, that a POET or
MAKER ought rather to be a MAKER OF FABLES, than of VERSES, in as much as he is a
POET

AGAIN, A DRAMATIC PIECE, or PLAY is the Exhibition of an Action, *not simply related*, as the *Eneid* or *Paradise Lost*, but where the Parties concerned are made *to appear in person*, and PERSONALLY TO CONVERSE AND ACT THEIR OWN STORY. 'Tis by this that the *Samson Agonistes* differs from the *Paradise Lost*, tho' both of them Poems from the same sublime Author. Ch. VI.

Now such DRAMATIC PIECE or PLAY, in order to make it pleasing (and surely, *to please* is an Essential to the Drama) must have A BEGINNING, MIDDLE, and END, that is, as far as possible, be a PERFECT WHOLE, *having Parts*. If it be defective here, it will be hardly comprehensible; and if hardly comprehensible, 'tis not possible that it should *please*.

BUT upon *Whole and Parts*, as we have spoken *already**, we speak not now. At present we remark, that SUCH AN ACTION, as *here described*, makes in every *Play* what we call THE STORY, or (to use a Term more *technical*) THE FABLE; and that this STORY or FABLE is, and has been justly called the very SOUL OF THE DRAMA†, since from this it derives its very Existence.

WE proceed—THIS DRAMA then being an *Action*, and that *not rehearsed* like an *Epopee* or *History*, but *actually transacted* by certain *present*

POET or MAKER in virtue of his IMITATION, and as the Objects he imitates are human actions. Arist. De Poet. cap. IX. p. 234. Edit. Sylb.

* Sup. Ch. V.

† Αρχὴ μὲν ἐν καὶ οἶον ΨΥΧΗ 'Ο ΜΥΘΟΣ τῆς τραγωδίας. Arist. Poet. C. VI. p. 231. Edit. Sylb.

Part H. *present living Agents*, it becomes necessary that *these Agents* should *mutually converse*, and that they should have too *a certain Place*, where to hold their Conversation. Hence we perceive that in every Dramatic Piece, not only THE FABLE is a requisite, but THE SCENERY, and THE STAGE, and more than these, a PROPER DICTION. Indeed the *Scenery* and *Stage* are not in the Poet's Department: they belong at best to the Painter, and after him to inferior Artists. The DICTION is the *Poet's*, and this indeed is important, since the Whole of his Performance is conveyed *thro' the Dialogue*.

BUT DICTION being admitted, we are still to observe, that there are other things wanting, of no less importance. In the various transactions of *real Life*, every person does *not simply speak*, but some way or other SPEAKS HIS MIND, and discovers by his behaviour *certain TRACES OF CHARACTER*. Now 'tis in these *almost inseparable Accidents* to Human Conduct, that we perceive the rise of SENTIMENT and MANNERS. And hence it follows that as DRAMATIC FICTION copies real Life, not only DICTION is a necessary part of it, but MANNERS also, and SENTIMENT.

WE may subjoin one Part more, and that is MUSIC. The ancient Chorusses between the Acts were probably *sung*, and perhaps the rest was delivered in *a species of Recitative*. Our modern Theatres have a Band of *Music*, and have *Music* often introduced, where there is no Opera. In this last (I mean the *Opera*) MUSIC seems to claim precedence.

FROM

FROM these Speculations it appears, that *the Constitutive Parts of the Drama* are *six*, that is to say, the FABLE, the MANNERS, the SENTIMENT, the DICTION, the SCENERY, and the MUSIC *. Ch. VI.

BUT then, as out of these *six* the *Scenery* and the *Music* appear to appertain to *other* Artists, and the *Play* (as far as respects the *Poet*) is *complete without them*: it remains that its *four primary and capital Parts* are the FABLE, the MANNERS, the SENTIMENT, and the DICTION.

THESE by way of Sketch we shall *successively* consider, commencing from the FABLE, as *the first* in dignity and rank.

* They are thus enumerated by *Aristotle*—μῦθος, καὶ ἦθος, καὶ λέξις, καὶ δianoia, καὶ ὄψις, καὶ μελοποιία. *De Poet.* C. VI. p. 230. *Edit. Syll.*

The Doctrines of *Aristotle* in this, and the following Chapters may be said to contain in a manner *the whole Dramatic Art*.

CHAP. VII.

In the constitutive Parts of a Drama, the FABLE considered first—its different Species—which fit for Comedy; which, for Tragedy—Illustrations by Examples—REVOLUTIONS—DISCOVERIES—Tragic Passions—Lillo's Fatal Curiosity—compared with the Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles—Importance of Fables, both Tragic and Comic—how they differ—bad Fables, whence—other Dramatic Requisites, without the Fable, may be excellent—Fifth Acts, how characterised by some Dramatic Writers.

Part II.

IF we treat of DRAMATIC FABLES or STORIES, we must first inquire how many are their SPECIES; and these we endeavour to arrange, as follows.

ONE SPECIES is, when the *several Events flow in a similar Succession*, and calmly maintain that *equal course*, till the Succession stops, and the *Fable* is at an end. Such is the Story of a simple Peasant, who quietly dies in the Cottage where he was born, the same throughout his life, both in manners, and in rank.

THERE IS A SECOND SPECIES of *Story* or *Fable*, not *simple*, but *complicated**; a Species, where the *succeeding Events* differ widely from

* Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοῖ, οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις, ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μυθοὶ εἰσιν, ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθὺς ἕσαι τοιαύται· λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. Of FABLES some are SIMPLE, and some are COMPLICATED; for such are Human Actions, of which Fables are Imitations. By simple, I mean, &c. *Arist. Poet. cap. 10. p. 235. Edit. Sylb.*

from *the preceding*; as for example, *the Story* of the well-known *Ch. VII.*
Massinello, who, in a few days, from a poor Fisherman rose to Sovereign Authority. Here the *Succession* is *not equal* or *similar*, because we have A SUDDEN REVOLUTION from low to high, from mean to magnificent.

THERE IS ANOTHER COMPLICATED SPECIES, the reverse of this last, where THE REVOLUTION, tho' in extremes, is from high to low, from magnificent to mean. This may be illustrated by *the same Massinello*, who, after a short taste of Sovereignty, was ignominiously slain.

AND thus are all FABLES or STORIES either *simple* or *complicated*; and *the complicated* also of two subordinate sorts; of which the one, beginning *from Bad*, ends *in Good*; the other, beginning *from Good*, ends *in Bad*.

IF we contemplate these various species, we shall find the *simple Story* least adapted either to *Comedy* or *Tragedy*. It wants those *striking Revolutions*, those *unexpected Discoveries**, so essential to engage, and to detain a Spectator.

'TIS

* These REVOLUTIONS and DISCOVERIES are called in Greek Περιπέτεια and Αναγνώρισις. They are thus defined. Ἐστὶ δὲ Περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τὸτο δὲ—κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ἀναγκαῖον. A REVOLUTION is, as has been already said, a Change into the reverse of what is doing, and that either according to Probability, or from Necessity. Arist. Poet. c. 11. p. 235. Edit. Sylb. Again—Αναγνώρισις δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ ἐχθρὰν τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων. A DISCOVERY is, as the name implies, a Change from Ignorance to Knowledge, a Knowledge leading either to Friendship or Enmity between those, who [in the course of the Drama] are destined to Felicity or Infelicity. Arist. Poet. ut supra.

Part II. 'Tis not so with COMPLICATED STORIES. Here every sudden REVOLUTION, every DISCOVERY has a charm, and the *unexpected events* never fail to *interest*.

It must be remarked however of *these complicated Stories*, that, where the REVOLUTION is *from Bad to Good*, as in the first subordinate Sort, they are more natural to COMEDY* than to Tragedy, because Comedies, however *Perplexed* and *Turbid* may be their Beginning, generally produce at last (as well the ancient as the modern) a Reconciliation of Parties, and a Wedding in consequence. Not only TERENCE, but every modern, may furnish us with examples.

ON the contrary, when the REVOLUTION, as in the *second sort*, is *from Good to Bad*, (that is, *from Happy to Unhappy*, from *Prosperous to Adverse*) here we discover the *true Fable*, or *Story*, proper for TRAGEDY. Common sense leads us to call, even in *real life*, such Events, TRAGICAL. When *Henry the fourth of France*, the triumphant Sovereign of a great people, was unexpectedly murdered by a wretched Fanatic, we cannot help saying, 'twas a TRAGICAL STORY.

BUT to come to the TRAGIC DRAMA itself.

WE

* The Stagirite having approved the practice, that Tragedy should end with Infelicity, and told us that the introduction of *Felicity* was a sort of Complement paid by the Poet to the wishes of the Spectators, adds upon the subject of a HAPPY ENDING—ἐστὶ δὲ οὐχ αὐτὴ ἀπὸ Τραγωδίας ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς Κωμωδίας οὐκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἂν οἱ ἐχθιστοὶ ὥσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ οἶον Ορέστης καὶ Αἰγισθος φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει ἕδεις ὑπ' ἑδενός. This is not a Pleasure arising from TRAGEDY, but is rather peculiar to COMEDY. For there, if the characters are most hostile; (as much so, as Orestes and Ægisthus were;) they become Friends at last, when they quit the Stage, nor does any one die by the means of any other. Arist. Poet. c. 13. p. 238. Edit. Sylb.

WE see this kind of REVOLUTION sublimely illustrated in the *Oedipus of Sophocles*, where *Oedipus*, after having flattered himself in vain, that his Suspicions would be relieved by his *Inquiries*, is at last by those very *Inquiries** plunged into the deepest woe, from finding it confirmed and put beyond doubt, that he had murdered his own Father, and was then married to his own Mother.

WE see the force also of such a REVOLUTION in *Milton's Samson Agonistes*. When his Father had specious hopes to redeem him from Captivity, these hopes are at once blasted by his unexpected destruction†.

OTHELLO commences with a prospect of *Conjugal Felicity*; LEAR‡ with that of *Repose*, by retiring from *Royalty*. DIFFERENT REVOLUTIONS (arising from Jealousy, Ingratitude, and other culpable affections) change both of these pleasing prospects into the deepest distress, and with this distress each of the Tragedies concludes.

NOR is it a small heightening to these REVOLUTIONS, if they are attended, as in the *Oedipus*, with A DISCOVERY§, that is, if the

Parties

* See the same Poetics of Aristotle, in the beginning of Chap. 11th—"Ὡς περ ἐν τῇ Ὀιδίποδι κ. τ. λ. p. 235. Edit. Sylb.

† See *Samson Agonistes*, v. 1452, &c.

‡ This Example refers to the *real Lear* of *Shakspeare*, not the *spurious* one, commonly acted under his name, where the imaginary Mender seems to have paid the same Compliment to his audience, as was paid to other audiences two thousand years ago, and then justly censured. See Note, in the preceding page.

§ See the preceding page.

Part II. Parties *who suffer*, and those *who cause* their sufferings, are *discovered* to be connected, for example, to be Husband and Wife, Brother and Sister, Parents and a Child, &c. &c.

If a man in *real* Life happen to kill another, it certainly heightens the Misfortune, even tho' an *Event of mere Chance*, if he *discover* that person to be his Father or his Son.

'Tis easy to perceive, if these Events are *Tragic* (and can we for a moment doubt them to be such?) that PITY and TERROR are *the true Tragic Passions**; that they truly bear that Name, and are necessarily diffused thro' every *Fable truly Tragic*.

Now, whether our ingenious Countryman, LILLO, in that capital Play of his, THE FATAL CURIOSITY, learnt this Doctrine from others, or was guided by pure Genius, void of Critical Literature: 'tis certain that in *this Tragedy* (whatever was the cause) we find the model of A PERFECT FABLE, under *all* the Characters here described.

“ A long-

* It has been observed that, if persons of *consummate Virtue and Probity* are made unfortunate, it does not move our *Pity*, for we are *shocked*; if Persons *notoriously infamous* are *unfortunate*, it may move our *Humanity*, but hardly *then* our *Pity*. It remains that PITY, and we may add FEAR, are naturally excited by *middle* characters, those who are no way distinguished by their *extraordinary Virtue*, nor who bring their misfortunes upon them so much by *Improbability*, as by *Error*.

As we think the sufferings of such persons *rather hard*, they move our PITY; as we think them *like ourselves*, they move our FEAR.

This will explain the following expressions—ΕΛΕΟΣ μὲν, περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον· ΦΟΒΟΣ δὲ, περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. *Arist. Poet. c. 13. p. 237. Edit. Sylb.*

“ A long-lost Son, returning home unexpectedly, finds his Parents
“ alive, but perishing with indigence. Ch. VII.

“ THE young man, whom from his long absence his Parents
“ never expected, discovers himself first to an amiable friend, his
“ long-loved *Charlotte*, and with her concert the manner how to
“ discover himself to his Parents.

“ 'TIS agreed he should go to their House, and there remain *un-*
“ *known*, till *Charlotte* should arrive, and make the happy Discovery.

“ HE goes thither accordingly, and having by a Letter of *Char-*
“ *lotte's* been admitted, converses, tho' unknown, both with Father
“ and Mother, and beholds their misery with filial Affection—com-
“ plains at length he was fatigued, (which in fact he really was)
“ and begs he may be admitted for a while to repose. Retiring
“ he delivers a Casket to his Mother, and tells her 'tis a deposit, she
“ must guard, till he awakes.”

“ CURIOSITY tempts her to open the Casket, where she is dazzled
“ with the splendor of innumerable Jewels. Objects *so alluring*
“ suggest *bad* Ideas, and *Poverty* soon gives to those Ideas a *sanction*.
“ Black as they are, she communicates them to her husband, who,
“ at first reluctant, is at length persuaded, and for the sake of the
“ Jewels stabs the stranger, while he sleeps.

“ THE fatal murder is *perpetrating*, or at least but *barely* *perpe-*
“ *trated*, when *Charlotte* arrives, *full of Joy* to inform them, that the
“ stranger within their walls was *their long-lost Son*.”

WHAT

Part II. WHAT a DISCOVERY? What a REVOLUTION? How irresistibly are the *Tragic Passions of Terror and Pity* excited*.

'Tis no small Praise to this *affecting Fable*, that it so much resembles that of the Play just mentioned, the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. In both Tragedies that, which *apparently* leads to *Joy*, leads in its completion to *Misery*; both Tragedies concur in the *horror* of their DISCOVERIES; and both in those great outlines of a truly TRAGIC REVOLUTION, where (according to the nervous sentiment of *Lillo* himself) we see

——— the two extremes of Life,
The highest Happiness, and deepest Woe,
With all the sharp and bitter Aggravations
Of such a vast transition——

A FARTHER concurrence may be added, which is, that each Piece begins and proceeds in a *train of Events*, which *with perfect probability* lead to its Conclusion, without the help of Machines, Deities, Prodigies, Spectres, or any thing else, incomprehensible, or incredible †.

WE may say too, in both Pieces there exists TOTALITY, that is to say, they have a *Beginning*, a *Middle*, and an *End* ‡.

WE mention this *again*, tho' we have mentioned it already, because we think we cannot enough enforce so absolutely essential a Requisite;

* See p. 364, &c.

† It is true that in one Play mention is made of an *Oracle*; in the other, of a *Dream*; but neither of them affects the Catastrophe; which in both Plays arises from Incidents perfectly natural.

‡ See before, Ch. V.

quisite; a Requisite descending in *Poetry* from the mighty *Epopée* down to the minute *Epigram*; and never to be dispensed with, but in Sessions Papers, Controversial Pamphlets, and those passing Productions, which, like certain insects of which we read, live and die within the day*.

AND now, having given in the above instances this Description of THE TRAGIC FABLE, we may be enabled to perceive its amazing efficacy. It does not, like a *fine Sentiment*, or a *beautiful Simile*, give an *occasional* or *local* Grace; it is never out of sight; it adorns every Part, and passes through the whole.

'TWAS from these reasonings that the great *Father of Criticism*, speaking of THE TRAGIC FABLE, calls it THE VERY SOUL OF TRAGEDY †.

NOR is this assertion less true of THE COMIC FABLE, which has too, like *the Tragic*, its REVOLUTIONS, and its DISCOVERIES; its Praise from NATURAL ORDER, and from A JUST TOTALITY.

THE DIFFERENCE between them *only lies* in the *Persons* and the *Catastrophe*, in as much as (contrary to the usual practice of *Tragedy*) THE COMIC PERSONS are mostly either of *Middle* or *Lower* Life, and THE CATASTROPHE for the greater part from *Bad* to *Good*, or (to talk less in extremes) from *turbid* to *tranquil* ‡.

ON

* *Vid. Aristot. Animal. Histor. L. 5. p. 143. Edit. Sylb.*

† See before, p. 359.

‡ See p. 364.

Part II.

ON FABLES, COMIC as well as TRAGIC, we may alike remark, that, when good, like *many other fine things*, they are *difficult*. And hence perhaps the Cause, why *in this respect* so many Dramas are *defective*; and why their *Story* or *Fable* is commonly no more, than either a *jumble of Events* hard to comprehend, or a *Tale taken from some wretched Novel*, which has little foundation either in Nature or Probability.

EVEN in the Plays we most admire, we shall seldom find our Admiration to arise from the FABLE: 'tis either from THE SENTIMENT, as in *Measure for Measure*; or from the purity of THE DICTION, as in *Cato*; or from the CHARACTERS and MANNERS, as in *Lear*, *Othello*, *Falstaff*, *Benedict* and *Beatrice*, *Ben the Sailor*, *Sir Peter* and *Lady Teazle*, with the other Persons of that pleasing Drama, *the School for Scandal*.

To these merits, which are great, we may add others far inferior, such as the *Scenery*; such, as in Tragedy, the *Spectacle* of Poms and Processions; in Comedy, the amusing *Bustle* of Surprizes and Squabbles; all of which have their effect, and keep our Attention alive.

BUT here, alas! commences the Grievance. After Sentiment, Diction, Characters and Manners; after the elegance of Scenes; after Poms and Processions, Squabbles and Surprizes; when, these being over, *the whole draws to a conclusion*—'tis then unfortunately comes the *Failure*. At that critical moment, of all the most interesting (by that *critical moment* I mean the CATASTROPHE), 'tis then the
poor

poor Spectator is led into a Labyrinth, where both himself and the Poet are often lost together. Ch. VII.

IN *Tragedy* this Knot, like the *Gordian Knot*, is frequently solved by the sword. The principal Parties are slain; and, these being dispatched, the Play ends of course.

IN *Comedy* the Expedient is little better. The old Gentleman of the Drama, after having fretted, and stormed thro' the first four Acts, towards the Conclusion of the fifth is unaccountably appeased. At the same time the dissipated Coquette, and the dissolute fine Gentleman, whose Vices cannot be occasional, but must clearly be habitual, are in the space of half a Scene miraculously reformed, and grow at once as completely good, as if they had never been otherwise.

'Twas from a sense of this concluding Jumble, this unnatural huddling of Events, that a witty Friend of mine, who was himself a Dramatic Writer, used pleasantly, tho' perhaps rather freely, to damn the man, who invented fifth Acts*.

AND

* So said the celebrated HENRY FIELDING, who was a respectable person both by Education and Birth, having been bred at Eton School and Leyden, and being lineally descended from an Earl of Denbigh.

His JOSEPH ANDREWS and TOM JONES may be called *Master-pieces* in the COMIC EPOPEE, which none since have equalled, tho' multitudes have imitated; and which he was peculiarly qualified to write in the manner he did, both from his Life, his Learning, and his Genius.

Had his Life been less irregular (for irregular it was, and spent in a promiscuous intercourse with persons of all ranks) his *Pictures of Human kind* had neither been so various, nor so natural.

Part II. AND so much for the *Nature* or *Character* of THE DRAMATIC
FABLE.

WE are now to inquire concerning MANNERS and SENTIMENT,
and first for the Theory of MANNERS.

Had he posselt less of *Literature*, he could not have infused such a spirit of *Classical Elegance*.

Had his *Genius* been less fertile in *Wit and Humour*, he could not have maintained that *uninterrupted Pleasantry*, which never suffers his Reader to feel fatigue.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning DRAMATIC MANNERS—*what constitutes them—Manners of Othello, Macbeth, Hamlet—those of the last questioned, and WHY—Consistency required—yet sometimes blameable, and WHY—Genuine Manners in Shakspeare—in Lillo—Manners, morally bad, poetically good.*

“WHEN the principal Persons of any Drama preserve such
“ a consistency of Conduct, (it matters not whether that
“ Conduct be virtuous, or vicious) that, after they have appeared
“ for a Scene or two, we conjecture WHAT THEY WILL DO HERE-
“ AFTER, from WHAT THEY HAVE DONE ALREADY, such Persons
“ in Poetry may be said to have MANNERS, for by this, and this
“ only, are POETIC MANNERS constituted*.”

Ch. VIII.

To explain this assertion, by recurring to instances—As soon as we have seen the violent *Love* and weak *Credulity* of OTHELLO, the
fatal

* Ἔστι δὲ ΗΘΟΣ μὲν τὸ τοιαύτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποιά τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἔκ ἐστι δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται, ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. MANNERS or CHARACTER is that which discovers, WHAT THE DETERMINATION [of a Speaker] will be, in matters, where IT IS NOT YET MANIFEST, whether he chuses to do a thing, or to avoid it. Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 231. Edit. Sylb.

It was from our being unable, in the Persons of some Dramas, to conjecture what they will determine, that the above author immediately adds—διόπερ ἐκ ἔχουσιν ἥθος ἐνιοὶ τῶν λόγων—*for which reason some of the Dramatic Dialogues have no MANNERS at all.*

And this well explains another account of MANNERS given in the same Book—Τὰ δὲ ΗΘΗ, καθ' ἃ τοῖς τινας εἶναι φάμεν τὰς πράττοντας.—MANNERS are those qualities, thro' which we say the actors are men of SUCH, or SUCH a character. ibid.

Bossu, in his *Traité du Poeme Epique*, has given a fine and copious Commentary on this part of *Aristotle's Poetics*. See his Work, Liv. IV. chap. 4, 5, &c.

Part II. *fatal Jealousy*, in which they terminate, is no more than what we may conjecture. When we have marked the *attention* paid by MACBETH to the *Witches*, to the persuasions of his *Wife*, and to the flattering dictates of his own *Ambition*, we suspect *something atrocious*; nor are we surpris'd, that, in the Event, he murders *Duncan*, and then *Banquo*. Had he changed his conduct, and been only wicked by halves, his MANNERS would not have been as they now are, *poetically good*.

IF the leading Person in a Drama, for example HAMLET, appear to have been *treated most injuriously*, we naturally infer that he will meditate *Revenge*; and should that *Revenge* prove fatal to those who had injured him, 'tis no more than was *probable*, when we consider the *Provocation*.

BUT should the *same Hamlet* by chance kill an *innocent old Man*, an old Man, from whom he had *never received Offence*; and with whose *Daughter* he was *actually in love*;—what should we expect then? Should we not look for *Compassion*, I might add, even for *Compunction*? Should we not be shockt, if, instead of this, he were to prove quite *insensible*—or (what is even worse) were he to be *brutally jocular*?

HERE the MANNERS are *blameable*, because they are *inconsistent*; we should never conjecture from HAMLET any thing so *unfeelingly cruel*.

NOR are *Manners* only to be blamed for being thus *inconsistent*. CONSISTENCY itself is blameable, if it exhibit *Human Beings completely*

pletely abandoned; *completely* void of Virtue; prepared, like King Richard, at their very birth, for mischief. 'Twas of such models that a jocosé Critic once said, they might make *good Devils*, but they could never make *good Men*: not (says he) that they want *Consistency*, but 'tis of a *supernatural* fort, which *Human Nature* never knew.

Quodcumque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi. Hor.

THOSE, who wish to see Manners in a more genuine Form, may go to the characters already alledged in the preceding chapter*; where, from our *previous* acquaintance with the several parties, we can hardly fail, as incidents arise, to *conjecture* † their *future Behaviour*.

WE may find also Manners of this sort in the *Fatal Curiosity*. Old Wilmot and his Wife discover *Affection* for one another; nor is it confined here—they discover it for their absent Son; for his beloved Charlotte; and for their faithful servant Randal. Yet, at the same time, from the memory of past Affluence, the pressure of present Indigence, the fatal want of Resources, and the cold ingratitude of Friends, they shew to all others (the few above excepted) a gloomy, proud, unfeeling *Misanthropy*.

IN this state of mind, and with these manners an Opportunity offers, *by murdering an unknown Stranger*, to gain them immense Treasure, and place them above want. As the Measure was at once
both

* See p. 370.

† See p. 373.

Part II. both tempting and easy, was it not natural that *such a Wife* should persuade, and that *such a Husband* should be persuaded?—We may conjecture from their past behaviour what part they would prefer, and that part, tho' *morally* wicked, is yet *poetically* good, because here all we require, is a *suitable Consistence* *.

WE are far from justifying Affassins. Yet Affassins, if truly drawn, are not Monsters, but *Human Beings*; and, as such, being chequered with *Good* and with *Evil*, may by their *Good* move our *Pity*, tho' their *Evil* cause *Abhorrence*.

BUT this in the present case is not all. The innocent parties, made miserable, exhibit a distress, which comes home; a distress, which, as mortals, it is impossible we should not feel.

Sunt lacrymæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt †. Virg. *Æn.*

* See p. 375.

† It was intended to illustrate, by large Quotations from different parts of this affecting Tragedy, what is asserted in various parts of these Inquiries. But the intention was laid aside, (at least in greater part) by reflecting that the Tragedy was easily to be procured, being modern, and having past thro' several Editions, one particularly so late, as in the year 1775, when it was printed with *Lillo's* other Dramatic Pieces.

If any one read this Tragedy, the author of these Inquiries has a request or two to make, for which he hopes a candid Reader will forgive him—one is, not to cavil at minute inaccuracies, but look to the superior merit of *the whole taken together*—another is, totally to expunge those *wretched Rhimes*, which conclude many of the Scenes; and which 'tis probable are not from *Lillo*, but from some other hand, willing to conform to an absurd Fashion, then practised, but now laid aside, the Fashion (I mean) of a *Rhiming Conclusion*.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning DRAMATIC SENTIMENT—*what constitutes it*—*Connected with* MANNERS, *and how*—*Concerning* SENTIMENT, GNOMOLOGIC, *or* PRECEPTIVE—*its Description*—*Sometimes has a Reason annexed to it*—*Sometimes laudable, sometimes blameable*—*whom it most becomes to utter it, and why*—*Bossu*—*Transition to* DICTION.

FROM MANNERS we pass to SENTIMENT; a Word, which tho' sometimes confined to mere Gnomology, or moral Precept, was often used by the Greeks in a more comprehensive Meaning, including every thing, for which men employ Language; for proving and solving; for raising and calming the Passions; for exaggerating and depreciating; for Commands, Monitions, Prayers, Narratives, Interrogations, Answers, &c. &c. In short, SENTIMENT in this Sense means little less, than the universal Subjects of our DISCOURSE*.

Ch. IX.

It

* There are two species of SENTIMENT successively here described, both called in English either a SENTIMENT or a SENTENCE; and in Latin, SENTENTIA. The Greeks were more exact, and to the different Species assigned different Names, calling the one Διάνοια, the other Γνώμη.

Of Γνώμη we shall speak hereafter: of Διάνοια their descriptions are as follows. "Ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τῆς λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι· μέρη δὲ τέτων, τό, τε ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασεύάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον, ἢ φόβον, ἢ ὀργὴν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα. All those things belong to SENTIMENT (or Διάνοια) that are to be performed thro' the help of Discourse: now the various branches of these things, are, to prove, and to solve, to excite Passions (such as Pity, Fear, Anger, and the like) and, besides this, to magnify, and to diminish. Arist. Poet. c. 19. p. 245. Edit. Sylb.

Part II.

It was under this meaning the word was originally applied to the **DRAMA**, and this appears not only from Authority, but from Fact: for what can conduce more effectually than **DISCOURSE**, to establish with precision *Dramatic* **MANNERS** and **CHARACTERS**?

To refer to a Play already mentioned, *the Fatal Curiosity*—When *old Wilmot* discharges his faithful Servant from pure affection, that he might not starve him, how strongly are his **MANNERS** delineated by his **SENTIMENTS**? The following are among his Monitions—

Shun my example; treasure up my precepts;

The world's before thee; BE A KNAVE AND PROSPER.

The young man, shocked at such advice from a Master, whose Virtues he had been accustomed so long to venerate, ventures modestly to ask him,

Where are your FORMER PRINCIPLES?

The old Man's Reply is a fine Picture of *Human Frailty*; a striking and yet a natural blending of *Friendship* and *Misanthropy*; of particular Friendship, of general Misanthropy.

No Matter (says he) for Principles;

Suppose I have RENOUNC'D 'EM: I have passions,

And

We have here chosen the fullest Description of *Διάνοια*; but in the same work there are others more concise, which yet express the same meaning. In the sixth chapter we are told it is—*τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα*—to be able to say (that is, to express justly) such things as necessarily belong to a subject, or properly suit it. And again soon after—*Διάνοια δὲ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύσιν τι, ὡς ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφάνοιαι*—*Διάνοια* or *Sentiment* exists, where men demonstrate any thing either to be, or not to be; or thro' which they assert any thing general or universal. Ibid. p. 231.

*And LOVE THEE still; therefore would have thee think,
THE WORLD is all A SCENE OF DEEP DECEIT,
And he, WHO DEALS WITH MANKIND ON THE SQUARE,
Is HIS OWN BUBBLE, and undoes HIMSELF.*

He departs with these expressions, but leaves the young man far from being convinced.

THE suspicious gloom of *Age*, and the open simplicity of *Youth*, give the strongest *Contrast* to THE MANNERS of each, and *all this from the SENTIMENTS alone*; *Sentiments*, which, tho' *opposite*, are still perfectly just, as being perfectly suited to their *different* characters.

'Tis to this *comprehensive* Meaning of SENTIMENT that we may in a manner refer the Substance of these *Inquiries*; for SUCH SENTIMENT is every thing, either written or spoken.

SOMETHING however must be said upon that other, and *more limited* SPECIES of it, which I call THE GNOMOLOGIC, or PRECEPTIVE; a species, not indeed peculiar to the Drama, but, when properly used, one of its capital ornaments.

THE following Description of it is taken from Antiquity. A GNOMOLOGIC SENTIMENT or Precept is an *Affertion* or *Proposition*—not however *all* Affertions, as that, *Pericles was an able Statesman*; *Homer a great Poet*, for these affertions are *Particular*, and *such a Sentiment* must be *General*—nor yet is it *every* affertion, tho' *General*; as that *The Angles of every Triangle are equal to two right Angles*—but it is

Part II. *an Affertion, which, tho' general, is only relative to Human Conduct, and to such Objects, as in moral action we either seek or avoid*.*

AMONG the Affertions of this sort we produce the following — the Precept, which forbids *unseasonable Curiosity* —

Seek not to know, what must not be reveal'd.

Or that, which forbids *unrelenting Anger* —

Within thee cherish not immortal Ire.

WE remark too, that these *Sentiments* acquire additional strength, if we *subjoin the Reason*.

For example —

Seek not to know, what must not be reveal'd;

JOYS only flow, where FATE IS MOST CONCEAL'D.

Or again,

Within thee cherish not IMMORTAL Ire,

When 'THOU THYSELF art MORTAL — †.

IN

* We now come to the second species of Sentiment, called in Greek Γνώμη, and which *Aristotle* describes much in the same manner as we have done in the Text. "Εστὶ δὲ ΓΝΩΜΗ ἀπόφανσις, ἢ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστον, οἷον, ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης· ἔτε περὶ πάντων Καθόλου, οἷον, ὅτι τὸ ἐνθῶ τῇ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκία εἴτι πρὸς τὸ πράσσειν. *Arist. Rhetor. L. II. c. 21. p. 96. Edit. Sylb.* So too the *Scriptor ad Herennium*, L. IV. f. 24. SENTENTIA est Oratio sumpta de vitâ, quæ aut quid fit, aut quid esse oporteat in vitâ, breviter ostendit, hoc modo—Liber is est existimandus, qui nulli turpitudini servit.

† The first of these *Sentiments* is taken from *Dryden*, the second is quoted by *Aristotle*, in his *Rhetoric*, L. II. c. 22. p. 97. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ἀθάνατον ὄργην μὴ φύλαττε, θνητὸς ὤν.

IN some instances the *Reason* and *Sentiment* are so blended, as to be in a manner inseparable. Thus *Shakspeare* — Ch. IX.

— He, who filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that, which not enriches Him,
But makes Me poor indeed —

THERE are too Sentiments of bad moral, and evil tendency —
If SACRED RIGHT should ever be infring'd,
It should be done for EMPIRE and DOMINION:
In OTHER things PURE CONSCIENCE BE THY GUIDE*.

And again,

— the Man's a Fool,
Who, having SLAIN the Father, SPARES the Sons†.

THESE Ideas are *only fit* for Tyrants, Usurpers, and other profligate Men; nor ought they to appear in a *Drama*, but to shew *such Characters*.

ON

On this the Philosopher well observes, that if the Monition had been no more, than that *we should not cherish our Anger for ever*, it had been a SENTENCE OF MORAL PRECEPT; but, when the words *Θνητὸς ὢν*, being *Mortal*, are added, the Poet then gives us the *Reason*, τὸ διὰ τί λέγει. *Rhet. ut sup.* The Latin Rhetorician says the same. *Sed illud quoque probandum est genus SENTENTIÆ, quod confirmatur SUBJECTIONE RATIONIS, hoc modo: omnes bene vivendi rationes in Virtute sunt collocandæ, PROPTEREA QUOD sola Virtus in suâ potestate est. Scriptor. ad Heren. L. IV. f. 24.*

* *Vid. Cic. de Officiis, L. III. c. 21.* who thus translates *Euripides*—

*Nam si violandum est Jus, regnandi gratiâ
Violandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas.*

† Νήπιος, ὃς, πατέρα κτείνας, παῖδας καταλείπει. *Arist. Rhet. L. I. c. 16. L. III. c. 22. p. 98. Edit. Sylb.*

Part II.

ON *Gnomologic Sentiments* in general it has been observed that, tho' they decorate, they should not be *frequent*, for then the Drama becomes affected and declamatory *.

It has been said too, they come most naturally from *aged persons*, because *Age* may be supposed to have taught them *Experience*. It must however be an *Experience, suitable to their characters*: an Old General should not talk upon Law; nor an Old Lawyer upon War†.

WE are now to proceed to DICTION.

* So the same *Latin Rhetorician*, above quoted—*SENTENTIAS interponi RARò convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi præceptores esse videamur.* Scriptor. ad Herenn. Lib. IV. f. 25.

† Ἀριότῃ δὲ γνομολογεῖν ἡλικία μὲν πρεσβύτερον, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὧν ἐμπειρὸς τις εἶναι. *It becomes HIM to be Sententious, who is ADVANCED IN YEARS, and that upon subjects, IN WHICH HE HAS EXPERIENCE.* *Aristot. Rhet. ut supra, p. 97. Edit. Sylb.* See also the ingenious *Bosſu*, in his *Traité du Poeme Epique*, Liv. VI. chap. 4. 5. who is, as usual, copious, and clear.

CHAP. X.

Concerning DICTION — *the vulgar — the affected — the elegant — this last, much indebted to the METAPHOR — Praise of the METAPHOR — its Description; and, when good, its Character — the best and most excellent, what — not turgid — nor enigmatic — nor base — nor ridiculous — instances — Metaphors by constant use sometimes become common Words — PUNS — Rupilius REX — OTTIE — ENIGMAS — Cupping — The God TERMINUS — Ovid's Fasti —*

AS every *Sentiment* must be expressed by *Words*; the Theory of Ch. X.
SENTIMENT naturally leads to that of DICTION. Indeed }
the *Connection* between them is so intimate, that the same *Sentiment*, where the *Diction* differs, is as different in *appearance*, as the same person, dressed like a Peasant, or dressed like a Gentleman. And hence we see, how much Diction merits a serious Attention.

BUT this perhaps will be better understood by an Example. Take then the following — *Don't let a lucky Hit slip; if you do, be-like you mayn't any more get at it.* The *Sentiment* (we must confess) is expressed clearly, but the DICTION surely is rather *vulgar* and *low*. Take it another way — *Opportune Moments are few and fleeting; seize them with avidity, or your Progression will be impeded.* Here the DICTION, tho' not *low*, is rather *obscure*. The Words are *unusual*, *pedantic*, and *affected*. — But what says SHAKESPEARE? —

There

Part II.

*There is a TIDE in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the Voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows —*

Here the **DICTION** is *Elegant*, without being *vulgar* or *affected*; the Words, tho' *common*, being taken under a *Metaphor*, are so far estranged by this *metaphorical use*, that they acquire thro' the change a competent dignity, and yet, *without becoming vulgar*, remain intelligible and *clear*.

KNOWING therefore the stress laid by the ancient Critics on THE **METAPHOR**, and viewing its admirable effects in the *decorating of Diction*, we think it may merit a farther regard.

THERE is not perhaps any *Figure of Speech* so pleasing, as THE **METAPHOR**. 'Tis at times the Language of *every Individual*, but above all is peculiar to the *Man of Genius**. His *Sagacity* discerns
not

* —τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μεταφορικὸν εἶναι· μόνον γὰρ τῷτο ἔτε παρ' ἄλλης ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖον ἐστὶ· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν, τὸ ὁμοίον θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ—the greatest thing of all is to be powerful in *Metaphor*; for this alone cannot be acquired from another, but is a mark of original *Genius*: for to metaphorize well, is, to DISCERN in DIFFERENT objects that which is SIMILAR. Arist. Poet. c. 22. p. 250. Edit. Sylb.

Δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν—ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὁμοίον καὶ ἐν πολὺν διέχοντι θεωρεῖν, εὐστόχως—We ought to metaphorize, that is, to DERIVE METAPHORS, from Terms, which are proper and yet not obvious; since even in PHILOSOPHY to discern THE SIMILAR in things widely DISTANT, is the part of one, who CONJECTURES HAPPILY. Arist. Rhetor. L. III. c. 11. p. 137. Edit. Sylb.

That **METAPHOR** is an effort of *Genius*, and cannot be taught, is here again asserted in the Words of the first Quotation.—καὶ λαβεῖν ἐκ ἑστίν ἁπλῆν (scil. Μεταφορὰν) παρ' ἄλλης. Rhetor. L. III. c. 2. p. 120. Edit. Sylb.

not only *common Analogies*, but those others *more remote, which escape the Vulgar*, and which, tho' they seldom invent, they seldom fail to recognise, when they hear them from persons, more ingenious than themselves. Ch. X.

It has been ingeniously observed, that the METAPHOR took its rise from the *Poverty* of Language. Men, not finding upon every occasion *Words ready made* for their ideas, were compelled to have recourse to *Words Analogous*, and transfer them from their *original* meaning to the meaning *then* required. But tho' the *Metaphor* began in *Poverty*, it did not end there. When the *Analogy* was just (and this often happened) there was something *peculiarly pleasing* in what was both *new*, and yet *familiar*; so that the *Metaphor* was then cultivated, not out of *Necessity*, but for *Ornament*. 'Tis thus that Cloaths were first assumed to defend us against the Cold, but came afterwards to be worn for *Distinction*, and *Decoration*.

It must be observed, there is a force in the *united* words, NEW and FAMILIAR. What is NEW, but *not Familiar*, is often *unintelligible*: what is FAMILIAR, but *not New*, is no better than *Common place*. 'Tis in the union of the two, that the *Obscure* and the *Vulgar* are happily removed, and 'tis in *this union*, that we view the *character* of a just *Metaphor*.

BUT after we have so praised the METAPHOR, 'tis fit at length we should explain *what it is*, and this we shall attempt as well by a Description, as by Examples.

Part II.

“ A METAPHOR is the transferring of a word from its usual Meaning to an Analogous Meaning, and then the employing it, agreeably to such Transfer*.” For example: the usual meaning of EVENING is the Conclusion of the Day. But AGE too is a Conclusion; the Conclusion of human Life. Now there being an Analogy in all Conclusions, we arrange in order the two we have alledged, and say, that, As EVENING is to the DAY, so is AGE to HUMAN LIFE. Hence, by an easy permutation, (which furnishes at once two Metaphors) we say alternately, that EVENING is THE AGE OF THE DAY; and that AGE is THE EVENING OF LIFE†.

THERE are other Metaphors equally pleasing, but which we only mention, as their Analogy cannot be mistaken. 'Tis thus that OLD MEN have been called STUBBLE; and THE STAGE OF THEATRE, THE MIRROR OF HUMAN LIFE‡.

IN

* Μεταφορὰ δ' εἰν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἐπιφορὰ, κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Poet. cap. 21. p. 247. Edit. Sylb.*

† —ὁμοίως ἔχει ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν, καὶ γῆρας πρὸς βίον· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίον. *Aristot. Poet. c. 21. p. 248. Edit. Sylb.*

‡ The Stagirite having told us what a natural pleasure we derive from INFORMATION, and having told us that, in the subject of WORDS, Exotic words want that pleasure, from being obscure, and Common words from being too well known, adds immediately— ἡ δὲ Μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τῆτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλαμὴν, ἐπόησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τῶ γένους, ἀμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα—But THE METAPHOR does this most effectually, for when Homer (in metaphor) said that AGE was STUBBLE, he conveyed to us Information and Knowledge thro' a common Genus (thro' the Genus of Time) as both old Men, and Stubble, have past the Flower of their existence.

The words in Homer are,

Ἄλλ' ἐμπης καλαμὴν γε σ' οἶμαι εἰσορόωντα
Γινώσκειν—

Οδυσσ. Ε. v. 214. 215.

IN Language of this sort there is a *double* Satisfaction: it is strikingly *clear*; and yet *raised*, tho' clear, above the low and *vulgar* Idiom. 'Tis a Praise too of such Metaphors, to be *quickly comprehended*. The Similitude and the thing illustrated are commonly dispatched in a *single Word*, and comprehended by an immediate, and instantaneous Intuition.

THUS a Person of wit, being dangerously ill, was told by his Friends, two more Physicians were called in. *So many!* says he—*do they fire then in Platoons?*—

THESE instances may assist us to discover, what METAPHORS may be called *the best*.

THEY

*Sed tamen stipulam saltem te arbitror intuentem
Cognoscere—*

In which Verse we cannot help remarking an Elegance of the Poet.

Ulysses, for his protection, had been metamorphosed by *Minerva* into the Figure of an old Man. Yet even then the Hero did not chuse to lose his dignity. By his discourse he informs *Eumæus* (who did not know him) that altho' he was *old*, he was still *respectable*—*I imagine* (says he) *that even now you may know THE STUBBLE by the look*. As much to suggest, that, tho' he had compared himself to STUBBLE, it was nevertheless to that *better sort*, left after the reaping of the *best* Corn.

See the Note upon this Verse by my learned Friend, the late Mr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his *Greek Edition* of the *Odyssy*, and *Klotzius* upon *Tyrtæus*, p. 26.

As to the next Metaphor, 'tis an Idea not unknown to *Shakspeare*, who, speaking of *Acting* or *Playing*, says with energy,

*That its End, both at first, and now, was, and is,
To hold as 'twere the MIRROR UP TO NATURE.* Hamlet.

According to *Aristotle*, the *Odyssy* of *Homer* was elegantly called by *Alcidamas*,—καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνε βίης κατόπτρον—a beautiful MIRROR of Human Life. Rhet. L. III. c. 3. p. 124. Edit. Sylb.

Part II.

THEY ought not, in an *elegant* and *polite* Stile (the Stile, of which we are speaking) to be derived from Meanings too *sublime*; for then the *Diction* would be *turgid* and *bombast*. Such was the Language of that Poet, who, describing the Footmen's Flambeaux at the end of an Opera, sung or said,

*Now blaz'd A THOUSAND FLAMING SUNS, and bade
Grim Night retire——*

—NOR ought A METAPHOR to be *far-fetched*, for then it becomes an *Enigma*. 'Twas thus a Gentleman once puzzled his Country Friend, in telling him by way of Compliment, that *He was become a perfect CENTAUR*. His honest Friend knew nothing of *Centaur*s, but being fond of Riding, was hardly ever off his Horse.

—ANOTHER Extreme remains, *the reverse* of the too *sublime*, and that is, *the transferring* from Subjects too contemptible. Such was the case of that Poet quoted by *Horace*, who, to describe Winter, wrote—

Jupiter hybernas canã nive CONSPUIT Alpes *.

O'er the cold Alps Jove SPITS his hoary snow.

NOR was that modern Poet more fortunate, whom *Dryden* quotes, and who, trying his Genius upon the same subject, supposed Winter—

To PERRIWIG with snow the BALD-PATE Woods.

WITH the same class of Wits we may arrange that pleasant fellow, who speaking of an old Lady, whom he had affronted, gave us in

one

* Hor. L. II. Sat. 5.

one short Sentence no less than *three* choice *Metaphors*. *I perceive* (said he) *her Back is up:—I must curry favour—or the Fat will be in the fire.* Ch. X.

NOR can we omit that *the same Word*, when *transferred* to *different Subjects*, produces *Metaphors* very *different*, as to *Propriety*, or *Impropriety*.

'Tis with *Propriety* that we *transfer* the word, *TO EMBRACE*, from *Human Beings* to things purely *Ideal*. *The Metaphor* appears just, when we say, *To Embrace a Proposition; To Embrace an Offer; To Embrace an Opportunity*. Its Application perhaps was not quite so elegant when the old Steward wrote to his Lord, upon the Subject of his Farm, that “*if he met any OXEN, he would not fail TO EMBRACE THEM* *.”

IF then we are to avoid *the Turgid, the Enigmatic, and the Base or Ridiculous*, no other *Metaphors* are left, but such as may be described by *Negatives*; such as are neither turgid, nor enigmatic, nor base and ridiculous.

SUCH is the character of many *Metaphors* already alledged, among others that of SHAKESPEARE'S, where *Tides* are transferred to *speedy*

* The Species of *Metaphors*, here condemned, are thus enumerated,—ἔισι γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον—αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δὲ, ἂν πορρωθεν, κ. τ. λ.—For *METAPHORS* are *unbecoming*, some from being *RIDICULOUS*, and others, from being *TOO SOLEMN* and *TRAGICAL*: there are likewise the *OBSCURE*, if they are fetched from too great a distance. Arist. Rhet. L. III. c. 3. p. 124. Edit. Sylb. See Cic. de Oratore, L. III. p. 155, &c.

Part II. *speedy and determined Conduct* *. Nor does his WOOLSEY with less propriety moralize upon his Fall in the following beautiful *Metaphor*, taken from *Vegetable Nature*.

*This is the state of Man ; to day he PUTS FORTH
THE TENDER LEAVES of Hope ; to-morrow BLOSSOMS,
And bears his BLUSHING HONOURS THICK upon him :
The third day comes A FROST, A KILLING FROST,
And — nips his root —*

IN *such Metaphors* (besides their intrinsic elegance) we may say the Reader is flattered ; I mean flattered by being left to discover something for himself.

THERE is one Observation, which will at the same time shew both the extent of this Figure, and how natural it is to all Men.

THERE are METAPHORS so obvious, and of course so naturalized, that ceasing to be *Metaphors*, they are become (as it were) THE PROPER WORDS. 'Tis after this manner we say, a sharp fellow ; a great Orator ; the Foot of a Mountain ; the Eye of a Needle ; the Bed of a River ; to ruminare, to ponder, to edify, &c. &c.

THESE we by no means reject, and yet the *Metaphors* we require we wish to be something more, that is, to be formed under the respectable conditions here established.

WE

* Sup. p. 383.—Vol. I. p. 171.

WE observe too, that a singular Use may be made of *Metaphors*, either to *exalt*, or to *depreciate*, according to the *sources*, from which we derive them. In ancient Story, *Orestes* was by some called *the Murtherer of his Mother*; by others, *the Avenger of his Father*. The Reasons will appear by referring to the Fact. The Poet *Simonides* was offered money to celebrate certain Mules, that had won a race. The sum being pitiful, he said with disdain, he should not write upon *DEMI-ASSES*.—A more competent Sum was offered,—he then began,

*Hail! DAUGHTERS OF THE GENEROUS HORSE,
That skims, like Wind, along the Course*.*

There are times, when, in order to *exalt*, we may call *Beggars*, *Petitioners*; and *Pick-pockets*, *Collectors*; other times, when in order to *depreciate*, we may call *Petitioners*, *Beggars*; and *Collectors*, *Pick-pockets*.—But enough of this.

WE say no more of *Metaphors*, but that 'tis a general Caution with regard to every Species, NOT TO MIX THEM, and that more particularly, if taken from subjects, which are *Contrary*.

SUCH was the Case of that Orator, who once asserted in his Oration, that — “ *If Cold Water were thrown upon a certain Measure, it would kindle a Flame, that would obscure the Lustre, &c. &c.*”

A WORD

* For these two facts, concerning *Orestes*, and *Simonides*, see *Arist. Rhet. L. III. c. 2. p. 122. Edit. Sylb.* The different appellations of *Orestes* were, ὁ Μητροφόνος, and ὁ Πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ—*Simonides* called the Mules ἡμίονοι at first; and then began—

Χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων σύγατρες ἵππων—

Part II.

A WORD remains upon ENIGMAS and PUNS. It shall indeed be short, because, tho' they resemble the *Metaphor*, it is as Brass and Copper resemble Gold.

A PUN seldom regards MEANING, being chiefly confined to SOUND.

HORACE gives a sad sample of this *spurious* Wit, where (as *Dryden* humorously translates it) he makes *Perfius* the Buffoon exhort the Patriot *Brutus* to kill Mr. KING, that is, RUPILIUS REX, because *Brutus*, when he slew *Cæsar*, had been accustomed to KING-KILLING.

Hunc REGEM occide; operum hoc mihi crede tuorum est.*

WE have a worse attempt in *Homer*, where *Ulysses* makes *PolypHEME* believe his name was ΟΥΤΙΣ, and where the dull *Cyclops*, after he had lost his Eye, upon being asked by his Brethren who had done him so much mischief, replies 'twas done by ΟΥΤΙΣ, that is, by NOBODY†.

ENIGMAS are of a more complicated nature, being involved either in *Pun*, or *Metaphor*, or sometimes in both.

Ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα.

I saw a man, who, unprovok'd with Ire,

Stuck Brass upon another's back by Fire‡.

THIS

* Horat. Sat. Lib. I. VII.

† Homer, Odyss. I. v. 366—408, &c.

‡ Arist. Rhet. L. III. c. 2. p. 121. Edit. Sylb.

THIS ENIGMA is ingenious, and means the operation of Cupping, performed in ancient days by a machine of Brass. Ch. X.

IN such Fancies, contrary to the Principles of good Metaphor, and good Writing, a Perplexity is caused, not by Accident, but by Design, and the Pleasure lies in the being able to resolve it.

Aulus Gellius has preserved A LATIN ENIGMA, which he also calls a *Sirpus* or *Sirpos*, a strange thing, far below the Greek, and debased with all the quibble of a more barbarous age.

Semel minusne, an bis minus, (non sat scio)

An utrumque eorum (ut quondam audivi dicier)

Jovi ipsi regi noluit concedere?*

THIS, being sifted, leaves in English the following small quantity of Meaning:

Was it ONCE MINUS, or TWICE MINUS (*I am not enough informed*), or was it not rather THE TWO TAKEN TOGETHER, (*as I have heard it said formerly*) that would not give way to Jove himself, the sovereign?

THE TWO TAKEN TOGETHER, (that is, ONCE MINUS and TWICE MINUS) make, when so taken, THRICE MINUS; and THRICE MINUS in Latin is TER MINUS, which, taken as a single word, is TERMINUS, the God of Boundaries.

HERE

* Aul. Gell. XII. 6.

Part II.

HERE the *Riddle*, or *Conceit*, appears. The Pagan Legend says, that, when in honour of *Jove* the Capitol was founded, the other Gods consented to retire, but the God *TERMINUS* refused.

THE Story is elegantly related in the *Fasti* of *Ovid*, III. 667.

Quid nova cum fierent Capitolia? nempe Deorum

Cuncta Jovi cessit turba, locumque dedit.

TERMINUS (ut veteres memorant) conventus in aede

RESTITIT, et magno cum Jove templa tenet.

THE moral of the Fable is just and ingenious; that *Boundaries* are sacred, and never should be moved.

THE Poet himself subjoins the reason with his usual address.

TERMINE, post illud Levitas tibi libera non est;

Quâ positus fueris in statione, MANE.

Nec Tu vicino quicquam concede roganti,

Ne videare hominem præposuisse Jovi.

AND so much for the subject of *Puns* and *Enigmas*, to which, like other things of bad Taste, no *Age* or *Country* can give a Sanction.

MUCH still remains upon the subject of *DICTION*, but, as much has been said already*, we here conclude.

* See Chapters II. III. IV.

CHAP. XI.

RANK or PRECEDENCE of the constitutive Parts of the Drama—
Remarks and Cautions both for judging, and Composing.

THE four constitutive Parts of Dramatic Poetry, which properly belong to the Poet*, have appeared to be THE FABLE, THE MANNERS, THE SENTIMENT, and THE DICTION, and something has been suggested to explain the nature of each. Ch. XI.

SHOULD we be asked, to which we attribute the first Place, we think it due to THE FABLE†.

IF THE FABLE be an *Ætion*, having a necessary reference to some *End*: it is evident that the *Manners* and the *Sentiment* are for the sake of that *End*; the *End* does not exist, for the sake of the *Manners* and the *Sentiment*‡. AGAIN,

* Sup. p. 361.

† Ἀρχὴ μὲν ἔν, καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ Μῦθος τῆς Τραγωδίας—THE FABLE therefore is THE PRINCIPLE, and (as it were) THE SOUL of Tragedy.—And not long before, after the constituent Parts of the Drama have been enumerated, we read—μέγιστον δὲ τῶν ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις.—But THE GREATEST and the most important of all these is THE COMBINING OF THE INCIDENTS, that is to say, THE FABLE. Arist. Poet. cap. 6. p. 231. Edit. Sylb.

‡ Οὐκ ἔν ὅπως τὰ ἥθη μιμήσωνται, πράττειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἥθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις—The Persons of the Drama do not act, that they may exhibit Manners; but they include Manners, on account of the Incidents in the Fable. Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. Edit. Sylb.

Part II.

AGAIN, the finest *unconnected* Samples either of *Manners* or of *Sentiment* cannot of themselves make a *Drama*, without a *Fable*. But, without either of these, *any Fable* will make a *Drama*, and have pretensions, (such as they are) to be called a *Play**.

A THIRD *superiority*, is, that the most *affecting* and *capital* Parts of every *Drama* arise out of its *FABLE*; by these I mean every unexpected *DISCOVERY* of unknown Personages, and every unexpected *REVOLUTION*† from one condition to another. The *Revolutions* and *Discoveries* in the *Oedipus* and the *Fatal Curiosity* have been mentioned already. We add to these the striking *Revolution* in the *Samson Agonistes*, where, while every thing appears tending to *Samson's Release*, a horrible *Crash* announces his *Destruction*‡.

THESE

* The *Stagirite* often illustrates his *Poetic Ideas* from *Painting*, an Art at that time cultivated by the ablest Artists, *Zeuxis*, *Polygnotus*, and others. In the present case, he compares the *DRAMATIC MANNERS* to *COLOURING*; the *DRAMATIC FABLE* to *DRAWING*; and ingeniously remarks—Ἐὰν τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν, καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα—If any one were to make a *CONFUSED DAUBING* with the most beautiful *COLOURS*, he would not give so much delight, as if he were to *SKETCH A FIGURE* in *CHALK* ALONE. *Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 231. Edit. Sylb.*

—Ἐτι εἰάν τις ἐφελῇς θῆ ῥήσεις ἡθικὰς, καὶ λέξεις, καὶ διανοίας, εὖ πεποιημένας, ἃ ποιήσει ὁ ἦν τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ καταδεετέροις τέτοις πεχημένῃ τραγωδίᾳ, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων—Were any one to arrange in order the best formed *EXPRESSIONS* RELATIVE TO *CHARACTER*, as well as the best *DICTION*, and *SENTIMENTS*, he would not attain what is the *Business* of a *Tragedy*; but much more would that *Tragedy* attain it, which, having these requisites in a very inferior degree, had at the same time a just *FABLE*, and *Combination of Incidents*. *Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. Edit. Sylb.*

† A *REVOLUTION*, *Περίπτεια*; A *DISCOVERY*, *Αναγνώρισις*. See before what is said about these two, from p. 363 to 365.

‡ *Sams. Agon. v. 481, and v. 1452 to v. 1507.*

THESE *Dramatic* Incidents are properly *Tragic*—but there are others of *similar* character, not wanting even to *Comedy*.—To refer to a *modern* Drama—what *DISCOVERY* more pleasing than that, where, in the *Drummer of Addifon*, the worthy lost Master is *discovered* in the supposed Conjuror? or, to refer still to the same Drama, what *RE-VOLUTION* more pleasing, than where, in consequence of this *Discovery*, the House of Disorder and Mourning changes into a House of Order and Joy? Now these *interesting* Incidents, as well *Comic* as *Tragic*, arise neither from *Manners*, nor from *Sentiment*, but purely from *THE FABLE*.

It is also a plausible Argument for the *Fable's Superiority*, that, from its superior difficulty, *more Poets* have excelled in drawing *Manners* and *Sentiment*, than there have in the forming of *perfect Fables* *.

BUT, altho' we give a superiority to *the Fable*, yet the other *constitutive Parts*, even supposing *the Fable bad*, have still an important value; so important indeed, that thro' them, and them alone, many Dramas have merited Admiration.

AND here next to the *Fable* we arrange the *MANNERS*. The *Manners*, if well formed, give us *samples of Human Nature*, and seem in Poetry as much to excel *Sentiment*, as the *Drawing* in Painting to excel *the Colouring*.

THE

* —οἱ ἐγχειρόμενοι ποιεῖν, πρότερον δύνασθαι τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσιν ἀκριβεῖν, ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρότεροι ποιήται σχεδὸν ἅπαντες. Those, who attempt to write *Dramatically*, are first able to be accurate in *THE DICTION* and *THE MANNERS*, before they are able to *COMBINE INCIDENTS* [and form a *Fable*] which was indeed the case of almost all the first Poets. Arist. Poet. c. 6. p. 230. Edit. Sylb.

Part II.

THE third Place after *the Manners* belongs to THE SENTIMENT, and that *before the Diction*, however they may be united, it being evident that Men *speak*, because they think; they *seldom think*, because they speak.

AFTER this, the fourth and last Place falls to THE DICTION.

HAVING settled *the Rank* of these several *Constitutive* Parts, a few cursory Remarks remain to be suggested.

ONE is this—that if *all* these Parts are *really* essential, no Drama can be *absolutely complete*, which in *any one of them* is deficient.

ANOTHER Remark is, that tho' a Drama be not absolutely complete in *every* Part, yet *from the excellence of one or two* Parts it may *still merit Praise* *. 'Tis thus in Painting, there are Pictures admired for *Colouring*, which fail in the *Drawing*; and others for *Drawing*, which fail in the *Colouring*.

THE

* This is a Case expressly decided by that able Critic, *Horace*, as to the MANNERS and the SENTIMENT.

—SPECIOSA LOCIS, MORATAQUE RECTE,
FABULA NULLIUS VENERIS, *sine pondere et arte*,
Valdius oblectat populum, meliusque moratur,
Quam versus inopes rerum, nugæque canoræ. Art. Poet. v. 320, &c.

Which may be thus paraphrased—

“ A FABLE (or Dramatic Story) OF NO BEAUTY, *without dignity or contrivance*, if
“ it excel in SENTIMENT, and have its CHARACTERS *well drawn*, will please an audience
“ much more than a trifling Piece barren of Incidents, and only to be admired for the
“ *Harmony of its Numbers.*” See p. 404.

THE next Remark is in fact a Caution; a Caution not to mistake *one Constitutive Part* for *another*, and still, much more, not to mistake it for *the Whole*. We are never to forget the *essential differences* between FABLE, MANNERS, SENTIMENT, and DICTION.

IF, without attending to these, we presume to admire, we act, as if in Painting we admired a *Rembrant* for *Grace*, because we had been told, that he was capital in *Colouring*.

THIS Caution indeed applies not only to *Arts*, but to *Philosophy*. For here if men fancy, that a Genius for *Science*, by having excelled in a *single part* of it, is superlative in *all parts*; they insensibly make such a Genius their Idol, and their Admiration soon degenerates into a species of Idolatry.

Decipit exemplar, vitius imitabile —

Hor.

'TIS to be hoped that our studies are at present more liberal, and that we are rather adding to that Structure, which our forefathers have begun, than tamely leaving it to remain, as if nothing farther were wanting.

OUR Drama among other things is surely capable of Improvement. Events from OUR OWN HISTORY (and none can be more interesting) are at hand to furnish FABLES, having *all the Dramatic Requisites*. Indeed should any of them be wanting, INVENTION may provide a Remedy, for here we know Poets have unbounded Privilege*.

IN

* *Infra*, 404.

Part II.

IN the mean time the subjects, by being *domestic*, would be as interesting to *Us*, as those of *Ajax* or *Orestes* were of old to the *Greeks*. Nor is it a doubt, that our Drama, were it thus rationally cultivated, might be made the School of Virtue even in a dissipated age.

AND now, having shewn such a regard for *Dramatic Poetry*, and recommended so many different RULES, as essential to its Perfection: it may not perhaps be improper to say something in their Defence, and, when that is finished, to conclude this Part of our Inquiries.

CHAP. XII.

RULES defended — do not cramp GENIUS, but guide it — flattering Doctrine that GENIUS will suffice — fallacious, and why — farther defence of RULES — No GENIUS ever acted without them; nor ever a Time, when RULES did not exist — Connection between RULES and GENIUS — their reciprocal aid — End of THE SECOND PART — Preparation for THE THIRD.

HAVING mentioned RULES, and indeed our whole Theory Ch. XII.
 having been little more than RULES DEVELOPED, we cannot
 but remark upon a common opinion, which seems to have arisen
 either from Prejudice, or Mistake.

*“ Do not RULES, say they, cramp Genius? Do they not abridge
 “ it of certain Privileges?”*

’Tis answered, if the obeying of RULES were to induce a Tyranny like this; to defend them would be absurd, and against the liberty of Genius. But the truth is, RULES, supposing them good, like good Government, *take away no Privileges.* They do no more, than save Genius from Error, by shewing it, that *a Right to err is no Privilege at all.*

’Tis surely no Privilege to violate in Grammar the *Rules of Syntax*;
 in Poetry, those of *Metre*; in Music, those of *Harmony*; in Logic,
 VOL. II. 3 F those

Part II. *those of Syllogism; in Painting, those of Perspective; in Dramatic Poetry, those of probable Imitation.*

IF we enlarge on *one* of these *Instances*, we shall illustrate the rest.

THE *probable Imitation* just now mentioned, like that of every other kind, is, when *the Imitation resembles the thing imitated in as many circumstances as possible; so that the more of those Circumstances are combined, the more probable the Resemblance.*

'Tis thus in Imitation by Painting the Resemblance is more complete, when to the *Out-line* we add *Light and Shade*; and more complete still, when to *Light and Shade* we add *the Colours*.

THE REAL PLACE of every *Drama* is a *Stage*, that is, a space of a few Fathoms deep, and a few Fathoms broad. ITS REAL TIME is *the Time it takes in acting, a limited Duration, seldom exceeding a few hours.*

Now *Imagination*, by the help of *Scenes*, can enlarge *this Stage* into a *Dwelling, a Palace, a City, &c:* and it is a decent Regard to this, which constitutes PROBABLE PLACE.

AGAIN, the *usual Intervals* between the *Acts*, and even the *Attention paid by the Mind* to an interesting Story, can enlarge without violence a *few Hours* into a *Day or two*; and 'tis in a decent

decent regard to this, we may perceive the Rise of PROBABLE Ch. XII.
TIME*.

Now 'tis evident that THE ABOVE PROBABILITIES, if they belong to the *Fable*, cannot but affect us, because they are both of them Requisites, which heighten the *Resemblance*, and because RESEMBLANCE is so universally an ESSENTIAL to IMITATION.

IF this Doctrine want confirming, we may prove it *by the contrary*, I mean by a supposition of SUCH *Time* and SUCH *Place*, as are both of them *improbable*.

FOR example, as to TIME, we may suppose a Play, where Lady *Desmond* in the *first Act* shall dance at the Court of *Richard the Third*, and be alive in the *last Act* during the reign of *James the First*†.

AS to PLACE, we may suppose a Tragedy, where *Motefuma* shall appear at *Mexico* in the *first Act*; shall be carried to *Madrid* in the *third*; and be brought back again in the *fifth*, to die at *Mexico*.

'TIS

* What this implies, we are told in the following passage—ὅτι μάλιστα περιῆται ὑπο μίαν περιόδον ἡλίου εἶναι, ἢ μικρὸν ἐξελλάττειν. Tragedy aims as far as possible to come within a single Revolution of the Sun (that is, A NATURAL DAY) or but a little to exceed. *Arist. Poet.* c. 5. p. 229. Edit. Sylb.

† *Aristotle* speaking upon the indefinite duration of the *Epopée*, which is sometimes extended to years, adds—καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις τὸ ἐποίησεν.—at first THEY DID THE SAME IN TRAGEDIES, that is, their Duration, like that of the *Epopée*, was alike undefined, till a better taste made them more correct. *Arist. Poet.* c. 5. p. 229. Edit. Sylb.

Part II.

'Tis true indeed, did such Plays exist, and were *their other Dramatic Requisites* good; these *Improbabilities* might be endured, and the Plays be *still* admired. *Fine Manners* and *Sentiment*, we have already said *, may support a wretched *Fable*, as a beautiful Face may make us forget a bad Figure. But *no Authority* for that reason can justify Absurdities, or make them *not to be so*, by being fortunately associated.

NOR is it enough to say, that *by this apparent Austerity many a good Play would have been spoilt* †. The Answer is obvious—*chuse another, and a fitter Subject*. Subjects are *infinite*. Consult the inexhaustible Treasures of HISTORY; or if these fail, the more inexhaustible Fund of INVENTION ‡. Nay more—if you are distressed, bring *History and Invention* TOGETHER, and let the Richness of the *last* embellish the Poverty of the *former*. Poets, tho' bound by the Laws of *Common Sense*, are not bound to the Rigours of *Historical Fact*.

IT must be confessed, 'tis a flattering Doctrine, to tell a young Beginner, *that he has nothing more to do, than to trust his own GENIUS, and to contemn all RULES, as the Tyranny of Pedants*. The painful
Toils

* See p. 398. in the Note.

† Aristotle, speaking about introducing any thing irrational into the Drama, adds—*ὥς τε τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ Μῦθος, γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ εἰ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοῖς τε*—that to say (by this restriction) *the Fable would have been destroyed, is ridiculous; for they ought not, from the very beginning, to form Fables upon such a Plan*. Arist. Poet. c. 24. p. 253. Edit. Sylb.

‡ Sup. p. 399. 400.

Toils of *Accuracy* by this expedient are eluded, for GENIUSES (like *Milton's Harps**) are supposed to be *ever tuned*. Ch. XII.

BUT the misfortune is, that Genius is something rare, nor can he, who possesses it, even then, *by neglecting Rules*, produce what is *accurate*. Those on the contrary, who, tho' they *want Genius*, think *Rules* worthy their attention, if they cannot become good *Authors*, may still make tolerable *Critics*; may be able to shew the difference between the Creeping and the Simple; the Pert and the Pleasing; the Turgid and the Sublime; in short, to sharpen, like the Whetstone, that Genius in others, which Nature in her frugality has not given to themselves.

INDEED I have never known, during a life of many years, and some small attention paid to Letters, and Literary men, that GENIUS in any Art had been ever cramped by RULES. On the contrary, I have seen great *Geniuses* miserably err by *transgressing* them, and, like vigorous Travellers, who lose their way, only wander the wider on account of their own strength.

AND yet 'tis somewhat singular in *Literary Compositions*, and perhaps more so in *Poetry* than elsewhere, that many things have been done in the best and purest taste, long before RULES were established, and systematized in form. This we are certain was true with respect to HOMER, SOPHOCLES, EURIPIDES, and other GREEKS. In modern times it appears as true of our admired SHAKSPEARE;
for

* *Par. Lost*, Book III. v. 365, 366.

Part II. for who can believe that *Shakspeare* studied Rules, or was ever versed in *Critical Systems*?

A *specious* Objection then occurs. “*If these great Writers were so excellent before Rules were established, or at least were known to them, what had they to direct their Genius, when RULES (to them at least) DID NOT EXIST?*”

To this Question 'tis hoped the Answer will not be deemed too hardy, should we assert, that THERE NEVER WAS A TIME, WHEN RULES DID NOT EXIST; that they *always* made a *Part* of that IMMUTABLE TRUTH, the natural object of every *penetrating Genius*; and that, if at that *early Greek Period*, Systems of Rules were not established, THOSE GREAT and SUBLIME AUTHORS WERE A RULE TO THEMSELVES. They may be said indeed to have excelled, not by *Art*, but by NATURE; yet by a *Nature*, which gave birth to the perfection of ART.

THE Case is nearly the same with respect to our SHAKSPEARE. There is hardly any thing we applaud, among his *innumerable beauties*, which will not be found *strictly conformable to the RULES of sound and ancient Criticism*.

THAT this is true with respect to his CHARACTERS and his SENTIMENT, is evident hence, that, in explaining *these Rules*, we have so often recurred to him for Illustrations*.

BESIDES

* See before, p. 310. 336. 341. 365. 370. 374. 384. 389. 390.

BESIDES Quotations *already alledged*, we subjoin the following as Ch. XII.
to CHARACTER.

WHEN FALSTAFF and *his suite* are so ignominiously routed, and the scuffle is by *Falstaff* so humorously exaggerated; what can be more natural than *such a Narrative to such a Character*, distinguished for his Humour, and withal for his want of Veracity and Courage*?

THE Sagacity of *common Poets* might not perhaps have suggested so good a Narrative, but it certainly would have suggested something of the kind, and 'tis in this we view the *Essence of Dramatic Character, which is, when we conjecture what any one WILL do or say, from what he HAS done or said* ALREADY†.

IF we pass from CHARACTERS (that is to say MANNERS) to SENTIMENT, we have already given Instances‡, and yet we shall still give another.

WHEN *Rosincrosse* and *Guildenstern* wait upon *Hamlet*, he offers them a Recorder or Pipe, and desires them *to play*—they reply, *they cannot*—He repeats his Request—they answer, *they have never learnt*—He assures them nothing was so easy—they *still* decline.—'Tis then he tells them with disdain, *There is much Music in this little Organ, and yet you cannot make it speak—Do you think I am easier to be plaid on, than a Pipe?* Hamlet, Act III.

THIS

* See Hen. IV. Part 2d.

† See before, p. 373, &c.

‡ See before, p. 377, &c.

Part II.

'THIS I call an elegant Sample of SENTIMENT, taken under its *comprehensive* Sense*. But we stop not here—We consider it as a complete instance of SOCRATIC REASONING, tho' tis probable *the Author* knew nothing, how SOCRATES used to argue.

To explain—XENOPHON makes SOCRATES reason as follows with an ambitious youth, by name *Euthydemus*.

" 'Tis strange (says he) that those who desire to play upon the Harp,
 " or upon the Flute, or to ride the managed Horse, should not think
 " themselves worth notice, without having practised under the best Mas-
 " ters—while there are those, who aspire to the governing of a STATE,
 " and can think themselves completely qualified, tho' it be without prepa-
 " ration or labour." Xenoph. Mem. IV. c. 2. f. 6.

ARISTOTLE'S Illustration is similar in his reasoning against Men, CHOSEN BY LOT for Magistrates. 'Tis (says he) as if Wrestlers were to be appointed BY LOT, and not those THAT ARE ABLE to wrestle: or, as if from among Sailors we were to chuse a Pilot BY LOT, and that the Man SO ELECTED were to navigate, and not the Man WHO KNEW the business. Rhetor. L. II. c. 20. p. 94. Edit. Sylb.

NOTHING can be more ingenious than this *Mode of Reasoning*. The Premises are *obvious* and *undeniable*; the Conclusion *cogent* and yet *unexpected*. It is a species of that Argumentation, called in Dialectic *Ἐπαγωγή*, or INDUCTION.

ARISTOTLE

* See before, p. 377, 379.

ARISTOTLE in his *Rhetoric* (as above quoted) calls such Reasonings τὰ Σωκρατικά, THE SOCRATICS; in the beginning of his *Poetics*, he calls them the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, THE SOCRATIC DISCOURSES; and HORACE, in his *Art of Poetry*, calls them the SOCRATICÆ CHARTÆ*.

Ch. XII.

IF TRUTH be always the same, no wonder *Geniuses* should co-incide, and that too in *Philosophy* as well as in *Criticism*.

WE venture to add, returning to RULES, that if there be any things in *Shakspeare* OBJECTIONABLE (and who is hardy enough to deny it?) THE VERY OBJECTIONS, as well as THE BEAUTIES, are to be tried BY THE SAME RULES, as the same Plummet alike shews, both what is out of the Perpendicular, and in it; the same Ruler alike proves, both what is crooked, and what is strait.

WE cannot admit, that *Geniuses*, tho' prior to *Systems*, were prior also to *Rules*, because RULES from the beginning existed in their own Minds, and were a part of that immutable Truth, which is eternal and every where†. *Aristotle* we know did not form *Homer*, *Sophocles*,
and

* See a most admirable instance of this INDUCTION, quoted by CICERO from THE SOCRATIC ÆSCHINES. *Cic. de Invent. Lib. I. f. 51.*

† The Author thinks it superfluous, to panegyryze TRUTH; yet in favour of SOUND AND RATIONAL RULES (which must be founded in Truth, or they are good for nothing) he ventures to quote the *Stagirite* himself. Ἀληθὴ ἀληθεῖ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐναντίαν εἶναι εἴτε δόξαν, εἴτε ἀντίφασιν—It is not possible for a TRUE OPINION, or a TRUE CONTRADICTORY PROPOSITION to be CONTRARY TO ANOTHER TRUE ONE. *Aristot De Interpret. c. 19. p. 78. Edit. Sylb.*

Part II. and *Euripides*; 'twas *Homer*, *Sophocles*, and *Euripides*, that formed
Aristotle.

AND this surely should teach us to pay attention to RULES, in as much as THEY and GENIUS are so *reciprocally* connected, that 'tis GENIUS, which discovers *Rules*; and then RULES, which govern *Genius*.

'Tis by this *amicable concurrence*, and by *this alone*, that every Work of Art justly merits Admiration, and is rendered as highly perfect, as by human Power it can be made*.

BUT we have now (if such language may be allowed) travelled over a vast and mighty Plain; or (as *Virgil* better expresses it)—
—immensum spatium confecimus æquor.

'Tis not however improbable that some intrepid spirit may demand again†, *What avail these subtleties?—Without so much trouble, I can be full enough pleased.*—I KNOW WHAT I LIKE.—We answer, *And so does the Carrion-crow, that feeds upon a Carcase.* The difficulty

This may be thus illustrated. *If it be TRUE, that THE TIME and PLACE of every Drama should be circumscribed, THE CONTRARY CANNOT BE TRUE, that its TIME and PLACE need not to be circumscribed.* See p. 351.

* This is fairly stated, and decided by *Horace*.

NATURA fieret laudabile carmen, an ARTE,
 Quæsitum est. Ego nec studium sine divite vendi,
 Nec rude quid proficit video ingenium; alterius sic
 Altera poscit opem res, et CONJURAT AMICEM. Art. Poet. v. 408, &c.

† See p. 341.

culty lies not in knowing WHAT *we like*; but in knowing HOW TO *like*, and WHAT IS WORTH LIKING. Till these Ends are obtained, we may admire *Durfey* before *Milton*; a smoaking Boor of *Hemskirk*, before an Apostle of *Raphael*.

Now as to the knowing, HOW TO LIKE, and then WHAT IS WORTH LIKING, the first of these, being the Object of *Critical* Disquisition, has been attempted to be shewn thro' the course of *these Inquiries*.

As to the second, WHAT IS WORTH OUR LIKING, this is best known by studying *the best* Authors, beginning from the GREEKS; then passing to the LATINS; nor on any account excluding those, who have excelled among the MODERNS.

AND here, if, while we peruse some Author of high rank, we perceive we don't instantly relish him, let us not be disheartened — let us even FEIGN a *Relish*, till we find a *Relish* come. A morsel perhaps pleases us — Let us cherish it — Another Morsel, strikes us — let us cherish this also. — Let us thus proceed, and steadily persevere, till we find we can relish, not *Morsels*, but *Wholes*; and feel that, what began in FICTION, terminates in REALITY. The Film being in this manner removed, we shall discover *Beauties*, which we never imagined; and condemn for *Puerilities*, what we once *foolishly* admired.

ONE thing however in this process is indispensibly required: we are on no account to expect that FINE THINGS SHOULD DESCEND TO US; OUR TASTE, if possible, MUST BE MADE ASCEND TO THEM.

Part II.

THIS is the Labour, this the Work; there is *Pleasure* in the Success, and *Praise* even in the Attempt.

THIS Speculation applies not to Literature only: it applies to Music, to Painting, and, as they are all *congenial*, to all the *liberal Arts*. We should in each of them endeavour to investigate WHAT IS BEST, and there (if I may so express myself) *there* to fix our abode.

By only seeking and perusing what is *truly* excellent, and by contemplating always *this* and *this alone*, the Mind insensibly becomes *accustomed* to it, and finds that *in this alone* it can acquiesce with content. It happens indeed *here*, as in a subject far more important, I mean in a *moral* and a *virtuous* Conduct. IF WE CHUSE THE BEST LIFE, USE WILL MAKE IT PLEASANT*.

AND thus having gone thro' the Sketch we promised, (for our concise manner cannot be called any thing more) we here finish THE SECOND PART of these Inquiries, and, according to' our original Plan, proceed to THE THIRD PART, THE TASTE AND LITERATURE OF THE MIDDLE AGE.

* Ἐλξ βίον ἄριστον, ἡδὺν δὲ αὐτὸν ἢ συνήθεια ποιήσει. *Plutarch. Moral. p. 602. Edit. Wolfii.*

END OF THE SECOND PART.

INQUIRIES.

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PHILOLOGICAL

INQUIRIES.

PART THE THIRD.

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PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.

PART THE THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

Design of the whole — Limits and Extent of THE MIDDLE AGE — THREE CLASSES of Men, during that interval, conspicuous; THE BYZANTINE GREEKS; THE SARACENS or ARABIANS; and THE LATINS or FRANKS, Inhabitants of Western Europe — Each Class in the following Chapters considered apart.

WHEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE grew enormous, and there were two imperial Cities, Rome and CONSTANTINOPLE, then that happened, which was natural; out of one Empire it became two, distinguished by the different names of the WESTERN, and the EASTERN.

Ch. I.

THE

Part III.

THE WESTERN EMPIRE soon sunk. So early as in the *fifth* Century*, ROME, once the Mistress of Nations, beheld herself at the feet of a *Gothic* Sovereign. THE EASTERN EMPIRE lasted many Centuries longer, and, tho' often impaired by *external* Enemies, and weakened as often by *internal* Factions, yet still it retained traces of its *ancient* Splendor, resembling in the language of *Virgil* some fair, but faded flower,

Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua forma recessit. VIRG.

At length, after various plunges and various escapes, it was totally annihilated in the *fifteenth* Century by the victorious arms of *Mahomet the Great*†.

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE FALL OF THESE TWO EMPIRES
(the *Western* or *Latin* in the *fifth* Century, the *Eastern* or *Grecian* in

* About the year of Christ 475, *Augustulus* was compelled to abdicate the *Western* Empire by *Odoacer*, King of the *Heruli*. As *Augustulus* was the last *Roman*, who possessed the Imperial Dignity at *Rome*, and as the Dominion both of *Rome* and *Italy* soon after passed into the hands of *Theodoric the Goth*, it has been justly said, that *then* terminated the *Roman* Empire in the *West*.

During these wretched times, ROME had been sacked not long before by *Alaric*, as it was a second time (about the middle of the sixth Century) by *Totila*; after which events the *Roman* Name and Authority were so far sunk, that early in the seventh Century they ceased to *speaking Latin*, even in *Rome* itself. See Blair's Chronology.

† See the various Histories of the *Turkish* Empire. The unfortunate *Greeks*, at this period, when, to resist such an Enemy as the *Turks*, they should have been firmly combined, were never so miserably distracted. An union with the Church of *Rome* was at the time projected. The *Greeks*, who favoured it, imputed their Calamities to their *Not-uniting*; those, who opposed it, to their *Uniting*. Between the two Factions all was lost, and *Constantinople* taken in the year 1453.

in the *fifteenth*) making a space of near a thousand years, constitutes what we call THE MIDDLE AGE.

Ch. I.

DOMINION past during this interval into the hands of rude, illiterate men; men, who conquered more by *multitude*, than by *military skill*; and who, having little or no taste either for Sciences or Arts, naturally despised those things, from which they had reaped no advantage.

THIS was the age of Monkeny and Legends; of *Leonine Verses**, (that is of *bad Latin put into rhyme*;) of *Projects to decide Truth* by Plough-shares and Battoons†; of *Crusades* to conquer Infidels, and extirpate

* See below, Chap. XI.

† This alludes to the two methods of TRIAL, much practised in those dark times, the Trial by ORDEAL, and that by DUEL.

Heated Plough-shares were often employed in Trials by ORDEAL, and 'tis remarkable that express mention is made of this absurd method of *Purgation by Fire*, even in the *Antigone of Sophocles*. The Messenger there says, in order to justify himself and his Companions—

Ἡμεν δ' ἑτοιμοὶ καὶ μύδρας αἶρειν χεροῖν,
καὶ πῦρ διέρπειν, καὶ θεὸς ὀρκωμοτεῖν,
τὸ μήτε δράσαι, μήτε, κ. τ. λ.

Ready we were with both our hands TO LIFT
THE GLOWING MASS; or slowly CROSS THE FIRE,
And by the Gods to swear, we neither did
The Deed, nor knew, &c.

Antig. v. 270.

This carries up the Practice to the time of *Eteocles* and *Polynices*, before the *Trojan War*.

Perhaps the Poet, by the incidental mention of so strange a Custom, intended to characterise the manners of a *runder* age; an age, widely different from *his own*, which was an Age of Science and Philosophical Disquisition.

Part III. extirpate Heretics; of Princes *deposed*, not as *Cræsus* was by *Cyrus*,
 but

As to *Trials by BATTLE*, they were either before *the Earl Marshal*, or *the Judges of Westminster Hall*. If before the Earl Marshal, they were upon accusations of Treason or other capital Crimes, and the Parties were usually of high and noble rank. If before the Judges of Westminster Hall, the Cause was often of inferior sort, as well as the Parties litigating.

Hence the Combats differed in their Ends. That before the Earl Marshal was *Victory*, often attended with *slaughter*; that before the Judges was *Victory alone*, with no such consequence.

The Weapons too differed, as well as the Ends. The Weapons before *the Earl Marshal* were a long Sword, a short Sword, and a Dagger: that before *the Judges* was a *Battoon* above mentioned, called in barbarous Latin *Druncus*, but in words more intelligible *Fustis teres*.

So late as the reign of *Queen Elizabeth* an instance occurs of this Trial being insisted upon. But that wise Princess, tho' she permitted the previous forms, I mean that of the Lifts being inclosed, of the Judges taking their seats there, of the Champions making their appearance, &c. (*Forms*, which perhaps could not *legally* be prevented) had too much sense to permit so foolish a decision. She compelled the Parties to a compromise, by the Plaintiff's taking an equivalent in money for his claim, and making in consequence a voluntary default.

Wyvil, Bishop of Salisbury, in the reign of *Edward the Third*, recurred to *Trial by BATTLE* in a dispute with the Earl of Salisbury, and ordered public Prayers thro' his Diocese for the success of his Champion, till the matter, by the King's authority, was compromised.

But notwithstanding this Bishop's Conduct, 'twas a PRACTICE which THE CHURCH disapproved, and wisely, as well as humanely endeavoured to prevent. TRUCULENTUM MOREM in omni ævo acriter insectarunt THEOLOGI, præ aliis Agobardus, et plurimo Canone IPSA ECCLESIA. See *Spelman*, under the words *Campus*, *Campsius*, and *Campio*.

I must not omit that there is a complete History of such a *Duel*, recorded by *Walsingham*, in the reign of *Richard the Second*, between *Aneslee* a Knight, and *Karryngton* an Esquire. *Karryngton* was accused by the other of Treason, for selling a Castle to the *French*; and, being defeated in the Combat, died the next day raving mad. *Walsingham's* Narrative is curious and exact, but their Weapons differed from those above mentioned, for they first fought with *Lances*, then with *Swords*, and lastly with *Daggers*. *Walsing. Histor.* p. 237.

but by one, who had no Armies, and who did not even wear a sword *. Ch. I.

DIFFERENT Portions of this Age have been distinguished by different descriptions; such as *Sæculum Monotheleticum*, *Sæculum Eiconoclasticum*, *Sæculum Obscurum*, *Sæculum Ferreum*, *Sæculum Hildebrandinum*, &c. strange names it must be confessed, some more obvious, others less so, yet none tending to furnish us with any high, or promising Ideas †.

AND yet we must acknowledge for the honour of *Humanity*, and of its GREAT and DIVINE AUTHOR, who *never* forsakes it, that some sparks of *Intellect* were at all times visible, thro' the whole of this dark and dreary Period. 'Tis here we must look for the TASTE and LITERATURE OF THE TIMES.

THE few, who were *enlightened*, when Arts and Sciences were thus *obscured*, may be said to have happily maintained the Continuity of

* Such was Pope *Innocent the third*, who, besides his Crusades to extirpate Heretics by Armies not his own, excommunicated *Philip*, King of France; *Alphonso*, King of Leon; *Raimond*, Earl of Toulouse; and *John*, King of England.

Nor is this wonderful, when we view in his own Language the Opinion he had of his own Station and Authority.

I am placed (says he) *IN THE MIDDLE, between GOD and MAN, ON THIS SIDE God, but BEYOND Man; nay I am greater than MAN, as I can judge of all Men, but can be judged by no one. Sum enim inter DEUM et HOMINEM MEDIUS constitutus, citra Deum sed ultra Hominem; imò major Homine, qui de omnibus judicem, a nemine vero judicari possim.* *Innocen. III. Serm. 2. in Historia Transubstantiationis Joannis Cofin. Episcop. Dunelm. Lond. 1675.* See also all the Church Histories of this Period.

† Those, who would be farther informed concerning these *Sæcula*, may, among other authors, consult two very learned ones, CAVE in his *Historia Literaria*, and MOSHEIM in his *Ecclesiastical History*.

Part III. *of Knowledge*; to have been (if I may use the expression) like the *Twilight* of a Summer's Night; that auspicious Gleam between the setting and the rising Sun, which, tho' it cannot retain the Lustre of the Day, helps at least to save us from the *Totality* of Darkneſs.

A cursory Diſquiſition, illuſtrated by a few ſelect Inſtances, will conſtitute the Subject of the preſent Eſſay; and theſe Inſtances we ſhall bring from among THREE CLASSES OF MEN, who had each a large ſhare in the tranſactions of thoſe times; from THE BYZANTINE GREEKS, from THE ARABIANS or SARACENS, and from *the Inhabitants of Western Europe*, at that time called THE LATINS. We ſhall give Precedence, as we think they merit it, to the GREEKS OF CONSTANTINOPLE, altho' it is not always eaſy to preſerve an *exact* Chronology, becauſe in each of theſe three Claſſes many eminent men were contemporary.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the first Class, THE BYZANTINE GREEKS—SIMPLICIUS—AMMONIUS—PHILOPONUS—Fate of the fine Library at Alexandria.

SIMPLICIUS and AMMONIUS were Greek Authors, who flourished at ATHENS during the sixth Century; for Athens, long after her Trophies at Marathon, long after her political Sovereignty was no more, still maintained her Empire in Philosophy and the fine Arts*.

Ch. II.

Philosophy indeed, when these Authors wrote, was sinking apace. The Stoic System, and even the Stoic Writings were the greater part of them lost†. Other Sects had shared the same fate. None subsisted but the Platonic, and the Peripatetic; which, being both derived from a common source (that is to say, the Pythagorean) were at this period blended, and commonly cultivated by the same Persons.

SIMPLICIUS and AMMONIUS, being bred in this School, and well initiated in its Principles, found no reason, from their education, to make Systems for themselves; a practice, referable sometimes to real Genius, but more often to not knowing, what others have invented before.

CONSCIOUS

* See below, Chap. III.

† See Vol. I. p. 144.

Part III. CONSCIOUS therefore they could not excel their great Predecessors, they thought, like many others, that the *Commenting* of their Works was doing mankind the most essential Service.

'Twas this, which gave rise, long before *their* time, to that Tribe of COMMENTATORS, who, in the person of *Andronicus the Rhodian*, began under *Augustus*, and who continued, for ages after, in an orderly succession.

SIMPLICIUS wrote a variety of Comments upon different parts of *Aristotle*, but his *Comment upon the Physics* is peculiarly valuable, as it is filled with quotations from *Anaxagoras*, *Democritus*, *Parmenides*, and other Philosophers, who flourished so early, as before the time of *Aristotle*, and whose fragments many of them are not to be found elsewhere.

As this *Compilation* must have been the result of *extensive Reading*, we may justly distinguish him by the title of a *learned Commentator**.

AMMONIUS wrote *Comments* on the first and second Tracts of *Aristotle's Logic*, as likewise upon the *Introductory Discourse* of the Philosopher *Porphyry*. His *manner* of writing is orderly; his style *clear* and *copious*; copious in its better sense, by leaving nothing unexplained, not copious by perplexing us with tiresome Tautology.

To

* For a fuller and more accurate account of SIMPLICIUS, see *Fabricii Biblioth. Græc.* Tom. VIII. p. 620, &c.

To those, who wish for a taste of this Literature, I know no Author, who better merits perusal. THE PREFACE to his *Comment on Porphyry* is a curious account of *Philosophy* under its many and different *Definitions*, every one of which he explains with perspicuity, and precision. THE PREFACE to his *Comment on the Predicaments* gives us an ingenious *Plan of Critical Scrutiny*; in other words furnishes us with *a suite of leading Queries*, by which, before we read a Book, we may learn *what it is*, and judge, when analyzed, if it be a *legitimate Composition* *.

WHEN things change by uninterrupted *Continuity*, as (to use an idea already suggested) the splendor of the Day to the darkness of the Night, 'tis hard to decide precisely, where the one concludes, and the other commences. By parity of reasoning 'tis difficult to determine, to *what age* we shall *adjudge* the two Philosophers just mentioned; whether to the Commencement of a *baser* age, or rather (if we regard their merit) to the Conclusion of a *purer*. If we arrange them with the Conclusion, 'tis, as *Brutus* and *Cassius* were called *the last of the Romans* †.

WE can have less doubt about the disciple of *Ammonius*, JOHN THE GRAMMARIAN, called PHILOPONUS from his love of labour. 'Twas his misfortune to live during the time of *Mahomet*, and to see *Alexandria* taken by the Arms of one of his immediate Successors. What past there on this occasion with regard to *the Library*, tho' recorded

* See *Fabr. Biblioth. Græc.* T. IV. p. 161.

† See *Tacit. Annal.* IV. 34.

Part III. corded in modern Books, is too curious to be omitted here. I translate it from the accurate version of *Abulpharagius's History*, made by that able Orientalist, *Pococke*.

“ WHEN *Alexandria* was taken by the *Mahometans*, *AMRUS*, their
 “ Commander, found there *PHILOPONUS*, whose conversation highly
 “ pleased him, as *Amrus* was a lover of Letters, and *Philoponus* a
 “ learned Man. On a certain day *Philoponus* said to him: *You have*
 “ *visited all the Repositories or Public Warehouses in Alexandria, and*
 “ *you have sealed up things of every sort, that are found there. As to*
 “ *those things, that may be useful to you, I presume to say nothing; but*
 “ *as to things of no service to You, some of them perhaps may be more*
 “ *suitable to ME.* *Amrus* said to him: *And what is it you want?*
 “ *The Philosophical Books* (replied he) *preserved in the Royal Libra-*
 “ *ries.* This, says *Amrus*, *is a request, upon which I cannot decide.*
 “ *You desire a thing, where I can issue no orders, till I have leave from*
 “ *Omar, the Commander of the Faithful.* Letters were accordingly
 “ written to *Omar*, informing him of what *Philoponus* had said, and
 “ an Answer was returned by *OMAR* to the following purport. —
 “ *As to the Books, of which you have made mention, if there be contained*
 “ *in them, what accords with the Book of God* (meaning the *ALCO-*
 “ *RAN*) *there is without them, in the Book of God, all that is sufficient.*
 “ *But if there be any thing in them repugnant to that Book, we in no*
 “ *respect want them. Order them therefore to be all destroyed.* *Am-*
 “ *rus* upon this ordered them to be dispersed thro’ the Baths of *Alex-*
 “ *andria*, and to be there burnt in making the Baths warm. After
 “ this manner, in the space of six months, they were all consumed.”

THE Historian, having related the Story, adds from his own feelings, HEAR WHAT WAS DONE, AND WONDER*.

Ch. II.

THUS ended this noble Library; and thus began, if it did not begin sooner, *the Age of Barbarity and Ignorance.*

* Vid. *Abulpharagii Dynastiar.* p. 114. Oxon. 1663.

THE Reader will *here* observe, that in the many Quotations, which we shall hereafter make from *Abulpharagius*, we shall *always* quote from the same Edition; that is, from the *Latin Version* of the learned *Pocock*, subjoined to the *original Arabic.*

C H A P. III.

Digression to a short Historical Account of ATHENS, from the time of her Persian Triumphs, to that of her becoming subject to the Turks — Sketch, during this long interval, of her Political and Literary State; of her Philosophers; of her Gymnasia; of her good and bad Fortune, &c. &c. — Manners of the present Inhabitants — Olives and Honey.

Part III.

HAVING mentioned ATHENS, I hope that celebrated City will justify a Digression, and the more so, as that Digression will terminate in Events, which belong to *the very Age*, of which we are now writing. But 'tis expedient to deduce matters from a much earlier period.

WHEN the *Athenians* had delivered themselves from the tyranny of PISISTRATUS, and after this had defeated the vast Efforts of the *Persians*, and that against two successive Invaders, DARIUS and XERXES, they may be considered as at the summit of their *national* Glory. For more than half a century afterwards they maintained, without controul, *the Sovereignty of Greece* *.

As their *Taste* was naturally good, *Arts* of every kind soon rose among them, and flourished. Valour had given them Reputation;
Reputation

* For these *Historical Facts* consult the *ancient and modern Authors of Grecian History*.

Reputation gave them an Ascendant; and that Ascendant produced a Security, which left their minds at ease, and gave them leisure to cultivate every thing liberal, or elegant*.

'Twas then that PERICLES adorned the City with Temples, Theatres, and other beautiful public Buildings. PHIDIAS, the great Sculptor, was employed as his Architect, who, when he had erected Edifices, adorned them himself, and added *Statues* and *Basso-relievo's*, the admiration of every beholder†. 'Twas then that POLYGNOTUS and MYRO painted; that SOPHOCLES and EURIPIDES wrote; and not long after, that they saw *the divine* SOCRATES.

HUMAN affairs are by nature prone to change, and states as well as individuals are born to decay. Jealousy and Ambition insensibly fomented wars, and Success in these wars, as in others, was often *various*. The *military* strength of the ATHENIANS was first impaired by the LACEDÆMONIANS; after that, it was again humiliated,


* 'Twas in a similar period of *Triumph*, after a formidable Adversary had been crushed, that *the Romans* began to cultivate a more refined and polished Literature.

—post *Punica bella* QUIETUS, *querere cœpit*,
Quid *Sophocles*, et *Theſpis*, et *Æſchylus* utile ferrent.

Horat. Ep. II. L. II. v. 162.

See the Note from a Greek MS. in my First Volume, p. 195, where the Progress of Arts and Sciences, from their Dawn to their Meridian, is elegantly and philosophically exhibited.

† See *Plutarch's* Life of *Pericles*, p. 350, 351, 352, 353, 354. in the Quarto *Greek* Edition of *Bryan*, Vol. I. and *Stuart's* *Antiquities of Athens*.

Part III.  liated, under EPAMINONDAS, by the *Thebans*; and last of all it was wholly crushed by *the Macedonian*, PHILIP*.

BUT tho' their *political* Sovereignty was lost, yet, happily for Mankind, their *Love* of LITERATURE and ARTS did not sink along with it.

JUST at the close of their *Golden Days of Empire* flourished XENOPHON and PLATO, the disciples of SOCRATES, and from *Plato* descended that Race of Philosophers, called *the old Academy*†.

ARISTOTLE, who was *Plato's* disciple, may be said, not to have invented *a new* Philosophy, but rather to have tempered the sublime, and rapturous mysteries of his master with Method, Order, and a stricter Mode of reasoning‡.

ZENO, who was himself also educated in the principles of *Platonism*, only differed from *Plato* in the *comparative* Estimate of things, allowing nothing to be *intrinsically* good but VIRTUE, nothing *intrinsically* bad but VICE, and considering all other things to be *in themselves* indifferent§.

He

* See, as before, the several Histories of Greece.

† See *Cic. de Fin.* L. V. and *Academ.* L. I. f. 5. p. 21. *Edit. Davissii.*

‡ See *Hermes*, p. 440.

§ See *Cicer. de Fin.* L. III. f. 7. 8. 16.—the beginning of the *Enchiridion* of *Epictetus*, Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, κ. τ. λ. *Diogen. Laert. in vitâ Zenon.* L. VII. f. 102.

He too and *Aristotle* accurately cultivated *Logic*, but in different ways; for *Aristotle* chiefly dwelt upon the *simple* Syllogism; *Zeno* upon that which is derived out of it, the *Compound* or *Hypothetic*. Both too, as well as other Philosophers, cultivated *Rhetoric* along with *Logic*; holding a knowledge in *both* to be requisite for those, who think of addressing mankind with all the efficacy of *Persuasion*. *ZENO* elegantly illustrated the force of these *two* powers by a Simile, taken from the Hand: the *close* power of *Logic* he compared to the *Fist*, or *Hand* *compressed*; the *diffuse* power of *Rhetoric*, to the *Palm*, or *Hand* *open* *.

I shall mention but *two* Sects more, the *New Academy*, and the *Epicurean*.

THE *New Academy*, so called from the *Old Academy*, (the name given to the School of *Plato*) was founded by *ARCESILAS*, and ably maintained by *CARNEADES*. From a mistaken imitation of the great parent of *Philosophy*, *Socrates*, (particularly as he appears in

* *ZENO* quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, MANU demonstrare solebat, quid inter has artes [Dialecticam scil. et Eloquentiam] interesset. Nam, cum compresserat digitos, PUGNUMQUE fecerat, DIALECTICAM aiebat ejusmodi esse: cum autem diduxerat, et manum dilataverat, PALME illius similem ELOQUENTIAM esse dicebat. *Cicer. Orator.* f. 113.

Both *Peripatetics* and *Stoics* wrote Tracts of *Rhetoric* as well as *Logic*. The *RHETORIC* of *Aristotle* is perhaps one of the most valuable Remains of Antiquity, and deservedly worth studying, be it for *Speculation* or *Practice*.

As for the *Rhetoric* of the *Stoics*, there is extant, among the *Latin* Rhetoricians, published in a thin *Quarto* by *Plantin* at *Paris*, an. 1599, a Tract by *Sulpitius Victor*, called *Institutiones Oratoriæ*, wherein he has this Expression at the beginning—*ZENONIS præcepta maximè persecutus*. See p. 240—also p. 247, 264, of the said Treatise.

Part III. in the Dialogues of *Plato*) because *Socrates* doubted *some* things, therefore *Arcefilas* and *Carneades* doubted *all**.

EPICURUS drew from another source; DEMOCRITUS had taught him *Atoms* and a *Void*: by the *fortuitous concourse* of *Atoms* he fancied he could *form a World*, while by a *feigned Veneration* he complimented away his *Gods*, and totally denied their *Providential Care*, lest the *Trouble* of it should impair their *uninterrupted State* of *Bliss*. VIRTUE he recommended, tho' *not* for the sake of *Virtue*, but *Pleasure*; PLEASURE, according to him, being *our chief* and *sovereign Good*. It must be confessed however, that, tho' his Principles were *erroneous* and even *bad*, never was a Man more *temperate* and *humane*; never was a Man more beloved by his *Friends*, or more cordially attached to them in affectionate esteem †.

WE have already mentioned the alliance between *Philosophy* and *Rhetoric*. This cannot be thought wonderful, if *Rhetoric* be the Art, by which men are *persuaded*, and if *Men* cannot be persuaded, without a knowledge of *Human Nature*: for what, but PHILOSOPHY, can procure us *this knowledge*?

'Twas for this reason the ablest *Greek Philosophers* not only taught (as we hinted before) but wrote also *Treatises* upon *Rhetoric*. They had

* Vid. Cic. Academ. L. I. f. 13. p. 48. Edit. Dav. *Itaque Arcefilas negabat esse quicquam, &c.*

† See *Diogen. Laert.* L. X. f. 9, &c. where an ample Detail is given of *Epicurus*, his *Friends*, his last Will, and his Death, all tending to establish his *Amiable Character*, however *erroneous* and *blameable* his *Doctrines*.

had a farther inducement, and that was the *intrinsic beauty of their Language*, as it was then spoken among the learned and polite. They would have been ashamed to have delivered *Philosophy*, as it has been too often delivered since, in Compositions as clumsy, as the common Dialect of the mere Vulgar.

THE same *Love of Elegance*, which made them attend to their *STYLE*, made them attend even to the *PLACES*, where their *Philosophy* was taught.

Plato delivered his Lectures in a Place shaded with Groves, on the Banks of the River *Ilissus*; and which, as it once belonged to a person called *Academos*, was called, after his name, THE ACADEMY*. *Aristotle* chose another spot of a similar character, where there were *Trees* and *Shade*; a spot called THE LYCÆUM†. *Zeno* taught in a PORTICO or COLONADE, distinguished from other buildings of that sort (of which the *Athenians* had many) by the name of the VARIEGATED PORTICO, the Walls being decorated with various *Paintings of Polygnotus* and *Myro*, two capital Masters of that transcendent Period‡. *Epicurus* addressed his hearers in those well known

* Vid. *Diog. Laert. Lib. III. f. 7.* *Potter's Arch. Græc. Vol. I. p. 40.*

† See *Potter's Arch. Græc. Vol. I. p. 40.*

‡ Of these two Artists it appears that *Myro* was *paid*, and that *Polygnotus* painted *gratis*, for which generosity he had the testimony of public Honours. *Plin. N. Hist. L. XXXV. cap. 9. sect. 35.*

We learn from History that the Pictures, which adorned this *Portico*, were four; two on the back part of it (open to the Colonnade) and a Picture at each end, upon the right and left.

Part III. known *Gardens*, called after his own name, THE GARDENS OF
 EPICURUS.

Some of these *Places* gave names to the *Doctrines*, which were taught there. *Plato's* PHILOSOPHY took its name of ACADEMIC from the *Academy*†; that of *Zeno* was called THE STOIC, from a *Greek* word, signifying a *Portico*‡.

THE System indeed of *Aristotle* was not denominated from the Place, but was called PERIPATETIC, from the manner in which he taught; from his walking about, at the time, when he dis-
 sected.

We learn also the Subjects: on one of the sides a Picture of the *Athenian* and *Lacedæmonian* Armies at *Oenoe* (an *Argive* City) facing each other, and ready to engage: on the back Ground, or middle part of the Portico, the Battle between the *Athenians* under *Theseus*, and the *Amazons*: next to that, on the same middle, the *Grecian Chiefs*, after the taking of *Troy*, deliberating upon the Violence offered by *Ajax* to *Cassandra*, *Ajax* himself being present, together with *Cassandra* and other Captive *Trojan* women; lastly, on the other side of the Portico opposite to the first, the triumphant Victory at *Marathon*, the *Barbarians* pushed into the *Morafs*, or demolished, while they endeavoured to escape to their ships; *Miltiades* and the *Greek Leaders* being to be known by their Portraits.

As the Portico was large, and the Pictures were only four, these we may suppose must have been large likewise, for 'tis probable they occupied the whole space. *Vid. Pausan. Attic. Lib. I. c. 15. p. 36. Edit. Lips. 1696.*

From the painting of this *Portico* to the time of *Honorius*, when it was defaced, stript, and its pictures destroyed*, was an interval of about eight hundred years.

It may merit Inquiry among the curious, upon what sort of Surface, and with what sort of Colours, Pictures were painted, that could indure so long.

† See the Note, next after the following.

‡ Στοά, Στωϊκοί.

* *Synes. Epist. 135.*

serted *. The Term, EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY, needs no Explanation. Ch. III.

OPEN Air, Shade, Water, and pleasant Walks seem above all things to favour that *Exercise*, the best suited to *Contemplation*, I mean *gentle walking without inducing fatigue*. The many agreeable Walks in and about OXFORD may teach my own Countrymen the truth of this assertion, and best explain how *Horace* lived, while a student at ATHENS, employed (as he tells us)

—*inter SILVAS ACADEMI quærerere verum.*

THESE *Places of Public Institution* were called among the *Greeks* by the name of GYMNASIA, in which, whatever that word might have originally meant, were taught all those *Exercises*, and all those *Arts*, which tended to cultivate not only THE BODY, but THE MIND. As *Man* was a Being consisting of *both*, the *Greeks* could not consider that Education as complete, in which *both* were not regarded, and *both* properly formed. Hence their *Gymnasia*, with reference to this *double End*, were adorned with *two Statues*, those of MERCURY and of HERCULES, the *corporeal Accomplishments* being patronized (as they supposed) by the *God of Strength*, the *mental Accomplishments* by the *God of Ingenuity* †.

"TIS

* Qui erant cum Aristotele, PERIPATETICI dicti sunt, quia disputabant INAMBULANTES in Lyceo; illi autem, qui Platonis instituto in ACADEMIA, quod est alterum gymnasium, cætus erant et sermones habere soliti, E LOCI VOCABULO NOMEN habuerunt. Cic. Academ. L. I. c. 4. p. 21, Edit. Davif.

† Vid. Athen. Deipnos. L. XIII. p. 561. Edit. Lugduni, 1657, Fol. Sometimes the *two Gods* were made into *one Statue*. Such compound Statues were called Ερμῆρακται. See Cic. ad Atticum, L. I. Epist. X.

Part III.

'Tis to be feared, that many Places, *now called Academies*, scarce deserve the name upon this *extensive* Plan, if the Professors teach no more, than how to dance, fence, and ride upon horses.

'Twas for the Cultivation of *every liberal Accomplishment* that ATHENS was celebrated (as we have said) during many Centuries, long after her *Political* influence was lost, and at an end.

WHEN ALEXANDER THE GREAT died, *many Tyrants*, like many *Hydras*, immediately sprung up. ATHENS then, tho' she still maintained the form of her *ancient* Government, was perpetually checked and humiliated by their insolence. ANTIPATER destroyed her *Orators*, and she was *sacked* by DEMETRIUS*. At length she became subject to the all-powerful ROMANS, and found the cruel SYLLA her severest Enemy.

HIS Face (which perhaps indicated his Manners) was of a purple red, intermixed with white. This circumstance could not escape the *witty Athenians*: they described him in a verse, and ridiculously said,

SYLLA's face is a Mulberry, sprinkled with meal†.

THE

* See the Writers (antient and modern) of *Grecian* History.

† The original Verse is a Trochaic.

Συκάμινον ἔσθ' ὁ Σύλλας, ἀλφίτῳ πεπασμένον.

Plutarch. in vit. Sylla, T. III. p. 44. Ed. Bryan, Quarto.

For his devastations of the Groves in the *Academy* and *Lyceum*, his demolition of their fine Buildings, and above all, his cruel massacre of the Inhabitants, when he took the City, see pages 61, 63, 64, 65 of the same Work, in the same Edition.

THE Devastations and Carnage, which he caused soon after, gave them too much reason to repent their *Sarcasm*.

THE civil War between CÆSAR and POMPEY soon followed, and their *natural Love of Liberty* made them side with Pompey. Here again they were unfortunate, for *Cæsar* conquered. But CÆSAR did not treat them like *Sylla*. With that Clemency, which made so amiable a part of his character, he dismissed them by a fine allusion to their illustrious Ancestors, saying, *that he spared the Living for the sake of the Dead**.

ANOTHER storm followed soon after this, the wars of BRUTUS and CASSIUS with AUGUSTUS and ANTONY. Their Partiality for *Liberty* did not here forsake them: they took part in the contest with the two patriot Romans, and erected their Statues near their own ancient Deliverers, *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton*, who had slain *Hipparchus*. But they were still unhappy, for their Enemies triumphed.

THEY made their peace however with AUGUSTUS, and having met afterwards with different treatment under different Emperors, sometimes favourable, sometimes harsh, and never more severe than under VESPASIAN, their Oppressions were at length relieved by the virtuous NERVA and TRAJAN†.

MANKIND

* Vid. *Meursium de Fortunâ Athenarum, in Gronov. Thesaur. Antiquitat. Græcar.* T. V. p. 1745, 1746.

† See the same Tract, in the same Volume of Gronovius's Collection, 1746, 1747.

Part III.

MANKIND during the interval, which began from NERVA, and which extended to the death of that best of Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS, felt a respite from those evils, which they had so severely felt before, and which they felt so severely revived under COMMODUS, and his wretched successors.

ATHENS, during the above golden period, enjoyed more than all others the general felicity, for she found in ADRIAN so generous a *Benefactor*, that her citizens could hardly help esteeming him a *second Founder*. He restored their old Privileges; gave them new; repaired their ancient Buildings, and added others of his own. MARCUS ANTONINUS, altho' he did not do so much, still continued to shew them his benevolent attention*.

IF from this period we turn our eyes back, we shall find, for Centuries before, that ATHENS was the *place of Education*, not only for *Greeks*, but for *Romans*. 'Twas hither, that HORACE was sent by his father; 'twas here that CICERO put his son MARCUS under CRATIPPUS, one of the ablest Philosophers then belonging to that City†.

THE Sects of Philosophers, which we have already described, were still existing, when St. PAUL came thither. We cannot enough admire the superior Eloquence of that Apostle, in his manner of addressing

* See the same Author, in the same Volume, p. 1748, 1749.

† See *Horat. Epist.* II. L. II. v. 43, and the beginning of *Cicero's Offices*, address to his Son—*Quamquam, Marce Fili, &c.*

addressing so intelligent an Audience. We cannot enough admire the sublimity of his Exordium; the propriety of his mentioning an *Altar*, which he had found there; and his Quotation from ARATUS, one of their well-known Poets *.

Ch. III.

NOR was *Athens* only celebrated for the Residence of Philosophers, and the Institution of Youth: Men of rank and fortune found pleasure in a *retreat*, which contributed so much to their liberal Enjoyment.

THE friend and correspondent of *Cicero*, T. POMPONIUS, from his long attachment to this City and Country, had attained such a perfection in its Arts and Language, that he acquired to himself the additional name of ATTICUS. This great Man may be said to have lived during times of the worst and cruelest factions. His youth was spent under *Sylla* and *Marius*; the middle of his life during all the sanguinary scenes that followed; and, when he was old, he saw the proscriptions of *Antony* and *Octavius*. Yet tho' *Cicero* and a multitude more of the best men perished, he had the good fortune to survive every danger. Nor did he seek a safety for himself alone; his Virtue so recommended him to the Leaders of every side, that he was able to save not himself alone, but the lives and fortunes of many of his friends†.

WHEN

* Acts, Ch. xvii. v. 22, &c.

† The Life of this extraordinary man is finely and fully written by *Cornelius Nepos*, a Life well worthy of perusal. See also the large and valuable Collection of *Confidential Letters*, address'd to him by *Cicero*.

Part III.

WHEN we look to this amiable character, we may well suppose, that it was not merely for amusement that he chose to live at *Athens*; but rather that, by residing there, he might so far realize Philosophy, as to employ it for the conduct of Life, and not merely for Ostentation.

ANOTHER person, during a better period, (that I mean between *Nerva* and *Marcus Antoninus*) was equally celebrated for his affection to this City. By this person I mean *HERODES ATTICUS*, who acquired the *last* name from the same reasons, for which it had formerly been given to *Pomponius* *.

WE have remarked already, that Vicissitudes befall both Men and Cities, and changes too often happen from prosperous to adverse. Such was the state of *ATHENS* under the successors of *Alexander*, and so on from *Sylla* down to the time of *Augustus*. It shared the same hard fate with the *Roman* Empire in general upon the accession of *Commodus*.

At length, after a certain period, the Barbarians of the North began to pour into the South. *Rome* was taken by *ALARIC*, and *Athens* was besieged by the same. Yet here we are informed (at least we learn so from History) that it was miraculously saved by *Minerva* and *Achilles*. The Goddess it seems and the Hero both of them appeared, compelling the Invader to raise the siege †.

"T WAS

* See *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* T. IV. p. 371, and *Suidas*, under the word *Herodes*.

† See *Zosimi Histor.* L. V. c. 5 and 6, p. 511, &c. *Edit. Gr. Lat.* 8vo. 1679. where the whole story is related at length.

"TWAS thus we are told, that, many years before, *Castor* and *Pollux* had fought for the *Romans**; and that, many centuries afterwards, *St. George*, at *Iconium*, discomfited the *Saracens*†—nay, so late as in the sixteenth century, a gallant *Spaniard*, *Peter de Paz*, was seen to assist his countrymen, *some months after his decease*, when they made an assault at the siege of *Antwerp*‡.

INSTEAD of giving my own Sentiments upon these events, I chuse to give those of an abler man upon a *similar* subject. After having related some singular stories of equal probability, *Lord Bacon* concludes with the following observation—

My Judgment (says he) *is, that they* (he means the stories) *ought all to be despised, and ought to serve but for winter-talk by the fire-side.*
Tho'

* See *Florus* L. I. 2. L. II. 12.—*Justin.* Lib. XX. 3.

† *Fuller's Holy War*, p. 27. *Matt. Paris*, p. 43. According to this last Author there were three that fought, *St. George*, *St. Demetrius*, and *St. Mercury*.

‡ The following Extract is taken from the *Disquisitiones Magicae* of *Martin Del-Rio*, printed at *Mentz*, an. 1617. *cum gratia et privilegio Caesar. Majest.* together with the approbation of *Oliverius Manarcus*, *Vice-Provincial of the Belgic Jesuits*, and *Gulielmus Fabricius*, filed *Apostolicus et Regius Librorum Censor*; and attested also by the evidence *multorum gravium militum*, QUI VIDISSE SE SANCTE JURABANT.

The besieged it seems and their Allies, the *Dutch* and *English*, were upon the point of forcing a Post (*Aggerem*) possessed by the *Spaniards*, who besieged the City.—*Del-Rio's* words after this are—*Tum a regis militibus* (*Hispanis scil.*) *primo paucioribus* CONSPECTUS PROPE AGGEREM PETRUS DE PAZ, *Hispanus Tribunus, vir et militarib. et pietatis ornamentis laudatissimus, qui, jam MENSIBUS ALIQUOT ANTE DEFUNCTUS, visus his armatus, UT SOLEBAT, legionem præcedere, et suis quondam militibus, MANU ADVOCATIS, sequerentur ut se IMPERARE. Indicant primi secundis; sic tertiis; sic sequentibus; VIDENT OMNES IDEM, mirantur, animisque resumptis NOTUM SEQUUNTUR DUCEM, &c.* *Disquisit. Mag.* p. 262.

Part III. *Tho' when I say despised, I mean it as for Belief; for otherwise the spreading or publishing of them is in no sort to be despised, for they have done much mischief* *.

SYNESIUS, who lived in the fifth Century, visited *Athens*, and gives in his *Epistles* an account of his visit. Its lustre appears at that time to have been greatly diminished. Among other things he informs us, that the celebrated Portico or Colonnade, the *Greek* name of which gave name to the Sect of Stoics, had by an oppressive Proconsul been despoiled of its fine Pictures; and that, on this devastation, it had been forsaken by those Philosophers †.

IN the thirteenth Century, when the *Grecian Empire* was cruelly oppressed by the *Crusaders*, and all things in confusion, *Athens* was besieged by one *Scgurus Leo*, who was unable to take it; and, after that, by a *Marquis of Montferrat*, to whom it surrendered ‡.

Its fortune after this was various; and it was sometimes under the *Venetians*, sometimes under the *Catalonians*, till *Mahomet the Great* made himself Master of *Constantinople*. This fatal catastrophe (which happened near two thousand years after the time of *Pisistratus*) brought *ATHENS* and with it all *GREECE* into the hands of

* *Essays and Counsels* by *Ld. Verulam*, No. XXXV.

† See *Synesi Epist.* 135. in *Gronovius's Collection*, T. V. (as before) p. 1751, and of this work, p. 431.

‡ See *Gronovius's Collection* (as before) p. 1751, 1752, 1753, 1754.

of the *Turks*, under whose despotic yoke it has continued ever since. Ch. III.

THE City from this time has been occasionally visited, and Descriptions of it published by different Travellers. WHEELER was there along with SPON in the time of our *Charles the Second*, and both of them have published curious and valuable Narratives. Others, as well natives of this Island, as foreigners, have been there since, and some have given (as Monfr. *Le Roy*) specious publications of what we are to suppose they saw. None however have equalled the Truth, the Accuracy, and Elegance of Mr. STUART, who, after having resided there between three and four years, has given us such Plans, and Elevations of the *capital Buildings* now standing, together with learned Comments to elucidate every part, that he seems, as far as was possible for the power of *Description*, to have restored the City to its *ancient Splendor*.

HE has not only given us the greater Outlines and their Measures, but separate Measures and Drawings of the *minuter Decorations*; so that a *British Artist* may (if he please) follow PHIDIAS, and build in *Britain*, as *Phidias* did at *ATHENS* *.

SPON, speaking of *Attica*, says that the Road near *ATHENS* was pleasing, and the very Peasants polished. Speaking of the *Athenians* in general, he says of them—*ils ont une politesse d'esprit naturelle,*

* This most curious and valuable Book was published at London, in the year 1762.

Part III. *turelle, & beaucoup d'adresse dans toutes les affaires, qu'ils entreprenent* *.

WHEELER, who was Spon's fellow-traveller, says as follows, when he and his Company approached ATHENS — *We began now to think ourselves in a MORE CIVILIZED COUNTRY, than we had yet past : for not a Shepherd, that we met, but bid us WELCOME, AND WISHED US a good journey* — p. 335, speaking of the ATHENIANS, he adds — *This must with great truth be said of them, their bad fortune hath not been able to take from them, what THEY HAVE BY NATURE, that is, much SUBTLETY or WIT*, p. 347. And again — *THE ATHENIANS, notwithstanding the long possession that Barbarism hath had of this place, seem to be much MORE POLISHED in point of MANNERS and CONVERSATION, than any other in these parts ; being civil, and of respectful behaviour to all, and highly complimentary in their discourse* †.

STUART says of the *present Athenians*, what Spon and Wheeler said of their forefathers ; — he found in them the same address, the same natural acuteness, tho' severely curbed by their despotic Masters.

ONE custom I cannot omit. He tells me, that frequently at their convivial Meetings, one of the company takes, what they now call, a Lyre, tho' it is rather a species of Guitar, and after a short prelude on the Instrument, as if he were waiting for inspiration, accompanies his instrumental Music with his voice, suddenly chanting some *extempore* Verses, which seldom exceed two or three Distichs ; that he

* Spon, V. II. p. 76, 92, Edit. 8vo.

† Wheeler, p. 356, Edit. Fol.

he then delivers the Lyre to his neighbour, who, after he has done the same, delivers it to another; and that so the Lyre circulates, till it has past round the table. Ch. III.

NOR can I forget his informing me, that, notwithstanding *the various Fortune* of ATHENS, as a *City*, ATTICA was still famous for OLIVES, and Mount HYMETTUS for HONEY. *Human Institutions perish, but Nature is permanent.*

CHAP. IV.

Account of Byzantine Scholars continued — SUIDAS — JOHN STOBÆUS or of STOBA — PHOTIUS — MICHAEL PSELLUS — *this last said to have commented twenty-four Plays of MENANDER* — *Reasons, to make this probable* — EUSTATHIUS, a Bishop, the Commentator of HOMER — EUSTRATIUS, a Bishop, the Commentator of ARISTOTLE — PLANUDES, a Monk, the admirer and translator of LATIN Classics, as well as the Compiler of one of the present GREEK ANTHOLOGIES. — *Conjectures concerning the duration of the LATIN TONGUE at Constantinople.*

Part III.

THAT I may not be prolix, I hasten from the writers already mentioned to SUIDAS, who is supposed to have lived during the ninth or tenth Centuries. In his *Lexicon*, which is partly *Historical*, partly *Explanatory*, he has preserved many Quotations from Authors who lived in the earlier and politer ages, and from Poets in particular, whose works at present are for the greater part lost. KUSTER, an able Critic in the beginning of the present Century, gave a fine Edition of this Author, at *Cambridge*, in three Volumes Folio; and Mr. TOUPE of *Cornwall* (whom I have mentioned already, and cannot mention with too much applause) has lately favoured the learned world with many valuable Emendations*.

JOHN

* Concerning this little known Author see the Preface of his learned Editor, *Kuster*.

JOHN STOBÆUS or of *Stoba*, (whose name *John* makes it probable he was a *Christian*) is of an uncertain age, as well as *Suidas*; tho' some imagine him to have lived during an *earlier* period, by two or three Centuries*. His work is *not a Lexicon*, like that of the other, but an *immense Common-Place*, filled with Extracts upon various subjects, both *Ethical* and *Physical*, which Extracts he had collected from the most approved Writers. As this Book is highly valuable from containing such an incredible variety of Sentiments upon *interesting* Topics, and those taken from Authors, many of whom are lost; as it is at the same time so incorrectly printed, that in too many places it is *hardly intelligible*: it would be a labour well worthy of an able Critic, by the help of *Manuscripts*, and plausible *Conjecture*, to restore it, as far as possible, to its original Purity. The Speculations he chiefly gives us are neither trivial, nor licentious, but, in the language of *Horace*,

—— quod magis ad nos

Pertinet, et nescire malum est. —

BUT to return from STOBÆUS to SUIDAS. If we consider the late age when *Suidas* lived; if we consider too the Authors, which he must needs have studied, in order to form his work; Authors, who many of them wrote in the most *refined* and *polished* Ages: it will be evident, that even in those *late* Centuries the Taste for a *purser Literature* was by no means *extinct*, and that even *then* there were Readers, who knew its value.

IN

* See *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* T. VIII. 665.

Part III.

IN the *ninth Century*, lived PHOTIUS, *Patriarch of Constantinople*. His most celebrated work may be called a *Journal of his Studies*; a *Journal*, where we learn the various *Authors* he perused; the *Subjects* they treated; the *Plans* of their Works; and where sometimes also we have *Extracts*. From him we are informed not only of many *Authors* now lost, but what was in his time the state of many, that are now remaining.

AMONG the *Authors* now lost he perused THEOPOMPUS the *Historian*, and HYPERIDES the *Orator*; among those, now mutilated and imperfect, he perused intire DIODORUS SICULUS. Many others, if necessary, might be added of either sort.

'Tis singular with regard to PHOTIUS, that from a *Layman* he was raised at once to be *Patriarch of Constantinople*. Yet his *Studies* evidently seem to have had such a rank in view, being principally applied to *Theology*, to *History*, and to *Oratory*; with enough *Philosophy*, and *Medicine*, not to appear deficient, if such subjects should occur. As to *Poetry*, one might imagine, either that he had no relish for it, or that, in the train of his inquiries, he did not esteem it a requisite*.

MICHAEL PSELLUS, of the *eleventh Century*, was knowing in the *Greek Philosophy and Poetry* of the purer ages, and for his various and extensive Learning was ranked among the first and ablest Scholars of his time.

BESIDES

* See *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* T. IX. 369.

BESIDES his Treatise of *Mathematics*, his Comments upon *Arif-* Ch. IV.
totle, and a number of other Works (many of which are printed) he is said to have commented and explained no less than *twenty-four* *Comedies* of MENANDER, a Treatise now lost, tho' extant as well as the *Comedies* in so *late* a period. He must have had a relish for that polite Writer, or otherwise 'tis not probable, he would have undertaken such a labour*.

NOR need we wonder this should happen. Why should not the polite MENANDER have had his Admirers in these Ages, as well as the licentious ARISTOPHANES?—Or rather, why not as well as SOPHOCLES, and EURIPIDES? The *Scholia* upon these (tho' some perhaps may be more ancient) were compiled by Critics, who lived long after PSELLUS†.

WE may add with regard to *all these Scholiasts* (whatever may have been their Age) they would never have undergone the *labours* of Compilation and Annotation, had they not been encouraged by the

* See *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* T. I. 769.

In the passage, quoted by *Fabricius* upon this subject, its Author says, that the latter *Greek* Monks persuaded the latter *Greek* Emperors, to destroy *Menander* and many other of the *old Greek Poets*, from the looseness of their Morals, and their great Indecencies. That the Monks may have persuaded this, is not improbable—perhaps from Bigotry; perhaps from a consciousness of their own wretched Inferiority in every species of elegant Composition—but certainly from no indignation against Indecency and Immorality. For if so, why preserve *Lucian*? why preserve *Aristophanes*? why preserve Collections of Epigrams, more indecent and flagitious, than the grossest Productions of the most licentious modern Ages?

† *Demetrius Triclinius*, the Scholiast on *Sophocles*, lived after *Planudes*, for he mentions him. See *Fabric. Bib. Græc.* p. 634.

Part III. the taste of their *Contemporary* Countrymen. For who ever published, without hopes of having Readers?

THE same may be asserted of the learned *Bishop of Thessalonica*, EUSTATHIUS, who lived in the *twelfth* Century. His admiration of HOMER must have been *almost* enthusiastic, to carry him thro' so complete, so minute, and so vast a Commentary, both upon *the Iliad* and *the Odyssey*, collected from such an immense number both of Critics and Historians*.

EUSTRATIUS, the *Metropolitan of Nice*, who lived a little earlier in the same Century, convinces us that he studied ARISTOTLE with no less zeal; and that, not only in his *Logical* pieces, but in his *Ethical* also, as may be seen by those minute and accurate Comments on the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, which go under his name, and in which, tho' *others* had their share, he still is found to have taken so large a Portion to himself†.

PLANUDES, a Monk of the *fourteenth* Century, appears (which is somewhat uncommon) to have understood and admired THE LATIN CLASSICS, *Cicero*, *Cæsar*, *Ovid*, *Boethius*, and others, parts of which Authors he translated, such as the Commentaries of *Cæsar*, relative to the *Gallic Wars*, the *Dream of Scipio* by *Cicero*, the *Metamorphosis* of *Ovid*, the fine Tract of *Boethius de Consolatione*, and (according to Spon) *St. Augustine de Civitate Dei*. Besides this, he

* See *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* T. I. p. 289, &c.

† See *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* T. II. p. 151.

he formed a GREEK ANTHOLOGY (that well known Collection printed by *Wechelius*, in 1600,) and composed several *original* Pieces of his own*.

Ch. IV.

It appears from *these* Examples, and will hereafter appear from others, how much the Cause of *Letters* and *Humanity* is indebted to THE CHURCH.

HAVING mentioned *Latin Classics*, I beg leave to submit a conjecture concerning the state and duration of the LATIN TONGUE at *Constantinople*.

WHEN CONSTANTINE founded this *Imperial City*, he not only adorned it with curiosities from every part of the *Roman Empire*, but he induced, by every sort of encouragement, many of the First Families in *Italy*, and a multitude more of inferior rank, to leave their Country, and there settle themselves. We may therefore suppose, that LATIN was for a long time the *prevailing Language* of the Place, till in a course of years it was supplanted by GREEK, the *common Language* of the neighbourhood, and the *fashionable acquired Language* of every polite *Roman*.

WE are told, that soon after the End of the *sixth Century* LATIN ceased to be spoken at ROME†. Yet was it in the beginning of that Century that JUSTINIAN published his *Laws* in LATIN at *Constantinople*; and that the celebrated PRISCIAN in the same City taught the *Principles of the Latin Grammar*.

IF

* See *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* T. X. p. 533.

† See before, p. 416.

Part III.

If we descend to a period still later, (so late indeed as to the *tenth* and *eleventh* Centuries) we shall find, in the Ceremonial of the *Byzantine* Court, certain Formularies preserved, evidently connected with this subject.

As often as the Emperor gave an Imperial Banquet, 'twas the Custom for some of his Attendants, at peculiar times during the Feast, to repeat and chant the following Words—Κωνσέρβειτ Δέξς ἡμπερίουμ βέξρουμ—βήξητε, Δόμνηι ἡμπεράτωρες ἐν μελλτος ἄννος· Δέξς ὀμνήποτενς πρέξεθ—Ἦν γαυδίῳ πρανδεῖτε, Δόμνηι.

It may possibly for a moment surprise a learned Reader, when he hears that the meaning of this strange Jargon is—*May God preserve your Empire—Live, imperial Lords, for many years; God almighty so grant—Dine, my Lords, in joy.*

BUT his doubts will soon vanish, when he finds this Jargon to be *LATIN*, and comes to read it exhibited according to A *LATIN ALPHABET*—

CONSERVET DEVS IMPERIVM VESTRVM—VIVITE, DOMINI IMPERATORES, IN MVLTO ANNOS; DEVS OMNIPOTENS PRAESTET—IN GAUDIO PRANDETE, DOMINI*.

Tis

* These Formularies are selected from a Ceremonial of the *Byzantine* Court, drawn up by the Emperor *Constantine Porphyrogenitus*, who reigned in the beginning of the *eleventh* Century. The Book, being a large Folio, was published in the original *Greek*, with

'Tis evident from these instances, that traces of LATIN were still remaining at *Constantinople*, during those Centuries. 'Twill be then perhaps less wonderful, if PLANUDES upon the same spot should, in the *fourteenth* Century, appear to have understood it. We may suppose, that by degrees it changed from a *Common* Language to a *Learned* one, and that, being thus confined to the *Learned Few*, its valuable Works were by *their* labours again made known, and diffused among their Countrymen in *Greek Translations*.

THIS too will make it probable, that even to the *lowest* age of the *Greek Empire* their great LIBRARIES contained many valuable LATIN MANUSCRIPTS; perhaps had entire Copies of *Cicero*, of *Livy*, of *Tacitus*, and many others. Where else did PLANUDES, when he translated, find his *Originals*?

with a *Latin* Translation and Notes, by *Leichius* and *Reiskius*, at *Lipfic*, in the year 1751. See of this Book p. 215, 216. Many more Traces of this *Hellenistic Latin* occur in other parts of it. In the *Latin Types* I have followed the *Commentator*, and not the *Translator*; and as the *Greeks* have no Letter but B to denote the *Latin V*, have preferred *Vivite* to *Bibite*.

CHAP. V.

NICETAS, THE CHONIA TE—*his curious Narrative of the Mischiefs done by BALDWIN'S CRUSADE, when they sackt CONSTANTINOPLE in the Year 1205—many of the Statues described, which they then destroyed—a fine Taste for Arts among the GREEKS, even in those Days, proved from this Narrative—not so, among the CRUSADERS—Authenticity of Nicetas's Narrative—State of CONSTANTINOPLE at the last Period of the Grecian Empire, as given by contemporary Writers, PHILELPHUS and ÆNEAS SYLVIUS—NATIONAL PRIDE among the Greeks not totally extinct even at this Day.*

Part III.

BESIDES PLANUDES a large number of the same nation might be mentioned, but I omit them all for the sake of NICETAS, THE CHONIA TE, in order to prove thro' him, that the more refined part of that ingenious people had not even in the *thirteenth Century lost their Taste*; a Taste not confined to *Literary Works* only, but extended to Works of *other* kinds and character.

THIS Historian (I mean NICETAS*) was present at the sacking of *Constantinople* by the Barbarians of *Baldwyn's Crusade*, in the year 1205. Take, by the way of Sample, a part only of his Enumeration of the noble Statues, which were probably brought thither by
Constantine,

* He was called the *Choniate* from *Chonæ*, a City of *Phrygia*, and posselt, when in the Court of *Constantinople*, some of the highest Dignities. *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* T. XI. p. 401, 402.

Constantine, to decorate his new City, and which these *Adventurers* then destroyed *. Ch. V.

AMONG others he mentions the *Colossian Statue* of JUNO, erected in the *Forum* of *Constantine*; the Statue of PARIS standing by VENUS, and delivering to her the Golden Apple; a square and lofty OBELISK, with a Figure on it to indicate the Wind; the Figure of BELLEROPHON, riding upon PEGASUS; the PENSIVE HERCULES, made by no less an Artist than LYSIPPUS; the two celebrated *Figures* of THE MAN and THE ASS, erected by *Augustus* after his Victory at *Actium*; the WOLF, suckling ROMULUS and REMUS; an EAGLE destroying a SERPENT, set up by *Apollonius Tyaneus*; and an exquisite HELEN, in all the Charms of Beauty and of Elegance.

SPEAKING of the *Wind-obelisk*, he relates with the greatest feeling the curious work on its sides; the rural Scene; *Birds* singing; *Rustics* labouring, or playing on their Pipes; Sheep bleating; *Lambs* skipping; the *Sea*, and a Scene of *Fish* and *Fishing*; little naked *Cupids*, laughing, playing, and pelting each other with Apples; A FIGURE on the summit, turning with the lightest blast, and thence denominated the *Wind's Attendant*.

OF

* A large part of this Chapter is extracted from the History of *Nicetas*, as printed by *Fabricius* in the Tome above quoted, beginning from p. 405, and proceeding to p. 418.

The Author has endeavoured to make his translated Extracts faithful, but he thought the whole *Original Greek* too much to be inserted, especially as it may be found in *Fabricius's Bibliotheca*, a Book by no means rare. A few particular passages he has given in the *Original*.

Part III. { OF the *two Statues* brought from *Actium* he relates, that they were set up there by *Augustus* on the following Incident. As he went out by night to reconnoitre the Camp of *Antony*, he met a *Man*, driving an *Afs*. The *Man* was asked, *who he was*, and *whither he was going*—*my Name*, replied he, is *NICO*, *my Afs's name* *NICANDER*; and *I am going to CESAR's Army*. The Story derives its force from the good Omen of lucky names, and may be found (tho' with some variation) both in *Suetonius* and *Plutarch*. The real Curiosity was, that Statues so celebrated should be then existing.

IF the Figures of the *Wolf* and the *Founders of Rome* were of the same age, they might probably have been the very *Work*, to which *VIRGIL* is supposed to have alluded, in describing the Shield of *ENEAS*:

——*illam tereti cervice reflexam*

Mulcere alternos, et corpora fingere lingua.

Æn. VIII. 633.

BUT no where does the Taste of *NICETAS* appear so strongly, as when he speaks of the *HERCULES*, and the *HELEN*.

THE *HERCULES* is exhibited to us, as if he were actually present—*immense in bulk*, and, with an Air of Grandeur, *reposing* himself—his *Lion's-skin* (that lookt formidable even in brags) *thrown over him*—himself sitting without a Quiver, a Bow, or a Club, but having the right leg bent at the knee; his Head gently reclining on the hand of his left Arm; and a Countenance full of dejection, as if he were reflecting

reflecting with indignation on the many successive labours, imposed on him by *Eurystheus* *.

Ch. V.

FOR his *Person*, we are informed he was *ample* in the *Chest*; *broad* in the *Shoulders*; had *Hair that curled*; *Arms* that were *strong* and *muscular*; and a *Magnitude* such, as might be supposed to belong to the ORIGINAL HERCULES, were he to revive; a *Leg* being equal in length to the *Stature* of a *common Man* †. And yet adds NICE-TAS, filled with Indignation, “this Hercules, being such as here “represented, this very Hercules did not these men spare.”

I can only subjoin, by way of digression, that there is a fine *Greek* Epigram describing the Statue of a DEJECTED HERCULES, sitting without his Weapons, which exactly resembles this of Nicetas, and which is said likewise to be the work of LYSIPPUS, only there the Poet imputes his Hero's *Dejection*, not to the Tyranny of *Eurystheus*, but to the love of *Omphale* ‡.

IF *Nicetas* speak with *admiration* of this Statue, 'tis with *rapture* he mentions the other. “What,” says he, “shall I say of the beautiful HELEN; of her, who brought together all Greece against Troy? “Did she MITIGATE these IMMITIGABLE, these IRON-HEARTED “Men?”

* Ενάθητο δὲ, μὴ γωρυτὸν ἐξημμένος, μὴ τόξον ταῖν χειρῶν φέρων, μὴ, κ. τ. λ. Fabr. as above, p. 408, 409.

† Ἦν δὲ τὸ σῆρνον εὐρύς, τῶς ὤμους πλατύς, τὴν τρίχα ἕλος, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 409.

‡ Vid. *Antholog.* L. IV, tit. 8.

Part III. *“Men? No,” says he, “nothing like it could even she affect, who had
“before enslaved so many Spectators with her Beauty*.”*

AFTER this he describes her Dress, and then proceeds to her Person; which Description, as it is something singular, I have endeavoured to translate more strictly.

*“HER LIPS,” says he, “like opening Flowers, were gently parted,
“as if she was going to speak: and as for that GRACEFUL SMILE,
“which instantly met the beholder, and filled him with delight; those
“elegant CURVATURES OF HER EYE-BROWS, and the remaining
“HARMONY OF HER FIGURE; they were what no Words can de-
“scribe, and deliver down to Posterity†.”*

He then breaks into an Exclamation — *“But O! HELEN, Thou
“pure and genuine Beauty; Offspring of the Loves; decorated by the
“Care of VENUS; most exquisite of Nature’s Gifts; Prize of Contest
“between Trojans and Grecians: where was thy NEPENTHES, that
“soothing Draught, which thou learnedst in Egypt? — Where thy irre-
“fistible Love-charms? — Why didst Thou not employ them now, as thou
“didst in days of yore? Alas! I fear ’twas destined by Fate, that
“Thou shouldst perish by Flames; Thou, who didst not cease even in thy
“Statue to inflame beholders into Love. I could almost say that these
“SONS OF ÆNEAS had demolished Thee by FIRE, as a species of reta-
“liation*

* Ἄρ’ ἐμείλιξε τῆς δυσμειλίκτης; ἄρ’, ἐμαλθαξε τῆς σιδηρόφρονος; ἐ μὲν ἔν ἧδ’ ὅλως τοῖς τὸν τι δεδύνηται ἢ πάντα θεατὴν τῷ κάλλει δελαγωγήσασα, καί περ, κ. τ. λ. Fabric. ut supra, p. 412. 413.

† Ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ χεῖλη, καλύκων δίκην, ἡρέμα παρανοιγόμενα, ὡς καὶ δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 413.

*“ liation for the BURNING OF THEIR TROY, as those Flames were
 “ kindled by thy unfortunate Amours*.”* Ch. V.

I HAVE been thus particular in these Relations, and have translated for the greater part the very words of the Historian, not only because the Facts are little known, but because they tend to prove, that even in those *dark Ages* (as we have too many reasons to call them) there were *Greeks still extant*, who had a *Taste for the finer Arts*, and an *Enthusiastic Feeling* of their exquisite *Beauty*. At the same time we cannot without indignation reflect on these *brutal Crusaders*, who, after many instances of *sacrilegious Avarice*, related by *Nicetas* in consequence of their Success, could destroy all these, and many other precious *Remains of Antiquity*, melting them down (for they were of *Brass*) into *Money to pay their Soldiers*, and exchanging things of *inestimable Value* for a poor pittance of contemptible *Coin* †. They surely were what *Nicetas* well calls them, Τῆ καλῆ ἀνέραςοι βάρβαροι, *BARBARIANS devoid of taste for the BEAUTIFUL and FAIR* ‡.

AND yet 'tis remarkable, that these *sad and savage Events* happened *more than a Century* after these *Adventurers* had first past into the

* Ἄλλ' ὦ Τυνδαρίς Ἑλένη, κάλλος αὐτόθεν καλόν, Ἑρώτων μόσχευμα, Ἀφροδίτης τημελέχημα, πανάριστον φύσεως δώρημα, Τρώων καὶ Ἑλλήνων βράβευμα, πῶ σοι τὸ Νηπενθές, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 413.

† Κεκόφασιν [ἀγάλματα] εἰς νομίσμα, ἀνταλασσόμενοι μικρῶν τὰ μεγάλα, καὶ τὰ δαπάναις πονηθέντα μεγάλαις ἐτιδανῶν ἀντιδιδόντες κερμάτων. Ibid. p. 408.

‡ I have given the words of *Nicetas* himself, which precede the passage just quoted. In another part of his Narrative he styles them *ILLITERATE BARBARIANS, who absolutely did not know their A B C.*—παρ' ἀγραμμάτοις βαρβάροις, καὶ τέλειον ἀναλφάβητοις—p. 414.

Part III. the East, above four-score years of which time they had possessed the
Sovereignty of Palestine. But —

COELUM, non ANIMUM mutant, &c.

HOR *.

THO' I have done with these Events, I cannot quit THE GREEKS without adding a word upon CONSTANTINOPLE, as to *Literature* and *Language*, just before the fatal period, when it was taken by the TURKS. There is more stress to be laid upon my Quotations, as they are transcribed from Authors, who lived at *the time*, or immediately after.

HEAR what PHILELPHUS says, who was himself at *Constantinople* in that part of the fifteenth Century, while the *Greek Empire* still subsisted. “ *Those GREEKS (says he) whose Language has not been*
 “ *depraved, and whom we ourselves both follow and imitate, speak even*
 “ *at this time in their ordinary talk, as the Comic ARISTOPHANES did,*
 “ *or the Tragic EURIPIDES; as the Orators would talk; as the Histo-*
 “ *rians; as the Philosophers themselves, even PLATO and ARIS-*
 “ *TOTLE †.*”

SPEAKING

* It ought to be observed, that tho' the NARRATIVE of *Nicetas*, whence these Extracts are taken, appear not in the printed Editions (being probably either thro' fraud, or shame, or both, designedly omitted;) yet has it been published by that *honest* and *learned Critic* FABRICIUS, in the *sixth* Volume of his *Bibliotheca Græca* here quoted, and is still extant in a *fair* and *ancient Manuscript* of the two last Books of *Nicetas*, preserved in THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY.

† *Græci, quibus lingua depravata non sit, et quos ipsi tùm sequimur, tùm imitatur, ita loquuntur vulgo hâc etiam in tempestate, ut Aristophanes Comicus, ut Euripides Tragicus, ut Oratores omnes, ut Philosophi etiam ipsi et Plato et Aristoteles.* Philelph. Epist. in *Hodii de Græcis illustribus*, Lib. I. p. 188.

SPEAKING afterwards of the *Corruption* of the Tongue in that City by the Concourse of Traders, and Strangers, he informs us, that the People belonging *to the Court* still retained “*the ANCIENT Dignity and Elegance of Speech, and above all THE WOMEN OF QUALITY, who, as they were wholly precluded from Strangers, STILL PRESERVED that genuine and pure Speech of the ANCIENT GREEKS, uncorrupted*.*”

ÆNEAS SYLVIUS, afterwards Pope by the name of PIUS THE SECOND, was the Scholar of this *Philelphus*. A long Letter of his is extant upon the taking of *Constantinople* by *Mahomet*, a Letter addressed to a Cardinal, just after that fatal Event. Speaking of the fortune of the City, he observes, that NEW ROME (for so they often called CONSTANTINOPLE) had subsisted, from its foundation to its capture, nearly the *same* number of years with OLD ROME—that
between

* The same *Philelphus* in the same Epistle adds—*Nam VIRI AULICI veterem sermonis dignitatem atque elegantiam retinebant; in primisque IPSÆ NOBILES MULIERES, quibus cum nullum esset omnino cum viris peregrinis Commercium, MERUS ILLE AC PURUS GRÆCORUM SERMO SERVABATUR INTACTUS. Hod. ut supra.*

'Tis somewhat singular, that what *Philelphus* relates concerning the *Women of Rank at the Court of Constantinople*, should be related by *Cicero* concerning the *Women of Rank* in the polished days of the *Roman Commonwealth*; concerning *Cornelia*, Mother of the *Gracchi*; concerning *Lælia*, Daughter of the great *Lælius*; concerning the *Mucia*, the *Licinia*, in short, the Mothers, Wives, and Daughters of the most illustrious Romans of that illustrious age.

Cicero accounts for the purity of their Language, and for its being untainted with vitious novelty, precisely as *Philelphus* does.—*Facilius enim MULIERES INCORRUPTAM ANTIQUITATEM CONSERVANT, quod, MULTORUM SERMONIS EXPERTES, ea tenent semper, quæ prima didicerunt.*

This Passage is no small strengthening of *Philelphus's* Authority. See *Cicer. de Oratore* III. 45. & *de Claris Orator.* f. 211.

Part III. between ROMULUS, the founder of *Old Rome*, and the Goth, ALARIC, who took it, was an interval of about *eleven hundred years*; and that there was nearly the same interval between CONSTANTINE and MAHOMET THE GREAT.

HE observes that tho' this *last City* had been taken before, it had never before suffered so *total* and so *fatal* a change. "Till this period" (says he) *the remembrance of ANCIENT WISDOM remained at CONSTANTINOPLE; and, as if it were the Mansion, the Seat of Letters, no one of the Latins could be deemed sufficiently learned, if he had not studied for some time at CONSTANTINOPLE. The same Reputation for Sciences, which ATHENS had in the times of ancient Rome, did CONSTANTINOPLE appear to possess in our times. 'Twas thence, that PLATO was restored to us; 'twas thence, that the Works of ARISTOTLE, DEMOSTHENES, XENOPHON, THUCYDIDES, BASIL, DIONYSIUS, ORIGEN and others were, in our days, made known; and many more in futurity we hoped would become so. But now, as the Turks have conquered, &c.**"

A LITTLE farther in the same Epistle, when he expresses his fears, lest THE TURKS should destroy all Books but their own, he subjoins — "Now

* —itaque mansit in hunc diem vetustæ sapientiæ apud CONSTANTINOPOLIM monumentum: ac, velut ibi domicilium Literarum esset, et arx summæ philosophiæ, nemo Latinorum satis doctus videri poterat, nisi Constantinopoli aliquandiù studuisset; quodque florente Romæ doctrinarum nomen habuerunt Athenæ, id tempestate nostra videbatur Constantinopolis obtinere. Inde nobis Plato redditus: inde Aristotelis, Demosthenis, Xenophontis, Thucididis, Basilii, Dionysii, Origenis et aliorum multa Latinis opera diebus nostris manifestata sunt; multa quoque in futurum manifestanda sperabamus. Nunc vero, vincentibus Turcis, &c. Æneæ Sylv. Epist. p. 704, 705. Edit. Basil. 1551.

—“ Now therefore both HOMER, and PINDAR, and MENANDER,
 “ and all the more illustrious Poets will undergo a second Death. Now
 “ will a final destruction find its way to the GREEK PHILOSOPHERS.
 “ A little light will remain perhaps among the LATINS, but that I ap-
 “ prehend will not be long, unless GOD from Heaven will look upon us
 “ with a more favourable eye, and grant a better fortune either to the
 “ Roman Empire, or to the Apostolic See, &c. &c. *”

It must be remarked that, in this Epistle, by LATINS † he means the Western Europeans, as opposed to THE GREEKS, or Eastern; and that by the ROMAN Empire (just before mentioned) he means the GERMANIC Body.

THE Author's apprehensions for the fate of Letters in the West was premature; for, upon the Destruction of this imperial City, the number of learned Greeks, which this Event drove into those Western parts of Europe; the Favour of the Popes and the Medici Family, shewn at this period to Literature; together with the then recent Invention of Printing, which, by multiplying Copies of Books, made them so easy to be purchased — all this (I say) tended to promote the

* Nunc ergo et Homero, et Pindaro, Menandro, et omnibus illustrioribus Poetis secunda mors erit; nunc Græcorum philosophorum ultimus patebit interitus. Restabit aliquid lucis apud Latinos; at, fateor, neque id erit diuturnum, nisi mitiori nos oculo Deus ex alto respexerit, fortunamque vel imperio Romano, vel Apostolicæ sedi præbuerit meliorem, &c. &c. Ibid. p. 705, 706.

Those who have not the old Edition of *Æneas Sylvius*, may find the above quotations in *Hody de Græcis Illustribus*, Lond. 1751. 8vo.

† Nicetas had before called them, SONS OF ÆNEAS. See p. 456.

Part III. *the Cause of Knowledge and of Taste, and to put things into that train, in which we hope they may long continue.*

BESIDES *Philelphus, Æneas Sylvius*, and many others, who were *Italians*, I might mention two *Greeks of the same age*, GEORGE GEMISTUS, and Cardinal BESSARIO, both of them deeply knowing in *Grecian Literature and Philosophy*.

BUT as some account of these last and of their Writings has been already given *, I shall quit the *Greeks*, after I have related a short Narrative; a Narrative so far curious, as it helps to prove, that even among the *present Greeks*, in the day of *Servitude*, the remembrance of their *ancient Glory* is *not yet* totally extinct.

WHEN the late Mr. *Anson* (Lord *Anson's* Brother) was upon his Travels in *the East*, he hired a Vessel, to visit the Isle of *Tenedos*. His Pilot, *an old Greek*, as they were sailing along, said with some satisfaction, — *There 'twas our Fleet lay*. Mr. *Anson* demanded, *What Fleet?* — *What Fleet*, replied the old Man (a little piqued at the Question) — WHY OUR GRECIAN FLEET AT THE SIEGE OF TROY †.

BUT we must now quit *the Greeks*, and, in consequence of our plan, pass to the ARABIANS, *followers of Mahomet*.

* See Vol. I. p. 133, 134.

† This story was told *the Author* by Mr. *Anson* himself.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning THE SECOND CLASS of Geniuses during the middle Age, THE ARABIANS, or SARACENS—at first, barbarous—their Character before the time of Mahomet—Their greatest Caliphs were from among the ABASSIDE—ALMANZUR one of the first of that race—ALMAMUM of the same race, a great Patron of Learning, and learned Men—ARABIANS cultivated Letters, as their Empire grew settled and established—Translated the best Greek Authors into their own Language—Historians, ABULPHARAGIUS, ABULFEDA, BOHADIN—Extracts from the last concerning SALADIN.

THE ARABIANS* began ill. The Sentiment of their Caliph OMAR, when he commanded the *Alexandrian Library* to be burnt (a fact we have already related †) was natural to any Bigot, when in the plenitude of Despotism. But they grew more rational, as they grew less bigotted, and by degrees began to think, that Science was worth cultivating. They may be said indeed to have recurred to their *ancient* Character; that Character, which they did not rest upon brutal Force alone, but which they boasted

Ch. VI.

* As many Quotations are made in the following Chapters from *Arabian* Writers, and more particularly from ABULPHARAGIUS, ABULFEDA, and BOHADIN, a short account of those three authors will be given in the Notes of *this* Chapter, where their Names come in course to be mentioned.

† See before, p. 424.

Part III. ed to imply three capital things, *Hospitality, Valour, and Eloquence* *.

WHEN Success in Arms has defeated Rivals, and Empire becomes not only extended but *established*, then is it that Nations begin to think of *Letters*, and to cultivate Philosophy, and liberal Speculation. This happened to *the Athenians*, after they had triumphed over the *Persians*; to the *Romans*, after they triumphed over *Carthage*; and to the ARABIANS, after the *Caliphate* was established at *Bagdad* †.

AND here perhaps it may not be improper to observe, that after the four first Caliphs, came the race of the OMMIADÆ. These about thirty years after *Mahomet*, upon the destruction of *Ali*, usurped the Sovereignty, and held it ninety years. They were considered by the *Arabic* Historians as a race of Tyrants, and were in number fourteen ‡. Having made themselves by their oppressions to be much detested, the last of them, *Merwin*, was deposed by *Al-Suffah*, from whom began another race, the race of ABASSIDÆ §, who claimed to be related in blood to *Mahomet*, by descending from his Uncle, *Abbas*. As

* *Schultens* in his *Monumenta vetustiora Arabiæ* (Lugdun. Batavor. 1740) gives us in his Preface the following Passage from *Saphadius*, an *Arabic* Author. ARABES antiquitus non habebant, quo gloriarentur, quam GLADIO, HOSPITE, et ELOQUENTIA.

† See before, p. 426, 427.

‡ See *Herbelot's Bibliothéque Orientale*, under the word OMMIADES, also *Abulpharagius*, p. 138, 160. and in particular *Abulfeda*, p. 138, &c.

§ *Abulphar.* p. 138—150, &c. *Abulfeda*, p. 143. *Herbelot's Bib. Orient.* under the word ABASSIDES.

As many of these were far superior in character to their predecessors, so their Dominion was of much longer duration, lasting for more than five Centuries.

THE former part of this Period may be called the *Æra of the Grandeur, and Magnificence of the CALIPHATE.*

ALMANZUR, who was among the first of them, removed the imperial seat from *Damascus* to *Bagdad*, a City which he himself founded upon the banks of the *Tigris*, and which soon after became one of the most splendid Cities throughout the *East*.

Almanzur was not only a great Conqueror, but a lover of Letters and learned Men. 'Twas under him that *Arabian Literature*, which had been at first chiefly confined to *Medicine* and a few other branches, was extended to *Sciences* of every denomination*.

HIS Grandson ALMAMUN (who reigned about fifty years after) giving a full Scope to his love of Learning, sent to the *Greek Emperors* for Copies of their *best Books*; employed the ablest Scholars, that could be found, to *translate* them; and, when translated, encouraged men of genius in their perusal, taking a pleasure in being present at *literary Conversations*. Then was it that learned men, in the lofty Language of *Eastern Eloquence*, were called *Luminaries, that dispel darkness; Lords of human kind; of whom, when the World becomes destitute, it becomes barbarous and savage*†.

THE

* See *Abulfeda*, p. 144. *Abulpharag.* p. 139. 141. 160.

† See *Abulfeda*, p. 181. *Abulpharag.* p. 160, 161. The lofty Language alluded to stands thus in the *Latin Version* of the page last quoted. *Docti tenebrarum laminae sunt, et generis humani domini, quibus destitutus ferus evadit mundus.*

Part III.

THE rapid Victories of these *Eastern* Conquerors soon carried their Empire from *Asia* even into the remote regions of *Spain*. Letters followed them, as they went. *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and their best Greek Commentators were soon translated into *Arabic*; so were *Euclid*, *Archimedes*, *Apollonius*, *Diophantus*, and the other Greek *Mathematicians*; so *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and the best professors of *Medicine*; so *Ptolemy*, and the noted Writers on the subject of *Astronomy*. The study of these Greeks produced others like them; produced others, who not only explained them in *Arabic* Comments, but composed *themselves* original pieces upon the same Principles.

AVERROES was celebrated for his Philosophy in *Spain*; ALPHARABI and AVICENNA were equally admired thro' *Asia**. Science (to speak a little in their own stile) may be said to have extended

— a Gadibus usque

Auroram et Gangem —

NOR, in this immense multitude, did they want *Historians*, some of which, (such as ABULFEDA, ABULPHARAGIUS, BOHADIN†, and others)

* See *Herbelot*, under the several Names here quoted.

† ABULFEDA was an *Oriental Prince*, descended from the same Family with the great *Saladin*. He died in the year 1345, and published a *General History*, in which however he is most particular and diffuse in the Narrative of *Mahomet*, and his Successors.

Learned Men have published different parts of this curious Author. *Gagnier* gave us in *Arabic* and *Latin* as much of him, as related to *Mahomet*. This was printed in a thin Folio at *Oxford*, in the year 1723.

The largest Portion, and from which most of the facts here related are taken, was published by *Reiske*, or *Reiskius* (a very able Scholar) in *Latin only*, and includes the History of the *Arabians* and their *Caliphs*, from the first year of the *Mahometan Era*,
An.

others) have been translated, and are perused, even in their Translations, both with pleasure and profit, as they give not only the outlines of amazing Enterprises, but a sample of Manners, and Character, widely differing from our own.

No History perhaps can be more curious than the Life of SALADIN by BOHADIN. This Author was a constant Attendant upon the

An. Dom. 622, to their 406th year, *An. Dom.* 1015. This Book, a moderate or thin Quarto, was printed at *Lipfic*, in the year 1754.

We have another Portion of a period *later still* than this, published by *Schultens* in *Arabic* and *Latin*; a Portion relative to the Life of *Saladin*, and subjoined by *Schultens* to the Life of that great Prince by *Bohadin*, which he (*Schultens*) published. But more of this hereafter.

ABULPHARAGIUS gave likewise a *general History*, divided into nine *Dynasties*, but is far more minute and diffuse (as well as *Abulfeda*) in his History of *Mahomet* and the *Caliphs*.

He was a Christian, and the Son of a Christian Physician—was an *Asiatic* by birth, and wrote in *Arabic*, as did *Abulfeda*. He brought down his History a little below the time of the celebrated *Jingez Chan*, that is to the middle of the thirteenth Century, the time when he lived. A fine Edition of this Author was given in *Arabic* and *Latin*, by the learned *Pococke*, in two small Quartos, at Oxford, 1663.

BOHADIN wrote the Life of the celebrated *Saladin*, but more particularly that part of it, which respects the *Crusades*, and *Saladin's* taking of *Jerusalem*. *Bohadin* has many things to render his History highly valuable: he was a *Contemporary* Writer; was an *Eye-witness* of almost every *Transaction*; and what is more, instead of being an obscure Man, was *high in office*, a favourite of *Saladin's*, and constantly about his person. This author flourished in the twelfth Century, that is in the time of *Saladin* and King *Richard*, *Saladin's* antagonist.

BOHADIN's History in *Arabic* and *Latin*, with much excellent Erudition, was published in an elegant Folio, by that accurate Scholar, *Schultens*, at *Leyden*, in the year 1755.

It must be observed that, tho' ABULPHARAGIUS was a *Christian*, yet ABULFEDA and BOHADIN were both *Muhometans*. All three Historians bear a great resemblance to *Plutarch*, as they have enriched their Histories with so many striking *Anecdotes*. From ABULPHARAGIUS too, and ABULFEDA, we have much curious information as to the *Progress and State of Literature* in those Ages and Countries.

Part III. the person of this great Prince thro' all his active and important Life, down to his last Sickness, and the very hour of his Death. The many curious Anecdotes, which he relates, give us the striking Picture of an Eastern Hero.

TAKE the following Instance of *Saladin's* Justice and Affability.

" HE was in company once with his intimate Friends, enjoying
 " their conversation apart, the crowd being dismissed, when a Slave of
 " some rank brought him a petition in behalf of a person oppressed.
 " The Sultan said, that he was then fatigued, and wished the matter,
 " whatever it was, might for a time be deferred. The other did not
 " attend to what was desired, but on the contrary almost thrust the
 " petition into the Sultan's face. The Sultan on this, opening and
 " reading it over, declared he thought the Petitioner's Cause a good
 " one. — *Let then our Sovereign Lord*, says the other, *sign it.* — *There*
 " *is no Ink-stand*, says the Sultan (who, being at that time seated at
 " the door of his Tent, rendered it impossible for any one to enter)
 " — *You have one*, replies the Petitioner, *in the inner part of your*
 " *Tent*, (which meant, as the Writer well observes, little less than
 " bidding the Prince go and bring it himself.) The Sultan, looking
 " back and seeing the Ink-stand behind him, cries out, *God help me,*
 " *the man says true*, and immediately reached back for it, and signed
 " the Instrument."

HERE the Historian, who was present, spoke the language of a good Courtier. " *God Almighty*, said he, *bore this Testimony to our*
 " *Prophet, that HIS Disposition was a sublime one: our Sovereign Lord,*
 " *I perceive,*

“ *I perceive, has a Temper like him.* The Sultan not regarding the
 “ Compliment, replied coolly.—*The Man did no harm; we have dis-*
 “ *patched his business, and the Reward is at hand*.*”

AFTER this fact we shall the more readily believe *Bohadin*, when speaking of the same illustrious person, he informs us, that his Conversation was remarkably elegant and pleasing; that he was a perfect master of the Arabian Families, of their History, their Rites, and Customs; that he knew also the Genealogies of their Horses (for which we know that to this hour Arabia is celebrated;) nor was he ignorant of what was rare and curious in the world at large; that he was particularly affable in his inquiries about the Health of his Friends, their Illness, their Medicines, &c. that his Discourse was free from all obscenity and scandal; and that he was remarkably tender and compassionate both to orphans and to persons in years†.

I MAY add from the same authority an instance of his Justice.

“ AS BOHADIN, the Historian, was one day exercising at *Jeru-*
 “ *salem* his office of a Judge, a decent old Merchant tendered him
 “ a Bill or Libel of Complaint, which he insisted upon having open-
 “ ed. *Who* (says *Bohadin*) *is your Adversary?*—*My Adversary*, re-
 “ plies the Merchant, *is the Sultan himself: but this is the Seat of*
 “ *Justice,*

* See *Bohadin*, p. 22.

† See *Bohadin*, p. 28. and at the end of *Bohadin*, the *Excerpta* from *Abulfeda*, p. 62, 63.

Part III. *“Justice, and we have heard that you (applying to Bohadin) are not governed by regard to Persons. Bohadin told him the Cause could not be decided without his Adversary’s being first apprized. The Sultan accordingly was informed of the affair; submitted to appear; produced his Witnesses; and, having justly defended himself, gained the Cause. Yet so little did he resent this Treatment, that he dismissed his Antagonist with a rich Garment and a Donation *.”*

His *Severity* upon occasions was no less conspicuous, than his *Clemency*.

WE learn from the same Writer, that *Arnold*, Lord of *Cracha*, (called *Reginald* by *M. Paris*, and *Rainold* by *Fuller*) had thought proper, during the Truce between the *Christians* and the *Saracens*, to fall upon the Caravan of Travellers going to *Mecca* from *Egypt*, whom he cruelly pillaged and thrust into Dungeons, and when they appealed to the Truce for better usage, replied with scorn, *Let your Mahomet deliver you.*

Saladin, fired with indignation at this perfidy, vowed a Vow to dispatch him *with his own hand*, if he could ever make him prisoner. This Event happened at the fatal Battle of *Hittyn*, where *Guy* King of *Jerusalem*, *Arnold*, and all the principal Commanders of the *Christian* Army were taken. *Saladin*, as soon as his Tent could be

* See *Bohadin*, p. 10.

be erected, in the height of his Festivity, orders King *Guy*, his Brother *Geoffry*, and prince *Arnold* into his presence. Ch. VI.

As *Guy* the King was nearly dying for thirst, *Saladin* presented him a delicious Cup, cooled with Snow, out of which the King drank, and then transmitted it to *Arnold*. *Tell the King*, says the Sultan, turning to his Interpreter, *tell him*, THOU, King, art HE, who hast given the Cup to THIS MAN, and not I.

Now it is a most admirable Custom (observes *Bohadin*) among the *Arabians*, a custom breathing their liberal and noble disposition, that a Captive, the moment he has obtained meat or drink from his Captor, is by that very treatment rendered secure of Life, the *Arabians* being a people, by whom HOSPITALITY and the generous point of honour is most sacredly observed.

THE Prisoners, being dismissed, were soon remanded, when only the Sultan and a few of his Ministers were left. *Arnold* was the first brought in, whom the Sultan reminding of his irreverent Speech, subjoined, *See ME now act the part of Mahomet's Avenger*. He then offers *Arnold* to embrace the *Mahometan* Faith, which he refusing, the Sultan with his drawn scymitar gave him a stroke, that broke the hilt, while the rest of his attendants joined and dispatched him. King *Guy* thought the same destiny was prepared for him. The Sultan however bid him be of good cheer, observing, that it was not customary for Kings to kill Kings; but that this Man had brought destruction upon himself by passing the Bounds of all Faith and Honour*.

WHEN

* See *Bohadin*, p. 27. 28. 70. 71.

Part III. *WHEN* Princes are victorious, their Rigour is often apt to extend too far, especially where Religion, as in these Wars called HOLY, blends itself with the transaction.

MORE than fourscore years before *Saladin's* time the Crusaders, when they took *Jerusalem*, had murdered every *Mahometan* they found there*.

WHEN *Saladin* took *Jerusalem*, he had at first meditated putting all the *Franks* to the sword, as a sort of retaliation for what had been done there by these first Crusaders. However he was persuaded to change his intention, and spare them: nay more, after he had turned the rest of their Churches into Mosques, he still left them one, in which they had Toleration to perform their worship†.

AFTER the fatal Battle of *Hittyn*, where *Guy* and *Arnold* (as above mentioned) were taken, *Saladin* divided his Prisoners; some were sold; others put to death; and among the last all the commanders of the *Hospitalers* and *Templars*.

ON the taking of *Ptolemais* by the Crusaders, some difference arising between them and *Saladin* about the Terms of the Capitulation,

* See *Abulpharagius*, p. 243. *Matt. Par.* in anno 1099. p. 48. *Fuller's Holy Warre*, B. I. c. 24. p. 141.

† See *Abulpharagius*, p. 273. *Bohadin*, p. 73. *Abulfedæ Excerpta*, p. 42. *Matth. Paris*, p. 145. *Fuller's H. Warre*, B. II. c. 46. p. 106.

lation, the Crusaders led the Captive *Musselmans* out of the City into a Plain, and there in cold blood murdered three thousand *. Ch. VI.

Customs in all times, and in all Countries, have a singular effect. When the French Ambassadors were introduced to *Saladin*, he was playing with a favourite Son, by name *Elemir*. The Child no sooner beheld the Embassadors with their Faces shaved, their Hair cut, and their Garments of an unusual form, than he was terrified, and began to cry. A Beard perhaps would have terrified a Child in *France*: and yet, if Beards are the gift of Nature, it seems easier to defend the little Arabian †.

BOHADIN, our Historian, appears to have thought so, who, mentioning a young *Frank* of high Quality, describes him to be a fine Youth, except that his Face was *shaved*; a *Mark*, as he calls it, by which the *Franks* are distinguished ‡.

WE cannot quit *Saladin*, without a word on his *Liberality*.

HE used to say, 'twas possible there might exist a man (and by such man 'twas supposed he meant *himself*) who with the same eye of contempt could look on *Riches* and on *Dirt* §.

THESE seem to have been his Sentiments, when some of his Revenue-officers were convicted of putting into his Treasury Purfes of

* See *Bohadin*, p. 70, for the *Templars*, and p. 183, for the *Musulmans*—also *Fuller's H. Warre*, B. II. c. 45. p. 105.

† See *Bohadin*, p. 270.

‡ See *Bohadin*, p. 193.

§ See *Bohadin*, p. 13.

Part III. of Brafs for Purfes of Gold. By the rigour of Eastern Juftice they might have immediately been executed; but *Saladin* did no more than difmifs them from their office*.

WHEN his Treafury was fo empty, that he could not fupply his Largeffes, in order to have it in his power, he fold his very furniture †.

WHEN his Army was encamped in the Plains of *Ptolemaïs*, 'twas computed he gave away no lefs than twelve thoufand Horfes; nay, 'twas faid he never mounted a Horfe, which was not either given away, or promifed ‡.

Bohadin, whom he employed in moft of his acts of *Munificence*, relates, that all who approached him, were fenfible of its effects; nay that he exceeded in his Donations even the unreafonable wifhes of the Petitioners, altho' he was *never heard to boast* of any favour that he had conferred §.

THE effect of fuch immense *Liberality* was, that, when he died, out of all the vaft revenues of *Egypt*, *Syria*, the *Oriental Provinces*, and *Arabia Felix*, there was no more left in his Treafury, than forty feven pieces of Silver, and one of Gold; fo that they were forced to borrow money, to defray the expences of his Funeral ||.

As

* See *Bohadin*, p. 27.

† See *Bohadin*, 12, 13.

‡ See *Bohadin*, p. 13.—The fame Book, in the Extract from *Abulfeda*, p. 62.

§ See *Bohad.* p. 13.

|| See *Bohadin*, p. 5. 13. and, in the fame Book, the Extracts from *Abulfeda*, p. 62.—*Abulpharagius*, p. 277. See *Fuller's Character of Saladin, Holy Warre*, B. III. c. 14. as alfo the above Extracts, and *Abulpharagius*, both under the fame pages.

As to the facts respecting the Western Crusaders at this period, and particularly *Saladin's* great Antagonist, *Richard Coeur de Leon*, these are subjects reserved, till we come to the *Latins* or *Franks*. Ch. VI.

We shall now say something concerning *Arabian Poetry* and Works of *Invention*, adding withal a few more Anecdotes, relative to their *Manners* and *Character*.

C H A P. VII.

ARABIAN POETRY, and Works of Invention — *Facts relative to their Manners and Characters.*

Part III.

ARABIAN POETRY is so immense a Field, that he, who enters it, is in danger of being lost. 'Twas their favourite study long before the time of *Mahomet*, and many Poems are still extant of an earlier *Æra**. So much did they value themselves upon the Elegance of their Compositions, that they called their neighbours, and more particularly the *Persians*, BARBARIANS†. It seems unfortunate for these last, that the *old Greeks* should have distinguished them by the same appellation‡.

If we reckon among pieces of Poetry not the *Metrical* only, but those also the mere efforts of *Invention* and *Imagination*, (such as the incomparable *Telemachus*, of the truly eloquent *Fenelon*) we may justly range in this Class the *Arabian Nights*, and the *Turkish Tales*. They are valuable not only for exhibiting a picture of *Oriental* manners, during the splendor of the *Caliphate*, but for inculcating in many

* See *Schultens* in his *Monumenta vetustiora Arabiæ*, Lugd. Bat. 1740, where there will be found Fragments of Poetry many Centuries before *Mahomet*, and some said to be as ancient as the days of *Solomon*.

† Vid. *Pocockii Not. in Carmen Tograi*, p. 5.—and *Abulfed.* p. 194.

‡ See *Isocrates*, *Plato*, *Demosthenes*, &c.

many instances a useful and instructive *Moral*. Nothing can be better written than *the Tale of Alnaschar*, to illustrate that important part of the *Stoic Moral*, the fatal consequence of *not resisting our Fancies* *.

Ch. VII.

THEY were fond of the *Fabulous* and *Allegorical*, and loved to represent under that Form the doctrines they most favoured. They favoured no doctrine more than that of each individual's *inevitable Destiny*. Let us see after what manner they conveyed this doctrine.

“THEY tell us, that as *Solomon* (whom they supposed a Magician from his superior Wisdom) was one day walking with a person in *Palestine*, his Companion said to him with some horror, *what ugly Being is that which approaches us? I don't like his Visage—send me, I pray thee, to the remotest Mountain of India*. *Solomon* complied, and the very moment he was sent off, the *ugly Being* arrived. *Solomon* (said the Being) *how came that fellow HERE? I was to have fetched him from the remotest Mountain of India*. *Solomon* answered—*ANGEL OF DEATH, thou wilt find him THERE*†.”

I MAY

* A curious and accurate Version of this admirable Tale is printed at *Oxford*, in a Grammar of the *Arabic* Language; a Version which gives us too much reason to lament our imperfect view of those other ingenious Fictions, so *obscurely* transmitted to us thro' a *French* Medium.

† This Tale was told me by *Dr. Gregory Sharpe*, late Master of the Temple, well known for his knowledge in *Oriental Literature*.

Part III.

I MAY add to this that elegant Fiction concerning the *self-taught* Philosopher *Hai Ebn Yokdan*, who, being supposed to have been cast an Infant on a desert Island, is made by various Incidents (some possible, but all ingenious) to ascend gradually, as he grew up in *Solitude*, to the Sublime of all Philosophy, Natural, Moral, and Divine*.

BUT this last was the Production of a more refined Period, when they had adopted the Philosophy of other nations. In their earlier days of Empire they valued no Literature, but their own, as we have learnt from the celebrated Story, already related, concerning *Omar*, *Amrus*, and the Library at *Alexandria* †.

THE same *Omar*, after the same *Amrus* had conquered the vast Province of *Egypt*, and given (according to the custom of those early times) many proofs of *personal* strength and valour, the same *Omar* (I say) was desirous to see the Sword, by which *Amrus* had performed so many Wonders. Having taken it into his hand, and found it no better than any other sword, he returned it with contempt, and averred, *it was good for nothing*. You say true, Sir, replied *Amrus*; for you demanded to see the Sword, not the Arm that wielded it; while that was wanting, the Sword was no better than the sword of *Pharezdacus*.

Now *Pharezdacus* was it seems a Poet, famous for his *fine description* of a Sword, but not equally famous for his *personal Prowess* ‡.

"Tis

* See *Pococke's* Edition of this Work, Oxon. 1671.

† See before, p. 424. 463.

‡ *Pocock. Notæ in Carm. Togr.* p. 184.

'Tis a singular instance of their attention to *Hospitality*, that they used to kindle Fires by night, upon Hills near their Camps, to conduct wandering Travellers to a place of refuge*. Ch. VII.

SUCH an attention to this Duty naturally brings to our mind what *Eumæus* in the *Odysssey* says to *Ulysses*.

Ξεῖν', ἔ μοι θέμις ἐς', εἴδ' εἰ κακίων σεθεν ἔλθοι,

Ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι, πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες

Ξεῖνοι —

STRANGER, I dare not with dishonour treat

A STRANGER, tho' a worse, than thou, should come;

For STRANGERS all belong to Jove — Οδυσ. Ε. 56.

NOR are there wanting other instances of Resemblance to the age of *Homer*. When *Ibrahim*, a dangerous competitor of the Caliph *Almanzur*, had in a decisive battle been mortally wounded, and his friends were endeavouring to carry him off, a desperate conflict ensued, in which the Enemy prevailed, overpowered his Friends, and gained what they contended for, the body of *Ibrahim*. The resemblance between this Story and that respecting the Body of *Patroclus*, is a fact too obvious, to be more than hinted †.

IN an earlier period, when *Moawigea* (the competitor of the great *Ali*) was preſt in a battle, and had juſt begun to fly, he is reported to have rallied upon the ſtrength of certain verſes, which at that
critical

* *Ejuſd. Carm. Tograi*, p. 111.

† See *Abulfeda*, p. 148.

Part III. critical instant occurred to his memory. The Verses were these, as we attempt to translate them.

*When direful Scenes of Death appear,
And fill thy flutt'ring Heart with fear :
Say — HEART ! be firm ; the storm endure ;
For Evils ever find a cure.
Their Mem'ry, should we 'scape, will please ;
Or, should we fall, we sleep at ease*.*

THIS naturally suggests to every Lover of *Homer*, what is said by *Ulysses*.

Τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης
Ἡματι τῷ, ὅτε, κ. τ. λ. Οδύς. γ'. 18.

*Indure it, HEART ; for worse thou hast indured
In days of yore, when, &c.*

SUCH Resemblances, as these, prove a probable connection between the manners of the *Arabians*, and those of the ancient *Greeks*. There are other Resemblances, which, as they respect not only *Greek* Authors but *Roman*, are perhaps no more than casual.

THUS an *Arabian* Poet—

*Horses and Wealth we know you've none ;
Let then your Eloquence atone
For Fortune's failure †——*

WHAT

* *Abulfeda*, p. 91.

† *Abulfeda*, p. 279.

WHAT the *Arabian* says of his Friend, *Horace* says of himself.

Ch. VII.

Donarem pateras, grataque commodus,

Censorine, meis &c.

Od. L.

ANOTHER of their Poets has the following Sentiment.

Who fondly can himself deceive,

And venture Reason's rules to leave;

Who dares, thro' ignorance, aspire

To that, which no one can acquire;

To spotless fame, to solid health,

To firm, unalienable, wealth:

Each Wish he forms, will surely find

A Wish denied to human kind.*

HERE we read the *Stoic* Description of *Things not in our power*, and the consequence of pursuing them, as if they were *Things in our power*, concerning which fatal mistake see *Epicætetus*, either in the Original, or in Mrs. Carter's valuable Translation. The *Enchiridion* we know begins with this very doctrine.

THERE is a fine Precept among the *Arabians* — Let him, to whom THE GATE of Good Fortune is opened, seize his Opportunity; for he knoweth not, how soon it may be shut.

COMPARE this with those admired Lines in *Shakspeare* —

There is A TIDE in the affairs of men,

Which taken at the flood, &c. Jul. Cæf. Act IV. Sc. 5.

Tho'

* *Abulfeda*, p. 279.

Part III.

THO' the *Metaphors* differ, the *Sentiment* is the same*.

IN the Comment on the Verses of *Tograi* we meet an *Arabic* Sentiment, which says, that a *Friend* is another *self*. The same elegant thought occurs in *Aristotle's* *Ethics*, and that in the same words. *Ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός †.*

AFTER the preceding instances of *Arabian* Genius, the following perhaps may give a sample of their *Manners* and *Character*.

ON a rainy day the *Caliph Almotasem* happened, as he was riding, to wander from his attendants. While he was thus alone, he found an old Man, whose *Afs*, laden with faggots, had just cast his burden, and was mired in a slough. As the old Man was standing in a state of perplexity, the *Caliph* quitted his horse, and went to helping up the *Afs*. *In the name of my father and my mother, I beseech thee*, says the old Man, *do not spoil thy cloaths. That is nothing to Thee*, replied the *Caliph*, who, after having helped up the *Afs*, replaced the faggots, and washed his hands, got again upon his horse, the old Man in the mean time crying out, *Oh Youth, may God reward thee!* Soon after this the *Caliph's* company overtook him, whom he generously commanded to present the old Man with a noble largess of gold ‡.

To this instance of *Generosity* we subjoin another of *Resentment*.

THE

* *Bohadin Vit. Salad.* p. 73. Of this Work, p. 375.

† *Arist. Ethic. Nicom.* X. 4. and *Not. in Carm. Tograi*, p. 25.

‡ *Abulpharagius*, p. 166.

THE Grecian Emperors used to pay the Caliphs a tribute. This the Emperor Nicephorus would pay no longer; and not only that, but requiring the Caliph in a haughty manner to refund all he had received, added that, if he refused, the Sword should decide the Controversy. The Caliph had no sooner read the Letter, than inflamed with rage he inscribes upon the back of it the following answer.

In the name of the most merciful God: from Harun, Prince of the Faithful, to Nicephorus, Dog of the Romans: I have read thy Epistle, Thou Son of an unbelieving Mother: to which, what thou shalt BEHOLD, and not what thou shalt HEAR, shall serve for an answer.

HE immediately upon the very day decamped; marched as far as *Heracia*, and, filling all things with rapine and slaughter, extorted from Nicephorus the performance of his Contract*.

THE following is an instance of a calmer *Magnanimity*. In the middle of the third Century after *Mahomet*, one *Jacob*, from being originally a Brazier, had made himself Master of some fine Provinces, which he governed at will, tho' professing (like the Eastern Governors of later times) a seeming deference to his proper Sovereign.

THE Caliph, not satisfied with this apparent submission, sent a Legate to persuade him into a more perfect obedience. *Jacob*, who

* *Abulfeda*, p. 166, 167.

Part III. who was then ill, sent for the Legate into his presence, and there shewed him three things, which he had prepared for his inspection; a Sword, some black Barley Bread, and a Bundle of Onions. He then informed the Legate, that, should he die of his present disorder, the Caliph in such case would find no farther trouble. But if the contrary should happen, there could be then no Arbitrator to decide between them, excepting *that*, pointing to the *Sword*. He added, that if Fortune should prove adverse, should he be conquered by the Caliph, and stripped of his possessions, he was then resolved to return to his ancient frugality, pointing to the *Black Bread* and the *Bundle of Onions**.

To former instances of *Munificence* we add the following, concerning the celebrated *Almamun*†.

BEING once at *Damascus*, and in great want of money, he complained of it to his Brother *Mottasem*. His Brother assured him he should have money in a few days, and sent immediately for thirty thousand pieces of Gold from the revenues of those Provinces, which he governed in the name of his Brother. When the money arrived, brought by the Royal beasts of burden, *Almamun* invited *Jahia* the Son of *Adtam*, one of his favourites, to attend him on horseback, and view what was brought. They went accordingly, and beheld the Treasure arranged in the finest order, and the Camels too, which had brought it, richly decorated. The Prince admired both the quantity of the money, and the elegance of the show; and

* *Abulfeda*, p. 214.

† See p. 465.

and as his Courtiers looked on with no less admiration, *he bid them be of good cheer.* Then turning about to *Jahia*: *O! Abu Mohamed*, says he, *we should be sordid indeed, were we to depart hence with all this money, as if it were scraped up for ourselves alone, whilst our longing friends look on to no purpose.* Calling therefore immediately for a Notary, he commands him to write down for such a family so many thousands; for such a family so many; and so on, never stopping till, out of the thirty thousand pieces, he had given away twenty-four thousand, without so much as taking his foot out of the stirrup*.

FROM *Munificence* we pass to another Quality, which, tho' less amiable, is not less striking and popular, I mean *Magnificence*.

THE splendour of the Caliph *Moctader*, when he received the Ambassador of the *Greek Emperor* at *Bagdad*, seems hardly credible. We relate it from one of their Historians, precisely as we find it.

THE Caliph's whole Army both Horse and Foot were under Arms, which together made a Body of one hundred and sixty thousand Men. His State-officers stood near him in the most splendid apparel, their Belts shining with Gold and Gems. Near them were seven thousand Eunuchs; four thousand white, the remainder of them black. The Porters or Door-keepers were in number seven hundred. Barges and Boats with the most superb decoration were swimming on the *Tigris*. Nor was the Palace itself less splendid,
in

* *Abulfeda*, p. 189.

Part III. in which were hung up thirty-eight thousand pieces of Tapestry; twelve thousand five hundred of which were of filk, embroidered with gold. The Carpets on the floor were twenty-two thousand. An hundred Lions were brought out, with a Keeper to each Lion.

AMONG the other Spectacles of rare and stupendous luxury, was a Tree of Gold and Silver, which opened itself into eighteen larger branches, upon which, and the other less branches, sat Birds of every sort, made also of gold and silver. The Tree glittered with Leaves of the same Metals, and while its branches thro' Machinery appeared to move of themselves, the several Birds upon them warbled their proper and natural notes.

WHEN the *Greek* Ambassador was introduced to the *Caliph*, he was led by the *Vizir* thro' all this *Magnificence* *.

BUT besides *Magnificence* of this kind, which was at best but *temporary*, the *Caliphs* gave instances of *Grandeur* more *permanent*. Some of them provided public buildings for the reception of Travellers; supplied the Roads with Wells and Watering Places; measured out the distances by columns of Stone, and established Posts and Couriers. Others repaired old Temples, or built magnificent new ones. The provision of Snow (which in hot Countries is almost a Necessary) was not forgotten. Add to this Forums, or public Places for Merchants to assemble; Infirmaries; Observatories, with proper Instruments, for the use of Astronomers; Libraries, Schools, and

* *Abulfeda*, p. 237. This, according to the *Christian Æra*, happened in the year 917.

and Colleges for Students; together with Societies, instituted for Ch. VII.
Philosophical inquiry*.

IN the account of the *Escurial Arabic* Manuscripts, lately given by the learned *Casiri*, it appears that the *Public* Libraries in *Spain*, when under the *Arabian* Princes, were no fewer than seventy: a noble help this to Literature, when Copies of Books were so rare and expensive†.

A TRANSACTION between one of the Caliph of *Bagdad*'s Ambassadors and the Court of *Constantinople*, is here subjoined, in order to illustrate the then *Manners* both of the Ambassador and the Court.

As this Court was a remnant of the ancient Imperial one under the *Cæsars*, it still retained (as was natural) after its dominions were
fo

* Many things are enumerated in this Paragraph, to confirm which we subjoin the following References among many omitted.

For *Buildings to accommodate Travellers*, *Abulfed.* p. 154. *Abulphar.* p. 315, 316.

For *Wells upon the Road, Watering-places and Mile-stones*, *Abulfed.* p. 154. for *Posts and Couriers*, the same, p. 157. 283.

For *Temples*, *Abulfed.* p. 125. *Abulphar.* p. 210, 315, 316.

For *Snow*, *Abulfed.* p. 154. *Abulphar.* p. 261. *Bohadin*, p. 70.

For *Infirmaries*, *Abulphar.* p. 210. 343.

For *Observatories, Public Schools, &c.* *Abulphar.* p. 216.

For *Learned Societies*, *Abulphar.* p. 217. *Abulfed.* p. 181, 182, 183. 210. 274. *Bohadin. Vit. Salad.* p. 25.

Among their Philosophical Transactions was a Mensuration of the Earth's Circumference, made by order of the Caliph *Almamun*, which they brought to about twenty-four thousand Miles.

† Vid. *Biblioth. Arabico-Hispan.* Vol. II. p. 71. *Matriti*, 1770.

Part III. so much lessened, an attachment to that Pomp and those minute Ceremonials, which in the zenith of its Power it had been able to enforce. 'Twas an Affection for this shadow of Grandeur, when the substance was in a manner gone, that induced the Emperor *Constantine Porphyrogenitus* to write no less than a large Folio Book upon its Ceremonials*.

'Twas in consequence of the same principles, that the above Ambassador, tho' coming from the *Caliph*, was told to make a humble Obeisance, as he approached the *Grecian* Emperor. This the Ambassador (who had his *national* pride also) absolutely refusing, it was ingeniously contrived, that he should be introduced to the Emperor thro' a door so very low, as might oblige him, however unwillingly, to make the Obeisance required. The Ambassador, when he arrived, no sooner saw the door, than he comprehended the contrivance, and with great readiness turned about, and entered the Room backward†.

WE have said little concerning eminent ARABIANS during this period in SPAIN. Yet that we may not be wholly silent, we shall mention one fact concerning AVERROES, the famous Philosopher and Lawyer, who was born at *Corduba* in the eleventh Century.

As he was lecturing one day in the College of Lawyers, a Slave, belonging to one who was his Enemy, came and whispered him. AVERROES turning round, and saying, *well, well*, the company believed

* See before, p. 450.

† *Abulphar*.

lieved the Slave had brought him a message from his master. The next day the Slave returned, implored his pardon, and publicly confessed that, when he whispered him, he had spoken a slander. *God forgive thee*, replied AVERROES; *Thou hast publicly shewn me to be a patient man; and as for thy injury, 'tis not worthy of notice.* AVERROES after this gave him money, adding withal this monition: *What thou hast done to ME, do not do to another*.*

AND here, before we conclude this Chapter, we cannot help confessing that the *Facts*, we have related, are not always arranged in the strict order of *Chronology*.

THE MODES indeed of *History* (if these Chapters merit that name) appear to be different. *There is a Mode* which we may call *Historical Declamation*; a *Mode*, where the Author, dwelling little upon *Facts*, indulges himself in various and copious *Reflections*.

WHATEVER Good (if any) may be derived from this Method, it is not likely to give us much Knowledge of *Facts*.

Another Mode is that, which I call *General* or rather *Public History*; a *Mode*, abundant in *Facts*, where Treaties and Alliances, Battles and Sieges, Marches and Retreats are accurately retailed; together with Dates, Descriptions, Tables, Plans, and all the collateral helps both of *Chronology* and *Geography*.

IN

* *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. T. XIII. p. 283, 284.*

Part III.

IN this, no doubt, there is Utility. Yet *the sameness* of the Events resembles not a little the Sameness of Human Bodies. One Head, two Shoulders, two Legs, &c. seem equally to characterise an *European* and an *African*; a native of old *Rome*; and a native of *Modern*.

A third Species of History still behind is that, which gives a sample of SENTIMENTS and MANNERS.

IF the account of *these last* be faithful, it cannot fail being instructive, since we view thro' these *the interiour of human Nature*. 'Tis by these we perceive what sort of animal *Man* is; so that while not only *Europeans* are distinguished from *Asiatics*, but *English* from *French*, *French* from *Italians*, and (what is still more) every individual from his neighbour; we view at the same time ONE NATURE, *which is common to them all*.

Horace informs us that a *Drama*, where the SENTIMENTS and MANNERS are well preserved, will please the Audience more than a POMPOUS FABLE, where they are *wanting* *. Perhaps, what is true in *Dramatic Composition*, is not less true in *Historical*.

PLUTARCH, among the *Greek* Historians, appears in a peculiar manner to have merited this praise. So likewise BOHADIN among the *Arabians*, and to Him we add ABULPHARAGIUS, and ABULFEDA, from whom so many facts in these Chapters are taken.

NOR

* Sup. p. 398. in the Note.

NOR ought I to omit (as I shall soon refer to them) some of our best MONKISH HISTORIANS, tho' prone upon occasion to degenerate into *the incredible*. As they often lived during the times which they described, 'twas natural they should paint *the life* and THE MANNERS, which *they saw*.

A SINGLE Chapter more will finish all we have to say concerning the *Arabians*.

C H A P. VIII.

ARABIANS favoured MEDICINE and ASTROLOGY—*facts, relative to these two subjects—they valued KNOWLEDGE, but had no Ideas of CIVIL LIBERTY—the mean Exit of their last Caliph, MOSTASSEM—End of their Empire in ASIA, and in SPAIN—their present wretched degeneracy in AFRICA—an Anecdote.*

Part III.

THE ARABIANS favoured MEDICINE and ASTROLOGY, and many of their Princes had Professors of each sort usually near their persons. *Self-Love*, a natural Passion, led them to respect the Art of Healing; *Fear*, another natural Passion, made them anxious to know *the Future*, and *Superstition* believed there were men, who, by *knowing the Stars*, could discover it.

WE shall first say something concerning MEDICINE*, which we are sorry to couple with so futile an imposture.

'Tis commonly supposed that *the Prescriber* of Medicines, and *the Provider*, that is to say in common words, *the Physician* and *the Apothecary*, were characters anciently united in *the same person*. The following fact proves the contrary, at least among *the Orientals*.

IN an Army commanded by *Aphshin*, an Officer of the Caliph *Al-Motasssem*, it happened that *Aphshin* and the Army Physician, *Zacharias*,

* *Abulphar*. p. 160.

charias, were discoursing together. *I assert*, says *Zacharias*, *you can send for nothing from an Apothecary, but, whether he has it or has it not, he will affirm that he has.* *Aphshin*, willing to make the trial, bids them bring him a catalogue of unknown people, and transcribing out of it about twenty of their names, sends Messengers to the Apothecaries to provide him those Medicines. A few confest they knew no such medicines; others affirmed *they knew them well*, and taking the money from the Messengers, gave them something out of their shops. *Aphshin* upon this, called them together, permitted those, who said they knew nothing of the Medicines, to remain in the Camp, and commanded the rest that instant to depart*.

THE following story is more interesting.

THE Caliph, *Mottawakkell*, had a Physician belonging to him, who was a CHRISTIAN, named *Honaïn*. One day, after some other incidental conversation, *I would have thee*, says the Caliph, *teach me a Prescription, by which I may take off any Enemy I please, and yet at the same time it should never be discovered.* *Honaïn*, declining to give an answer, and pleading ignorance, was imprisoned.

BEING brought again, after a year's interval, into the Caliph's presence, and still persisting in his ignorance, tho' threatened with death, the Caliph smiled upon him and said, *Be of good cheer, we were only willing to try thee, that we might have the greater confidence in thee.*

As

* *Abulphar*. p. 167.

Part III. As *Honain* upon this bowed down and kissed the Earth, *What hindered thee*, says the *Caliph*, from granting our request, when thou sawest us appear so ready to perform what we had threatened? Two things, replied *Honain*, MY RELIGION, and MY PROFESSION: MY RELIGION, which commands me to do good to my Enemies; MY PROFESSION, which was purely instituted for the benefit of Mankind. Two NOBLE LAWS, said the *Caliph*, and immediately presented him (according to the Eastern Usage) with rich Garments and a sum of Money*.

THE same *Caliph* was once sitting upon a Bench with another of his Physicians named *Bactish*, who was dressed in a Tunic of rich silk, but which happened on the edge to have a small Rent. The *Caliph*, entering into discourse with him, continued playing with this rent, till he had made it reach up to his girdle. In the course of their conversation, the *Caliph* asked him, *How he could determine, when a Person was so mad, as to require being bound?* — *We bind Him*, replies *Bactish*, when things proceed to that extremity, that he tears the Tunic of his Physician up to the girdle. The *Caliph* fell backward in a fit of laughing, and ordered *Bactish* (as he had ordered *Honain*) a Present of rich Garments, and a Donation in Money†.

THAT such Freedom of Conversation was not always checked, may appear from the following, as well as the preceding Narrative.

THE *Caliph*, *Al-wathick*, was once fishing with a rod and line, upon a Raft in the River *Tigris*. As he happened to catch nothing, he turned

* *Abulpharag*. p. 172, 173.

† *Abulpharag*. p. 171.

turned about to his Physician *John, the Son of Misna*, then sitting near him, and said a little sharply, *Thou unlucky fellow, get thee gone.* Ch. VIII.
Commander of the Faithful, replies his Physician, *say not what is absurd. That John, the Son of Misna, whose Father was an obscure Man, and whose Mother was purchased for a few pieces of Silver; whom Fortune has so far favoured, that he has been admitted to the society and familiarity of Caliphs; who is so overpowered with the good things of life, as to have obtained from them that, to which even his hopes did not aspire; that HE (I say) should be an UNLUCKY FELLOW, is surely something most absurd.—*

However, if the Commander of the Faithful would have me tell him, WHO IS UNLUCKY, I will inform him.—And who is he, says the Caliph? —The Man, replied JOHN, who being sprung from four Caliphs, and being then raised thro' God to the Caliphate HIMSELF, can leave his Caliphate and his Palaces, and in the middle of the Tigris sit upon a paultry raft twenty cubits broad, and as many long, without the least assurance that a stormy blast may not sink him; resembling too by his employ the poorest, the worst fellows in the world, I mean Fishermen.

THE Prince on this singular discourse only remarked—My Companion I find is moved, if my presence did not restrain him.*

ANOTHER instance of lenity I must not omit, tho' in a later period, and in another Country. When *Al-azis* was Sultan of Egypt, a Poet there wrote a scandalous invective upon *Him* and *his Vizir*.
The

* *Abulpharag.* p. 168.

Part III. The Vizir complained and repeated the Verses to *Al-azis*, to whom the Sultan thus replied: *I perceive, says he, that in this invective I have my share along with Yóu: in pardoning it, Yóu shall have your share along with ME' **.

WE are now, as we promised, to mention *ASTROLOGY*, which seems to have been connected in its origin with *Astronomy*. Philosophers, men of veracity, studied the Heavenly Bodies; and 'twas upon *their* labours, that Impostors built *Astrology*.

THE following Facts however, notwithstanding its temporary credit, seem not much in its favour.

WHEN *Al-wathick* (the *Caliph*, whom we have just mentioned) was dangerously ill, he sent for *his Astrologers*, one of whom, pretending to inquire into his destiny, pronounced that from that day he would live fifty years. He did not however live beyond ten days †.

A few years after, the same Pretenders to Prediction said, that a vast number of Countries would be destroyed by floods; that the Rains would be immense, and the Rivers far exceed their usual boundaries.

MEN began upon this to prepare; to expect Inundations with terror; and to betake themselves into places, which might protect them by their altitude.

THE

* *Abulpharag*. p. 219.

† *Abulpharag*. p. 168.

THE Event was far from corresponding either to the *threats* of Ch.VIII. the Prophets, or to the *fears* of the Vulgar. The Rain that season was so remarkably small, and so many Springs and Rivers were absorbed by the Drought, that Public Supplications for Rain were many times made in the City of *Bagdad* *.

WE must however confess that notwithstanding these and many other such failures, *Astrologers* still maintained their ground, gained admittance for many years into the Courts of these Princes, and were consulted by many, who appear not to have wanted abilities.

As the *West* of *Europe* learnt *Astronomy* from these *Arabians*, so *ASTROLOGY* appears to have attended it, and to have been much esteemed during Centuries not remote; thro' *Germany, Italy, France, &c.*

EVEN so late as the days of Cardinal *Mazarine*, when that Minister lay on his death-bed, and a Comet happened to appear, there were not wanting Flatterers to insinuate, that it had reference to *Him*, and his destiny. The Cardinal answered them with a manly pleasantry—" *Messieurs, la Comete me fait trop d'honneur* †.

WE cannot quit these Orientals without observing that, tho' they eagerly coveted the fair Fruit of KNOWLEDGE, they appear to have had

* *Abulpharag.* p. 181. *Abulfeda*, p. 222.

† *Bayle, sur la Comete.*

Part III. had little relish for the fairer Fruit of LIBERTY. This valuable Plant seems to have rarely flourished beyond the bounds of *Europe*, and seldom even there, but in *particular* regions.

It has appeared indeed from the facts already alledged, that these *Eastern* Princes often shewed many eminent Virtues; the Virtues I mean of Candour, Magnanimity, Affability, Compassion, Liberality, Justice, and the like. But it does not appear, that either *they* or their *subjects* ever quitted those ideas of *Despotism* and *Servitude*, which during all ages appear to have been *the Characteristic* of *Oriental* Dominion.

As all things human naturally decay, so, after a period of more than five Centuries, did the illustrious race of the ABASSIDE. The last reigning Caliph of that Family, *Al-Mostasssem*, wasting his time in idleness and luxury, and that without the least Judgment, or Consistency in the conduct of his Empire; when he was told of the formidable approach of the *Tartars*, and how necessary it was, either to soothe them by Submission, or to oppose them by Force, made, in answer to this advice, the following mean reply—*For ME Bagdad suffices; which they will not surely think too much, if I yield them the other Provinces. They will not invade me, while I remain there; for this is my Mansion, and the place of my abode.*

LITTLE did these poor Sentiments avail. *Bagdad* soon after was taken, and he himself, having basely asked permission to approach the *Tartar* Prince, appeared, and offered him dishes, filled with Pearls and precious Stones. These *the Tartar* distributed among his

his Attendants, and a few days after put the unhappy *Caliph* to death*. Ch. VIII.

Bagdad being lost, by this fatal Event the *Dignity* and *Sovereignty* of the *Caliphs* were no more.

THE Name indeed remained in *Egypt* under the *Mamlucs*, but it was a name merely of *Honour*, as those other Princes were absolute.

IT even continued in the same Family to the time of *Selim*, Emperor of the *Turks*. When that Emperor in 1520 conquered *Egypt*, and destroyed the *Mamlucs*, he carried the *Caliph*, whom he found there, a Prisoner to *Constantinople*. 'Twas partly in this last City, and partly in *Egypt* that this *Caliph*, when degraded, lived upon a Pension. When he died, the Family of THE ABASSIDÆ, once so illustrious, and which had borne the Title of *Caliph* for almost eight hundred years, sunk with Him from Obscurity into Oblivion†.

WHEN the *Tartars* and the *Turks* had extinguished the Sovereignty of these *Arabians* in the East, and the Descendants of the ancient

* *Abulpharag.* p. 318, 337, 338, 339. These Events happened in the middle of the thirteenth Century.

† See the Supplement of that excellent Scholar, *Pococke*, to his Edition of *Abulpharagius*. In this Supplement we have a short but accurate Account of the *Caliphs* who succeeded *Mostasssem*, even to the time of their Extinction.

See also *Herbelot's Biblioth. Orientale*, under the Word *Abassides*, with the several references to other Articles in the same Work.

Part III. ancient *Spaniards* had driven them out of *Spain*, the remainder in *Africa* soon degenerated; till at length under the celebrated MULY ISMAEL, in the beginning of this Century, they sunk into a State of *Ignorance*, *Barbarity*, and *abject Servitude*, hardly to be equalled either in ancient or in modern History.

BUT I say nothing concerning them during this unhappy Period. That which I have been treating, tho' in Chronology a *middle* Period, was to them, in many respects, a truly *Golden* one.

I conclude this Chapter with the following Anecdote, so far curious, as it proves that, even in our own Century, the Taste among the *Orientals* for Philosophy was not *totally* extinguished.

IN the year 1721 a Turkish Envoy came to the Court of *France*. As he was a Man of Learning, he searched thro' *Paris* (tho' in vain) for the Commentary of *Averroes upon Aristotle*, a large Work in *Latin*, containing five Folio Volumes, printed at *Venice* by the *Juntæ*, in the years 1552, 1553. It happened that, visiting the King's Library, he saw the Book he wanted; and seeing it, he could not help expressing his ardent wish to possess it. The King of *France*, hearing what had happened, ordered the Volumes to be magnificently bound, and presented him by his Librarian, the Abbe *Bignon**.

* *Vid. Reimanni Histor. Atheismi et Atheorum*, 8vo. p. 537.

C H A P. IX.

Concerning the *LATINS* or *FRANKS*—*BEDE*, *ALCUIN*, *JOANNES ERIGENA*, &c. *GERBERTUS* or *GIBERTUS*, travelled to the *Arabians* in *Spain* for improvement—suspected of *MAGIC*—this the misfortune of many superior *Geniuses* in dark Ages; of *BACON*, *PETRARCH*, *FAUST*, and others—*Erudition* of *THE CHURCH*; *Ignorance* of *THE LAITY*—*INGULPHUS*, an *Englishman*, educated in the *Court* of *Edward the Confessor*—attached himself to the *Duke* of *Normandy*—accomplished *Character* of *QUEEN EGITHA*, *Wife* of the *Confessor*—*Plan* of *Education* in those *Days*—*THE PLACES* of *Study*, *THE AUTHORS* studied—*Canon Law*, *Civil Law*, *Holy War*, *Inquisition*—*Troubadours*—*WILLIAM* of *POICTOU*—*Debauchery*, *Corruption*, and *Avarice* of the *Times*—*WILLIAM* the *CONQUEROR*, his *Character* and *Taste*—his *Sons*, *RUFUS* and *HENRY*—little *Incidents* concerning them—*HILDEBERT*, a *Poet* of the times—*fine Verses* of his quoted.

I PASS now to another Race, *THE LATINS*, or *Inhabitants* of *WESTERN EUROPE*, who in this middle age were often by the *Arabians*, their *Contemporaries*, called *FRANKS*. Ch. IX.

IGNORANCE was their *general Character*, yet *Individuals* we except in the enumeration, which follows.

BEDE, called *the Venerable* from his respectable *Character*, was an *Englishman*; was born in the seventh *Century*, but flourished in the eighth;

Part III. eighth; and left many Works, Critical, Historical, and Theological, behind him.

ALCUIN (sometimes called *Alcuinus*, sometimes *Flaccus Albinus*) was *Bede's* Disciple, and like him an *Englishman*. He was famous for having been Preceptor to *Charlemagne*, and much in his favour for many years*.

JOANNES ERIGENA, a Native of *Scotland*, and who about the same period, or a little later, lived sometimes in *France*, and sometimes in *England*, appears to have understood *Greek*, a rare accomplishment for *those* Countries in those days.

It is related of him, that when he was once sitting at table over against the Emperor *Charles the Bald*, the Emperor asked him—*How far distant A SCOTT was from A SOTT?*—*As far, Sir*, replied he, *as the Table's length*†.

A TREATISE of his, which appears to be *Metaphysical*, intitled *De Divisione Naturæ*, was printed in a thin Folio at OXFORD, in the year 1681.

ADELARD,

* The *Grammatical* Works of these two, together with those of other Grammarians, were published in Quarto by *Putschius*, at *Hanover*, in the year 1605. Those, who would learn more concerning them, may consult *Fabricius* and *Cave*.

† In the original, taken from *Roger de Hoveden, Annal. pars prior*, it is—*Quid distat inter SOTUM et SCOTUM?*—The Answer was—*Tabula tantum*.

We have translated *SOTUM*, *SOTT*, in order to preserve the Emperor's dull Pun, tho' perhaps not quite agreeably to its proper meaning.

The word *SCOTUM* plainly decides the Country of this learned man, which some seem, without reason, to have doubted.

ADELARD, a Monk of *Bath*, for the sake of *Mathematical Knowledge* travelled into *Spain*, *Egypt*, and *Arabia*, and translated *Euclid* out of *Arabic* into *Latin*, about the year 1130. ROBERT OF READING, a Monk, travelled into *Spain* on the same account, and wrote about the year 1143*.

THEY found, by fatal experience, that little Information was to be had *at home*, and therefore ventured upon these perilous journies abroad.

GERBERTUS or GIBERTUS, a Native of *France*, flourished a little before them in the *tenth* Century, called, (tho' not on his account) *Sæculum obscurum*, the *dark Age*. His ardent Love for *Mathematical Knowledge* carried Him too from his own Country into *Spain*, that he might there learn Science from the learned *Arabians*.

AFTER an uncommon proficiency in the *Mathematics*, and after having recommended himself for his Learning and Abilities both to *Robert*, King of *France*, and to the Emperor *Otho*, he became first Archbishop of *Rheims*, then of *Ravenna*, and at length *Pope*, by the name of SYLVESTER THE SECOND.

HIS three capital Preferments being at *Rheims*, *Ravenna*, and *Rome*, each beginning with an R, gave occasion to the following barbarous Verse —

Transit ab R Gerbertus ad R, post Papa viget R †.

"TIS

* See *Wallis's Preface* to his *Algebra*, *Fol. Lond.* 1685. p. 5.

† See *Brown's Fasciculus rerum expetendā. et fugiendā.* Vol. II. p. 83.

Part III.

'Tis singular that not his *Sacerdotal*, nor even his *Pontifical* Character could screen him from the imputation of *MAGIC*, incurred merely, as it should seem, from his *superior Ingenuity*.

A BISHOP *Otho*, who lived in the next Century, gravely relates of him, that he obtained the *Pontificate* by *wicked Arts*, for in his youth, when he was nothing more than a simple Monk, having left his Monastery, he gave himself up wholly to the Devil, on condition he might obtain that, which he desired.

SOON after this, the same Historian, having given an account of his gradual Rise, subjoins—that at length, *by the Devil's help*, he was made *Roman Pontiff*, but then it was upon *Compact*, that after his decease, he should wholly in *Body* and *Soul* belong to HIM, thro' whose frauds he had acquired *so great a Dignity* *.

A CARDINAL *Benno*, of nearly the same age with this Bishop *Otho*, speaking of the same great man (*Gerbertus* I mean) informs us, his *Demon* had assured him, that he should not die, till he had celebrated Mass at *Jerusalem*—that *Gerbertus*, mistaking this for the City so called, unwarily celebrated Mass at *Rome*, in a Church called *Jerusalem*,

* *Hic* (scilicet *Gerbertus*) *malis artibus Pontificatum obtinuit, eo quod ab adolescentia, cum Monachus esset, relicto Monasterio, se totum Diabolo obtulit, modo quod optabat obtineret.*—And soon after, a short narrative of his Rise being given, the Historian subjoins—*Postremò Romanus Pontifex Diabolo adjuvante fuit constitutus; hâc tamen lege, ut post ejus obitum totus ILLIUS in anima et corpore esset, CUJUS fraudibus tantam adeptus esset dignitatem.* See Bishop *OTHO*, in *Brown's Fasciculus*, just quoted, V. II. p. 88.

salem, and, being deceived by the *Equivocation of the Name*, met a sudden and a wretched end*. Ch. IX.

As to these Stories, they are of that *vagabond* sort, which wander from Age to Age, and from Person to Person; which find their way into the Histories of distant periods, and are sometimes transferred from *Histories* to the *Theatre*.

THE JERUSALEM TALE may be found in *Shakspeare's* HENRY THE FOURTH; and for THE COMPACT, we have all seen it in the Pantomime of DR. FAUSTUS.

ONE thing we cannot but remark: the dull Contemporaries of these superior Geniuses, not satisfied with referring their Superiority to Pre-eminence *merely natural*, recurred absurdly to Power *supernatural*, deeming nothing less could so far exceed themselves.

SUCH was the Case of *the able Scholar* just mentioned. Such, some centuries afterward, was the Case of ROGER BACON, of FRANCIS PETRARCH, of JOHN FAUST, and many others.

BACON's Knowledge of Glasses, and of the *Telescope* in particular, made them apply to Him *literally*, what *Virgil* had said *poetically* —

Carmina vel Caelo possunt deducere Lunam.

VIRGIL

* See the same *Fascicul.* p. 88.

Part III.

VIRGIL himself had been foolishly thought a *Magician*, and therefore, because PETRARCH was delighted with the study of so capital an author, even PETRARCH also was suspected of MAGIC.

FOR JOHN FAUST, as he was either the Inventor, or among the first Practisers of the Art of *Printing*, 'tis no wonder the ignorant vulgar should refer to *Diabolical Assistance* a Power, which multiplied Books in a manner to them so incomprehensible.

THIS Digression has led us to Examples rather against *Chronological Order*; tho' all of them included within that Age, of which we are writing*. For the honour too of the CHURCH, these *falsly accused Geniuses* were all of them *Ecclesiastics*. Indeed the rest of *Western Europe* was in a manner *wholly barbarous*, composed of ignorant *Barons*, and their more ignorant *Vassals*; men like *Homer's Cimmerians*,

Ἦεροι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι —

With Fog and Cloud envelop'd —

FROM these we pass, or rather go back, to INGULPHUS, an *Ecclesiastic*, and an *Historian*, valuable for having lived during an interesting *Time*, and in interesting *Places*.

HE was by birth an *Englishman*, and had been educated in the Court of *Edward the Confessor*; went thence to the Court of the
Duke

* BACON lived in the thirteenth Century; PETRARCH, in the fourteenth; FAUST, in the fifteenth. See a curious Book of *Gabriel Naude*, a learned *Frenchman* of the last Century, intitled *Apologie pour les grand Hommes, accusés de MAGIE*.

Duke of Normandy, to whose favour he was admitted, and there preferred. Some time after this, when the successful Expedition of that Duke had put him in possession of the *Crown of England*, the Duke (then *William the Conqueror*) recalled him from *Normandy*; took him into favour here, and made him at length *Abbot of Croyland*, where he died advanced in years*.

INGULPHUS tells us, that King *Edward's* Queen, *EGITHA*, was admirable for her *Beauty*, her *literary Accomplishments*, and her *Virtue*.

HE relates, that being a Boy he frequently saw *Queen Egitha*, when he visited his Father, in King *Edward's* Court;—that many times when he met her, as he was coming from School, she used to dispute with him about his Learning, and his Verses—that she had a peculiar pleasure to pass from *Grammar* to *Logic*, in which she had been instructed; and that, when she had entangled him there with some subtle Conclusion, she used to bid one of her Attendants give him two or three pieces of money, and carry him to the Royal Pantry, where he was treated with a Repast†.

As to the *Manners of the times*, he tells us, that the whole Nation began to lay aside the *English Customs*, and in many things to imitate the *Manners of the French*; all the Men of Quality to speak the *Gallic Idiom* in their Houses, as a high strain of Gentility; to draw

* See *Ingulphus's History*, in the Preface to the *Oxford* Edition of the year 1684. See also p. 75, of the Work itself.

† See the same *Ingulphus*, p. 62.

Part III. draw their Charters and public Instruments after the manner of *the French*; and in these and many other things *to be ashamed of their own Customs**.

SOME years before the Conquest, *the Duke of Normandy* (whom INGULPHUS calls *most illustrious and glorious*) made a visit to *England*, attended with a grand retinue. King *Edward* received him honourably, kept him a long while, carried him round to see *his Cities and Castles*, and at length sent him home with many rich Presents †.

INGULPHUS says, that at this time *Duke William* had no hopes of *the Succession*, nor was any mention made of it; yet considering the Settlement of the Crown made upon him soon afterward, and the Reception he then found, this should hardly seem probable.

KING *Edward*, according to INGULPHUS, had great merit in remitting the DANE-GELT, that heavy Tax imposed upon the people by the *Danish Usurpers*, his immediate Predecessors ‡.

AS to LITERARY MATTERS, it has appeared that *the Queen*, besides the usual Accomplishments of the times, (which she undoubtedly possessed) had been instructed also in superior sorts of Knowledge. She may be supposed therefore to have surpassed, not only *her own Court*, but perhaps other Courts *since*, as they have seldom more to boast, than the fashionable Polish.

FOR

* See the same Author, in the same page.

† See the same Author, p. 65. 68.

‡ See the same Author, p. 65.

FOR the LITERARY QUALIFICATIONS of our *Historian* himself, Ch. IX. we perceive something of his Education in what we have already quoted from him. He is more particular afterwards, when he tells that he was first bred at *Westminster*, and then sent to *Oxford*—that in the first he learnt *Grammar*, in the last he studied *Aristotle* and the *Rhetoric of Cicero*:—that finding himself superior to many of his Contemporaries, and disdaining the littleness of his own Family, he left home, sought the Palaces of Kings and Princes, &c. &c. 'Twas thus that, after a variety of Events, he became Secretary to the Duke of Normandy, afterwards William the Conqueror, and so pursued his Fortune, till he became Abbot of Croyland*.

WE shall only remark on this Narrative, that WESTMINSTER and OXFORD seem to have been destined to the same purposes then, as now; that the Scholar at WESTMINSTER was to begin, and at OXFORD was to finish; a Plan of Education which still exists; which is not easy to be mended; and which can plead so ancient and so uninterrupted a Prescription.

NEARLY the same time a Monk, by name GRATIAN, collecting the numerous Decrees of Popes and Synods, was the first who published a Body of CANON LAW †. 'Twas then also, or a little earlier, that Amalfi, a City of Calabria, being taken by the Pisans, they discovered there by chance an original MS. of Justinian's CODE, which had been in a manner unknown from the time of that Emperor ‡.

This

* See the same Author, p. 73. 75.

† This happened in the year 1157. See *Duck De Auctoritate Juris Civilis Romanor.* p. 66. 88. Edit. Lond. 1679.

‡ See the same author, p. 66.—Amalfi was taken by the Pisans in the year 1127.

Part III. This curious Book was brought to *Pisa*, and, when *Pisa* was taken by the *Florentines*, was transferred to *Florence*, and there has continued even to this day.

AND thus it was that by singular fortune the CIVIL and CANON Law, having been about the same time promulged, gradually found their way into most of the *Western* Governments, changing more or less their Municipal Laws, and changing with those Laws the very forms of their Constitutions.

'Twas soon after happened that *wild Enthusiasm*, which carried so many thousands from the *West* into the *East*, to prosecute what was thought, or at least called A HOLY WAR*.

AFTER the numerous Histories ancient and modern of these CRUSADES, it would be superfluous to say more, than to observe that, by repeating them, men appear to have grown worse; to have become more savage, and greater barbarians. It was so late as during one of the last of them, that these Crusaders sacked the *Christian City* of *Constantinople*†, and that while these were committing unheard-of cruelties in that *Capital of Christendom*, another party of them, nearer home, were employed in massacring the innocent *Albigensis*‡.

So

* It began in the year 1095. See *Fuller's Holy Warre*, Book I. ch. 8. *William of Malmesbury*, Lib. IV. c. 2. among the *Scriptores post Bedam*.

† In the year 1204. See the same *Fuller*, B. III. chap. 17. and *Nicetas the Choniote*, already quoted at large, from p. 452 to p. 458.

‡ The Crusades against them began in the year 1206; the Massacres were during the whole course of the war; see *Fuller's H. Warre*, B. III. from chap. 18 to ch. 22. especially chap. 21. and *Mosheim's Church History*, under the article *Albigenses*.

So great was the zeal of Extirpation, that when one of these *home* Crusades was going to storm the City of *Beziers*, a City filled with *Catholics*, as well as *Heretics*, a scruple arose that, by such a measure, *the Good* might perish as well as *the Bad*. *Kill them all*, said an able Sophist — *kill them all, and God will know his own* *.

To discover these *Albigois*, the *home* Crusades were attended by a *Band of Monks*, whose business was to INQUIRE after Offenders, called *Heretics*. When the *Crusade* was finished, the *Monks*, like the Dregs of an empty Vessel, still remained, and deriving from *the Crusade* their *Authority*, from the *Canon Law* their *judicial* Forms, became by *these two* (I mean *the Crusade* and *Canon Law*) that formidable Court, THE COURT OF INQUISITION.

BUT in these latter events we rather anticipate, for they did not happen, till the beginning of *the thirteenth* Century, whereas the first Crusade was towards the End of *the eleventh* †.

ABOUT the beginning of the eleventh Century, and for a Century or two after, flourished the Tribe of TROUBADOURS, OR PROVENÇAL POETS,

* *Tuez. les tous: Dieu connoit ceux, qui sont a lui.* Histoire de Troubadours, Vol. I. p. 193.

† In the year 1095 or 1096.—Fuller's *H. Warre*, p. 21. And *William of Malmesbury*, before quoted, p. 510.

'Tis to be remarked, that these two Events, I mean the sacking of *Constantinople*, and the Massacres of the *Albigois*, happened more than a *hundred years* after this *Holy War* had been begun, and after its *more splendid* Parts were *past*, that is to say, the taking of *Jerusalem*, the establishment of a *Kingdom* there, (which lasted eighty years) and the *gallant Efforts* of *Coeur de Leon* against *Saladin*. All against the *Saracens*, that followed, was languid, and, for the greater part of it, adverse.

Part III. POETS *, who chiefly lived in the Courts of those Princes, that had Sovereignties in or near PROVENÇE, where the *Provençal Language* was spoken. 'Twas in this Language they wrote, a Language, which, tho' obsolete now, was then esteemed the best in Europe, being prior to the *Italian* of Dante and Petrarch.

THEY were called TROUBADOURS from *Trouver*, to find or to invent †, like the *Greek Appellation*, POET, which means (we know) A MAKER.

THEIR Subjects were mostly *Galantry* and *Love*, in which their *licentious* Ideas we are told were excessive. Princes did not disdain ‡ to be of their number, such among others as our RICHARD COEUR DE LEON, and the celebrated WILLIAM, COUNT of POICTOU, who was a Contemporary with *William the Conqueror* and his Sons.

A SONNET or two, made by RICHARD, are preserved, but they are obscure, and as far as intelligible, of little value §.

THE Sonnets of WILLIAM of Poictou, now remaining, are (as we are informed) of the most *licentious* kind, for a more *licentious man* never existed ||.

HISTORIANS

* See a Work, 3 Vol. 12mo. intitled, *Histoire Litteraire de Troubadours*, printed at Paris 1774, where there is an ample detail both of them, and their Poems.

† See *Hist. de Troub.* Vol. I. Discours prelim. p. 25.

‡ See the same Work in the same page.

§ See *Hist. de Troub.* Vol. I. p. 54.

|| See *Hist. de Troub.* Vol. I. p. 7.

As to his famous Abbey or Nunnery, soon after mentioned, see the same Work, p. 3, 4. but more particularly and authentically, see *William of Malmesbury*, a writer nearly contemporary,

HISTORIANS tell us, that near one of his Castles he founded a fort of Abbey for Women of Pleasure, and appointed the most celebrated among his Ladies to the Offices of Abbess, Prioress, &c. that he dismissed his Wife, and, taking the Wife of a certain Viscount, lived with her publicly,—that being excommunicated for this by *Girard Bishop of Angoulesme*, and commanded to put away his unlawful Companion, he replied, *Thou shalt sooner curl Hair upon that bald Pate of thine, than will I submit to a divorce from the Viscountess*—that having received a like rebuke, attended with an Excommunication from his own Bishop, the Bishop of Poictou, he seized him by the Hair, and was about to dispatch him, but suddenly stopt by saying, *I have that Aversion to Thee, Thou shalt never enter Heaven thro' the assistance of MY Hand* *.

If I might be permitted to digress, I would observe that HAMLET has adopted precisely the same sentiment. When he declines the opportunity offered him of killing the King at his Prayers, he has the following Expressions among many others:

*A Villain kills my Father, and for that
I, his sole son, do this same Villain SEND
To HEAV'N—O! THIS is Hire and Salary,
NOT REVENGE.*——— *Hamlet, Act III. Sc. X.*

'Tis

contemporary, and from whom the Narrative here given is taken. The passage in *Malmesbury* begins with the words—*Erat tum Williclmus, Comes Piclavorum, &c. &c.* p. 96. Edit. Londin. Fol. 1596.

* The Words in *Malmesbury* are—*Nec cælum unquam intrabis meæ manus ministerio.* P. 96.

Part III.

'Tis hard to defend so strange a sentiment either in HAMLET, or THE COUNT. We shall only remark that HAMLET, when he delivered it, was perfectly *cool*; THE COUNT, agitated by *impetuous Rage*.

This Count, as he grew older, became, as many others have done, from a *Profligate* a *Devotee*; engaged in one of the *first Crusades*; led a large body of Troops into the East; from which however, after his Troops had been routed, and most of them destroyed, he himself returned with ignominy home*.

THE loose Gallantry of these *Troubadours* may remind us of the Poetry during the Reign of our *second Charles* — nor were the *Manners* of one Court unlike those of the other, unless that those of the Court of *Poitou* were more abandoned of the two.

BE that as it may, we may fairly I think conclude, if we compare the two Periods, there were Men as *wicked* during the *early* period, as during the *latter*, and not only so, but *wicked* in Vices of *exactly the same* Character.

IF we seek for Vices of *another* character, we read at the *same æra* concerning a neighbouring Kingdom to *Poitou*, that “ All the people of rank were so blinded with *AVARICE*, that it might be truly said of them (according to *JUVENAL*)

*Not one regards the method, HOW HE GAINS,
But fix'd his Resolution, GAIN HE MUST.*

“ THE

* See the same *William of Malmesbury*, p. 75. 84.

“THE more they discoursed about Right, the greater their Injuries. Those, who were called the Justiciaries, were the Head of all Injustice. The Sheriffs and Magistrates, whose Duty was Justice and judgment, were more atrocious than the very Thieves and Robbers, and were more cruel than others, even the most cruel. The King himself, when he had leased his Domains as dear, as was possible, transferred them immediately to another that offered him *more*, and then again to another, neglecting always his former agreement, and labouring still for *bargains* that were greater, and more profitable*.”

SUCH were *the* GOOD OLD TIMES OF GOOD OLD ENGLAND, (for 'tis of *England* we have been reading) during the reign of our CONQUEROR, WILLIAM.

AND yet if we measure GREATNESS (as is too often the case with *Heroes*) by any other Measure, than that of *Moral Rectitude*, we cannot but admit that he *must* have been GREAT, who could conquer a Country so much larger than his own, and transmit the permanent Possession of it to his Family. The numerous *Norman* Families, with which he filled this Island, and the very few *Saxon* ones, which he suffered to remain, sufficiently shew us the Extent of this Revolution.

As

* See *Henrici Huntindoniensis Histor. L. VII. p. 212, inter Scriptores post Bedam—* Edit. London, 1594, beginning from the Words, *Principes omnes, &c.* The Verse from *Juvenal* is—

Unde habeat, quærit nemo, sed oportet habere.

Part III. As to his TASTE, (for 'tis *Taste* we investigate, as often as we are able) there is a curious Fact, related of him by JOHN OF SALISBURY, a learned Writer, who lived as early as the times of *Stephen* and *Henry the Second*.

THIS Author informs us, that WILLIAM, after he was once settled in the peaceable possession of his Kingdom, sent Ambassadors to Foreign Nations, that they should collect for him, out of all the celebrated Mansions, whatever should appear to them *magnificent* or *admirable*.

OUR Author cannot help allowing that this was the laudable project of a great man, desirous of pouring into *his own* Dominions all, that was excellent in *others**.

IT does not appear what these Rarities were, but it sufficiently shews *the Conqueror* to have had a Genius superior to the Barbarity of his Age.

ONE may imagine he was not ignorant of *Ovid*, and the ancient *Mythology*, by his answer to *Philip* King of France.

William,

* *Simile aliquid fecisse visus est Rex Anglorum VILHELMUS PRIMUS, cujus virtuti Normannia et tandem major Britannia cessit. Assumpto namque regni diademate, et pace composita, legatos misit ad exteras nationes, ut a præclaris omnium domibus, quicquid eis magnificum aut mirificum videretur, afferrent. Defluxit ergo in insulam opulentam, et quæ fere sola bonis suis est in orbe contenta, quicquid magnificentiæ, imo luxuriæ potuit inveniri. Laudabile quidem fuit magni viri propositum, qui virtutes omnium orbi suo volebat infundere. Joan. Salisb. de Nugis Curialium, p. 480. Edit. Lugd. 8vo. 1595.*

William, as he became old, grew to an *unweildy* Bulk. The king of *France*, in a manner not very polite, asked of him, (with reference to this bulk) "*When, as he had been so long in breeding, he expected to be brought to bed?*"—"Whenever that happens," replied *William*, "*it will be, as SEMELE was, in Flames and Thunder.*" *France* soon after that felt his Devastations*.

HIS SON *RUFUS* seems more nearly to have approached the character of the times.

WE have a Sample of his Manners in the following Narrative: Being immensely fond of expence in dress, when one of his attendants brought him new Shoes, and was putting them on, he demanded, "*How much they cost?*"—"Three Shillings, Sir," replied his Attendant—"Son of a Whore," says *Rufus*,—"at so pitiful a price to provide Shoes for a King!—Go and purchase me some for a mark of Silver†."

Matthew Paris writes, that he was once told of a formidable dream, relative to his death, which had been dreamed by a certain Monk. *RUFUS*, on hearing it, burst into laughter, and said, "*The*
"Man's

* *Quærente, sc. Philippo, numquidnam tandem pareret GUIELMUS, qui tam diu gessisset UTERUM: se pariturum, sed instar SEMELIS, respondit, cum flammis et fulmine. Panciroll. Nova Reperta, Tit. x. p. 219. Edit. Francofurt. 1631. See this fact somewhat differently told by Matthew Paris, p. 13. Edit. Fol. London, 1640. The devastations, here mentioned, are related in the same page.*

† *Will. of Malmesbury, p. 69. The words of Rufus were—Fili meretricis, ex quo habet Rex caligas tam exilis pretii! Vade et affer mihi emptas marcas argenti.*

Part III. “ *Man’s a Monk, and Monk-like has dreamed, to get a little money—*
 “ *give him a hundred Shillings, that he may not think he has been*
 “ *dreaming for nothing* *.”

HIS Historian *Malmesbury*, after having related other Facts of him, adds, *that he had neither Application enough, nor Leisure, ever to attend to Letters* †.

It was not so with his Brother, *Henry the First*. He (as this Historian informs us ‡) spent his Youth in the schools of liberal Science, and so greedily imbibed the sweets of *Literature*, that in aftertimes, (as the same Writer rather *floridly* relates) *no Tumults of War, no Agitation of Cares, could ever expel them from his illustrious Mind.*

Soon after we meet the well-known saying of *Plato*, that ’twas then States would be happy, if *Philosophers* were to reign, or *Kings* were to philosophize. Our Historian, having given this Sentiment, tells us, (to use his own expressions) that *Henry* fortified his Youth with *Literature* in a view to the Kingdom, and ventured even in his Father’s hearing, to throw out the Proverb, *Rex illiteratus, Asinus coronatus*, *that an illiterate King was but an Ass crowned* §.

THAT

* *Matthew Paris*, p. 53. Rufus’s words were—*Monachus est, & lucri causa monachiliter somniavit: da ei centum solidos, ne videatur inaniter somniasse.*

† *William of Malmesbury*, p. 70.

‡ The same, p. 87.

§ The same, p. 87, b.

THAT the King his Father, from perceiving his Son's Abilities, had something like a *Presentiment* of his future Dignity, may appear from the following Story.

WHEN *Henry* was young, one of his Brothers having injured him, he complained of his ill-treatment to his Father with tears. *Don't cry, Child,* says his Father, *for Thou too shalt be King*.*

As *Henry* was a learned Prince, we may suppose he was educated by learned men; and perhaps, if we attend to the account given by *Ingulphus* of his own Education† in the time of *Edward* the Confessor, 'tis probable there may have been among the Clergy a succession of learned men from the time of *Venerable Bede*.

'TIS certain that in *England* at least, during these middle Ages, LEARNING never flourished more, than from the time of *Henry the First* to the reign of his Grandson *Henry the Second*, and for some years after.

THE learned Historian of the Life of *Henry the Second* (I mean the First Lord Lyttelton) has put this beyond dispute.

PERHAPS too the *Times*, which followed, were adverse to the Cause of Literature. THE CRUSADES had made the Laity greater Barbarians,

* The Words of *William* were—*Ne fleas, Fili; quoniam et Tu Rex eris.* See *William of Malmesbury*, p. 87. b.

† P. 507, 8, 9.

Part III. barians, if possible, than they were before. Their Cruelty had been stimulated by acting against *Greeks*, whom they hated for *Schismatics*; and against *Saracens*, whom they hated for *Infidels*; altho' it was from *these alone* they were likely to *learn*, had they understood (which *few* of them did) a syllable of *Greek* or *Arabic*.

ADD to this, THE INQUISITION being then * established in all its terrors, *the Clergy* (from whom *only* the Cause of *Letters* could hope any thing) found their Genius insensibly checkt by its gloomy terrors.

THIS depraved Period (which lasted for a Century or two) did not mend, till *the Invention of Printing*, and the *Taking of Constantinople*. Then 'twas that these, and other hidden Causes, roused the Genius of *Italy*, and restored to Mankind those *Arts* and that *Literature*, which to *Western Europe* had been so long unknown.

BEFORE I conclude this Chapter, I cannot but remark, that, during these inauspicious times, so *generally* tasteless, there were even LATINS as well as GREEKS †, whom *the very Ruins of Antique Arts* carried to *Enthusiastic Admiration*.

HILDEBERT, Arch-Bishop of *Tours*, who died in the year 1139, in a fine Poem, which he wrote upon the City of *Rome*, among others
has

* See before, p. 511.

† See before, what has been quoted from NICETAS THE CHONIATE, p. 452, &c.

has the following Verses, in praise of the then remaining Statues and Antiquities. Ch. IX.

Non tamen annorum series, nec flamma, nec ensis,

Ad plenum potuit tale abolere decus.

Hic Superum formas Superi mirantur et ipsi,

Et cupiunt fictis vultibus esse pares.

Nec potuit Natura Deos hoc ore creare,

Quo miranda Deum signa creavit Homo.

Vultus adest his Numinibus, potiusque coluntur*

Artificum studio, quam Deitate sua †.

'Tis worth observing, that the *Latinity* of these Verses is in general pure, and that they are wholly free from the *Leonine jingle*.

THEY are thus attempted in *English*, for the sake of those, who do not read the original.

But neither passing Years, nor Fire, nor Sword

Have yet avail'd such Beauty to annul.

Ev'n Gods themselves their mimic Forms admire,

And wish their own were equal to the feign'd.

Nor e'er could Nature Deities create

With such a Countenance, as Man has giv'n

To these fair Statues, Creatures of his own.

Worship they claim, tho' more from HUMAN ART,

Than from THEIR OWN DIVINITY, ador'd.

* Forfan Cultus.

† William of Malmesbury, p. 76.—Fabricii Bibliotheca med. et infim. atat. in voce HILDEBERT.

CHAP. X.

SCHOOLMEN—their Rise, and Character—their Titles of Honour—Remarks on such Titles—ABELARD and HELOISA—JOHN of SALISBURY—admirable Quotations from his two celebrated Works—GIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS—WALTER MAPPS—RICHARD COEUR DE LEON—his Transactions with Saladin—his Death, and the singular Interview, which immediately preceded it.

Part III.

WE are now to consider the state of LITERATURE with respect to other Geniuses, both before the Conquest, and after it, so low as to the times of our First Richard.

’TWAS during this Period began the Race of SCHOOLMEN, a Race much admired, and followed in their day. Their *subtlety* was great, and though that subtlety might sometimes have led them into Refinements rather *frivolous*, yet have they given eminent samples of *penetrating Ingenuity*.

THEY began in the eleventh Century, and lasted to the fourteenth, when *new Causes* leading to *new Events*, they gradually decreased, and were no more.

THAT they had some merit must be allowed, when we are told that the learned Bishop *Saunderson* used constantly to read the SE-

CUNDA

CUNDA SECUNDE of THOMAS AQUINAS*, and that *this Treatise*, together with ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC, and CICERO'S OFFICES, were *three Books*, which he always had with him, and never ceased to peruse. The *Scholastic Tract* must have been no bad one, which was so well associated.

Ch. X.

VARIOUS Epithets at the time were bestowed upon these Schoolmen. There was *the Irrefragable doctor*, *the Subtle*, *the Seraphic*, *the Angelic*, &c.

THERE is certainly something exaggerated in the *Pomp* of these Appellations. And yet, if we reflect on our *modern Titles of Honour*; on our common *superscriptions of Epistles*; on our common modes of *concluding* them; and mark how *gravely* we admit all this; may we not suppose those *other* Epithets appear ridiculous, not so much from their being *absurd*, as from their being *unusual* †?

BEFORE we quit these *Schoolmen*, we cannot omit the famous PETER ABELARD, who, when he taught at *Paris*, was followed by thousands, and was considered almost as an Oracle in discussing the abstrusest of subjects. At present he is better known for his unfortunate Amour with the celebrated HELOISA, his Disciple, his Mistress, and at length his Wife.

HER

* This able and acute man died, aged 48 years, in the year 1274.

† For a fuller account of these *Schoolmen* see *Scholasticæ Theologiæ Syntagma*, by Prideaux Bishop of Worcester, *Mosheim's History*, and *Cave's Histor. Lit.* V. 2. p. 275.

Part III.

HER *Ingenuity* and *Learning* were celebrated also, and their *Epistolary* Correspondence, remarkably curious, is still * extant. The Religion of the times drove them at length to finish their days in two separate Convents. When ABELARD died (which happened about the year 1134), his Body was carried to HELOISA, who buried it in the Convent of the *Paraclete*, where she presided.

MY Countryman, JOHN OF SALISBURY, comes next, who lived in the reign of *Stephen*, and *Henry the Second*. He appears to have been conversant in *all the Latin Classics*, whom he not only quotes, but appears to understand, to relish, and to admire †.

How far they sunk into his Mind, and inspired him with sentiments similar to their own, the following passages may suffice to shew.

TAKE his Ideas of LIBERTY and SERVITUDE.

“ For as the true and only LIBERTY is to serve Virtue, and discharge
 “ its various duties; so the only true and essential SLAVERY is to be in
 “ subjection to the Vices. He therefore is evidently mistaken, who
 “ imagines that either of these Conditions can proceed from any other
 “ Cause: for indeed (if we except the difference of VIRTUE and VICE)
 “ all men throughout the world proceed from a similar beginning; con-
 “ sist

* An octavo Edition of their Letters in *Latin* was published at *London*, in the year 1718.

† See p. 255 (Philosophical Arrangements) of this Volume.

“ *first of, and are nourished by the same elements; draw from the same principle the same vital breath; enjoy the same cope of heaven; all alike live; all alike die*.*”

Ch. X.

TAKE his idea concerning the extensive influence of PHILOSOPHY.

“ ’Tis PHILOSOPHY, that prescribes a just measure to all things; and while she arranges moral Duties, condescends to mix with such as are plebeian and vulgar. — No otherwise, indeed, can any thing be said to proceed rightly, unless she herself confirm by DEEDS, what she teaches us in WORDS †.”

SPEAKING of VIRTUE and FELICITY, he thus explains himself. —

“ But these (two possessions) are more excellent than any other, because VIRTUE includes all things, that are to be done; FELICITY, all things that are to be wished. Yet does FELICITY excel VIRTUE, because in all things the End is more excellent than the Means.

“ Now

* *Sicut enim vera et unica LIBERTAS est, servire virtuti, et ipsius exercere officia; ita unica et singularis SERVITUS est vitiis subjugari. Errat plane quisquis aliunde conditionem alterutram opinatur accidere. Si quidem omne hominum genus in terris simili ab ortu surgit, eisdem constat et alitur elementis, eundemque spiritum ab eodem principio carpit, eodemque fruitur celo, æque moritur, æque vivit. De Nugis Curialium, p. 510. Edit. Lugdun. 1595.*

† *Ipsa (PHILOSOPHIA) est, quæ universis præscribit modum, et dum disponit officia, etiam plebeis, et vulgaribus interesse dignatur. Alioquin nihil aliud recte procedit, nisi et ipsa rebus afferat, quod verbis docet. De Nugis Curial. p. 483.*

Part III. *“ Now no one is HAPPY, that he may act rightly ; but he acts RIGHTLY,
 “ that he may live happily *.”*

THE following Distich is of his own Age, but being difficult to translate, is only given in its original, as a sample of elegant and meritorious Poetry.

It expresses a refined thought ; that as the Soul of Man animates the Body, so is the Soul itself animated by God.

*Vita Animæ DEUS est ; hæc, Corporis ; hac fugiente,
 Solvitur hoc ; perit hæc, destituyente Deo †.*

THE preceding Quotations are taken from his Tract *De Nugis Curialium* : those, which follow, are from another Tract called METALOGICUS, so named from being subsequent to *Logic*, as METAPHYSICS are to *Physics*.

HE makes three things requisite to the existence of every ART, and these are GENIUS, MEMORY, and THE REASONING FACULTY, and these three he thus defines —

*“ GENIUS is a certain Power, naturally implanted in the Mind, and
 “ which is of itself ORIGINALLY CAPABLE ‡.*

“ MEMORY

* *Sunt autem hæc omnibus aliis præstantiora, quia VIRTUS omnia agenda, FELICITAS omnia optanda complectitur. Felicitas tamen Virtuti præstat, quia in omnibus præstantius est propter quod aliquid, quam quod propter aliquid. Non enim felix est quis, ut recte agat ; sed recte agit, ut feliciter vivat. De Nugis Curial. p. 367, 368.*

† *Ibid. p. 127.*

‡ *Est autem INGENIUM vis quædam, animæ naturaliter insita, per se valens. Metalog. p. 756.*

“ MEMORY is (as it were) THE MIND’S ARK or CHEST ; the firm
 “ and faithful preserver of things perceived*.”

Ch. X.

“ THE REASONING FACULTY is a power of the Mind, which ex-
 “ mines things, that have occurred either to THE SENSES, or to THE
 “ INTELLECT, and fairly decides in favour of the better ; which, well
 “ weighing the SIMILITUDES and DISSIMILITUDES of things, at
 “ length (after due discussion) establishes ART, and shews it to be (as
 “ it were) A FINITE SCIENCE OF THINGS INFINITE †.”

OUR Author concludes with telling us, that “ As NATURE is the
 “ MOTHER of all ARTS, so the Contempt of them surely redounds to
 “ the Injury of their PARENT ‡.”

I MUST

* MEMORIA vero quasi MENTIS ARCA, firma et fidelis custodia perceptorum. Metalog.
 p. 757.

† RATIO eorum, quæ Sensibus aut animo occurrunt, examinatrix animi vis est, et fidelis
 arbitra potiorum; quæ, rerum similitudines dissimilitudinesque perpendens, tandem ARTEM
 statuit quasi quandam INFINITORUM FINITAM ESSE SCIENTIAM. Metalog. 757.

This may be illustrated from the Arts of ARITHMETIC and GRAMMAR.

Numbers, which are INFINITE, being reduced to the FINITE GENERA of Even and
 Odd; and these again being divided into the FEW SUBORDINATE SPECIES: in this
 limited Reduction we behold the Rise of ARITHMETIC, and of all the various Theorems
 contained in that Art.

Sounds Articulate, which are INFINITE, being reduced to the FINITE GENERA of
 Vowels and Consonants; and Vowels again being enlarged into the species of Long,
 Short, and Middle; Consonants into the Species of Mutes and Liquids: in these limited
 Reductions we behold the Rise of GRAMMAR; thro’ which, by about twenty Simple
 Sounds called Letters, we form Articulate Sounds by Millions.

‡ Quia ARTIUM NATURA mater est, merito in injuriam parentis redundat contemptus
 earum. Metalog. 757.

Part III. I MUST not omit some of his *Grammatical* ideas, because they are of a superior sort, that is to say, they are *Logical* and *Philosophical*.

HE tells us—*For as [IN NATURE] ACCIDENTS cloath SUBSTANCES, and give them a FORM; so [IN LANGUAGE] through a similar correspondence are SUBSTANTIVES vested with a FORM by ADJECTIVES. And that this [grammatical] Institution of REASON may the more easily coincide with NATURE, in the same manner as the SUBSTANCE OF EVERY NATURAL BEING knows nothing of INTENSION and REMISSION: so likewise in LANGUAGE SUBSTANTIVES admit no DEGREE OF COMPARISON* *.

AFTER this he proceeds to shew that *this Imitation of Nature* not only exists in *Nouns*, but in *the other Parts of Speech*. He tells us, that *VERBS*, as they denote *TIME*, are necessarily provided with *TENSES*; and, as they always express *something else* in their original meaning, he calls the *additional denoting of Time* by a truly philosophic Word, a *CONSIGNIFICATION* †.

THE writer of these Remarks cannot say he has transferred any of them into his *Hermes*, because *Hermes* was written long before he knew *John of Salisbury*. But, that both Writers drew from the same source,

* *Sicut enim ACCIDENTIA SUBSTANTIAM vestiunt, et informant: sic quadam proportionē RATIONIS ab ADJECTIVIS SUBSTANTIVA informantur. Et, ut familiarius RATIONIS Institutio NATURÆ cohæreat, sicut SUBSTANTIA cujusque rei INTENSIONIS et REMISSIONIS ignara est: sic SUBSTANTIVA ad COMPARATIONIS GRADUM non veniunt.* Metalog. 561.

† *MOTUS non est sine TEMPORE, nec VERBUM esse potuit sine TEMPORIS CONSIGNIFICATIONE.* Metalog. 561. *Aristot. de Interpret. c. 3.*

source, he thinks sufficiently clear from the similitude of their sentiments*.

Ch. X.

I FEAR, I have dwelt too long on my *Countryman*, perhaps, because a countryman; but more in truth, because his Works are little known, and yet are certainly curious and valuable.

I SHALL only mention, that there were other respectable Geniuses of the same Century, such as the *Epic Poet*, JOSEPH OF EXETER; the pleasant *Archdeacon of Oxford*, WALTER MAPPS; GIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS, &c.

BUT the eloquent *Author of the Life of Henry the Second* has in his third Volume handled the state of our Literature during this period in so masterly a way, that the writer of these observations would not have said so much, had not the Arrangement of his Remarks made it in some degree necessary †.

WE must not conclude this Chapter without relating a few Facts, relative to the gallant RICHARD, called from his *Magnanimity Cœur de Leon*. Other Heroes, long before him, had been likened to Lions; and the celebrated Ali, in the lofty language of Arabia, was called the *Lion of God*.

WHAT Bohadin says of RICHARD is remarkable. “He was,” as that Historian relates, “uncommonly active; of great spirit and firm Resolution; one, who had been signalized by his Battles,
“ and

* See Vol. I. p. 267, 268.

† See Lord Lyttelton's *Life of Henry the Second*.

Part III. “ and who was of intrepid courage in War. By those, whom he
 “ led, he was esteemed *less than the King of France* on account of
 “ his Kingdom, and Dignity, but more abundant in Riches, and
 “ *far more illustrious for military Valour* *.”

THIS Testimony receives no small weight, as it comes from a contemporary writer, who was *present*; and who, being likewise a fast Friend to *Saladin*, *Richard's* great Antagonist, can hardly be suspected of flattering an *Adversary*.

IN the following Extracts from the same Author, which Extracts contain *Different* Conferences between *Richard* and *Saladin*, we have a sample of their *sentiments*, and of *the manner* in which they *express* them.

WHEN *RICHARD* in *Palestine* was ill, he longed for Fruit and Ice, and the fruits he desired were Pears and Peaches. He sent for them to *Saladin*, and they were immediately given him. *Richard* in return was equally bountiful, and entertained the Sultan's people magnificently. War between great men seldom extinguishes Humanity †.

AFTER a long and various War, *RICHARD* sent to *SALADIN* the following MESSAGE.

“ WHEN you have greeted the Prince, you will lay what follows
 “ before him—The *Mussulmans* and *Francs* are both perishing;
 “ their

* *Bohadin, vit. Salad. p. 160.*

† *Bohadin, p. 176.*

“ their countries laid waste, and completely passing to ruin; the
 “ wealth and Lives of their people consumed on either side. To
 “ this Contest and *Religious War* its proper Rights have been now
 “ paid. Nothing remains to be settled, but the affair of *the Holy*
 “ *City*, of *the Cross*, and of *the several Regions* or Countries. As
 “ to *the Holy City*, it being the seat of our Worship, from *that*
 “ indeed we can by no means recede, altho’ not a single man of
 “ us were to survive the attempt. As to *the Countries*, those on
 “ this side *Jordan*, shall be restored to us. As to *the Cross*, it being
 “ with you only a pitiful piece of Wood, altho’ to us of value inesti-
 “ mable, This *the Sultan* will give us; and thus Peace being establish-
 “ ed, we shall all of us rest from this our uninterrupted fatigue *.”

SALADIN’S ANSWER TO RICHARD.

“ THE HOLY CITY is as much holy to us, as to you; nay, is
 “ rather of greater worth and dignity to us, than to you; as ’twas
 “ thence that our Prophet took his Journey by night to Heaven;
 “ ’tis there the Angels are wont solemnly to assemble themselves.
 “ Imagine not therefore that we shall ever depart thence. We
 “ dare not among the *Mussulmans* appear so abandoned, so neg-
 “ lectful of our Affairs, as to think of this. As to THE REGIONS
 “ or COUNTRIES, these also you know were originally ours, which
 “ you indeed have annexed to your Dominions by the Imbecillity
 “ of the *Mussulmans* at the period, when you attacked them. God
 “ has not suffered you to lay a single stone there, ever since the
 “ War

* Bohadin, p. 207.

Part III. “ War began; while we, ’tis evident, enjoy all the produce of our
 “ Countries to the full. Lastly, as to the Cross, that in truth is
 “ *your* Scandal, and a great dishonour to the Deity; which, how-
 “ ever, it does not become us, by giving up, to neglect, unless it
 “ be for some more important advantage, accruing thence to the
 “ Faith of *Mahomet* *.”

It must be observed, that *the Cross* here mentioned was supposed to have been that, on which *Christ* was crucified; and which being in *Jerusalem*, when it was taken, had been from that time in the hands of *Saladin*.

THO’ no Peace was now made, it was made soon after, yet without restoration either of *Jerusalem*, or of *the Cross*.

’TWAS usual in those days to swear to Treaties, and so did the inferior Parties; but the *two Monarchs* excused themselves, saying, “ *it was not usual for Kings to swear †.*”

WHEN RICHARD was returning home, he was basely seized by a *Duke of Austria*, and kept prisoner for more than a year, till by a large sum raised upon his people he was redeemed ‡.

THIS gallant Prince, after having escaped for years the most formidable perils, fell at length unfortunately by the Arrow of an obscure hand, in besieging an obscure Castle, within *his own French Domains*. HE

* *Bohadin*, p. 208.

† *Bohadin*, p. 261.

‡ See the Histories of *Richard’s Life*, *Rapin*, *Hume*, &c.

HE did not immediately die; but, as the wound began to mortify, and his end to approach, he ordered the person, who had shot him (his name was *Bertram de Gurdun*) to be brought into his presence.

WHEN he arrived, the King thus addrest him. “*What harm have I ever done thee? for what reason hast thou slain me?*” Bertram replied — “*Thou hast slain my Father and two Brothers with thy own hand; and now ’twas thy desire to slay ME. Take then any Vengeance upon me thou wilt; I shall freely suffer the greatest tortures thou canst invent, so that THOU art but dispatched, who hast done the world so much mischief.*”

THE King, on this intrepid answer, commanded his Chains to be taken off; forgave what he had done, and dismissed him with a Present.

BUT the King’s servants were not so generous, as their master; for, when the King was dead, (which soon happened) they put the prisoner to a cruel death.

A POET of the time compares, not improperly, the Death of RICHARD to that of a *Lion*, killed by an *Ant*. The *sentiment* is better than the *Metre*.

*Istius in morte perimit Formica Leonem**.

’TIS

* *Rogeri de Hæredon Annalium pars posterior*, p. 791, Edit. Francof. 1601. We have transcribed from the original the Discourse, which past between *Richard* and *Bertram*, as it appears to be curious, and the *Latinity* not to be despised.

Quid

Part III.

"Tis somewhat singular, that in these Periods, considered as dark and barbarous, *the same Nations* should still retain their *superiority of Taste*, tho' not perhaps in its original purity. During the reign of *Henry the Third*, (which soon followed) when Bishop *Poore* erected *the Cathedral of Salisbury* (which considering its lightness, its uniformity, and the height of its Spire, is one of the completest *Gothic* buildings now extant) we are informed he sent into ITALY for the best Architects*.

LONG before this, in the eighth Century, when one of the *Caliphs* erected a most magnificent *Temple or Mosque* at *Damascus*, he procured for the building of it the most skilfull Architects, and those not only from his own Dominions, but (as the Historian informs us) from GREECE†.

FROM these accounts it is evident, that some Knowledge of the FINE ARTS, even during this *middle Age*, existed both in ITALY and GREECE.

SHOULD it be demanded, *to which Nation, in this respect, we give the Preference*,—it is a Question to be decided by recurring to Facts.

ITALY

Quid mali tibi feci? Quare me interemisti?—Cui ille respondit—Tu interemisti patrem meum, et duos fratres manu tuâ, et ME nunc interimere voluisti. Sume ergo de me vindictam, quamcunque volueris: libenter enim patiar, quæcunque excogitaveris majora tormenta, dummodo Tu interficiaris, qui tot et tanta mala contulisti mundo.

* *Matthew Paris.*

† *Abulfed. p. 125.*

ITALY at the beginning of her History was barbarous; nor did she emerge from her Barbarity, till GREECE, which she had conquered, gave her Poets, Orators, Philosophers, &c.

GRÆCIA capta ferum VICTOREM cepit—— HOR.

AFTER a succession of Centuries the *Roman Empire* fell. By this fatal Event the *Finer Arts* fell also, and lay for years in a kind of torpid state, till they revived through the genial warmth of GREECE.

A FEW GREEK Painters, in the *thirteenth* Century, came from Greece into *Italy*, and taught their Art to CIMABUE, a *Florentine**. Cimabue was the Father of *Italian Painters*, and from him came a Succession, which at length gave the *Raphaels*, the *Michael Angelo's*, &c.

THE *Statues*, and ruined *Edifices*, with which *Italy* abounded, and which were all of them by GREEK Artists, or after GRECIAN Models, taught the *Italians* the *Fine Arts* of *Sculpture* and *Architecture*†.

THE GREEK FUGITIVES from *Constantinople*, after it's unhappy Catastrophe, brought that superior *Literature* into *Italy*, which enabled

* Cimabue died in 1300.

† How early these fine Remains began to excite their admiration, we learn from those warm Verses of *Hildebert*, quoted before, p. 521.

Part III. enabled the *Italians* to read in the original the capital Authors of
 ATTIC ELOQUENCE *.

WHEN *Literature, Sculpture, Architecture, and Painting* had thus attained a perfection in *Italy*, we learn from History, they were transplanted into *the North*, where they lived, tho' it was rather like *Exotics*, than *Natives*.

As therefore *Northern Europe* derived them from *Italy*, and *this* last from *Greece*, the conclusion is evident, that NOT ITALY, but GREECE WAS THEIR COMMON PARENT. And thus is the Question concerning *Preference* to be decided.

* Sup. p. 461.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning the POETRY of the LATTER LATINS, or WESTERN EUROPEANS — Accentual Quantity — RHIME — Samples of RHIME in Latin — in Classical Poets, accidental; in those of a later age, designed — RHIME among the Arabians — ODILO, HUCBALDUS, HILDIGRIM, HALABALDUS, Poets or Heroes of Western Europe — RHIMES in MODERN Languages — of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, &c. — Sannazarius, a pure Writer in Classic Latin, without Rhime — Anagrams, Chronograms, &c. finely and accurately described by the ingenious Author of the SCRIBLERIAD.

AND here, as we are about to speak upon the POETRY of these times; we wish our Readers previously to review, what we have already said upon the *two Species of verbal Quantity*, the *Syllabic* and the *Accentual**.

Ch. XI.

It will there appear that till *Greek* and *Latin* degenerated, *Accentual Quantity* was hardly known. But tho' *Degeneracy* spread it thro' these two Languages, yet, with regard to *modern Languages*, 'twas the best that could be attained. Their harsh and rugged *Dialects* were in few instances suited to the *Harmonious Simplicity* of the *Syllabic Measure*.

AND

* See from p. 321 to p. 332.

Part III.

AND yet, tho' this more perfect and elegant *Profody* was rarely attainable, so strong was the Love of Mankind for RHYTHM, so *con-nate* (if I may so say) with their very Being, that METRE of some sort was every where cultivated, and even these *northern Tribes* had their *Bards*, their *Minstrels*, their *Troubadours*, and the like.

NOW, tho' in THE LATTER LATINITY *Syllabic Quantity* was little regarded, and the *Accentual* more frequently supplied its place, they did not esteem even *this last* always sufficient to mark the Measure. An Expedient was therefore found (flattering to the Ear, because it had something of *Harmony*) and this was, to mark the last Syllables of different Verses with Sounds that were Similar, so that the Ear might not doubt a moment, where every Verse ended.

AND hence in Modern Verse these last Syllables, which Poets of a purer Age in a manner neglected, came to claim a peculiar and superior regard, as helping to mark the RHYTHM thro' the medium of the RHIME.

*Si Sol spendescat Mariâ purificANTE,
Major erit glacies post festum, quam fuit ANTE*.*

NOR was this practised in *Heroics only*, but in *Trochaics* also. —

*Suscitavit igitur || Deus HebræORUM
Christianos principes, || et robur EORUM
Vindicare scilicet || Sanguinem SanctORUM,
Subvenire filiis || MortificATORUM †.*

NAY

* RHIME is the SIMILITUDE OF SOUND at the Ends of two Verses. RHYTHM is MEASURED MOTION, and exists in Verses of every sort, whether Classical or not Classical, whether Blank Verse, or Rhime. In short, WITHOUT RHYTHM no Verse can exist of any species; WITHOUT RHIME they may, and often do.

† Roger Hoveden. *Annal.* p. 379, b.

NAY so fond were those Poets of their Jingle, that they not only infused it into *different* Verses, but into *one and the same* Verse; making the *Middle* of each Verse to rhyme with its *End*, as well as *one Verse* to rhyme with *another*.

THUS in *St. Edmund's* Epitaph we read—

*Hic erat EDMUNDUS, animâ cum corpore MUNDUS,
Quem non IMMUNDUS potuit pervertere MUNDUS *.*

AND again in those verses transcribed from an old monument—

*Hic sunt confossa Bernoldi præfulis ossa;
Laudet cum GLOSSA, dedit hic quia munera GROSSA.*

To these may be added the Inscription upon the three Wise Men of the East, buried (as they tell us) at *Cologne* in the West.

*Corpora sanctorum recubant hic terna MAGORUM,
Ex his sublatum nihil est, alibive locatum.*

VERSES of this sort, of which there are innumerable still extant, have been called *Leonine* Verses, from *Leo*, a writer of the 12th Century, who is supposed to have been their inventor. But this should seem a mistake, if the Inscription upon the Image of a King *Dagobert*, who lived in the *seventh* Century, be of the same period with that Monarch.

*Fingitur hac specie, bonitatis odore REFERTUS,
Istius Ecclesiæ fundator, Rex DAGOBERTUS.*

'Tis

* *Waverly*, p. 202.

Part III. *'Tis true there are Verses of this sort to be found even among Poets, the first in classical rank.*

Thus VIRGIL,

Trajicit : i, VERBIS virtutem illude SUPERBIS.

Thus HORACE,

Fratrem mæRENTIS, rapto de fratre DOLENTIS.

Thus even HOMER himself,

Ἐκ γὰρ κρηΤΑΩΝ ἴενος ἔνχομαι ἑΥΡΕΙΑΩΝ.

THE difference seems to have been, THE RHIMES, falling from these *superior* Geniuses, fell ('twas probable) *accidentally*: with the *latter* race of Poets they were the Work of *labour* and *design*. They may well indeed be called Works of *labour* and *design*, when we reflect on the immense pains, which their makers must have taken, where *their Plan of Rhiming* was so *complicated*, as they sometimes made it.

TAKE a singular example of no fewer than *three* RHIMES to each Verse.

Crimina CRESCERE *flete*; TEPESCERE *jus, decus, æquum*;

Flete, GEMISCITE; *denique* DICITE, *dicite* MECUM,

Qui regis OMNIA, *pelle tot* IMPIA, *surge, PERIMUS,*

Nos, Deus, ASPICE, ne sine SIMPLICE *lamine* SIMUS.

Fabricius, who gives these Verses, remarks, that they were written in the *Dactylic Leonine*; that is, they had every Foot a *Dactyl*, excepting

cepting the last, and contained *three Rhimes* in each Verse, two *within the Verse* itself, and *ONE* referring to the Verse that followed. He adds, that their Author, *Bernardus Morlanensis*, a Monk of the eleventh Century, composed no less than *three Books* of this wonderful Verfication. What leisure must he have had, and how was it employed *?

BEFORE we quit the subject of RHIME we may add, that RHIME was used not only by the *Latin*, but by the *Arabian* Poets, as we may see by a tract upon the *Arabic* Profody, subjoined by Dr. *Pococke* to his *Carmen Togrāi*.

RHIME however was not so strictly followed, but that sometimes they quitted it. In the following *Heroics*, the Monk *Odilo*, addressing himself to his Friend *Hucbaldus*, appears so warm in his wishes, as not only to forget *Rhime*, but even *Classical* Quantity.

Hucbaldo Sōpho Sōphīā sīt semper amica;

Hucbaldus Sōphus Sōphīæ semper amicus :

Exposco hoc Odīlo, peccator cernuus ēgo.

THIS Genius (over whose Verses I have occasionally marked the *accentual* Quantity in contra-distinction to the *Syllabic*) is supposed to have written in the *tenth* Century.

OTHERS, rejecting *Rhime*, wrote *Elegiacs*; as that Monk, who celebrated *Hildigrim* and *Halabuldus*; the one for building a Church, the other for consecrating it. *Hildigrim*

* See *Fabric. Biblioth. med. et infim. ætatis*, under the word *Bernardus Morlanensis*.

Part III.

*Hildigrim struxit; Häläbaldus Episcopus Archi**Sanctificavit: honor certus utrumque manet.*

IN the first of these two Verses the word *Archi-Episcopus* is, by a pleasant *transposition*, made into a *Dactyl* and *Spondree*, so as to complete the Hexameter*.

'TWAS upon *these* Principles of Verfication, that the early Poets of this Æra wrote much bad *Verse* in much bad *Latin*. At length they tried their skill in their *Vernacular* tongues, introducing *here* also their *Rhime* and their *Accentual quantity*, as they had done before in *Latin*.

THRO' the Southern parts of *France* the TROUBADOURS (already mentioned) † composed Sonnets in the *Provençal* Tongue. Soon after them DANTE, PETRARCH, and BOCCACCIO wrote Poems in *Italian*; and soon after these, CHAUCER flourished in *England*. From *Chaucer*, thro' *Rowley*, we pass to Lords *Surry* and *Dorset*; from them to *Spencer*, *Shakspeare*, and *Johnson*: after whom came *Milton*, *Waller*, *Dryden*, *Pope*, and a succession of Geniuses, down to the present time.

THE THREE ITALIAN POETS, we have mentioned, were capital in their kind, being not only strong and powerful in *Sentiment*, but, what

* See *Recueil de divers Ecrits pour servir de l'Eclaircissement a l'Histoire de France* par L'Abbe de Beuf, p. 115.—p. 106.

† See before, p. 511.

what is more surprising, elegant in their *Diction* at a time, when Ch. XI.
the Languages of England and France were barbarous and unpolished. This in *English* is evident from our Countryman, CHAUCER, who, even to an *English* Reader appears so uncouth, and who yet wrote later than the latest of these three.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that, if *we except his Language*, for LEARNING and WIT he appears equal to the best of his *Contemporaries*, and I may add even of his *Successors*.

I CANNOT omit the following *sample of his LITERATURE*, in the *Frankleyn's Tale*. In that Poem the fair *Dorigen* is made to lament the absence of her much loved *Arveragus*; and, as she sits upon a Cliff, beholding the Sea, and the formidable Rocks, she breaks forth with terror into the following Exclamation.

Eternal GOD! that thro' thy Purveyaunce
 LEADEST *the World* by CERTAIN *Governaunce*;
 IN IDLE, as men sayn, YE NOTHING MAKE.
 But, Lord, those griesly, fendly, ROCKIS, blake,
 That seem rathir a FOUL CONFUSIÓÑ
 Of Work, than any FAIR CREA'TIÓÑ
 OF SUCH a PERFECT GOD, wise, and full stable:
 WHY have ye wrought this work unreasonáble?

Dorigen, after more expostulation of the same sort, adds —

I wote well Clerkis woll sayn, as 'hem leste,
By Arguments, that ALL IS FOR THE BESTE,

Tho'

Part III.

*Tho' I ne cannot well the Causes know —
But thilké God, that made the Winds to blow,
Ay keep my Lord, &c.*

THERE is an elegant Pathos in her thus quitting those deeper Speculations, to address a Prayer for the safety of her *Arveragus*.

The Verse, before quoted,

To LEAD *the World* by CERTAIN Governauce,
is not only a philosophical Idea, but philosophically exprest.

The next Verse,

IN IDLE, as Men sayn, YE NOTHING MAKE,
is a sentiment translated literally from ARISTOTLE, and which that Philosopher so much approved, as *often* to repeat it.

TAKE one Example —

Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις ἔθεν μάτην ποιεῖσιν —

GOD and NNATURE MAKE NOTHING IN VAIN.

Arist. de Cælo, Lib. I. Cap. 4.

As to what follows, *I mean that speculation of learned men, that ALL IS FOR THE BEST*, this too we meet in the same Philosopher, annexed (as it were) to the sentiment just alleged.

Ἡ φύσις ἔθεν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βελτίον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων. NNATURE, (*as has been said before*) CREATES NOTHING IN VAIN, but ALL THINGS FOR THE BEST, out of the contingent materials. *De Animal. incessu. C. 12.*

IT

It may be fairly doubted, whether CHAUCER took this from Ch. XI.
the *original Greek*—'tis more probable he took it from the *Latin*
Version of the *Spanish Arabic Version*, which *Latin* was then current,
and admitted thro' *Western Europe* for the *Aristotelic Text*.

The same thought occurs in one of our most elegant *modern*
Ballads; tho', whence the Poet took it, I pretend not to decide.

How can they say, that NATURE

HAS NOTHING MADE IN VAIN?

Why then beneath the Water

Do HIDEOUS ROCKS remain?

THOSE ROCKS no eyes discover,

Which lurk beneath the deep,

To wreck, &c.

BUT to return to CHAUCER—

IF in the *Tale* we have just quoted; if in the *Tale* of the *Nun's*
Priest, and in many other of his works, there are these sprinklings
of *Philosophy*; if to these we add the extensive Knowledge of *His-*
tory, *Mythology*, and various other subjects, which he every where
shews: we may fairly, I think, arrange him among our *learned*
Poets, and take from HIM an *Estimate of the Literature of the Times*,
as far at least as posset by men of *superior* Education.

AFTER having mentioned (as we have lately done) PETRARCH
and some of the *Italians*, I can by no means omit their countryman
SANNAZARIUS, who flourished in the Century following, and whose

Part III. Eclogues in particular, formed on the Plan of *Fishing* Life instead of *Pastoral*, cannot be enough admired both for their *Latinity* and their *Sentiment*. His fourth *Eclogue*, called *Proteus*, written in imitation of *Virgil's* Eclogue called *Silenus*, may be justly valued as a master-piece in its kind. The following flight sketch of it is submitted to the Reader.

“ Two Fishermen, sailing during a dark night from *Caprea* into
 “ the Bay of Naples, as they silently approach the Promontory
 “ of *Minerva*, hear *PROTEUS* from the Shore, finging a marvelous
 “ Narrative of the strange Events, of which *those Regions* had been
 “ the well-known Scene. He concludes with the unhappy fate of
 “ the Poet's Friend and Patron, *Frederic King of Naples*, who,
 “ having been expelled his Kingdom, died an Exile in *France*.”

IF I might be pardoned a digression, it should be on the Elegance of the *Numbers*, by which this unfortunate part of the Tale is introduced.

*Addit tristia fata, et te, quem luget ademptum
 Italia, &c.*

THE Omission of the usual *Cæsura*, in the first of these verses, naturally throws it into that *Anapaestic Rhythm*, so finely suited to solemn Subjects.

*Addit—tristia—fata et—te quem, &c.**

IT

* So Homer,

Πόντια—δέα μὴ—μοί τόδε—χάωο.

Odyss. E. 215.

It may be observed also, in how *pathetic*, and yet withal, in how *manly* a way *Sannazarius* concludes. *Frederic* died in a remote region, and was buried, where he died. “ ’Tis *pleasing*, says *PROTEUS*, for a man’s remains to rest in his own Country; and yet for a Tomb every Land suffices.” Ch. XI.

Grata quies patriæ, sed et omnis terra Sepulcrum.

THOSE, who know how much sooner *Italy* emerged from *Barbary*, than the rest of *Europe*, may chuse to place *SANNAZARIUS* rather at the *beginning* of a good age, than at the *conclusion* of a bad one. Their opinion, perhaps, is not without foundation, and may be extended to *FRACASTORIUS*, *POLITIAN*, *POGGIUS*, and many other eloquent Authors, which that Century then produced, when *Eloquence* was little known elsewhere.

BEFORE we quit *Poetry*, we shall say something upon its *lowest* Species, upon *Acrostics*, *Chronograms*, *Wings*, *Altars*, *Eggs*, *Axes*, &c.

THESE were the poor Inventions of men *devoid of Taste*, and yet absurdly aiming at *Fame* by these despicable whims. Quitting the paths of *Simplicity* and *Truth* (of which ’tis probable they were wholly ignorant) they aspired, like *Rope-dancers*, to *Merit*, which only lay in the *difficulty*. The *Wings*, the *Axes*, the *Altars*, &c. were *wretched Forms*, into which they tortured poor *Words*, just as poor *Trees* in our Gardens were formerly mangled into *Giants*, *Flower-Pots*, *Peacocks*, *Obelisks*, &c.

Part III.

WHOEVER remembers that ACROSTICS, in Verification, are formed from the *Initial Letter* of every Verse, will see the Force and Ingenuity of the following description.

*Firm and compact, in three fair Columns wove,
O'er the smooth plain the bold ACROSTICS move:
HIGH o'er the rest THE TOW'RING LEADERS RISE,
With LIMBS GIGANTIC and SUPERIOR SIZE.*

CHRONOGRAMS, by a different conceit, *were not confined to INITIAL LETTERS*, but, as they were *to describe Dates*, THE NUMERAL LETTERS, in whatever part of the Word they stood, were distinguished from other Letters by being written in CAPITALS.

For example, I would mark by a CHRONOGRAM the Date 1506. I take for the purpose the following Words,

—*feriam sidera vertice*;

and by a *strange Elevation of CAPITALS* I compel even Horace to give me the Date required.

—*feriaM siDera VertIce*, MDVI.

THE Ingenious Author, whom I have quoted before, thus admirably describes this *second species* of folly.

*Not thus the looser CHRONOGRAMS prepare;
Careless their Troops, undisciplin'd to War;
With RANK IRREGULAR, CONFUS'D they stand,
THE CHIEFTAINS MINGLING with the vulgar band.*

IF I have dwelt too long on these trifles, it is not so much for their *merit* (of which they have none) as for those *elegant* Lines, in which they are so well described. Ch. XI.

ON the same motive I conclude this Chapter with selecting a few more Lines from the same ingenious Poem.

*To join these squadrons, o'er the champain came
A numerous race, of no ignoble name;
RIDDLE, and REBUS, Riddle's dearest Son,
And false CONUNDRUM, and insidious PUN;
FUSTIAN, who scarcely deigns to tread the ground,
And RONDEAU, wheeling in repeated round.
On their fair standards, by the winds display'd,
EGGS, ALTARS, WINGS, PIPES, AXES, were pourtray'd*.*

* See THE SCRIBLERIAD, (Book II. V. 151, &c.) of my valuable Friend, Mr. Cambridge of Twickenham.

C H A P. XII.

PAUL *the Venetian*, and SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, *great Travellers*—
 SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, *a great Lawyer*—*his valuable Book, addrest*
to his Pupil, the Prince of Wales—KING'S COLLEGE CHAPEL in
 Cambridge, FOUNDED BY HENRY THE SIXTH.—

Part III.

Part III. **T** WAS during this middle Period lived those celebrated Travellers, PAUL THE VENETIAN, and our Countryman, SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE.

WE have mentioned CHAUCER before them, tho' he flourished *after both*; for *Chaucer* lived till past the year 1400, PAUL began his Travels in the year 1272, and MANDEVILLE began his in the year 1322. The Reason is, *Chaucer* has been arranged with *the Poets, already* spoken of.

MARC PAUL, who is the first Writer of any Note concerning the *Eastern* Countries, travelled into those remote Regions as far as the Capital and Court of *Cublai Chan*, the sixth from that tremendous Conqueror *Jingiz Chan**. *Paul* is a curious and minute Relator of what he saw there.

HE describes *the Capital*, CAMBALU, to be a square walled in, of *Six miles* on every side, having to each side three Gates, and the several streets rectilinear, and crossing at right angles.

The

* See *Abulpharagius*, from p. 281 to p. 306.

The Imperial Palace, he tells us, was inclosed within a square wall of *a mile* on every side, and was magnificently adorned with Gilding and Pictures. 'Twas a piece of state, that thro' the grand or principal gate no one could enter but the Emperor *himself*. Ch. XII.

WITHIN the walls of this Square there were extensive Lawns, adorned with Trees, and stockt with wild animals, stags, goats, fallow deer, &c. not to mention a River, which formed a Lake, filled with the finest fish.

BESIDES this, at a League's distance from the Palace, he describes a small Mountain or Hill, planted with Ever-greens, in circumference about a mile. " Here (he tells us) the Emperor had
" all the finest trees that could be procured, brought to him, employing his Elephants for that purpose, as the trees were extracted
" with their roots.

" THE Mountain, from its verdure, was called THE GREEN
" MOUNTAIN. On its summit stood a fine Palace, distinguished
" also by its *Green* Colour, where he (*the Great Chan*) often retired
" to enjoy himself*."

SPEAKING

* The preceding Extracts are taken from a *Latin* Edition of PAULUS VENETUS, published, in a small Quarto, *Coloniæ Brandenburgicæ, ex officina Georgii Schulzii, anno 1679.*

As the Book is not rare, nor the title curious, we have only given the several Pages, by way of reference.

For the *Capital*, CAMBALU, see p. 68. *Lib. 2. Cap. 10.*

For the *Imperial Palace*, Lawns adjoining, and the *Green Mountain*, see p. 66, 67, *Lib. 2. Cap. 9.*

Part III. SPEAKING of *the Person of Cublai*, the then Monarch, he thus describes him.

“ HE is remarkably handsome; of a moderate stature; neither too corpulent, nor too lean; having a Countenance ruddy and fair; large eyes; a beautiful Nose; and all the lineaments of his Body formed in due proportion*.”

WE here quit our Traveller, only observing, as we conclude, that learned men have imagined this CAMBALU to be PEKIN in *China*, founded there by *Jingiz Chan*, soon after he had conquered it.

WHEN we consider the immense Power of this mighty Conqueror, who in a manner subdued the vast Tract of *Asia*; we are *the less difficult* in believing such marvellous Relations. The City, the Palace, and the Territory around teach us, what was the *Taste* of him and his Family, whose boundless Empire could admit of *nothing minute*.

IT is too an additional argument for *Credibility*, that, tho’ the Whole is *Vast*, yet nothing appears either *Foolish*, or *Impossible*.

ONE thing is worthy of notice, that, tho’ PAUL resided in *China* so long, he makes no mention of the *celebrated WALL*.—Was this *forgetfulness*? or was it not *then* erected?

As

* *Rex CUBLAI est homo admodum pulcher, staturâ mediocri, non nimis pinguis, nec nimis macilentus, faciem habens rubicundam atque candidam, oculos magnos, nasum pulchrum, et omnia corporis lineamenta debitâ proportionem consistentia.* Mar. Pauli Lib. 2. Cap. 8. p. 65.

As to our Countryman, SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, tho' he did not travel so far as *Marc Paul*, he travelled into many Parts of *Asia* and *Africa*; and, after having lived in those Countries for thirty-three years, died at *Liege* in the year 1371. Ch. XII.

He wrote his Travels in three Languages, *Latin*, *French*, and *English*, from the last of which Languages we quote, taking the liberty, in a few instances, to modernize the *Words*, tho' not in the minutest degree to change the *Meaning*.

We confine ourselves for brevity to a single fact.

TRAVELLING thro' *Macedonia*, he tells us, as follows—" In this " Country was ARISTOTLE born, in a City, that men call *Strageris**, a little from the City of *Tragie* or *Trakys*; and at *Strageris* " is *Aristotle* buried, and there is an Altar at his Tomb, where " they make a great Feast every Year, as tho' he was a Saint. " Upon this Altar the Lords (or Rulers) hold their Great Councils " and Assemblies, for they hope, that, thro' the inspiration of God " and of Him, they shall have the better counsel †."

SUCH was the Veneration (for it was more than Honour) paid by the *Stagirites* to their Countryman, more than *eighteen hundred years* after his death ‡. FROM

* Its ancient name in *Greek* was Στάγειρα, whence *Aristotle* was often called, by way of eminence, THE STAGIRITE, as being a Citizen there.

† See *Mandeville's Voyages*, Chap. 2.

‡ Those, who desire a taste of THIS GREAT MAN'S PHILOSOPHY in *English*, may find their curiosity amply gratified in the last work of that learned and acute *Grecian*, LORD MONBODDO, which work he files ANTIEN METAPHYSICS, published in Quarto at *Edinburgh*, 1779.

Part III.

FROM these times we pass over the triumphant reign of *Henry the Fifth* (a reign rather of *Action* than of *Letters*) to that of his unfortunate Son. This was a Period, disgraced by unsuccessful wars abroad, and by sanguinary disorders at home. *The King himself* met an *untimely* End, and so did his hopeful and high spirited Son, the *Prince of Wales*. Yet did not even these Times keep one Genius from emerging, tho' plunged by his rank into their most tempestuous part. By this I mean SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, Chancellor of *England*, and Tutor to *the young Prince*, just mentioned. As this last office was a Trust of the greatest importance, so he discharged it not only with consummate *Wisdom*, but (what was more) with consummate *Virtue*.

HIS TRACT IN PRAISE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND*, is written with the noblest view that man ever wrote; written to inspire his Pupil with a Love of the Country he was to govern, by shewing him that, TO GOVERN BY THOSE ADMIRABLE LAWS, would make him a FAR GREATER PRINCE, than the most UNLIMITED DESPOTISM†.

THIS

* This Book, which he titles DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIÆ, is written in Dialogue between himself, and the young Prince his Pupil, and was originally in *Latin*. The great *Selden* thought it worthy of a Commentary, and since that it has been published and enriched with additional Notes by Mr. *Gregor*. A new Edition was given ann. 1775, and the Latin Text subjoined.

† See of *Fortescue's* Work, Chap. IX. and XIII. and, above all, Chap. XIV. where he tells us *the Possibility of doing amiss*, (which is the only Privilege an *absolute* Prince enjoys above a *limited* one) can be called AN ADDITION OF POWER no other, than we so call A POSSIBILITY TO DECAY, OR TO DIE. See p. 41 of the English Version.

'Tis worth observing that *Fortescue*, in his dialogue, gives these fine sentiments to the *young Prince*, after he has heard much and due Reasoning upon the excellence of our Constitution. See Chap. XXXIV. p. 119.

THIS he does not only prove by a detail of *particular Laws*, but by an accurate comparifon between the ftate of *England* and *France*, one of which he makes a Land of *Liberty*, the other of *Servitude*. His thirty-fifth and thirty-fixth Chapters upon this fubject are invaluable, and fhould be read by every ENGLISHMAN, who honours that NAME. Ch. XII.

THRO' thefe and the other Chapters, we perceive an *interesting Truth*, which is, that the capital parts of our Conftitution, the *Trial by Juries*, the *Abhorrence of Tortures*, the *Sovereignty of Parliament* as well in the granting of *Money*, as in the making and repealing of *Laws*, I fay, that all thefe, and many other ineftimable privileges, exifted THEN, as they do NOW; were not *new* projects of the Day, but SACRED FORMS, to which *Ages* had given a venerable *Sanction* *.

As for the LITERATURE of this Great Man (which is more immediately to our purpofe) he appears to have been a Reader of *Aristotle*, *Diodorus Siculus*, *Cicero*, *Quinçtilian*, *Seneca*, *Vegetius*, *Boethius*, and many other ancients; to have been not uninformed in the Authors and History of *later Ages*; to have been deeply knowing not only in the *Laws of his own Country* (where he attained the higheft dignity they could beftow) but in the *Roman* or *Civil Law*, which he holds to be

* For trial by *Juries*, fee of this *Author* Chap. XX, XXI, and XXII.—For his abhorrence of *Torture*, fee Chap. XXIII.—For the *fovereignty of Parliament*, fee Chap. IX, XIII, XVIII, XXXVI, particularly p. 118 of the *English Verfion*.—For the high antiquity of our *Laws* and *Conftitution*, fee Chap. XVII.

Part III. be far inferior*; we must add to this a masterly insight into the
State and Policy of the neighbouring Nations.

PERHAPS a person of Rank, *even at present*, need not wish to be better instituted, if he had an ambition to soar above the Fashionable Polish.

WE must not conclude, without observing that the Taste for *Gothic Architecture* seems never to have been so *elegant*, as during this period; witness that exquisite structure, built by *Henry the Sixth*, I mean THE CHAPEL OF KING'S COLLEGE in *Cambridge*.

* The inferiority of the *Roman Law* to *our own*, is a Doctrine he strongly inculcates. See above all Chap. IX, XIX, &c. also Chap. XXXIV, where he nobly reprobates, as he had done before in Chap. IX, that infamous maxim, *Quod PRINCIPi placuit, LEGIS habet Vigorem*; a Maxim, well becoming an *Oriental Caliph*, but hardly decent even in a *degenerate Roman Law-giver*.

CHAP. XIII.

Concerning NATURAL BEAUTY—its Idea the same in all Times—THESSALIAN TEMPE—Taste of VIRGIL, and HORACE—of MILTON, in describing Paradise—exhibited of late years first in Pictures—thence transferred to ENGLISH Gardens—not wanting to the enlightened Few of the middle Age—proved in LELAND, PETRARCH, and SANNAZARIUS,—comparison between the Younger CYRUS, and PHILIP LE BEL of France.

BUT let us pass for a moment from the elegant Works of ART Ch. XIII.
to the more elegant Works of NATURE. The two subjects are
so nearly allied, that *the same Taste* usually relishes them both.

Now there is nothing more certain, than that the Face of *inanimate Nature* has been at all times captivating. *The Vulgar*, indeed, look no farther than to Scenes of *Culture*, because all their Views merely terminate in *Utility*. They only remark, that 'tis fine Barley; that 'tis rich Clover; as an Ox or an Ass, if they could speak, would inform us. But *the Liberal* have nobler views, and tho' they give to *Culture* it's due Praise, they can be delighted with *natural Beauties*, where *Culture* was never known.

AGES ago they have celebrated with enthusiastic rapture “ a deep
“ *retired Vale, with a River rushing thro' it; a Vale having it's sides*
“ *formed by two immense and opposite Mountains, and those sides di-*
“ *versified*

Part III. “*versified by Woods, Precipices, Rocks and romantic Caverns.*” Such was the Scene, produced by the River *Penēus*, as it ran between the Mountains, *Olympus* and *Ossa*, in that well known Vale, the THESSALIAN TEMPE*.

VIRGIL and HORACE, the first for Taste among the *Romans*, appear to have been enamoured with Beauties of this character. HORACE prayed for a Villa, where there was a Garden, a Rivulet, and above these a little Grove.

*Hortus ubi, et tecto vicinus jugis aquæ fons,
Et paulum Silvæ super his foret.* Sat. VI. 2.

VIRGIL wished to enjoy Rivers, and Woods, and to be hid under immense shade in the cool valleys of Mount *Hæmus*—

— O! qui me gelidis in Vallibus Hæmi
Sistat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbra?

Georg. II. 486.

THE great ELEMENTS of this species of Beauty, according to these Principles, were WATER, WOOD, and UNEVEN GROUND; to which may be added a fourth, that is to say, LAWN. 'Tis the happy Mixture of these four, that produces every Scene of natural Beauty, as

* *Est nemus Hæmonia, prærupta quod undique claudit
Silva: vocant TEMPE. Per quæ Penēus ab imo
Effusus Pindo spumosis volvitur undis,
Dejectuque gravi, &c.* Ovid. Metam. Lib. I. 568.

A fuller and more ample account of this beautiful spot may be found in the First Chapter of the Third Book of *Ælian's Various History*.

as 'tis a more mysterious Mixture of *other* Elements (perhaps as Ch. XIII.
simple, and *not more* in number) that produces a *World* or *Universe*.

Virgil and *Horace* having been quoted, we may quote, with equal truth, our great countryman, MILTON. Speaking of the Flowers of *Paradise*, he calls them *Flowers*,

—— which NOT NICE ART
In beds and curious Knots, but NATURE BOON
Pours forth profuse on hill, and dale, and plain. P. L. IV. 242.

Soon after this he subjoins —

—— *this was the Place,*
A happy rural Seat, of VARIOUS VIEW.

He explains this VARIETY, by recounting the Lawns, the Flocks, the Hillocks, the Valleys, the Grotts, the Waterfalls, the Lakes, &c. &c. and in another Book, describing the approach of *Raphael*, he informs us, that this divine Messenger past

—— *Thro' Groves of Myrrh,*
And flow'ring Odors, Cassia, Nard and Balm,
A WILDERNESS of Sweets; for Nature here
Wanton'd as in her prime, and play'd AT WILL
Her Virgin-fancies, pouring forth more sweet,
Wild ABOVE RULE or Art, ENORMOUS BLISS. —
P. L. V. 292.

THE *Painters* in the preceding Century seem to have felt the power of these *Elements*, and to have transferred them into their
Landscapes

Part III. Landscapes with such amazing force, that they appear not so much to have *followed*, as to have *emulated* Nature. *Claude de Lorraine*, the *Poussins*, *Salvator Rosa*, and a few more, may be called *superior Artists* in this exquisite Taste.

Our Gardens in the mean time were tasteless and insipid. Those, who made them, thought *the farther they wandered from Nature*, the nearer they approached *the Sublime*. Unfortunately, where they travelled, *no Sublime was to be found*; and the farther they went, the farther they left it behind.

BUT *Perfection*, alas! was not the work of a day. Many Prejudices were to be removed; many gradual Ascents to be made; Ascents from Bad to Good, and from Good to Better, before the *delicious Amenities* of a *Claude* or a *Poussin* could be rivalled in a *Stourhead*, a *Hagley*, or a *Stow*; or the *tremendous Charms* of a *Salvator Rosa* be equalled in the Scenes of a *Peircefield*, or a *Mount Edgecumb*.

NOT however to forget the subject of our Inquiry. — Tho' 'twas not before the *present* Century, that we established a chaster Taste; tho' our neighbours at this instant are but learning it from us; and tho' to the Vulgar every where it is totally incomprehensible (be they Vulgar in rank or Vulgar in capacity): yet, even in the darkest periods we have been treating, periods, when Taste is often thought to have been lost, we shall still discover *an enlightened few*, who were by no means insensible to the power of *these* beauties.

How

How warmly does LELAND describe *Guy's Cliff*; SANNAZARIUS, *Ch. XIII.*
his Villa of *Mergilline*; and PETRARCH, his favourite *Vaucluse*?

TAKE GUY'S CLIFF from *Leland* in his own *old English*, mixt with *Latin*—"It is a place meet for the *Muses*; there is *Sylence*; a *praty*
"wood; *antra in vivo saxo*; (Grottos in the living Rock) the River
"roling over the stones with a *praty noyse*." His *Latin* is more elegant
—*Nemusculum ibidem opacum, fontes liquidi et gemmei, prata florida,*
antra muscosa, rivi levis et per saxa decursus, nec non solitudo et quies
*Musis amicissima**.

MERGILLINE, the Villa of *Sannazarius* near *Naples*, is thus
sketched in different parts of his Poems:

Exciso in scopulo, fluctus unde aurea canos
Despiciens, celso se culmine MERGILLINE
Attollit, nautisque procul venientibus offert.

Sannaz. De partu Virgin. I. 25.

Rupis O! sacrae, pelagique custos,
Villa, Nympharum custos et propinqua
Doridos——

Tu mihi solos nemorum recessus
Das, et hærentes per opaca lauros
Saxa: Tu, fontes, Aganippedumque


Antra recludis.

Ejusd. Epigr. I. 2.

—— *quæque*

* See *Leland's Itinerary*, Vol. IV. p. 66.

Part III.



— *quæque in primis mihi grata ministrat*

Otia, Musarumque cavas per saxa latebras,

MERGILLINA; *novos fundunt ubi citria flores,*

Citria, Medorum sacros referentia lucos.

Ejusd. De partu Virgin. III. sub fin.

De Fonte Mergillino.

Est mihi rico vitreus perenni

Fons, arenosum prope littus, unde

Sæpe descendens sibi nauta rores

Haurit amicos. &c.

Ejusd. Epigr. II. 36.

"TWOULD be difficult to translate these elegant Morfels — 'Tis sufficient to express what they mean, *collectively* — " that the Villa of
" MERGILLINA had solitary Woods; had GROVES of Laurel and
" Citron; had GROTTOS in the Rock, with RIVULETS and SPRINGS;
" and that from ITS LOFTY SITUATION it lookt down upon the Sea,
" and commanded an extensive prospect."

'Tis no wonder that *such a Villa* should enamour *such an Owner*. So strong was his affection for it, that, when during the subsequent Wars in *Italy*, it was demolished by the Imperial Troops, this unfortunate Event was supposed to have hastened his end*.

VAUCLUSE (*Vallis Clausa*) the favourite retreat of PETRARCH, was a romantic Scene, not far from *Avignon*.

" IT

* So we learn from *Paulus Jovius*, the writer of his Life, published with his Poems by *Grævius*, in a small Edition of some of the *Italian Poets*, at *Amsterdam*, in the year 1695.

“ IT is a VALLEY, having on each hand, as you enter, immense
“ Cliffs, but *closed up* at one of its Ends by a semi-circular Ridge of
“ them; from which *incident* it derives *its name*. One of the most
“ stupendous of these Cliffs stands in the front of the semi-circle,
“ and has at its foot an opening into an immense Cavern. Within
“ the most *retired and gloomy part* of this Cavern is a *large oval*
“ *Basin*, the production of Nature, filled with pellucid and unfathomable Water; and from this reservoir issues a River of respectable magnitude, dividing, as it runs, the Meadows beneath, and winding thro’ the Precipices, that impend from above*.”

Ch. XIII.

THIS is an imperfect sketch of that spot, where PETRARCH spent his time with so much delight, as to say that *this alone* was Life to him, the rest but a state of punishment.

IN the two preceding Narratives I seem to see an anticipation of that Taste for *natural* Beauty, which now appears to flourish thro’ *Great Britain* in such perfection. It is not to be doubted that the *Owner of Mergillina* would have been charmed with *Mount Edgcomb*; and the *Owner of Vacluse* have been delighted with *Piercefield*.

WHEN we read in XENOPHON†, that the *younger* CYRUS had with his own hand planted *trees for Beauty*, we are not surpris’d, tho’

* See *Memoires pour la Vie de François Petrarque*, Quarto, Tom. I. p. 231, 341, 342. See also *Plin. Nat. Hist.* L. XXVIII. c. 22.

† See the *Oeconomics of Xenophon*, where this Fact is related.

Part III.  tho' pleased with the Story, as *the Age* was *polished*, and *Cyrus* an accomplished Prince. But, when we read that in the beginning of the 14th Century, a *King of France* (PHILIP LE BELL) should make it penal to cut down a Tree, *qui a este gardè pour sa beauté, which had been preserved FOR ITS BEAUTY*; tho' we praise the Law, we cannot help being surprised, that the Prince should at such a period have been so far enlightened*.

* See a valuable Work, intituled *Observations on the Statutes, chiefly on the ancient, &c.* p. 7, by the Hon^{ble}. Mr. *Barrington*; a work, concerning which it is difficult to decide, whether it be more entertaining, or more instructive.

CHAP. XIV.

SUPERIOR LITERATURE and KNOWLEDGE both of the Greek and Latin CLERGY, whence — BARBARITY and IGNORANCE of the LAITY, whence — Samples of Lay-manners, in a Story from ANNA COMNENA's History — CHURCH AUTHORITY ingeniously employed to check Barbarity — the same Authority employed for other good purposes — to save the poor Jews — to stop Trials by Battle — more suggested concerning Lay-manners — Ferocity of the NORTHERN LAYMEN, whence — different Causes assigned — INVENTIONS during the dark Ages — great, tho' the Inventors often unknown — Inference arising from these Inventions.

BEFORE I quit the LATINS, I shall subjoin two or three Observations on THE EUROPEANS in general. Ch. XIV.

THE *superior* Characters for *Literature* here enumerated, whether in the *Western* or *Eastern Christendom* (for 'tis of *Christendom* only we are now speaking) were by far the greater part of them ECCLESIASTICS.

IN this number we have selected from among THE GREEKS the *Patriarch of Constantinople*, PHOTIUS; MICHAEL PSELLUS; EUSTATHIUS and EUSTRATIUS, both of *Episcopal Dignity*; PLANUDES; Cardinal BESSARIO — from among THE LATINS, *Venerable* BEDE; GERBERTUS, afterwards POPE SYLVESTER THE SECOND; INGULPHUS, *Abbot of Croyland*; HILDEBERT, *Archbishop of Tours*; PETER ABELARD; JOHN OF SALISBURY, *Bishop of Chartres*; ROGER BACON;

Part III. CON; FRANCIS PETRARCH; *many Monkish Historians*; ÆNEAS SYLVIUS, afterwards POPE PIUS THE SECOND, &c.

SOMETHING has been already said concerning each of *these*, and other *Ecclesiastics**. At present we shall only remark, that 'twas necessary, *from their very Profession*, that they should *read and write*; accomplishments, at that time *usually confined to themselves*.

THOSE of the *Western Church* were obliged to acquire some knowledge of LATIN; and for GREEK, to those of the *Eastern Church* it was still (with a few Corruptions) their *native Language*.

IF we add to these Preparations *their mode of Life*, which, being attended mostly with a decent competence, gave them immense leisure; 'twas not wonderful that, *among such a multitude, the more meritorious* should emerge, and soar by dint of Genius above the common herd. Similar Effects proceed from similar Causes. The Learning of *Egypt* was possessed by their *Priests*; who were likewise left from their institution to a life of leisure†.

FOR THE LAITY on the other side, who, from their mean Education, wanted all these Requisites, they were in fact no better than what *Dryden* calls them, *a tribe of Issachar*; a race, from their cradle bred in *Barbarity and Ignorance*.

A SAMPLE

* Those, who wish to see more particulars concerning these learned Men, may recur to their Names in the Index, or, if he please, may consult the *Third Part* of these Inquiries, in Chapters IV. IX. X. XI. XIV.

† *Aristotle*, speaking of *Egypt*, informs us—ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος—*For there* (meaning in *Egypt*) THE TRIBE OF PRIESTS were left TO LEAD A LIFE OF LEISURE. *Arist. Metaph. L. I. c. 1.*

A SAMPLE of these illustrious *Laymen* may be found in ANNA Ch. XIV.
COMNENA's History of her Father *Alexius*, who was *Grecian Emperor*
in the *eleventh* Century, when the first CRUSADE arrived at *Constan-*
tinople. So promiscuous a Rout of rude Adventurers could not fail
of giving umbrage to the *Byzantine Court*, which was stately and ce-
remonious, and conscious withal of its internal debility.

AFTER some altercation, the Court permitted them to pass into
Asia thro' the *Imperial Territories*, upon their *Leaders* taking an *Oath*
of *Fealty* to the Emperor.

WHAT happened at the performance of this Ceremonial, is thus
related by the fair Historian above-mentioned.

“ ALL the Commanders being assembled, GODFREY OF BUL-
“ LOIGN himself among the rest, as soon as the Oath was finished,
“ one of the *Counts* had the audaciousness to seat himself *beside the*
“ *Emperor* upon his throne. *Earl Baldwin*, one of *their own* people,
“ approaching, took *the Count* by the hand; made him rise from the
“ throne; and rebuked him for his insolence.

“ THE *Count* rose, but made no reply, except it was in his own
“ unknown Jargon to mutter abuse upon the Emperor.

“ WHEN all things were dispatched, the *Emperor* sent for this man,
“ and demanded, *who he was, whence he came, and of what Lineage?*
“ — His answer was as follows — *I am a genuine FRANK, and in the*
“ *number of their Nobility. One thing I know, which is, that in a*
“ *certain part of the Country I came from, and in a place, where three*
“ *ways*

Part III. *“ ways meet, there stands an ancient Church, where every one, who has
 “ a desire to engage in single Combat, having put himself into fighting
 “ order, comes and there implores the assistance of the Deity, and then
 “ waits in expectation of some one, that will dare attack him. On this
 “ spot I MYSELF waited a long time, expecting and seeking some one,
 “ that would arrive, and fight me. But THE MAN, THAT WOULD
 “ DARE THIS, was no where to be found*.”*

THE Emperor, having heard this strange Narrative, replied pleasantly — *“ If at the time, when you sought War, you could not find it,
 “ a Season is now coming, in which you will find Wars enough. I there-
 “ fore give you this advice : not to place yourself either in the Rear of
 “ the Army, or in the Front, but to keep among those, who support the
 “ Centre ; for I have long had knowledge of the Turkish method in their
 “ Wars†.”*

THIS was one of those COUNTS, or BARONS, the petty Tyrants of Western Europe ; men, who, when they were not engaged in general wars, (such as the ravaging of a neighbouring Kingdom, the massacring of Infidels, Heretics, &c.) had no other method of filling up their

* Those, who attend to *this* Story, and who have perused any of the Histories of Chivalry, in particular an ingenious French Treatise upon the subject, in two small Volumes 8vo. published at Paris, in the year 1759, intitled, *Mémoires sur l'ancienne Chevalerie*, will perceive that the much admired *Don Quixote* is not an Imaginary Character, but a Character, drawn after the real Manners of the times. 'Tis true indeed, the Character is somewhat heightened ; but even here the witty Author has contrived to make it probable, by ingeniously adding a certain mixture of *Insanity*.

These Romantic Heroes were not wholly extinct even in periods far later than the Crusades. THE CHEVALIER BAYARD flourished under Francis the First of France, and LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY under James and Charles the First of England.

† See Anna Comnena's History of her Father, *Fol. Gr. Lat.* p. 300.

their leisure, than, thro' help of their *Vassals*, by waging war upon one another. Ch. XIV.

AND here the *Humanity* and *Wisdom* of THE CHURCH cannot enough be *admired*, when by *her authority* (which was then mighty) she endeavoured to *shorten* that scene of Bloodshed, which she could not *totally* prohibit. THE TRUCE OF GOD (a name given it *purposely* to render the measure more *solemn*) enjoined *these ferocious Beings*, under the terrors of *Excommunication*, not to fight from *Wednesday Evening to Monday Morning*, out of reverence to the *Mysteries*, accomplished on the other four days; the *Ascension* on Thursday; the *Crucifixion* on Friday; the *Descent to Hell* on Saturday; and the *Resurrection* on Sunday*.

I HOPE a farther observation will be pardoned, when I add that *the same Humanity* prevailed during the fourteenth Century, and that *the terrors of CHURCH POWER* were then held forth with an intent *equally* laudable. A dreadful plague at that period desolated all *Europe*. *The Germans*, with no better reason than their own *senseless Superstition*, imputed this calamity to *the Jews*, who then lived among them in great opulence and splendour. Many thousands of these unhappy people were inhumanly massacred, till *the Pope* benevolently interfered, and prohibited by the severest Bulls so mad and sanguinary a proceeding†.

I COULD

* See any of the Church Histories of the time, in particular an ingenious French Book, entitled *Histoire Ecclesiastique*, in two Volumes, 12mo. digested into *Annals*, and having the several years marked in the course of the Narrative. Go to the years 1027, 1031, 1041, 1068, 1080.

† See the *Church Histories* about the middle of the fourteenth Century, and *Petrarch's Life*.

Part III.

I COULD not omit *two* such *salutary* exertions of *Church Power*, as they both occur within the period of this Inquiry. I might add a *third*, I mean the opposing and endeavouring to check that absurdest of all Practices, THE TRIAL BY BATTLE, which *Spelman* expressly tells us that THE CHURCH in all ages *condemned**.

IT must be confessed, that the Fact just related concerning the *unmannered* Count, at the Court of *Constantinople*, is rather against the order of *Chronology*, for it happened during the first Crusades. It serves however to shew *the Manners* of the *Latin* or *Western Laity*, in the beginning of *that Holy War*. They did not, in a succession of years, grow *better*, but *worse*.

'Twas a Century after, that another *Crusade*, in their march against Infidels, sacked *this very City*; deposed the then Emperor; and committed *Devaslations*, which no one would have committed, but *the most ignorant, as well as cruel Barbarians*. If we descend not at present to particulars, it is, because we have already quoted so largely from *Nicetas*, in a former Chapter†.

BUT a Question here occurs, easier to propose, than to answer.—
 “To what are we to attribute this character of FEROCITY, which seems
 “to have then prevailed thro’ THE LAITY OF EUROPE?”

SHALL we say, 'twas CLIMATE, and THE NATURE OF THE COUNTRY?—These we must confess have in some instances great Influence. The

* *Truculentum morem in omni ævo acriter infectarunt THEOLOGI, &c.* See before, p. 418.

† See Part III. chap. 5, and *Abulpharagius*, p. 282, who describes their *indiscriminate Cruelty* in a manner much resembling that of their *Brother Crusaders* at *Beziers*, and that nearly about the same time. See before, p. 511.

The Indians, seen a few years since by Mr. *Byron* in the southern parts of *South America*, were brutal and savage to an enormous excess. One of them, for a trivial offence, murdered his own Child (an infant) by dashing it against the Rocks. *The Cyclopes*, as described by *Homer*, were much of the same sort; each of them gave Law to his own Family, without regard for one another; and besides this, they were *Atheists* and *Man-eaters*.

MAY we not suppose, that a stormy sea, together with a frozen, barren, and inhospitable shore, might work on the Imagination of these *Indians*, so, as by banishing all *pleasing* and *benign* Ideas, to fill them with *habitual* Gloom, and a Propensity to be cruel?—or might not the *tremendous* Scenes of *Etna* have had a like Effect upon the *Cyclopes*, who lived amid Smoke, Thunderings, Eruptions of Fire, and Earthquakes? If we may believe *Fazelius*, who wrote upon *Sicily* about two hundred years ago, the *Inhabitants* near *Etna* were in his time a similar Race*.

If therefore these *limited* Regions had such an effect upon their *Natives*, may not a similar Effect be presumed from the *vast* Regions of the North? May not its cold, barren, uncomfortable Climate have made its numerous Tribes *equally* rude and savage?

If this be not enough, we may add another Cause, I mean their *profound* Ignorance. Nothing mends THE MIND more than CULTURE, to which these Emigrants had no desire, either from Example or Education, to lend a patient Ear.

WE

* See *Fazelius de Rebus seculis*, L. II. c. 4.

Part III.

WE may add *a farther Cause still*, which is, that, when they had acquired Countries better than their own, they *settled* under the *same Military Form*, thro' which they had *conquered*; and were in fact, when settled, *a sort of Army after a Campaign*, quartered upon the wretched remains of the *ancient Inhabitants*, by whom they were attended under the different names of *Serfs, Vassals, Villains, &c.*

'Twas not likely the Ferocity of these *Conquerors* should abate with regard to their *Vassals*, whom, as strangers, they were more likely to suspect, than to love.

'Twas not likely it should abate with regard to one another, when the *Neighbourhood* of their Castles, and the *Contiguity* of their Territories, must have given occasions (as we learn from History) for endless Altercation. But this we leave to the learned in FEUDAL TENURES.

WE shall add to the preceding Remarks one more somewhat *singular*, and yet perfectly *different*; which is, that tho' the Dark-ness in *Western Europe*, during the Period here mentioned, was (in Scripture Language) *a Darkness that might be felt*, yet is it surprising that, during a Period so obscure, many *admirable Inventions* found their way into the world; I mean such as *Clocks, Telescopes, Paper, Gunpowder, the Mariner's Needle, Printing*, and a number here omitted*.

'Tis

* See two ingenious Writers on this Subject, *Polydore Virgil, De Rerum Inventoribus*; and *Pancirolius, De Rebus perditis et inventis*.

'TIS surprising too, if we consider the *importance* of these arts, and their *extensive utility*, that it should be either *unknown*, or at least *doubtful*, by whom they were *invented*. Ch. XIV.

A LIVELY Fancy might almost imagine, that every Art, as it was wanted, had suddenly started forth, addressing those that sought it, as *Eneas* did his companions—

—*Coram, quem quæritis, adsum.* VIRG.

AND yet, Fancy apart, of this we may be assured, that, tho' *the particular Inventors* may unfortunately be forgotten, THE INVENTIONS THEMSELVES are clearly referable to MAN; to that *subtle*, and *active Principle*, HUMAN WIT, or INGENUITY.

LET me then submit the following Query—

IF the HUMAN MIND be as truly of *divine* Origin, as every *other* part of the Universe; and if every *other* part of the Universe bear testimony to its *Author*: do not the INVENTIONS above mentioned give us reason to assert, that GOD, IN THE OPERATIONS OF MAN, NEVER LEAVES HIMSELF WITHOUT A WITNESS?

CHAP. XV.

Opinions on PAST Ages, and the PRESENT—Conclusion arising from the Discussion of these Opinions—CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE.

Part III.

AND now having done with THE MIDDLE AGE, we venture to say a word upon THE PRESENT.

Every Past Age has in its turn been a Present Age. This indeed is obvious, but this is not all; for every Past Age, when present, has been the object of Abuse. Men have been represented by their Contemporaries not only as bad, but degenerate; as inferior to their predecessors both in Morals and bodily Powers.

THIS is an Opinion so generally received, that VIRGIL (in conformity to it) when he would express FORMER times, calls them simply BETTER, as if the Term, *better*, implied *former* of course.

Hic genus ANTIQUUM Teucris, pulcherrima proles,

Magnanimi Heroes, nati MELIORIBUS annis.

Æn. vi. 648.

THE same opinion is ascribed by HOMER to old NESTOR, when that venerable Chief speaks of those Heroes, whom he had known in his youth. He relates some of their names; *Pirithous, Dryas, Cæneus, Theseus*; and some also of their exploits; as how they had extirpated the savage *Centaur*s—He then subjoins

————— κείνοισι

——— κείνοισι δ' ἂν ἔτις,

Τῶν·οἱ νῦν βροτοῖ ἐσιν ἐπιχθόνιοι, μαχέοιτο.

Il. A. 271.

——— with these no one

Of earthly race, as men ARE NOW, could fight.

As these Heroes were supposed to exceed in *strength* those of the Trojan War, so were the Heroes of *that* period to exceed those, *that* came after. Hence, from the time of the Trojan War to that of Homer, we learn that *Human Strength* was decreased by a complete half.

Thus the same Homer,

——— ὁ δὲ χερμάδιον λάβε χεῖρι

Τυδείδης, μέγα ἔργον, ὃ εἰ δύο γ' ἄνδρες φέροιεν,

Οἷοι νῦν βροτοί· εἰς· ὃ δέ μιν ῥέα πάλλε κ' ὄιος.

Il. E. 302.

Then grasp'd Tydides in his hand a stone,

A Bulk immense, which not TWO MEN could bear,

As Men are NOW, but he ALONE with ease

Hurl'd it———

Virgil goes farther and tells us, that not TWELVE MEN of his time (and those too *chosen* ones) could even carry the stone, which Turnus flung.

Vix illud LECTI BIS SEX cervice subirent,

Qualia NUNC hominum producit corpora tellus:

Ille manu raptum trepidâ torquebat in hostem. Æn. xii. 899.

Thus

Part III. *Thus Human strength, which in HOMER'S TIME was lessened to half, in VIRGIL'S TIME was lessened to a twelfth. If Strength and Bulk (as commonly happens) be proportioned, what Pygmies in Stature must the Men of Virgil's time have been, when their strength, as he informs us, was so far diminished? A Man only eight times as strong (and not, according to the Poet, twelve times) must at least have been between five and six feet higher, than they were.*

BUT we all know the Privilege, claimed by Poets and Painters.

"Tis in virtue of this Privilege that HORACE, when he mentions the moral Degeneracies of his *Contemporaries*, asserts that "*their Fathers were worse than their Grandfathers; that they were worse than their Fathers; and that their Children would be worse than they were;*" describing no fewer, after the Grandfather, than *three Successions of Degeneracy*.

Ætas parentum, PEJOR avis, tulit

Nos NEQUIORES, mox datuos

Progeniem VITIOSIOREM. Hor. Od. L. iii. 6.

WE need only ask, were this a fact, what would THE ROMANS have been, had they *degenerated in this proportion* for five or six Generations more?

YET JUVENAL, subsequent to all this, supposes a similar *Progression*; a Progression in Vice and Infamy, which was not *complete*, till his own times.

THEN

THEN truly we learn, *it could go no farther.*

Ch. XV.

*Nil erit ULTERIUS, nostris quod moribus addat
Posteritas, &c.*

Omne IN PRÆCIPITI vitium fletit, &c. Sat. i. 147, &c.

BUT even JUVENAL it seems was mistaken, *bad* as we must allow his times to have been. Several Centuries after, without regard to *Juvenal*, the *same* Doctrine was inculcated with greater zeal than ever.

WHEN the *Western Empire* began to decline, and *Europe* and *Africa* were ravaged by *Barbarians*, the Calamities *then* happening (and formidable they were) naturally led Men, who felt them, to esteem *their own Age the worst.*

THE Enemies of *Christianity* (for *Paganism* was not then extinct) absurdly turned these Calamities to the discredit of the *Christian* Religion, and said the times were so unhappy, because the Gods were dishonoured, and the ancient Worship neglected. OROSIUS, a *Christian*, did not deny the melancholy facts, but, to obviate an objection so dishonourable to the true Religion, he endeavours to prove from Historians, both *sacred* and *profane*, that Calamities of every sort had existed in every age, as many and as great, as those that existed *then.*

IF OROSIUS has reasoned right (and his Work is an elaborate one) it follows that the *Lamentations* made *then*, and made ever since, are no more than *natural Declamations incidental to Man;*

Part III. *Declamations naturally arising, let him live at any period, from the superior efficacy of present Events upon present Sensations.*

THERE is a *Praise belonging to THE PAST congenial with this Censure; a Praise formed from NEGATIVES, and best illustrated by Examples.*

THUS a Declaimer might assert, (supposing he had a wish, by exalting *the eleventh Century*, to debase *the present*) that “in the
“ time of THE NORMAN CONQUEROR we had *no Routs, no Ridottos,*
“ *no Newmarkets, no Candidates to bribe, no Voters to be bribed,*
“ &c.” and string on NEGATIVES, as long as he thought proper.

WHAT then are we to do, when we hear *such Panegyric*?—Are we to *deny* the Facts?—That cannot be—Are we to *admit* the Conclusion?—That appears not quite agreeable.—No method is left but to TO COMPARE EVILS WITH EVILS; *the Evils* of 1066 with *those* of 1780; and see whether the *former Age* had not *Evils* of *its own*, such as the *present* NEVER experienced, because they do *not* NOW exist.

WE may allow, the *Evils* of the *present* day to be *real*—we may even allow, that a much *larger* number might have been added—but then we may alledge evils, by way of return, felt in THOSE days severely, but now *not* felt at all.

“ WE may assert, we have not *now*, as happened *then*, seen our
“ Country conquered by foreign Invaders; *nor* our Property taken
“ from

“ from us, and distributed among the Conquerors; *nor* ourselves, Ch. XV.
 “ from Freemen debased into Slaves; *nor* our Rights submitted
 “ to *unknown* Laws, imported, without our consent, from foreign
 “ Countries.”

SHOULD the same Reasonings be urged in favour of Times, *nearly* as remote, and other Imputations of *Evil* be brought, which, tho' well known *now*, did not *then* exist; we may still retort that—“ we
 “ are *no longer* NOW, as they were THEN, subject to *feudal* Oppression; *nor* dragged to War, as they were *then*, by the petty
 “ Tyrant of a neighbouring Castle; *nor* involved in scenes of blood,
 “ as they were *then*, and that for many years, during the uninteresting disputes between A STEPHEN and A MAUD.”

SHOULD the same Declaimer pass to a *later* period, and praise after the same manner the reign of HENRY THE SECOND, we have then to retort, “ *that we have now* NO BECKETS.” Should he proceed to RICHARD THE FIRST, “ *that we have now* NO HOLY WARS”—to JOHN LACKLAND, and his Son, HENRY, “ *that we have now* NO BARONS WARS”—and with regard to BOTH of them, “ that, tho' we enjoy at this instant all the benefits of MAGNA CHARTA, we have *not* been compelled to purchase them at the price of our blood.”

A SERIES of Convulsions brings us, in a few years more, to the Wars between the Houses of YORK and LANCASTER—thence, from the fall of *the Lancaster Family*, to the calamities of *the York Family*, and its final destruction in RICHARD THE THIRD—thence

Part III. to the oppressive Period of his *avaricious* SUCCESSOR; and from Him to the formidable reign of HIS RELENTLESS SON, when neither the Coronet, nor the Mitre, nor even the Crown could protect their wearers; and when (to the amazement of Posterity) those, by whom Church Authority was denied, and those, by whom it was maintained, were dragged together to Smithfield, and burnt at one and the same stake*.

THE reign of his SUCCESSOR was *short* and *turbid*, and soon followed by the *gloomy* one of a BIGOTTED WOMAN.

WE stop here, thinking we have instances enough. Those, who hear any portion of these *past* times, *praised for the invidious purpose above mentioned*, may answer by thus *retorting* the Calamities and Crimes, which *existed* AT THE TIME *praised*, but which NOW *exist no more*. A true Estimate can never be formed, but in consequence of such a *Comparison*; for if we drop *the laudable*, and alledge *only the bad*, or drop *the bad*, and alledge *only the laudable*, there is no Age, whatever its real character, but may be made to pass at pleasure either for a *good one*, or a *bad one*.

IF I may be permitted in this place to add an observation, it shall be an observation founded upon *many* years experience. I have often heard Declamations against the *present* Race of Men; Declamations against them, as if they were *the worst of animals*; treacherous,

* Some of these unfortunate men *denied the King's Supremacy*, and others, *the real Presence*. See the Histories of that Reign.

treacherous, false, selfish, envious, oppressive, tyrannical, &c. &c. This (I say) I have often heard from grave Declaimers, and have heard the Sentiment delivered with a kind of Oracular Pomp.— Yet I never heard any such Declaimer say (what would have been *sincere at least*, if it had been nothing more) “ I prove my assertion “ by an example, where I cannot err; *I assert MYSELF to be the* “ *Wretch, I have been just describing.*”

So far from this, it would be perhaps dangerous to ask him, even in a gentle whisper — *You have been talking, with much Confidence, about certain profligate Beings. — Are you certain, that YOU YOURSELF are not one of the number?*

I HOPE I may be pardoned for the following Anecdote, altho’ compelled in relating it, to make myself a party.

“ SITTING once in my Library with a friend, a worthy but melancholy man, I read him out of a Book the following passage —

“ *In our time it may be spoken more truly than of old, that Virtue is* “ *gone; the Church is under foot; the Clergy is in error; the Devil* “ *reigneth, &c. &c. My Friend interrupted me with a sigh, and* “ *said, Alas! how true! How just a picture of the Times! — I asked* “ *him, of what Times? — Of what Times, replied he with emotion,* “ *can you suppose any other but THE PRESENT? Were any BEFORE* “ *ever so bad, so corrupt, so, &c.? — Forgive me (said I) for stopping you* “ *—THE TIMES, I am reading of, are OLDER than you imagine; the* “ *Sentiment*

Part III. " *Sentiment was delivered above four hundred years ago; its Author*
 " SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, *who died in 1371* *."

As *Man* is by nature a *social* Animal, GOOD HUMOUR seems an ingredient highly necessary to his character. 'Tis the Salt, which gives a seasoning to the Feast of Life; and which, if it be wanting, surely renders the Feast incomplete. Many Causes contribute to impair this *amiable* Quality, and nothing perhaps more, than *bad Opinions of Mankind*. *Bad Opinions of Mankind* naturally lead us to MISANTHROPY. If these bad opinions go *farther*, and are *applied to the Universe*, then they lead to something worse, for they lead to ATHEISM. The melancholy and morose Character being thus insensibly formed, MORALS and PIETY sink of course; for what EQUALS have we TO LOVE, or what SUPERIOR have we TO REVERE, when we have *no other* objects left, than those of *Hatred*, or of *Terror* †?

IT

* See *this Writer's own Preface*, p. 10, in the large *Octavo English Edition* of his *Travels*, published at London, in 1727. See also of these *Philolog. Inquiries*, p. 553.

† MISANTHROPY is so dangerous a thing, and goes so far in fapping the very foundations of MORALITY and RELIGION, that I esteem the last part of *Swift's Gulliver* (that I mean relative to his *Hoyhnms* and *Yahoos*) to be a worse Book to peruse, than those which we forbid, as the most flagitious and obscene.

One absurdity in this Author (a wretched Philosopher, tho' a great Wit) is well worth remarking—in order to render *the Nature of MAN odious*, and *the Nature of BEASTS amiable*, he is compelled to give HUMAN Characters to his BEASTS, and BEASTLY Characters to his MEN—so that we are to *admire* THE BEASTS, *not for being Beasts*, but *amiable MEN*; and to *detest* THE MEN, *not for being MEN*, but *detestable BEASTS*.

Whoever has been reading this *unnatural* Filth, let him turn for a moment to a *Spectator* of ADDISON, and observe the PHILANTHROPY of that *Classical Writer*; I may add the *superior* Purity of his *Diction* and his *Wit*.

It should seem then expedient if we value our *better* Principles, Ch. XV.
 nay, if we value our own *Happiness*, to withstand such dreary Sentiments. 'Twas the advice of a wise Man—*Say not Thou, what is the Cause, that THE FORMER DAYS WERE BETTER THAN THESE? For thou DOST NOT INQUIRE WISELY concerning this* *.

Things Present make Impressions amazingly superior to *things Remote*; so that in objects of every kind, we are easily mistaken as to their *comparative* Magnitude. Upon the Canvass of *the same* Picture a *near* Sparrow occupies the Space of a *distant* Eagle; a *near* Mole-hill, that of a *distant* Mountain. In the perpetration of *Crimes*, there are few persons, I believe, who would not be more shocked at *actually seeing* a *single* man *assassinated* (even taking away the Idea of *personal* danger) than they would be shocked *in reading* the *Massacre of Paris*.

THE *Wise Man*, just quoted, wishes to save us from these Errors. He has already informed us—*The thing, that HATH BEEN, is that, which SHALL BE; and THERE IS NO NEW THING under the Sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, SEE, THIS IS NEW? IT HATH BEEN ALREADY of old time, which WAS BEFORE US.*—He then subjoins the Cause of this *apparent* Novelty—*things past*, when they return, appear *new*, if they are *forgotten*; and *things present* will appear so, should they too be *forgotten*, when they return †.

THIS

* *Ecclesiastes*, Chap. vii. v. 10.

† See of the same *Ecclesiastes*, chap. the first, v. 9, and chap. the second, v. 16.

Part III.

THIS *Forgetfulness* of *what is similar in Events which return* (for in every returning Event *such Similarity exists*) is the *Forgetfulness* of a Mind uninstructed and weak; a Mind ignorant of that great, that PROVIDENTIAL CIRCULATION, which never ceases for a moment thro' every part of the Universe.

It is not like that *Forgetfulness*, which I once remember in a man of Letters, who, when at the conclusion of a long life, he found his Memory began to fail, said chearfully — “ *Now I shall have a pleasure, I could not have before; that of reading my OLD BOOKS, and finding them all NEW.*”

THERE was in this *Consolation* something *philosophical* and *pleasing*. And yet perhaps 'tis a *higher Philosophy* (could we attain it) NOT TO FORGET THE PAST; but IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE PAST TO VIEW THE FUTURE, so that we may say on the *worst* Prospects, with a becoming Resignation, what ÆNEAS said of old to THE CUMEAN PROPHETESS,

—— *Virgin, no Scenes of Ill*

To me or NEW, or UNEXPECTED rise;

I've seen 'em ALL; have seen, and long BEFORE

WITHIN MYSELF revolv'd 'em in my mind.*

IN such a Conduct, if well founded, there is not only *Fortitude*, but *Piety*: FORTITUDE, which never sinks, from a *conscious Integrity*;

* Æn. VI. 103, 104, 105.

grity; and PIETY, which never resists, by referring all to *the Divine Will*. Ch. XV.

BUT lest such Speculation, by carrying me *above* my subject, should expose a Writer upon *Criticism* to be himself *criticized*, I shall here conclude these PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.



they; and I have which more readily, by turning all to the Divine
 Will, and thus to the glory of God, than to the glory of man.
 But let this speculation, by which the soul is raised, should
 excite a more useful desire to be better acquainted with the
 conduct of these creatures, and to pursue it.



A P P E N D I X

A P P E N D I X

OF

DIFFERENT PIECES.

THE FIRST, containing an Account of THE ARABIC MANUSCRIPTS, belonging to THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY in *Spain*.

THE SECOND, containing an Account of THE MANUSCRIPTS OF LIVY in *the same Library*.

THE THIRD, containing an Account of THE MANUSCRIPTS OF CEBES, in THE LIBRARY OF THE KING OF FRANCE, at *Paris*.

THE FOURTH, containing some Account of LITERATURE IN RUSSIA, and of its *Progress* towards being CIVILIZED.

A P P E N D I X.

PART THE FIRST:

An Account of THE ARABIC MANUSCRIPTS, belonging to the
Escurial Library in Spain.

THIS Account is extracted from *two fair Folio Volumes*, to the
First of which Volumes the Title is conceived in the following
words:

BIBLIOTHECÆ ARABICO-HISPANÆ ESCURALIENSIS, *five Libro-*
rum omnium MSS, quos Arabicè ab auctōribus magnam partem Arabo-
Hispanis compositos Bibliotheca Cænobii Escuraliensis complectitur,

RECENSIO et EXPLANATIO:

Opera et Studio MICHAELIS CASIRI,

Syro-Maronitæ, Presbyteri, S. Theologiæ Doctōris, Regis a Bibliothecâ,
Linguarumque Orientalium Interpretatione;

CAROLI III. REGIS OPT. MAX. auctōritate atque auspiciis edita.

TOMUS PRIOR.

MATRITI.

Antonius Perez de Soto imprimebat

Anno MDCCLX.

THIS

THIS Catalogue is particularly valuable, because not only each Manuscript is enumerated, but its *Age* also and *Author* (when known) are given, together with large *Extracts* upon occasion, both in the *original Arabic*, and in *Latin*.

FROM THE FIRST VOLUME it appears that the ARABIANS cultivated every species of PHILOSOPHY and PHILOLOGY, as also (according to their Systems) JURISPRUDENCE and THEOLOGY.

THEY were peculiarly fond of POETRY, and paid great honours to those, whom they esteemed good Poets. Their *earliest* Writers were of *this* sort, some of whom (and those much admired) flourished many centuries before the time of *Mahomet*.

THE study of their Poets led them to the Art of CRITICISM, whence we find in the above Catalogue, not only a multitude of *Poems*, but many works upon *Composition*, *Metre*, &c.

WE find in the same Catalogue TRANSLATIONS of ARISTOTLE and PLATO, together with their *Lives*; as also Translations of their BEST GREEK COMMENTATORS, such as ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, PHILOPONUS, and others. We find also *Comments* of *their own*, and *original Pieces*, formed on the *Principles* of the above *Philosophers*.

THERE too may be found TRANSLATIONS of EUCLID, ARCHIMEDES, APOLLONIUS PERGÆUS, and the other ancient *Mathematicians*, together with THEIR GREEK COMMENTATORS, and many original Pieces of their own upon the *same Mathematical* subjects. In the ARITHMETICAL Part they are said to follow DIOPHANTUS, from whom they learnt that ALGEBRA, of which they are *erroneously* thought to have been the *Inventors*.

THERE we may find also the works of PTOLEMY *translated*, and
many

many original Treatises of *their own* upon the subject of ASTRONOMY.

It appears too, that they Studied with care the important Subject of AGRICULTURE. One large Work in particular is mentioned, composed by a *Spanish Arabian*, where every mode of Culture, and every species of Vegetable is treated; Pasture, Arable, Trees, Shrubs, Flowers, &c. By this work may be perceived (as *the Editor* well observes) *how much better* SPAIN was cultivated in *those* times; and that *some species of Vegetables* were *then* found there, which are *now* lost.

HERE are many Tracts on the various Parts of JURISPRUDENCE; some ancient Copies of the ALCORAN; innumerable COMMENTARIES on it; together with Books of PRAYER, Books of DEVOTION, SERMONS, &c.

AMONG their *Theological* Works, there are some upon the Principles of THE MYSTIC DIVINITY; and among their *Philosophical*, some upon the Subject of TALISMANS, DIVINATION and JUDICIAL ASTROLOGY.

THE FIRST VOLUME, of which we have been speaking, is elegantly printed, and has a *learned Preface* prefixed by the Editor, wherein he relates what he has done, together with the assistance he has received, as well from the Crown of *Spain* and its *Ministers*, as from *learned Men*.

HE mentions a *fatal Fire*, which happened at *the Escorial*, in the year 1670; when *above three thousand* of these valuable Manuscripts were destroyed. He has in this Volume given an account of *about fourteen hundred*.

THE

THE SECOND VOLUME of this valuable Work, which bears *the same* Title with *the First*, was published at *Madrid*, ten years after it, in the year 1770.

It contains chiefly THE ARABIAN CHRONOLOGERS, TRAVELLERS, and HISTORIANS; and, tho' *national* partiality may be sometimes suspected, yet, as these are accounts given us by the *Spanish Arabians themselves*, there are *many* Incidents preserved, which other writers could not know; Incidents respecting not only *the Successions*, and *the Characters* of the *Arabic-Spanish Princes*, but the *Country* and its *Productions*, together with *the Manners*, and *the Literature* of its *then* Inhabitants.

NOR are the Incidents in these Volumes *confined* to SPAIN only, many of them relate to *other* Countries, such as the Growth of SUGAR in *Egypt*; the Invention of PAPER there (of which material there are *Manuscripts* in the *Escorial Library* of the year 1180); the use of GUNPOWDER, carried not only to the beginning of the fourteenth Century, but even so far back (if we can believe it) as to the *seventh* Century; the Description of MECCA; the *Antiquity* of the ARABIC LANGUAGE, and the practice of THEIR MOST ANCIENT AUTHORS, *to write in verse*; their *Year*, *Months*, *Weeks*, and *Method of Computation*; their Love for POETRY, and RHETORIC, &c.

GREAT HEROES are recorded to have flourished among them, such as *Abdelrahmanus*, and *Abi Amer Almoapheri*.

Abdelrahmanus lived in the beginning of the tenth Century, and *Abi Amer Almoapheri* at its latter end. *The first*, having subdued innumerable Factions and Seditions, reigned at *Corduba* with reputation

tation for fifty years, famed for his love of *Letters*, and his upright administration of *Justice*. *The second*, undertaking the tuition of a young Prince (who was a minor, named *Hescham*) and having restored Peace to a turbid Kingdom, turned his Arms so successfully against its numerous Invaders, that he acquired the honourable name of *Almanzor*, that is, THE DEFENDER. (See Vol. 2d of this Catalogue, pages 37, 49, 50.)

Arabian Spain had too its MEN OF LETTERS, and those in great numbers; some, whose Fame was so extensive, that even *Christians* came to hear them from remote Regions of *Europe*. But this has been already mentioned, p. 502, 503, of these Inquiries.

PUBLIC LIBRARIES (not less than seventy) were established thro' the Country; and noble Benefactions they were to the Cause of Letters, at a time, when *Books*, by being *Manuscripts*, were so costly an Article, that few Scholars were equal to the expence of a Collection.

To the Subjects, already treated, were added the Lives of their FAMOUS WOMEN; that is, of *Women* who had been famous for their *Literature* and *Genius*.

'TIS somewhat strange, when we read these accounts, to hear it asserted, that *the Religion of these people* was hostile to *Literature*, and this Assertion founded on no better reason, than that *the Turks*, their successors, by being barbarous and ignorant, had little value for accomplishments, of which they knew nothing.

THESE SPANISH ARABIANS also, like their Ancestors in the East, were great HORSEMEN, and particularly fond of HORSES. Accounts are preserved both of HORSES and CAMELS; also of their

Coin; of the *two Races* of *Caliphs*, the *Ommiadae*, and the *Abbassadae*; of the first *Arabic Conqueror* of *Spain*, and the *Conditions* of *Toleration*, granted to the *Christians*, whom he had conquered.

IT farther appears from these *Arabic Works*, that not only *SUGAR*, but *SILK* was known and cultivated IN *SPAIN*. We read a beautiful Description of *GRENADA*, and its *Environs*; as also *EPITAPHS* of different kinds; some of them approaching to *Attic Elegance*.

WHEN that pleasing *Liquor COFFEE* was first introduced among them, a *Scruple* arose among *the Devout* (perhaps from feeling its *exhilarating Quality*), whether it was not *forbidden by the ALCORAN*, under the article of *WINE*. A *Council* of *Mahometan Divines* was held upon the occasion, and *the Council* luckily decreed for the *Legality of its use*. (See Vol. 2d of this Catalogue, p. 172, 173.)

THE *Concessions* made by *the Arabian Conqueror* of *Spain* to the *Gothic Prince*, whom he subdued, is a striking Picture of his *Lenity* and *TOLERATION*. He neither deposed the *Gothic Prince*, nor plundered *his People*, but, on payment of a moderate *Tribute*, stipulated not to deprive them either of their *Lives* or *Property*, and gave them also their *Churches*, and a *Toleration* for their *Religion*. See this curious Treaty, which was made about the year 712 of the *Christian Æra*, in the *second Vol. of this Catalogue*, p. 106.

WHEN the *Posterity* of these *Conquerors* came in their turn to be conquered, (an Event, which happened *many Centuries after-ward*) they did not experience that *INDULGENCE*, which had been granted by their *Forefathers*.

The

The conquered Moors (as they were *then* called) were expelled *by thousands*; or, if they ventured to *stay*, were exposed to the Carnage of a merciless *Inquisition*—

—*pueri, innuptæque puellæ,*

IMPOSITIQUE ROGIS JUVENES ante ora parentum,

It appears that many of these ARABIC-SPANISH PRINCES were men of *amiable Manners*, and great Encouragers both of *Arts* and *Letters*, while others, on the contrary, were *tyrannic, cruel, and sanguinary*.

THERE were usually *many Kingdoms* existing *at the same time*, and these on every occasion *embroiled one with another*; not to mention much *internal Sedition* in each particular state.

LIKE their *Eastern* Ancestors, they appear *not to have shared the smallest Sentiment of CIVIL LIBERTY*; the difference as to *good and bad Government* seeming to have been *wholly* derived, *according to them*, from the *Worth or Pravity* of the Prince, who governed. See p. 498 of these *Inquiries*.

THE Reader will observe, that the Pages *referring to Facts*, in the *two Historical Volumes* of these Manuscripts, are *but seldom* given, because whoever possesses those Volumes (and without them any Reference would be useless) may *easily find* every Fact, by referring to the copious and useful *Index*, subjoined to the *second* Volume, which *Index* goes to the *whole Work*.

A P P E N D I X.

PART THE SECOND:

Concerning the Manuscripts of LIVY, in the ESCURIAL LIBRARY.

IT having been often asserted, that AN INTIRE AND COMPLETE COPY OF LIVY was extant in THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY, I requested my Son, in the year 1771 (he being at that time Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of *Madrid*), to inquire for me, *what Manuscripts of that Author were there to be found.*

HE procured me the following accurate Detail from a learned Ecclesiastic, DON JUAN DE PELLEGEROS, Canon of *Lerma*, employed by Monsr. DE SANTANDER, his Catholic Majesty's Librarian, to inspect for this purpose the Manuscripts of that valuable Library.

THE Detail was in *Spanish*, of which the following is a Translation.

AMONG the MSS. of THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY are the following Works of T. LIVY.

1st. THREE LARGE VOLUMES, which contain *so many Decads, the 1st, 3d, and 4th* (one *Decad* in each *Volume*) curiously written
on

on Parchment, or fine Vellum, by *Pedro de Middleburgh*, or of *Zeeland* (as he styles himself).

The Books are truly magnificent, and in the Title and Initials curiously illuminated. They bear *the Arms* of the House of *Borgia*, with a *Cardinal's Cap*, whence it appears that they belonged either to Pope *Callixtus the third*, or to *Alexander the sixth*, when *Cardinals*.

2d. TWO OTHER VOLUMES, written by the same Hand, one of *the first Decad*, the other of *the third*; of the same size, and beauty, as the former. Both have the same *Arms*, and in the last is a Note, which recites: *This Book belongs to D. Juan de Fonseca, Bishop of Burgos*.

3d. ANOTHER VOLUME OF THE SAME SIZE, and something *more ancient*, than the former (being of the beginning of the fifteenth Century) containing *the third Decad entire*. This is also well written on Parchment, tho' not so valuable as the former.

4th. ANOTHER OF THE FIRST DECAD, *finely written* on Vellum. At the end is written as follows—*Ex centum voluminibus, quæ ego indies vitæ meæ magnis laboribus hætenus scripsisse memini, hos duos Titi Livii libros Anno Dni. 1441. Ego Joānes Andreas de Colonia feliciter, gratia Dei, absolvi*—and at the end of each book—*Emendavi Nicomachus Fabianus*.

IN the last leaf of this Book is a *Fragment* either of *Livy himself*, or of some *Pen, capable of imitating him*. It fills the whole leaf, and the Writer says, it was in the Copy, from which he transcribed.

It

It appears to be a Fragment of the latter times of *the second Punic War*.

5th. ANOTHER LARGE VOLUME in Parchment, well written, of the same Century, viz. the fifteenth, containing *three Decads*. 1. *De Urbis initus*. 2. *De Bello Punico*. 3. *De Bello Macedonico*. In this *last Decad* is wanting a part of the Book. *This Volume is much esteemed*, being full of *Notes and various Readings*, in the hand of *Hieronimo Zunita*, its former possessor.

6th. ANOTHER VERY VALUABLE VOLUME, containing *the first Decad*, equal to the former in the elegance of its Writing and Ornaments. This also belonged to *Hieronimo Zunita*; the age the same.

7th. LASTLY, there is ANOTHER OF THE FIRST DECAD also, written on Paper, at the beginning of the fifteenth Century. This contains nothing remarkable.

IN all, THERE ARE TEN VOLUMES, and ALL NEARLY OF THE SAME AGE.

HERE ends *the Account of the ESCURIAL MANUSCRIPTS*, given us by this *learned Spaniard*, in which Manuscripts we see *there appears no part of LIVY, but what was printed in the early Editions*.

THE *other Parts* of this Author, which *Parts none of the Manuscripts here recited* give us, were *discovered and printed afterwards*.

As to *the Fragment* mentioned in the fourth article, (all of which Fragment is there transcribed) it has, *tho' genuine*, no peculiar
rarity,

rarity, as it is to be found in all the latter printed Editions. See particularly in Crevier's Edition of Livy, Paris, 1736, Tome 2d, pages 716, 717, 718, beginning with the words *Raro simul hominibus*, and ending with the words *increpatis risum esse*, which is the whole Extent of the Fragment here exhibited.

FROM this Detail it is evident, that NO INTIRE COPY OF LIVY IS EXTANT IN THE ESCURIAL LIBRARY.

A P P E N D I X.

PART THE THIRD:

GREEK MANUSCRIPTS OF CEBES, *in* THE LIBRARY OF THE KING
OF FRANCE.

THE PICTURE OF CEBES, one of the most elegant *Moral Allegories* of *Grecian* Antiquity, is so far connected with the *middle Age*, that the ingenious *Arabians* of that time thought it worth translating into ARABIC.

IT was also translated from *Greek* into *Latin* by *Ludovicus Odaxius*, a learned *Italian*, soon after *Greek* Literature revived there, and was published in the year 1497.

AFTER this it was often printed, sometimes *in Greek alone*, sometimes *accompanied* with more modern *Latin* Versions. But the Misfortune was, that the *Greek* Manuscripts, from which the *Editors* printed, (that of *Odaxius* alone excepted) were all of them defective in their *End* or *Conclusion*. And hence it followed that *this Work* for *many* years was published, Edition after Edition, *in this defective manner*.

HAD its *End* been lost, we might have lamented it, as we lament *other* losses of the same kind. But in the present case, to the shame
of

of Editors, we have THE END PRESERVED, and that not only in the *Arabic Paraphrase*, and the old *Latin Translation of Odaxius*; but, what is more, even in the ORIGINAL TEXT, as it stands in two excellent Manuscripts of the King of France's Library.

FROM these MSS. it was published in a neat 12mo. Edition of *Cebes*, by *James Gronovius*, in the year 1689; and after him by the diligent and accurate *Fabricius*, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, Tom. I. p. 834, 835; and, after *Fabricius*, in a small octavo Edition, by *Thomas Johnson*, A.M. printed at *London*, in the year 1720.

WHOEVER reads the Conclusion of this Treatise will find sufficient internal Evidence to convince him of its Authenticity, both from the purity of the Language, and the Truth, as well as Connection of the Sentiment.

HOWEVER, the Manuscript authority resting on nothing better than the perplexed account of that most obscure and affected writer, *James Gronovius*, I procured a search to be made in the Royal Library at Paris, if such Manuscripts were there to be found.

UPON Inspection of no less than FOUR MANUSCRIPTS OF CEBES, preserved in that valuable Library, No. 858, 2992, 1001, 1774, it appeared that in THE SECOND, and in THE THIRD, THE END OF CEBES WAS PERFECT and INTIRE, after the manner in which it stands in the printed Editions above mentioned.

THE End of this short Essay is to prove, that the Genuineness of the Conclusion thus restored does not rest merely on such authority, as that of *James Gronovius*, (for *Fabricius* and *Johnson* only follow Him) but on the authority of the best Manuscripts, actually inspected for the purpose.

A P P E N D I X.

PART THE FOURTH:

*Some Account of LITERATURE IN RUSSIA, and of its Progress
towards being CIVILIZED.*

THE vast Empire of RUSSIA, extending far into *the North*, both in *Europe* and *Asia*, 'tis no wonder that, in *such a Country*, its *Inhabitants* should have remained so long *uncivilized*. For *Culture of the finer Arts* it is necessary there should be *comfortable Leisure*. But how could such *Leisure* be found in a Country, where every one had enough to do, to support his family, and to resist the Rigour of an uncomfortable Climate? Besides this, to make *the finer Arts flourish*, there must be *Imagination*; and *Imagination* must be enlivened by the *Contemplation of pleasing Objects*; and that *Contemplation* must be performed in a manner *easy to the Contemplator*. Now, who can contemplate with ease, where the Thermometer is often many degrees below *the freezing point*? Or what object can he find *worth contemplating* for those many long months, when all the Water is Ice, and all the Land covered with Snow?

IF then the Difficulties were so great, how great must have been the *Praise* of those *Princes* and Legislators, who dared attempt to *polish mankind* in so unpromising a Region, and who have been able, by their *perseverance*, in some degree to accomplish it?

THOSE, who on this occasion bestow the highest praises upon PETER THE GREAT, praise him, without doubt, as he justly deserves. But if they would refer the *Beginning* of this work to *Him*, and much more its *Completion*, they are certainly under a mistake.

As long ago as the time of our *Edward the 6th*, IVAN BASILOWITZ adopted *Principles of Commerce*, and granted peculiar privileges to the *English*, on their discovery of a *Navigation to Archangel*.

A SAD scene of sanguinary Confusion followed from this period to the year 1612, when a Deliverer arose, Prince PAJANKY. He, by unparalleled fortitude, having routed all the Tyrants and Impostors of the time, was by the *Bojars* or *Magnates* unanimously elected *Czar*. But this Honor He, with a most disinterested magnanimity, declined *for himself*, and pointed out to them MICHAEL FEDOROWITZ, of the house of *Romanoff*, and by his mother's side descended from *the ancient Czars*.

FROM THIS PERIOD we may date the first appearances of a *real Civilizing*, and a *Developement* of the Wealth and Power of *the Russian Empire*. MICHAEL reigned thirty-three years. By his wisdom, and the mildness of his character, he restored Ease and Tranquillity to subjects, who had been long deprived of those inestimable Blessings—he encouraged them to *Industry*, and gave them an example of the most *laudable* behaviour.

HIS son ALEXIUS MICHAELOWITZ was superior to his Father in the Art of *Governing* and found *Politics*. He promoted *Agriculture*; introduced into his Empire ARTS AND SCIENCES, of which he was himself a lover; published a *Code of Laws*, still used in the Administration of Justice; and greatly improved *his Army*, by mending its discipline. This he effected chiefly by the help of *Strangers*, most of whom were *Scotch*. *Lesley*, *Gordon*, and *Ker*, are the Names of Families still *existing* in this Country.

THEODORE or FEDOR succeeded his Father in 1677. He was of a *gentle Disposition*, and weak Constitution; fond of Pomp and Magnificence, and in satisfying this passion *contributed to polish his subjects* by the introduction of *foreign Manufactures*, and *Articles of Elegance*, which they soon began to adopt and imitate. His delight was in *Horses*, and he did his country a real service in the beginning and establishing of those fine breeds of them in the *Ukraine*, and elsewhere. He reigned seven years, and having on his death-bed called his *Bojars* round him, in the presence of his Brother and Sister, IVAN and SOPHIA, and of his half Brother PETER, said to them; “*Hear my last sentiments; they are dictated*”
 “*by my love for the state, and by my affection for my people—the*”
 “*BODILY Infirmities of IVAN necessarily must affect his MENTAL*”
 “*Faculties—he is INCAPABLE of ruling a Dominion like that of*”
 “*RUSSIA—he cannot take it amiss, if I recommend to you to set him*”
 “*aside, and to let your approbation fall on PETER, who to A ROBUST*”
 “*CONSTITUTION joins great STRENGTH OF MIND, and marks of*”
 “*A SUPERIOR UNDERSTANDING.*”

Theodore dying in 1682, PETER became *Emperor*, and his brother IVAN remained contented. But SOPHIA, *Ivan's sister*, a Woman of great Ambition, could not bring herself to submit.

THE

THE Troubles, which ensued; the imminent Dangers, which PETER escaped; his Abolition of that *turbulent* and *seditionous* Sol-diery, called *the Strelitz*; the Confinement of his half-sister Sophia to a Monastery; all these were important Events, which left PETER in the year 1689 with no other competitor, than the mild and easy IVAN; who, dying not many years after, left him SOLE MONARCH OF ALL THE RUSSIAS.

THE Acts at home and abroad, in Peace and in War, of *this stupendous and elevated Genius*, are too well known to be repeated by me. PETER adorned his Country with *Arts*, and raised its Glory by *Arms*; he created a *respectable Marine*; founded *St. Petersburg*, a new Capital, and that from the very ground; rendering it withal one of *the first Cities in Europe* for Beauty and Elegance.

To encourage Letters he formed ACADEMIES, and invited foreign Professors not only to PETERSBURGH (his *new City*) but to his *ancient Capital Moscow*; at both which places *these Professors* were maintained with *liberal Pensions*.

As a few *Specimens of Literature* from both these Cities have recently come to my hand, I shall endeavour to enumerate them, as I think it relative to my subject.

1. PLUTARCHUS *περὶ Δυσωπίας, καὶ περὶ Τύχης* — Gr. Lat. *cum animadversionibus Reiskii et alior.* — suas adjecit Christianus Fridericus Matthæi. Typis Universitatis Mosquensis, an. 1777, 8vo.

2. PLUTARCHI *libellus de Superstitione, et Demosthenis Oratio funebris*, Gr. Lat. *cum notis integris Reiskii et alior.* — suas adjecit Christ.

Christ. Frider. Matthæi—*Typis Cæsareæ Mosquensis Universitatis*, an. 1778, 8vo.

3. *LECTIONES MOSQUENSES*, in two Volumes, 8vo. bound together, and printed at *Leipfic*, an. 1779—they contain various Readings in different Authors, and some entire pieces, all in *Greek*, collected from the Libraries of *Moscow*, and published by the same learned Editor.

4. *ISOCRATIS, DEMETRII Cyd. et MICHAEL GLYCE aliquot Epistolæ, nec non DION. CHRYSOSTOMI Oratio*—*Græc.*—*Typis Universitatis Cæsareæ Mosquensis*—8vo.—By the same learned Editor.

5. *GLOSSARIA GRÆCA MINORA, et alia Anecdota Græca*—a Work, consisting of two Parts, contained under one Volume, in a thin Quarto, by the same able Professor, printed at *Moscow* by the University Types, in the years 1774 and 1775. A Catalogue of the several pieces in both Parts is subjoined to the end of the second Part—Among the Pieces in the first Part are, *Excerpta ex Grammaticâ Niceph. Gregoræ; ex Glossario Cyrilli Alexandrini; Glossarium in Epistolas Pauli; Nomina Mensium*;—those of the 2d Part are chiefly Theological.

6. *NOTITIA CODICUM MANUSCRIPTORUM GRÆCORUM BIBLIOTHECARUM MOSQUENSIVM, cum variis Anecdotis, Tabulis Æneis, Indicibus locupletissimis*—edidit *Christ. Fridericus Matthæi*—*Mosquæ, Typis Universitatis*, an. 1776.

This Publication, on a large Folio Paper, is as yet incomplete,
only

only sixty Pages being printed off. It ends, *Partis primæ Sectionis primæ Finis.*

7. AN ODE to the PRESENT EMPRESS, CATHARINE, in *ancient Greek and Russian.*

8. AN ODE on the Birth-day of CONSTANTINE, second son to the Grand Duke, in *ancient Greek and Russian*—printed at *Peterburgh*, and as we learn from the Title, ἐν τῇ Ἀυτοκρατορικῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ τῶν Ἐπιστημῶν, in the *Imperial Academy of Sciences.*

9. AN ODE TO PRINCE POTESKIN, *ancient Greek and Russian*, and printed (as before) an. 1780.

10. AN ODE, consisting of *Strophe, Antistrophe, and Epode*, *ancient Greek and Russian*, made in 1779, in honour of THE EMPRESS, THE GREAT DUKE and DUCHESS, and ALEXANDER and CONSTANTINE, their two Sons, Grandsons to the Empress.

THIS Ode was sung in the *Original Greek* by a large number of *Voices*, before a numerous and splendid Court in one of the *Imperial Palaces.*

As I have a Copy of this *Music*, I cannot omit observing, that it is a genuine Exemplar of the *Ancient ANTIPHONA*, so well known to the Church in very remote ages. On this Plan two complete Choirs (each consisting of Trebles, Counters, Tenors, and Bases) sing against each other, and reciprocally answer; then unite all of them; then separate again, returning to the alternate Response, till the Whole at length concludes in one general Chorus. The Music of

of this Ode may be called *purely Vocal*, having no other accompaniment but that of an Organ.

The Composer was no less a man than the celebrated PAESIELLO, so well known at present, and so much admired, both in Italy and elsewhere, for Music of a very different Character, I mean his truly natural, and pleasing *Burlettas*.

THOSE, who are curious to know more of *this Species of Music*, may consult the valuable *Glossary* of SPELMAN, under the word ANTIPHONA, and the ingenious *Musical Dictionary* of ROUSSEAU, under the Word ANTIENNE.

11. A SHORT Copy of *Greek Elegiac Verses*, printed at *Peterburgh*, in the year 1780, and addrest to Prince POTEKIN, with this singular Title,

Ἐπίγραμμα ἐπὶ τῆς παμφαῦς καὶ χαρμῶδους ΓΟΡΓΕΙΟΦΟΡΙΑΣ, τῆς κοινοτέρως ΜΑΣΚΑΡΑΔΟΣ καλεμένης, ἣν κ. τ. λ.

THUS Englished — A Poem, on the splendid and delightful FESTIVITY, WHERE THEY WEAR GORGONIAN VISORS; more commonly called A MASQUERADE; which Prince POTEKIN celebrated, &c. &c.

A better Word to denote A MASQUERADE could hardly have been invented, than the Word here employed, Γοργειοφόρια. In attempting to translate it, that I might express ONE Word, I have been compelled to use many.

12. A TRANSLATION of *Virgil's Georgics* from the *Latin Hexameters* into GREEK HEXAMETERS, by the celebrated EUGENIUS, famous

mous for his Treatise of *Logic*, published a few years since in *ancient Greek* at *Leipfic*. He was made an Archbishop, but chose to resign his dignity. He is now carrying on *this Translation* under the protection of *Prince Potemkin*, but has as yet gone no farther, than to the end of the *First Georgic*.

THE Work is printed on a large Folio Paper, having the *Original* on one side, and the *Translation* on the other. Copious Notes in *Greek* are at the bottom of the several Pages.

TAKE a short Specimen of the Performance.

*Continuo, ventis surgentibus, aut freta ponti
Incipiunt agitata tumescere, et aridus altis
Montibus audiri fragor; aut resonantia longe
Littora misceri, et nemorum increbrescere murmur.* Geor. I. 356.

Ἀυτίκα, ἐγρομένων ἀνέμων, πορθμοῖς ἐπὶ πόντῳ

Ἄλς τε σαλευομένη οἰδαίνει, καὶ κορυφαὶ δὲ

Ουρεὸς ἄκραι τραχὺ βοᾷσιν· ἀτὰρ μακρόθεν γε

Ἀκλαὶ τ' εἰνάλοισι ῥὰ βρέμονται, καὶ αἰγιαλοὶ τε

Σμερδαλέον πνοιῇσι δὲ μυκάει' αἶα καὶ ὦλη.

OF these various printed Works, the first six were sent me by the learned Scholar above mentioned, *Christianus Fridericus Matthæi*, from *Moscow*; the last six I had the honour to receive from *Prince Potemkin* at *Petersburgh*.

BESIDES the Printed Books, the learned Professor at *Moscow* sent me a curious *Latin Narrative* in *Manuscript*.

IN it he gives an account of a fine *Manuscript* of *STRABO*, belonging to the *Ecclesiastical Library* at *Moscow*.—He informs me, this

MS. is in *Folio*; contains 427 Leaves; is beautifully written by one, whom he calls a learned and diligent scribe, at the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth Century; and came, as appears by a memorandum in the Manuscript, from *the celebrated Greek Monastery at Mount Athos*.

HE adds (which is worth attention) that almost all the *Greek Manuscripts*, which are now preserved at *Moscow*, were originally brought *thither* from this *Monastery*; and that, in the last Century, by order of *the Emperor Alexius Michaelowitz*, and *the Patriarch Nico*, by means of the *Monk Arsenius*. So early in this Country did a Gleam of Literature shew itself.

HE strongly *denies* the Fact, that there is any other MS. of STRABO besides this either at *Moscow*, or at *Petersburgh*.

OF the *present MS.* he has been so kind as to send me *COLLATIONS*, taken from the *first* and *second Book*.

AFTER this he mentions THE UNPUBLISHED HYMN OF HOMER UPON CERES, and THE FRAGMENT of another by the same Poet UPON BACCHUS; both of which, since I heard from him, have been published by RUNKENIUS at *Leyden*, to whom *my Correspondent* had sent them from *the Moscowan Library*.

HE has been generous enough to send me Copies of all the Books he has published, for which valuable Donation I take this public opportunity of making my grateful acknowledgments.

WITH regard to *all the Publications* here mentioned, it is to be observed, that those from PETERSBURGH are said to be printed in *the Imperial Academy of Sciences*; those from Moscow, by *the Types of the Imperial University*; each place by *its stile* indicating its *Establishment*.

IN justice TO MY SON, *his Majesty's Minister to the Court of Russia*, it is incumbent upon me to say, that all this Information, and all these Literary Treasures have been procured for me by *his* Help, and thro' *his* Interest.

I MUST not conclude without observing (tho' perhaps it may be a *Repetition*) that the Efforts to CIVILIZE this country *did not begin from PETER THE GREAT*, but were *much older*. A small Glimmering, like the first Day-break, was seen under Czar IVAN, in the middle of the *sixteenth Century*.

THIS Dawn of CIVILIZING became more conspicuous *a Century afterwards*, under Czar ALEXIUS MICHAELOWITZ; of whom, as well as of his son THEODORE or FÆDOR we have spoken already.

BUT under THE GREAT PETER it burst forth, with all the splendor of a Rising Sun, and (if I may be permitted to continue my Metaphor) has continued ever since to ascend towards its Meridian.

MORE than fifty years have past since the Death of PETER; during which period, with very little exception, *this vast Empire has been governed by FEMALE SOVEREIGNS ONLY*. All of them have pursued more or less the Plan of their great Predecessor, and none of them more, than THE ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCESS, who *now* reigns.

AND so much for LITERATURE IN RUSSIA, and for ITS PROGRESS TOWARDS BEING CIVILIZED.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IT was proposed, as mentioned in p. 299 of this Work, to have joined a few Notes to the Pieces contained in the preceding Appendix; but, the Work growing larger than was expected, the Notes, as not being essentially Parts of it, have been omitted.

One Omission however we beg to supply, because it has happened thro Inadvertence. Besides the Arabic Translations from the Greek, mentioned in the Appendix, Part the First, there are also Translations of HIPPOCRATES GALEN, and the old Greek Physicians, whom the Arabians, as they translated, illustrated with Comments, and upon whose Doctrines they formed many Compositions of their own, having been remarkably famous for their Study and Knowledge of MEDICINE.

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
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